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CHAPTER III

The Mobilization of Discontent

Mobilization means bringing the "affected group into action" (Smelser, 1963: 17). It is the process whereby people are prepared for active service for a cause which they see as consonant with their own interests. The efforts involved in mobilization are familiar to all who have experienced the rigors of "getting out the vote" at election time. Mobilization is in this sense the opposite of apathy or inaction. High mobilization is rare, most people remaining politically inert even at the height of social disturbances. And yet it takes only a small change in the level of mobilization of a discontented group to effect major social changes. The accomplishment of mobilization is thus an important step in the formation of social protest. It is also important as a formative stage in its own right because it brings qualitative changes in the interaction of those people affected which significantly influence the nature of the resulting protest group. It is at this stage that through a process of interaction that could not be predicted from antecedent conditions, properties of leadership, commitment, and group structure emerge to shape the expression of discontent.

To illuminate the process of mobilization a distinction must be made between social discontent and social unrest: "social unrest signifies an aroused readiness to act against the prevailing social order (or some portion of it) whereas mere social discontent implies an acceptance of the social order, and hence a passive readiness to abide by it despite its harshness and unfairness" (Blumer, 1971:7). In the well-known phrase of the civil-rights

movement, to move from an attitude to act one must "get tired of being sick and tired." * Social discontent, which provides only the potential for action, must undergo the qualitative transformation to social unrest before it can generate social movements.† Whether or not discontent leads to social unrest and further to the formation of a social movement is determined by a number of factors (such as the intensity of the deprivation, the presence of agitators and ideologies, the reactions of the authorities, the alternate responses available, and so on), each of which will have to be given some attention in this chapter.

Surprisingly, the whole problem of mobilization is a relatively neglected one in the literature on social movements. There is no obvious reason why this should be so, but one probable factor is the emphasis commonly placed on antecedent conditions in the attempt to account for social movements as outcomes or products. This focus is based on the assumption that circumstances establish predispositions in people who are in turn drawn toward certain outcomes—more specifically, that structural conditions "push" people into protest groups. But social movements are not a simple knee-jerk response to social conditions. For instance, to simply speak of colonial rule as "giving rise" to protest and rebellion is to see resistance as just a primitive response to an undifferentiated stimulus. In actual fact, the response to colonial domination has taken many forms, varying according to the nature of the foreign intrusion (its power, its extensiveness, its political and economic character); the native perception of the potency of the challenge; the structure of the native society; the political and religious capabilities of the native leaders; and so on. The outcome is, then, never determined finally by remote variables, but is always influenced by processes of interaction which reflect the coming-into-being of the movement. The same can be said about the process whereby individuals become joined in a common cause. Joining a social movement is not purely the result of predispositions, but entails the construction of a new identity in which the decision to commit oneself is negotiated through a series of encounters and interactions. Being willing, being able, being encouraged, experimenting, and being la-

* Gay liberationists had a similar saying: "We're tired of being scared" (Teal, 1971:47).

† "A significant social movement becomes possible when there is a revision in the manner in which a substantial group of people look at some misfortune, seeing it no longer as a misfortune warranting charitable consideration but as an injustice which is intolerable in society" (Turner, 1969:391).

beled are all important ingredients in the process of becoming a member. The phenomenon of mobilization is, consequently, an important emergent property of the process of interaction whereby social movements come into being.

The first part of this chapter on mobilization will discuss ideologies. It is based on the premise that the major difference between discontent and unrest lies in the different interpretations given to the same objective situation and upon the generalized observation that the chief source of these reinterpretations is ideologies. The step from impulse to act is managed through the interpretation of discontents in a way which makes social activism the most attractive way out. The shift from discontent to unrest is effected by a withdrawal of legitimacy from present social arrangements and the legitimation of noninstitutionalized solutions to social and personal problems. However, although the acceptance of ideologies is a response to preexisting discontents, those discontents are also in part a reflection of preexisting ideological beliefs. There is always, therefore, a complex process of interaction between belief and action undergirding the formation of social protest groups. On the one hand, the experience of social tensions has the effect of sensitizing individuals to issues and ideas about which formerly they had been apathetic or ignorant. They consequently become open to influences which would previously have passed them by and readier to accept somewhat ill-substantiated accounts of events as well as more unorthodox solutions to their problems. Only ideologies which cater to these new sensitivities prove convincing. On the other hand, ideologies undoubtedly play a large part in educating politically and religiously ignorant populations, in heightening the individual's awareness of his circumstances, especially relative to other people or other times, and in acquainting him with the working of political or supernatural processes. An ideology may well be injected therefore into a relatively stable situation and create social unrest by virtue of its consciousness-raising effects. The ideology must be the first consideration because of the role it plays in crystallizing and intensifying discontent to a degree that facilitates mobilization for action.

Ideology is the generic name given to those beliefs which mobilize people into action in social movements. An ideology is a set of beliefs about the social world and how it operates, containing statements about the rightness of certain social arrangements and what action would be undertaken in the light of those statements. An ideology is both a cognitive map

of sets of expectations and a scale of values in which standards and imperatives are proclaimed. Ideology thus serves both as a clue to understanding and as a guide to action, developing in the mind of its adherents an image of the process by which desired changes can best be achieved. A great deal is owed to Marx for introducing the concept of ideology into the social sciences. As a result of his work much more is known about the use of ideas and belief systems as a weapon in the class struggle. Recently, however, some attempts have been made to reconceptualize ideology in such a way that although the notion of the use of ideas as political weapons is preserved, the concept is not so closely tied to theories of class conflict. The contemporary version holds that ideology is more of a catharsis for anxieties created by social tensions, and functions as a therapeutic as well as a mobilizing agent to combat these tensions.

In the interest theory, ideological pronouncements are seen against a background of a universal struggle for advantage; in the strain theory, against the background of a chronic struggle to correct socio-psychological disequilibrium. In one, men pursue power; in the other they flee anxiety (Geertz, 1964:52).

There are advantages to holding the narrower Marxist view. It grounds ideology firmly in the social structure through its focus on the economic motivations of people who embrace the ideology. It also spotlights the use of ideas as weapons in the struggle between social groups, drawing attention to, for instance, the way in which the bourgeoisie used Christian teachings and the established church in its political struggle against the new industrial working class during the nineteenth century. But, as Geertz (1964:53) points out, this view, which emphasizes the role of ideology in the ceaseless struggle for power, leads to a neglect of its broader and less dramatic functions. In other words, it restricts the applicability of the concept to large-scale, class-based movements, which do not exhaust the forms which social movements can take.

The battle field image of a society as a clash of interests thinly disguised as a clash of principles turns attention away from the role that ideologies play in defining (or obscuring) social categories, stabilizing (or upsetting) social expectations, maintaining (or undermining) social norms, strengthening (or weakening) social consensus, relieving (or exacerbating) social tensions.

The advantage of the wider perspective is that it brings into much clearer view the relation between objective structures of opportunities and the

states of personal tension created by them. Ideology is seen in this view as a "symbolic outlet" for these personal tensions.

It is loss of orientation that most directly gives rise to ideological activity, an inability, for lack of usable models, to comprehend the universe of civic rights and responsibilities in which one finds oneself located. . . . It is a confluence of sociopsychological strain and an absence of cultural sources by means of which to make (political, moral or economic) sense of that strain, each exacerbating the other, that sets the stage for the rise of systematic . . . ideologies. . . . Whatever else ideologies may be—projections of unacknowledged fears, disguises for ulterior motives, phatic expressions of group solidarity—they are, most distinctively, maps of problematic social reality and matrices for the creation of collective conscience (1964:64).

In other words, ideologies support and create conduct which has adaptive consequences for their adherents.

In the context of this broader concept of ideology, the inadequacy of the Marxist approach becomes apparent, for the understanding of, for example, religious movements (here the crude employment of a theory of reflection makes the analysis of allusion and metaphor all too easy) because it is too narrowly tied to assumptions of self-interest and hypocrisy. Considering ideologies simply as a distortion of objective truths which are created by the loss of objectivity due to self-interested involvement is overly constricting and presumptuous. Ideologies have a much broader "nomic function" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:91) of putting everything in its place. Although they may still be tied to specific carrier groups, their ability to impart meaning may be considered independent of any economic interest that group may have. Thus, for social movements, the utopian as well as the ideological aspects of beliefs and ideas must be examined (Mannheim, 1936). Utopias and ideologies richly express not only the anxieties and fears of people but their hopes and wishes as well.

Although ideologies display a tremendous variety, not only substantively (some being economic, others political, some being right-wing, others left-wing) but also categorically (some being reformative, others being revolutionary), they do demonstrate certain uniformities in their essential features.

Ideology states what must be done. In other words, there is an obligation to accept its tenets as a basis of action. To endorse an ideology is to be committed to a way of life. While the scientific or philosophic attitude is one of disinterested speculation, inherent in ideology is a demand for involvement. Ideologies are ideas that move men and women to action. There-

fore a decision to act is part of the process of conversion to an ideological position.

Ideology is total belief. An ideology provides the means for integrating social events and group goals in an all-embracing explanatory scheme. A program, such as a party manifesto, is not by itself an ideology because it confines itself to specific proposals on political and economic issues. A group which takes the abolition of capital punishment as its aim is not ideologically oriented unless this goal is embedded in, for instance, a set of religious or political beliefs which say something about the role of the abolition of executions in bringing about a more perfect society. Admittedly, ideologies differ in the extent to which all the ramifications of their beliefs are spelled out. In some cases every event, however marginal, can be incorporated into the belief system. In others, the relation of many social situations and events to the central tenets of the ideology is obscure. Nevertheless, the distinctive mark of the ideologist remains; for him, conversion is potentially far more total and extensive than for someone who merely supports a piecemeal program.

Ideology means consistency. The more radical the ideology, the more it seeks "to impose a unified, internally consistent scheme of interpretation upon a world of heterogeneous meanings . . ." (Bittner, 1963:939). The ideologist is concerned more than anything else with purity. He is above all interested in a meaningful rather than a logical expression of order. Ideologies are typically shaped by an overarching principle such as "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." Consistency with this principle is the governing criterion for the acceptance or rejection of an idea or event. The appeal of the ideology therefore lies not in its rational validity but in the conviction with which the heterogeneous events of the social world are integrated. Once an ideology has been fully absorbed there is no such thing as counterevidence. For some, the conflict between Black and white in America is largely an ideological one in which each side establishes and builds upon ideologically colored stereotypes of the other and uses it to interpret their actions. From this standpoint, "if a civil-rights bill is not passed, this proves the viciousness of the whites refusing to recognize Negro rights. If the same bill is passed, it merely proves the duplicity of the whites in trying to hide their viciousness" (Howard 1971:457). Ideology has much of the appeal of dogma, then, in providing certitude in an uncertain world. And yet an ideology cannot maintain its

credibility on apparent consistency alone. To achieve lasting support, the ideology must be seen to work. It must provide practical solutions to the problems of everyday life.

Ideology is associated with collectivity. Ideologies are formulated for the purposes of, and reflect the particular positions of, social groups. A collectivity which shares certain objective characteristics in common thus becomes a social movement through the common adoption of an ideology, while a belief becomes an ideology through the endorsement of a collectivity. This is not to say that beliefs are created *de novo* by social groups to suit their own purposes. In a sense, potential themes of protest are ever-present in society, laying dormant until they strike a responsive chord. When dormant they are kept alive by "carrier" groups such as intellectual coteries or religious enclaves. When the times and the needs of social groups are in tune, these themes are resuscitated and modified to suit the occasion. The Christian idea of the millennium is perhaps the most famous example, but many other cultures possess enduring themes in which the return of the culture hero is expressed. The notion of a Jewish conspiracy has provided the fuel for many mass movements (Cohn, 1967).*

Although these descriptive features give some idea of the characteristics which ideologies share, ideologies may also be treated on a more analytical level by separately considering their structural elements. Ideological *structures* consist of three parts, each of which is closely related to the others: a diagnosis of present problems; a solution to these problems and a vision of a better world; and a rationale for the movement.

The Diagnosis—What Is Wrong

The *diagnosis* comprises that part of the belief in which the source of discontent is located and (sometimes) the agents responsible are identified. This part of the ideology is easily recognizable. Many social movements base their appeal more on their critique of society than upon any positive program of reform they have (student movements are a well-known example). However, the diagnosis does not consist simply of a fault-finding exer-

* Ideas may also be "imposed" from outside, of course. Societies attempting to revitalize themselves from a state of malaise are frequently open to outside influences or "extra-Processual events" (Fernandez, 1970:428).

cise; a radical ideological critique of society involves a wholesale reinterpretation of the meaning of events. Things are not as they seem. These beliefs, especially when they entail a reconsideration of values, might actually mean that the individual's whole social world is reconstructed. A whole new interpretation of the sources of man's ills is given. The world may be seen, for example, as a vast arena for the Manichean battle between the forces of good and the forces of evil in which the individual has been playing an unwitting part.

The diagnostic component of the ideology is the consciousness-raising part. Here is found a new image of the social world expressed in stark and forceful symbols which knives through the old, dull apathy of discontent. The French student militants taking part in the May 1968 rebellion called this process *proletarianization*, describing a situation in which students and workers not only were without the opportunity for self-determination but were made conscious of the fact (Willener, 1970:137). By accepting this part of the ideology "the convert's view of the world not only becomes more compatible with his personal experiences; it also becomes more congenial" (Toch, 1966:125-126). The impetus to seek out and accept such beliefs comes from the experience of social stress of the kind described in the previous chapter. Changing social circumstances thus open the way for new ideologies. However, new ideas and new self-conceptions can help bring the hope of change where none existed before. It is always a distortion, therefore, to speak of the ideologue acting as a diagnostician making statements about uncertain illnesses. Beliefs are part of the situation from the outset and are therefore part of the original source of discontent. The ideologue merely plays upon some or all of these beliefs. Traditional notions of right and justice become infused with new ideas.

Still, ideologies do bring new knowledge. They consequently create new sensitivities which mature into anger, resentment, and bitterness. But they do not build anew. They place new meaning on old concepts. They do this at least in part through a new terminology in which a language currently fashionable is used to pin new labels and impose fresh meanings on familiar events and traditional institutions. The coming of the women's liberation movement brought new significance to many old words. Women were no longer "innocent" but kept in "forceful ignorance," no longer "protected" and "dependent" but "helpless," no longer "selfless" but "exploited," no longer "pure" but "sexually suppressed." Once contemporary women

began to hear the message of the new feminism, new facts were constantly forced upon them. Through intensified deprivation, new social contacts, and a variety of personal traumas, women became open to a whole process of rethinking about the position of women in contemporary America.

The facts we came up against, the statistics! The history we learned, the political sophistication we discovered, the insights into our own lives that dawned on us! I couldn't believe—still can't—how angry I could become, from deep down and way back, something like a five-thousand-year-buried anger (Morgan, 1970:40).

Naturally, the extent to which the ideology reinterprets the world varies from one case to another. The women's liberation movement has found it necessary to "re-examine the foundation of civilization" to understand woman's present predicament. It has discovered on reexamining history that "women have had a separate historical development from men" and have "identified a system of oppression—Sexism" as laying at the root of all the world's ills. The ideology also typically extends and generalizes specific discontents—thus for the feminist, the experiences which all women have of petty discontents and which they are accustomed to tolerating are in fact symptoms of a "widespread, deeply rooted social disease" (Dunbar, 1970:479).*

A social movement which enjoyed even more public attention than the militant women (because it was seen as more of a political threat than the feminist movement) was Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). This so-called new left movement did not share the benevolent view of American society propagated by the orthodox political groups in this country. In the SDS founding "Port Huron Statement," many familiar aspects of American society were given a new interpretation. Technology was seen as at best a mixed blessing, tending as much to the destruction of human life as to its enhancement. The potential for abundance contained within the American economy thus became a destructive force. In this image of America the "land of opportunity and freedom" disappeared, to be replaced by a rigidly bureaucratized, inflexible social order with ossified political structures and irresponsible and unaccountable economic institutions dominating the natu-

* Eric Mann, writing for SDS in *New Left Notes* (March 1969), advised: "Our job is to give focus to the unhappiness which many students do feel—an unhappiness which many of them blame on their own inadequacies until they are given an alternative explanation" (Wallerstein, 1971:154).

ral impulses of the people. SDS adapted Marx's notion of the alienated worker of the industrial age. Specific discontents, including those of the Black people, of the migrant worker, of the student in the multi-university, of the factory worker, of the female secretary, became manifestations of the diseases spread by the same capitalistic, mechanical society.

The status of the Black people in America, one of the most critical areas of conflict in the United States in the 1960's, has not surprisingly been the focus of a great deal of continuing ideological ferment. The upsurge of social movements during the 1950's and 1960's was largely due to the demythologization of current beliefs about the nature of the American system as one providing equality of opportunity and to the substitution of a Black person's view in which enduring obstacles to the advancement of minority groups were underlined. While all these movements were motivated by a desire for Black liberation from white discrimination, they coalesced around a wide variety of ideologies. Commonalities and differences are both demonstrated in two of the most publicly notorious movements in the 1960's, the Black Muslims and the Black Panthers.

The Black Muslims, which originated in the 1930's, but became widely known to the white public only during the 1960's, is officially designated the Nation of Islam. It is a religious movement which has reinterpreted the relative position of Black and white in America in religious terms. This has been done before, of course. The proliferation of religious sects among the Black population manifests a well-established technique for accommodating to a situation which, intolerable in secular, this-world terms, can be made bearable by a more cosmic, transcendental identity assumption (Fauset, 1944). But the Black Muslims represent something distinctive; a new consciousness of the worth of this-world Black identity and a new militant attitude toward the white man. According to Elijah Muhammed, leader of the Nation, God himself is a Black Man and the white man's rule of this world has been determined by Him to end about the year 2,000. As they become aware that they are God's chosen people, Blacks are taught that "the white race and their religion (Christianity) are their open enemies." Slavery, for years presented as a sign of the backwardness and weakness of Negroes, is reinterpreted as being part of a divine plan "that Allah might make Himself known through us to our enemies." Not only are Black people the "cream" of the earth, but white people are the product of Black weaknesses, having been "grafted" from Black people, who, being the earliest inhabi-

rants of the earth, are the progenitors of civilization (Essien-Udom, 1964:147-149).

The Black Panthers are a more overtly political movement, offering a secular reinterpretation of American society and the Black people's place in it which is very much influenced by Marxism. The most basic and most obvious theme in Black Panther ideology is the diagnosis of Black people's trouble as being due to institutional racism, which is in turn a reflection of the evils of capitalism. Because they see American society as deeply racist, the Panthers cannot accept the conventional images of freedom, justice, and plenty for all. These images have been destroyed by vivid tales of the suffering, brutality, and starvation experienced by the Black community. In contrast to the traditional emphasis on the opportunities and wealth provided by the American capitalistic systems, the Black Panthers focus on the economic exploitation it engenders. In contrast to the images of political choice and full participation contained in the Bill of Rights, they act out a drama of political exclusion, corruption, and the deep-seated elitistic conservatism that pervades American politics. Accompanying this radical reinterpretation of American society is a reappraisal of Blackness. A new pride in being Black, expressed in the adoption of African dress, natural hair styles, and the rejection of the word "Negro," together with a general movement toward political and economic independence, reflect a sense of independence and potency (always present in the Black community) expressed in new and challenging terms.

Ideologies create highly simplified images of social processes. Much of the interpretive appeal of social movements, the reason why they so often appear to have "the answer" when more orthodox groups do not, is attributable to a relatively unambiguous and uncomplicated identification of the source of present ills. This is most clearly exemplified in the conspiracy theory, where the responsibility for social and personal tribulations is laid upon the shoulders of a relatively few, concealed but extremely powerful, evil men who are intent on ruling the world for their own ends by any means they think expedient. This amoral group (contrasting vividly with the intense moralism of the threatened group) is usually socially located in the group's social enemies and symbolize all that is distasteful to it. The intensity of conviction with which such beliefs are held varies from one movement to another, but wherever political beliefs are informed by intense moralism, those who are in error are never mistaken—they are evil.

Among the new left, conspiracy theories which unite ostensibly disparate political enemies into a closed Establishment are current but not a dominant concern, but among groups like the Ku Klux Klan, the idea of a conspiracy plays an important part in focusing and giving rationale to diffused hostilities and resentments. In the diagnosis which the Klansman has come to accept, the "source of discontent is not seen as the social system, social conditions or the government. The difficulty is personified as the 'enemy' as 'evil persons' . . . and evil groups . . . it appears as if everywhere there is a conspiracy afoot" (Vander Zanden, 1960:462). In other words, it is not just that political collusion exists (for it always does), but that this collusion is the prime mover in social change and the key to understanding history. What is more, this source of evil can be traced back through time, so that whole sequences of change are understood. Thus Robert Welch of the John Birch Society draws a straight line between the fall of the Bastille in 1789 and the Poor Peoples' March on Washington in 1968 (Lipset and Raab, 1971:253). A better appreciation of the diagnostic utility of the conspiracy theory can be gained from looking at some social movements in which it has been an overriding theme.

The best known example of the conspiracy theory used to mobilize discontent is Adolf Hitler's obsession with the evil influence of Jewry. Most of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, the manifesto of the National Socialist movement, is taken up with the maneuvers supposedly being used by the Jews to gain world domination. Hitler believed that the Jews, too cunning to reveal themselves, were working through Freemasonry to control the middle classes and through the press to control the lower orders. He saw capitalism, democracy, and Bolshevism as common products of the Jewish mind and equally destructive of the "natural" hierarchical order. Hitler's theory was not original, having been drawn from the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, a book originating in Russia which put forward the idea, itself not new, that the evils of the world were attributable to a secret Jewish government—the Kabbalah—which had determined to destroy civilization. From reading this work, there were few events and institutions which Hitler could not attribute to the Jewish plot—even Christianity. The Jewish drive to world domination became the "very heart of Hitler's interpretation of history and of human existence" (Cohn, 1967:185). It was an idea which greatly simplified the task of seeking out the causes of the troubles besetting Germany—the loss of World War I, the humiliations at

Versailles, the threat of the Russian Revolution, the economic insecurity of the middle classes, and the unemployment of the workers. Hitler cast his own kind as "Aryans" in whom was vested the only hopes for the salvation of civilization. While it is doubtful that even a majority of the Nazi party were as anti-Semitic as Hitler himself, it is likely that large numbers of the members of the storm troopers (SA) and the national student's movement found in this idea a compelling and utterly convincing interpretation of their discontents.

Conspiracy beliefs have not been restricted to Fascist movements and did not die with Hitler. A number of contemporary right-wing movements in America such as the New American party, the Ku Klux Klan, the John Birch Society and the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade are mobilized by some form of conspiracy theory. The strong appeal of the conspiracy theory for these movements is its localization of the ills from which society appears to be suffering. The support the theory gets reflects the bewilderment that many people feel as complex processes of change and a multitude of events seem to work against them. McCarthy expressed this sense of loss well when he asked:

How can we account for our present situation unless we believe that men high in this government are conspiring to deliver us to disaster? This must be the product of a great conspiracy, a conspiracy on a scale so immense as to dwarf any previous venture in the history of man. A conspiracy of infamy so black that, when it is finally exposed, its principals shall be forever deserving of the maledictions of all honest men (Hofstadter, 1965:7-8).

One detailed example should serve to illustrate the way in which the conspiracy theory is integrated into right-wing ideology today. The Minutemen is a social movement founded in 1961 by Robert DePugh, an ex-member of the John Birch Society. At its inaugural meeting, DePugh spoke of being "tired of being pushed around by Communists" and called for support from all those anxious "to do something to stem the tide of their advance" (Jones, 1968:2). Named after the superpatriots of the Revolutionary War, the Minutemen style themselves as a vigilante group on guard against the encroachments of Communism. Although they originally believed that a military invasion was imminent, the Minutemen now teach that the Communists are infiltrating the United States by more devious means. The fruits of Bolshevism can already be detected in the trends towards a more permissive morality, more progressive education, greater civil rights, school

desegregation, and so on. DePugh has suggested that "the Communist-Socialist conspiracy now controls our government to such a point that it controls all major policy, both domestic and foreign" (Jones, 1968:267). The enemy travels under a variety of names (liberals and bureaucrats included) and several well-known figures, including Presidents Eisenhower and Johnson are thought to have been either members of the conspiracy or willing tools of it. There is no way of accurately measuring the support such beliefs get from the general public. The FBI estimated the 1968 membership of the Minutemen to be no more than 500, but the number of sympathizers for right-wing movements, in which conspiracy theories always play an important part, must number in the hundreds of thousands. For these people, the diagnosis of present ills, both their own and those they believe to be afflicting society as a whole, has been much simplified.*

The notion of the Jewish conspiracy can be traced back to the competition for souls carried on by the Judaic and Christian faiths in the Hellenistic world in the third and fourth centuries and is therefore religious in origin. (Cohn, 1967:267). It is no surprise, then, that religious movements have demonstrated a predilection for the conspiracy theory as strong as that shown by secular movements. Although many examples could be cited, only one will be described here. Mankind United, known successively as the "International Registration Bureau of Mankind United" and "Christ's Church of the Golden Rule," is typical of the many sectarian religions which have flourished in California, particularly in its radical departure from orthodox Christianity. The movement, founded by Arthur Bell in 1934, was focused around the Manichean belief in an international plot to enslave humanity hatched by "the hidden rulers" and the efforts of "the sponsors" to foil this plot. Bell revealed to his followers that "for many hundreds of years there had existed a secret world-wide organization, com-

* Conspiracy theories have mobilized many social movements in many countries but there is reason to believe that Americans are particularly susceptible to this way of thinking. One important factor is a "condition of social fluidity and personal insecurity," which makes Americans "especially susceptible to the belief that appearances are deceiving, that things were not as they seemed to be" (Davis, 1971:xvii). A second factor is that America is a "nation that lacked any tradition of privileged orders or large monopolistic companies" where there was a "particular fear of secret alliances that might give certain groups unfair advantages in the race for economic and political power" (Davis, 1971:xvii). Finally, "So long as equality has endured as a viable ideal, it has encouraged Americans to interpret gross inequalities as evidence of hidden and illegitimate power" (Davis, 1971:xvii).

prised of a small group of families possessing fabulous accumulations of wealth, who, through their clandestine operations, were the real forces behind the affairs of men" (Dohrman, 1958:13). These hidden rulers were "in control of every political party, government, industry and public utility in every civilized nation in the world" (Dohrman, 1958:14). They had accomplished this by their control over gold and silver resources. Thus, according to Bell, all wars, revolutions, dictatorships, depressions, unemployment, and poverty were the work of the hidden rulers. He promised, however, that the sponsors were more than equal to the forces of evil and would eventually triumph. The apocalyptic theme in this message attracted considerable attention during the troubled 1930's and the sect, reaching a peak in 1939, gained as many as 27,000 followers (Dohrman, 1958:32). The movement suffered from the conviction of its leaders on charges of sedition in 1943, a conviction which was overturned in 1945 on a technicality, but too late to revive the movement. Bell set up another organization, called "Christ's Church of the Golden Rule," but it never gained the following of Mankind United, despite a close similarity of beliefs. By 1956 fewer than a hundred members remained. Bell's identification of the conspiracy in a group called the "hidden rulers" is unique among religious movements. By far the most common target of this kind of theorizing is the Roman Catholic Church, especially among radical Protestant sects. The Seventh Day Adventists are typical in their evident fear of, and hatred for, the Catholic Church. Using well-worn scriptural references to the "Beast of Babylon" these millennialists see the Pope as the principal and conscious agent of the devil and are wont to attribute most of the evils of the world to a conspiracy supervised by him (Schwartz, 1970:106).

A curious variant of the conspiracy idea is the belief in evil forces. This belief, which borders on the magical, is usually found in religious movements in which the power of good is not personalized to any great extent but seen more as a "force" which can be "tapped" or "harnessed." Christian Science, which teaches that good thought can alter a person's condition for the better, not unnaturally also teaches that bad thought can alter it for the worse. "Malicious animal magnetism" (MAM) is the name given to evil thought and is a source of great fear and anxiety among Christian Scientists who are not sure of their power to control it. It is, however, something which provides a very convincing (and therefore satisfying in a cognitive sense) explanation of one's troubles. This is not to say that the force does

not operate through people and institutions, often without their knowing it. For instance, the Roman Catholic Church is the target of much Christian Science antagonism on account of its intense animal magnetism. But like the John Bircher who hates Communism not for itself but because he sees it as the work of the devil, the Christian Scientist sees the real enemy as being MAM and not the Catholic Church. The belief in MAM, which has on occasion subjected Christian Scientists to some ridicule, is one way in which the traumatic events of life can be met. With this belief one is "prepared to relate every functional disorder, every accident and mishap, to this basic evil, which must be mentally expurgated by self-expostulation" (Wilson, 1961:349).

Through diagnosis the notion of common cause is introduced. The question is no longer: Why should this happen to me? But, why should a thing like this happen to people like me? The ideology helps people to see themselves as one of a kind and their individual fortunes as part of a general social pattern.* Ideologies differ in the extent to which the diagnosis calls into question the values of society or is merely concerned with their implementation. Clearly, the ideologies summarized above demand a critical reappraisal of the values of society, change the meaning of important symbols, and transform the identification of important categories of people. Pivotal social institutions are called into question—the family, the economy, the polity, and the stratification system. They are therefore revolutionary in their diagnosis—they have gone to the roots of social life to find the source of present ills.

Social movements which orient themselves to normative change are mobilized by ideologies which are in part agreement with prevailing value systems. The diagnostic part of reform ideologies focuses on how well common values are being actualized in laws, statutes, and customs. They do not find fault with society as a whole, nor do they reinterpret history. Instead they call attention to backsliding and hypocrisy in social life and to social

* Mobilization is in part effected by a change in identity on the part of subject people. A transformed self is capable of bridging the gap between discontent and unrest, leading to a more hopeful kind of change-orientation. Caplan (1971:163) in his survey of findings on Black militancy and its causes, concluded: "The most plausible response to 'Why now?' is because black is beautiful now, whereas it was not in the past." He suggests that the new mood of militancy and political autonomy among Blacks is "as much a product of old terms taking on new meanings as of any deterioration in material conditions."

advances which can be made with a more "relevant" interpretation of accepted values. The difference between a revolutionary movement and a reformative movement is therefore a matter of degree, depending on how radically the diagnosis goes to the basic assumptions on which a society rests. In actual fact, because those basic assumptions are often questioned and rarely consensually supported, reform movements usually at least also throw some shadow of doubt on social values. In other words, a change in the law—for instance, concerning the freedom to sell contraceptives—may become the focus of agitation in a way which is not thought by its *protagonists* to challenge the values of the community. But this is not how its *opponents* will interpret it; they see in it a fundamental and serious threat to the values of romantic love in sex and the sanctity of family life—and even a challenge to the value placed on life itself and people's freedom to prevent it. In any reform movement, its advocates may make appeal to a common grounding in certain values which the wider population does not in fact share, while its opponents may see much more fundamental implications in the normative change than its advocates probably intend. Thus is reflected the real ambiguity upon which value consensus rests.

Reform movements spring up more readily and are therefore more commonly found than revolutionary movements, partly because deep and widespread discontent felt sufficiently intensely to create an openness to revolutionary doctrines is not typical even of contemporary society, and partly because there is a limit to the number of challenges to its basic patterns of meaning that any society can tolerate. Of the multitude of reform movements that have occurred in western societies in this century, three will be selected for special attention; a civil-rights movement, Congress of Racial Equality (CORE); an old-age pension movement, the Townsend plan; and an agrarian movement, the National Farmers' Organization (NFO). The particular focus in this section, it will be remembered, is on the diagnostic component of each movement's message—that part which identifies the cause of discontents and in so doing focuses and intensifies those discontents.

Oriented to change at the level of norms, reform ideologies are not so elaborate as, and thus have fewer ramifications than, revolutionary ideologies. There is not the same attempt to find one overarching principle by means of which a variety of social discontents can be united and therefore

little preoccupation with a total world view within which future changes can be envisaged. The reform movement is usually trying to change a law, to make existing laws more effective, or to gain acceptance for new social practices in the belief that certain specific social ills can be traced to a failure to actualize values. Discontent is thus traced to a disjuncture between values and norms.

The Congress of Racial Equality founded in 1942 is one of a number of social movements which came into prominence in the 1960's united under the banner of desegregation. CORE, like SCLS, developed no systematic, radical critique of the values of American life because it relied on the liberal interpretation of the Constitution for its legitimacy, a Constitution in which guarantees of equality of opportunity and individual freedom are written in large dimensions. "The assumption underlying CORE's propaganda style was clearly that its audience was sufficiently committed to the American Creed and that they only needed to have the contrast between the real and the ideal made dramatic enough to justify drastic action and to call forth strong commitments" (Bell, 1968:30). The poverty and political exclusion of the Black people—the main ingredients of discontent among that community—were put down to traditional discriminatory practices, which, especially in the South, were in flagrant violation of the principles of the Constitution. The source of discontent was the federal government's failure to guarantee the rights of minority groups and the lack of strength and specificity in the laws that were supposed to facilitate equal rights. At a more personal level, the leaders of CORE felt that many whites were misguided about the true social worth of Black people, mainly because of their ready acceptance of derogatory stereotypes about them. Like many other reform ideologies, part of the trouble was diagnosed as ignorance and a breakdown in communication. CORE concerned itself with reform, the full inclusion of the Black people in American life—a goal which the American creed fully supported. There was no need, therefore, to elaborate a new ideology.

The Townsend plan was first broached in 1933 and the Townsend movement was incorporated as Old Age Revolving Pensions Ltd. in 1934. It was only one of a number of social movements advocating national pensions for the aged which arose during the Depression but it was by far the most successful. The movement obviously appealed mainly to old people, poor and declining in social status and self-esteem, who were beginning to

take a hard look at the economic system they had always taken for granted but which now seemed to be treating them badly. The acceptability of the Townsend ideology was clearly linked to the specific economic promises it made but it is also attributable to the appealing diagnosis it made of the causes of discontents of the old. Benefiting as they had formerly done from the advantages of the capitalistic system, the oldsters were in no mood to entertain ideologies which saw the roots of the depression in basic inadequacies of the American economy (and there were many in the air at this time) but instead turned to a form of money radicalism. Money radicalism has been a constant theme in American populism and teaches that the fundamentals of the American economy (free enterprise, competition, and private property) should be accepted, but the way in which currency is used should be changed. In the Townsend version of money radicalism, money was seen as not circulating fast enough ("idle money") and excessive saving was condemned. It appears that years of the Depression had shaken the confidence of the oldsters in how the economy was being managed rather than in the values underlying it. They therefore advocated more plentiful and more varied forms of federal intervention—in fact a tinkering with the system to rectify its maladjustments and ease the plight of a disadvantaged group. The sense of personal frustrations and guilt which many old people felt at having to rely on their children or on welfare was thus transposed to a responsibility of the federal government and the economy it was so badly mismanaging. Townsend felt no compunction to formulate an elaborate ideology to justify his plan; he felt that the legitimation for it was already contained in values like "honor thy father and thy mother."

The National Farmer's Organization forms part of a long tradition of social movements designed to protect the interests of American farmers. In fact, there is little in the message of the NFO to separate it from the Grange, one of the pioneering farmers' movements of the nineteenth century. Farmers' movements generally arise when the economic position of the farm population relative to the urban-based factory worker undergoes a sharp deterioration. The formation of the NFO in 1955 was a response to a recent movement of incomes that not only had made the farmer relatively worse off than he had been in comparison to the urban worker but actually saw an absolute decline in his income. In times of such hardship individual farmers were normally disposed to blame their own incompetent, individual bargaining with the middleman and their own lack of success at farm-

ing efficiently. Staley, in founding the NFO, declared that no individual farmer's problem was unique, but common to all farmers and attributable in fact to practices common among those who *buy* farm produce. The middleman's freedom to exploit the farmer was due to inefficiencies and lack of safeguards in the marketing system on which all farmers relied for their livelihood. The NFO thus reiterated a common theme found in the ideologies of farmers' movements—that the cause of the farmer's insecurities is a chronic inefficiency in a cumbersome and costly system of marketing. The economic power structure, favoring the middleman, is thus identified as the source of discontents. However, although the NFO worked to change the system in certain important particulars (introducing collective bargaining, for instance), it did not question the fundamentals on which it was based, nor, for that matter, the need for middlemen. Although the NFO backed up its actions with an ideology embracing traditional agrarian values (the farmer as the backbone of the nation), it felt no need to elaborate a new ideology, being concerned not with the overthrow of the system but with changing it to better protect its interests. This is not to say that the movement's opponents saw its activities in the same light. The middlemen felt that the attempts at cooperativism and collective bargaining as well as the holding actions were forms of "creeping socialism" designed to undermine the free enterprise system, and firmly resisted the farmers' demands (Schlebecker, 1969).

Prognosis—What Must Be Done

In many social movements a sense of what is wrong with the world is much stronger than any idea about what is to be done to put it right. It seems that ideology mobilizes primarily by the clarity and assurance with which it identifies the sources of individual discontents and only secondarily by the promises of a better future that it makes. This is nowhere better illustrated than in movements like the Feminists, New York Radical Feminists, Redstockings, WITCH, and the National Organization for Women whose leaders are quite clear about what is wrong with society ("sexism" and its attendant evils) but rather less assured about what is needed to do away with it. The vote, the contraceptive pill, the new left ideologies, the Hippie life-style have all been touted as remedies that would give women

the freedom they want, but they have all failed. Identifying the source of evil has not meant that the way out has been found and the feminists do not seem to know what they want. This is a source of great sensitivity among workers in the movement. Militant women resent being asked to "come up in five short years with the magic remedy cleanser that will wipe clean the unbelievable mess men have created from their position of power during the past five thousand years" (Morgan, 1970:xxxii). Yet, however perplexed she may be, the woman who has developed a new awareness of her social position demands hope and a vision of a better future, promising escape from present burdens. And so, although the feminists may not have a really clear idea about what must be done, they do have a number of possibilities in mind.

Living alone? Living in mixed communes with men and women? Having children? Not having children? Raising them collectively, or in the old family structure? The father and/or other men sharing equally in child care, or shouldering it entirely, or not being permitted any participation? Homosexuality as a viable political alternative which strain the women must begin to recognize as such? . . . Test tube births? Masturbation? Womb transplants? Gender control of the fetus? (Morgan, 1970:xxxiii).

Women's liberation movements are therefore not without a promise that an answer is there and will be found—they are saying to women who have become aware of the true nature of their problem, of their oppression, that a solution can be worked out and/or will be brought about by a strong, imaginative movement of millions of women. The wave of student movements of the 1960's exhibited similar weaknesses in the area of prognosis. In fact, these movements were almost anti-ideological, in the sense of proclaiming a morality of openness, of antidoctrine, and in adopting a crusading style rather than a dogmatic creed. This relative planlessness has its own appeal, of course, which should not be ignored by the outsider looking for specific objectives. Although there are uncertainties, there is the excitement of exploration of the unknown and a sense of being with, and a part of, history as it unfolds.* The absence of prognosis is not always attributable either to anti-ideology or sheer inability to forecast the future. It has partly to do with the fact that it is easier for the disgruntled to agree on what is wrong with the old than on what is right with the new. But

* This idea is spelled out at length in Scott and Lyman (1970:40-41).

it may also be the result of a deliberate postponement of detailing alternative programs in the knowledge that once an alternative has been elaborated, many supporters will have second thoughts, for spelling out alternatives makes clear the consequences of redesigning the system.

The prognostic component of the ideology has two parts. In one the goals of the movement are stated. The goals are some specific changes in the social structure, the environment, or the personality which the movement is working for. In the other the utopian vision is proclaimed—the state of affairs which the accomplishment of the movement's goals is thought to bring about. Thus, for the Townsend movement the specific goals consisted of the institutionalization of an old-age pension scheme, but this was seen as only a means to achieving a society free of divorce, crime, and insanity. Each specific goal can thus be looked upon as the immediate application of some general notion concerning ideals such as equality, opportunity, status, and justice. The combination of specificity and generality performs important mobilizing functions. Since few will benefit from the attainment of the specific goal, more general reasons of an ethical character must be offered to attract support for it. However, those prompted by ideals of an ethical nature will not be mobilized to collective action unless immediate goals are specified for them.

All social movements have prognostic ideologies and it is this which makes them change-oriented. Even so-called conservative movements envision a better future and a cure for present ills, although this is to be accomplished by a return to the past. Thus just as each ideology has an image of the past and the present, so each has an image of the future. The fulcrum between the present and the future is the movement itself. The importance of the prognosis is the effect it has on the entire quality of the movement. The sectarian, for example, in settling the question: "What shall we do to be saved?" establishes a whole new conception of the natural and supernatural worlds and how one should behave toward them (Wilson, 1971:36).

The action orientation of social movements stems from this statement of what must be done, for a solution to social and personal problems has been promised on the basis of certain actions. Eric Hoffer once wrote that the true believer is a particularly credulous individual with an "urge to escape the rational and the obvious" (Hoffer, 1966:78), thereby implying that the kinds of beliefs he was likely to endorse were not common-sensical or logical. This is a common stereotype of the follower of mass movements. He is

pictured as impatient with gradual solutions and uneasy with multifaceted and complex programs for reform. He apparently prefers clear and identifiable targets, concrete issues, and solutions to problems which promise a swift and sudden end to his troubles. The implication is that ideological beliefs exhibit an unusual kind of reasoning. More recently, Neil Smelser has addressed the problem of the logical status of ideological beliefs and has concluded that they are much like people's day-to-day thinking except that some "short-circuiting" occurs (Smelser, 1963:79-130). To understand this idea, it is necessary to look at the structure of everyday problem solving and contrast it with the way solutions are arrived at in ideological beliefs.

Attempts to find solutions to social problems can be made at a number of different levels. Take, for instance, being out of work and unable to find a job. The individual in this situation is first led to specific causes of the problem, either in his own inadequacies in training and education, or in situational factors such as the closing down of a local factory. The individual not satisfied with explanation at this level of analysis, however, may conclude that his own individual circumstance is a particular case of a general phenomenon. He thereupon digs deeper and finds reason to believe that his plight is attributable to such things as large-scale mismanagement in his industry, inefficiencies in trade union practices within the industry, old-fashioned methods of hiring and firing, lack of retraining programs, and so on. If not convinced by this kind of explanation, he may come to believe that the problem has even deeper roots, going as far, perhaps, as the whole system of norms governing the industry—he detects nepotism or discrimination; he becomes disillusioned with the supposed benefits of unfettered free enterprise within the industry. Finally, the truly discontented man will question the values upon which the economic system as a whole is run; he sees his plight (as did many workers during the Great Depression) as symbolic of weaknesses inherent in the capitalistic system. Clearly, such a process of reasoning is part of everyday life and not necessarily associated only with those who find themselves in trouble. There is, in this chain of reasoning, the assumption that a failure to solve a problem at one level of analysis will be followed by a movement to a higher level of generality where the principles governing the lower level are to be found. The common-sense notion that it is no good attacking the symptom if the disease is left untouched is a crude way of expressing this idea.

How do the beliefs which mobilize social movements differ in their structure from that described above? By definition, all such beliefs involve attempts to seek solutions at the highest levels of generality—at the levels of norms and values. In other words, whatever the specific discontent involved, the diagnosis has been accepted that their real cause lies in the norms or values of society. The difference lies in the ascription of causes for social and individual problems and the nature of the solution which is proposed. It is here that the process of short-circuiting occurs. Solving a problem by going to a more general level of analysis rationally involves respectification, or a mapping-out of the detailed ramifications of changes made at the more general level. If the unemployed worker detects inefficiencies in his industry he should rationally be able to specify how the improvements he recommends will help the unemployment situation. A trade union member dissatisfied with the chronically disadvantageous wage negotiations it is conducting and (not finding fault with its own mode of operations) begins to blame the rules governing collective bargaining in the industry. If it proposes changes in these rules it should be able to specify what the effects of these changes will be on the course of collective bargaining, giving clear indications of the ways in which changes in the broader structure will benefit the union's position at the bargaining table. Otherwise its supporters will accuse it of wishful thinking. In the ideology or "generalized belief," Smelser calls it, this last step is omitted. By jumping straight from changes at the more general level to promised changes at specific levels without specification of what actions will be necessary to carry them through, reasoning is short-circuited. Many of the steps which will necessarily have to be taken to actualize normative or value changes are not specified. Long-term, multisteped, and indirect solutions are ignored in the drive for immediacy, speed, and simplicity. The generalized belief is a panacea, promising to alleviate a variety of discrete complaints through a simple operation. It raises the prospect of finding immediate solutions to persistent problems and provides the comforting assurance that social and personal crises are knowable and susceptible to some kind of direct counteraction. The direct application of values to everyday action in this way accounts for the element of moralism which is such a marked characteristic of social movements. There is "a strong tendency to believe that human events are totally shaped by the supremacy of good intention over bad at any given moment or vice versa . . ." (Lipset and Raab, 1971:10). Some examples will help illustrate the nature of this tendency in social movements.

The goal of the Townsend movement was to establish old-age pensions on a national basis. The belief which induced so many to support the movement was not solely the promise of economic betterment for a select category, however. Listening to Townsend, many became convinced that one simple operation, revolving pensions, "provided the cure for all America's ills" (Holtzman, 1963:42). If only the lot of the aged were improved, he declared, "insanity would be reduced by half and divorces by 75% . . . religious organizations would be strengthened and . . . a large proportion of the crime would be eliminated" (Holtzman, 1963:112). Townsend's followers did not see themselves as a mere interest group then, concerned only with the protection of their own self-interest. They were guardians of the general good, possessors of the key to a set of general social improvements which, couched in "spectacular claims and glittering promises," seemed to promise wealth and happiness to all. These promises were, unfortunately, rarely reduced to the "sober specifics" of social planning.*

The goal of Moral Re-Armament is "world revival." This movement was founded by Frank Buchman just after World War I with the object of "life-changing" for others as a cure to many, if not all, social ills. On the assumption that nations and institutions can be good only when the people constituting them are good, Buchman taught that the world could be saved from total anarchy only through the personal, spiritual regeneration of all people. Goodness was thought to stem from a life of "Honesty, Purity, Unselfishness and Love." Buchman believed that international problems like wars and social problems such as strikes could be overcome by individual goodness. But no part of his teachings contain any specification of how changes at the individual level will bring about immediate social transformations. Nevertheless his followers firmly believe that the Four Absolutes, if followed by enough people, will "overcome all war, all class dissension and all economic stagnation" (Eister, 1950:189). MRA is, in this respect,

* The belief that, by one simple stroke the tangle of economic and financial problems besetting society can be swept away, is what lies at the foundation of the many social movements set up to reform the currency or taxation system of the United States, beginning around the middle of the nineteenth century and continuing to this day. Henry George's message, as founder of the Single Tax movement in 1886, is representative of this tradition. He believed that he had found in his tax reform proposals "the simple yet sovereign remedy for social ills," which would "raise wages, increase the earnings of capital, extirpate pauperism, abolish poverty, give remunerative employment to whoever wishes it, afford free scope to human powers, lessen crime, elevate morals, and taste, and intelligence, purify government and carry civilisation to yet nobler heights" (Weinberg and Weinberg, 1968:129).

like many other salvationist religions in that faith is put in individual transformation as the key to social transformation. The acceptance of Jesus Christ as one's Savior—an act of faith demanding great psychic energy but rather simply achieved—is believed to bring about this fundamental change. For Jesucentric religions like Pentecostalism, "Jesus is the answer."

Social movements with a political message, like the John Birch Society, tend to assume that there *must* be solutions to social problems and that the nature of social processes is basically simple and understandable. Where solutions do not present themselves and where social processes appear to be complex and incomprehensible to the man in the street, they detect conspiracies designed to mask and obfuscate. Their own prognosis is fundamentalist—what is needed is a rooting-out of evil elements to restore the social order to its old integrity and simplicity. The social world that Birchers seek is one without foreign entanglements and obligations and without the complex bureaucracies of the modern welfare state.

The Birch Society's writings display a curious combination of vagueness and precision. Mixed with sweeping and highly simplified analyses of social processes and changes are extremely precise and straightforward propositions. Thus, Welch tells his followers that if only you would "reduce all of the governments of the nations of the world to one third of their present size . . . you would immediately accomplish two things—you would reduce the likelihood and destructiveness of war by one ninth" (Lipset and Raab, 1971:248). Therein is reflected the Birchite's ambivalent concern for accuracy and scientific knowledge about the social processes going on all around him which he barely understands. While generally anti-intellectual in his ideology, the Birchite reveals in his own beliefs an exaggerated concern for accurate and telling correlations in which complex social phenomena are reduced at one stroke of the pen to simple formulas. As far as restructuring society is concerned, the Birchers want to return to an uncomplicated past, and advocate the abolition of such measures as income tax, social security, government control of wages and prices, the Federal Reserve System, federal aid to housing, and so on. On the international front they advocate withdrawal from the United Nations and NATO and relinquishing all foreign aid and military assistance treaties. By blaming all society's ills upon the Communist conspiracy, the John Birch Society has a simple solution—if only the influence of the Communist in the United States were extinguished, many of life's insecurities and injustices would vanish. One of the more virulently anti-Semitic of the Society's spokesmen,

Revalo Oliver, is quoted as saying: "If only by some miracle all the Bolsheviks or all the Illuminati or all the Jews were vaporized at dawn tomorrow, we should have nothing to worry about" (Lipset and Raab, 1971:266). Obviously, an enemy which is totally evil and totally unappeasable cannot be compromised with and must therefore be totally eliminated. The victory demanded is unqualified. Communists must be combated on their own terms—through subversion, infiltration, and spy networks. With this message the John Birch Society, with an estimated membership of 60,000 in 1962, has succeeded in drawing together a wide variety of people, most of them middle class and most of them anxious about a shrinking world full of new and awesome international responsibilities for them as Americans. They are uncomfortable in an increasingly complicated society in which it seems the more things need managing, the more things are mismanaged. Robert Welch provides his followers with a vision of a society free of these entanglements and free of the social obligations and restrictions of the welfare state.

One of the simplest, and yet most appealing and profoundly influential of generalized beliefs, is the image of the promised land, the idea that escape from present trials and tribulations can be achieved by leaving this world altogether and establishing the kingdom of the righteous right here on earth. This belief (it has a secular variant in mass migrations, as in the European migrations to the New World and to the Antipodes) has spawned a wide variety of social movements. The dream of a promised land where present tribulations can be escaped is found most commonly among people suffering the consequences of discrimination and exclusion in a land to which they feel no clear and unambiguous ties. This helps to explain the Zionist urge of many Jews as well as the vision of a return to Africa found among many freed slaves on the American continent. Many Negroes, excluded from anything approaching full participation in American society, have kept alive a sense of their African heritage and look upon Africa as their true home, a place where they will be free of oppression and poverty. Several social movements have sprung up centered around this theme, the most remarkable of which (by virtue of its size, imaginativeness, and ambition) was the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), established in Harlem in 1916.* Its founder, Marcus Garvey, was a West Indian

* There had been previous associations to repatriate freed slaves but they were organized and run by white men, seemingly on behalf of white men who feared the presence of many freed slaves in their own country. The first was the American So-

who, convinced that the Negro had no hope of justice and freedom in the United States, sought to liberate his people by encouraging and facilitating their return to Africa (Cronon, 1964). Garvey believed that the only answer to the tribulations of the Black people was for them to establish their own independent nation and that the only place that this was feasible was Africa. His was thus a form of transposed nationalism. He attempted to get white support for his scheme but intended to rely mainly on the resources of the Black community. These he tried to mobilize through a series of economic ventures, the most ambitious of which was the "Black Star" shipping line. He also founded an African Orthodox Church in which the theme of Black independence was given theological justification. The Church worshipped a Black God and Black angels and fought against a satan who was white. The movement enjoyed remarkable success for a time, considering the low level of political mobilization of the Black community during the 1920's. Membership is reported to have reached one million in 1923. Like many before it, the movement failed after a short while. This was partly due to Garvey's financial and entrepreneurial incompetence, partly due to Garvey's conviction in 1925 on a charge of using the mails to defraud, but chiefly due to the systematic harassment of the federal government and the unrelenting opposition of Black middle-class groups such as the NAACP. Garvey was deported in 1927 and died in 1940. The flame of nationalism still burns, however, among a group of his followers who remain active in Harlem (Draper, 1970:132). In a curious way, the practical failure of the UNIA and the persistence of the small Harlem group underline the particular appeal of the back-to-Africa dream and of all promised land ideas. It seems that the image far outstripping the reality is not discomfiting to people. Many are prepared to accept the vision without being prepared to make the necessary practical sacrifices to bring it about.

The idea of a return to Africa as the means of escape from a world of trouble has also mobilized a well-known movement on the island of Jamaica where the conditions of the Black population are, if anything, worse than they are in the United States (and where, incidentally, Garvey is still

cety for Colonizing the Freed People of Color of the United States, founded in 1816 with Madison, Monroe, and Jackson among its backers. The association enjoyed no great success and was virtually defunct by the time of the Civil War (although it did not formally dissolve until 1964). Interestingly, it was revived in 1969, again with an all-white board of directors. This time it arose in response to the nationalist sentiments of Black people (Draper, 1970:9).

a folk hero). This movement is known as the Ras Tafari, by virtue of its worship of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia as the Living God. Beginning in 1930, many Jamaican Blacks came to believe that Ethiopia was the Black people's true home, and that repatriation to Africa was the only way of redemption for them. The Ras Tafarians taught that the return to the promised land had been foretold in the Scriptures and would occur shortly. Conditions were so bad and the outlook so hopeless in Jamaica in the 1930's that these utopian beliefs drew a large response from the Black community. In 1933, five thousand people purchased photographs of Haile Selassie to serve as "passports to Ethiopia" with little knowledge of how they would get there or what they would do on their arrival. These purchasers were disappointed, however, for no ships appeared to give them the free transportation they needed, and interest in the movement subsided. The Ras Tafari are still active, however. In 1959, 15,000 people bought tickets for October sailings which were promised but which did not materialize, and in 1961 the movement entered politics by forming the Black Man's party. The latest move may indicate that the vision of a promised land across the seas is beginning to lose its appeal (Barrett, 1968).

Although some social movements have combined migratory impulses with more spiritualized conceptions of the promised land (the Mormons would be an example) (O'Dea, 1957), more frequently the vision of the promised land involves not migration but a newly established world in the same locality. The two most common types are utopian and millennial beliefs. These are both images of perfection derived from ideas of salvation (a lasting triumph over adverse forces) and are powerful mobilizing themes for those who find themselves in trouble.

Utopias are perhaps the most profound "expressions of . . . optimistic faith in the perfectibility of the world" known to man. They are an attempt to set up a nucleus or model for a new and better social order and part of an enduring search by man for the perfect life on earth (Tyler, 1962:166). The Oneida community, founded about 1845 by John Noyes in New York State, is one of the best-known instances of a utopian social experiment and will serve as an example here. Noyes was a perfectionist, convinced that human perfection—freedom from sin through the direct contact of the soul with God—was a distinct possibility for all men and women. Noyes was troubled by many features of the society in which he lived. He was particularly upset by the rigid orthodoxy and lack of spiritual

fervor of the churches, the impoverishment of the laboring classes, and the unhappiness caused by the family system. He began to preach that release from the sufferings of this world was possible by the establishment of a community in which perfectionist principles could be actualized. He gradually drew converts from among similarly discontented people by preaching that the present social order should be shunned. In 1845 he set up his first commune. Common property, work sharing, and complex marriages were undergirded by the spiritualism of the dedicated perfectionist. The formula proved very attractive and many people were drawn to the group; by 1851 the community numbered 250 and was attracting considerable public attention and (usually) admiration. The experiment flourished as a true community until 1880 when its common property was abolished in the inauguration of the joint-stock company which still exists today.

The major appeal of the Oneida community, as in all utopias, was that life could begin completely anew. Unpleasant surroundings, unsuccessful jobs, unhappy social relationships could all be escaped. Although the majority of these early settlers apparently had few economic problems, they all felt that their personal problems were not being met by orthodox religion. They were much attracted by the promise that through establishing a certain way of life divinely commanded, typical of the "social state of the resurrection" (Tyler, 1962:109), an age of bliss free of disease, marital tensions, and fruitless labor could be established. It was their conviction that only in the confines of the utopian community could a person possibly attain salvation.

If utopia is the search for perfect space, millennium is the search for perfect time (Shepperson, 1970:45). Millennial movements are mobilized by a belief in the imminent coming of a society in which all conflicts are resolved and all injustices removed. The most radical expression of this belief is known as "Pre-Millennialism" in which the Second Coming will take place before the millennium. The idea is that social conditions are so bad and man is so evil that only supernatural forces can inaugurate the age of bliss. Post-Millennialists are more reform-oriented, being convinced that is possible for the righteous here on earth to bring the millennium into being through their own example and faith. Millennial beliefs are particularly effective agents of mobilization for social movements because they promise collective salvation from an unlimited variety of discrete tribulations—they thus have great gathering power. Where such beliefs and intensified deprivation are united in a religious context, "the result is a collective emotional

agitation which is peculiar not only in its intensity but also in the boundlessness of its aims" (Cohn, 1970b:42). The millennial belief transforms the usual desire of the poor to improve the material conditions of their lives into a fantasy of a return to a primeval state of purity and innocence, to be accomplished, if necessary, by a searing and cleansing apocalyptic battle.

History has recorded many millennial movements. Few, aside from Christianity itself, have attracted so much attention as the Jehovah's Witnesses. Although the Witnesses' theology is quite complex, their major concern is with the Second Coming of Jesus Christ. It is their belief that the world is corrupt because satan has "spiritual jurisdiction" over it. His reign will be ended by the coming of Christ, who will inaugurate the millennium. The Witnesses' image of the new world is fairly typical: there will be no more pain, sickness, or old age; everyone will be young and healthy; death from natural causes will not occur; the sexual urge will disappear once the world has reached an optimum population; and so on. There is a great sense of urgency about the Witnesses' work. Their belief is that Christ returned to this earth in spiritual form in 1914 to help prepare the way (the spread of the Witnesses being one sign) and that the Battle of Armageddon will take place some time before 1975. These apocalyptic beliefs have proven to be enormously attractive to large numbers of people in a wide variety of social contexts. Despite a record of fairly consistent public hostility and occasional government persecution, the movement has expanded steadily since its inception in 1879. Its recent growth is even more remarkable. While in 1938 there were 60,000 Witnesses, in 1967 the number had risen to over one million, scattered throughout 197 countries (Rogerson 1969:74).

One interesting variant of the millennial theme concerning the promise of better things to come is the Cargo cult belief. Of the many that have occurred in Melanesia, one of the best known is the Vailala Madness, so called because of the district in which it appeared and the hysterical seizures with which some of its adherents were gripped. Like the other Cargo cults, the Vailala Madness is best seen as a response to the disruption of the autochthonous culture which resulted from European colonization. The coming of the European to Melanesia meant a new economic system, a new monetary system, new work practices, and new educational codes; European goods were introduced without the means being provided for the islanders to manufacture them or acquire them; and considerable antiwhite hostility was generated by the colonial administration itself.

This particular Cargo cult was first reported in 1919 when an old man

called Evara began spreading the message that a steamer would soon come, carrying the spirits of the ancestors who were bringing a Cargo. "In the initial stages rifles were included among the expected goods and 'vague ideas of Papua for the Papuans were current.' Later teachings stated that the Cargo was to be allotted to villages by the signs of identity on the crates. The spirits had revealed that all the flour, rice, tobacco, and other trade belonged to the Papuans, not the whites. The latter would be driven away, and the Cargo would pass into the hands of the rightful owners, the natives. To obtain these goods, it was necessary to drive out the whites" (Worsley, 1968:81). This belief gained quite a hold in the Vailala area and in some places undermined both the traditional authority structure and that of the colonial administration (Worsley, 1968:86). The movement did not die out until 1930, although it probably reached its peak in 1923. The promise of this movement was basically two-fold. Immediate material betterment (the ship would bring the desired European goods) and the removal of the whites (the ship would bring ancestors who would help banish the European oppressors).

The Vailala Madness, in common with other Cargo cults like the Milne Bay Prophet movement (1893), the Taro cult (1914), Mambu (1939), the John Frum movement (1941), and the Marching Rule (1945), combined promises of immediate economic betterment with images of a millennium to come which were heavily influenced by Christianity. The Marching Rule which cropped up in the Solomon Islands is a particularly interesting case because it took up a quite militant political position toward the colonial authorities, becoming the *de facto* government in large parts of the protectorate. And yet it combined this political strategy with millennialism strikingly similar to the other Cargo cults. There were rumors of the coming of American ships bringing American goods and of the entry into paradise which was to take place soon thereafter. The people even built warehouses in which to store the goods (Worsley, 1968:115). For this kind of movement, the golden age is rooted in the past. A reminder that protest is not always a negative statement about the things of the past but may contain, as these revivalistic movements did, affirmative statements about things of the past and a renewed expression of commitment to them. This is perhaps most clearly the case with movements which arise in response to colonial conquest, for this is an experience which usually brings a severe and traumatic denigration of most aspects of the traditional culture. Rot-

berg notes that the African rebellion against European domination was almost always conservative, seeking a return to a previous golden age. Movements like the Maji-Maji (Tanzania, 1905-1907) were revivalistic (Rotberg, 1971:xiv).

In the ideologies thus far described, the "if-only mentality" makes a forcible impression. In each of these beliefs an overall cure is promised upon accomplishment of a single, but fundamental change. Not all social movements have such a strong element of wishful thinking, however. Although the leaders of some reform movements have made extravagant claims for their program (Townsend would be an example), in most cases only specific improvements are envisaged. The way these movements of a more limited scope differ from ordinary social planning agencies is the means they intend to use to bring the change about. Those who join social movements are likely to have met with constant frustration. They want action now because they feel the solution to important social problems has already been too long delayed. They are therefore impatient with the gradualism of the institutionalized channels.

Although it is true, then, that many zealots become convinced of the unlimited potential for good of the changes they propose, it is also true that many social movements exist which show few signs of "if-only thinking." Failure to accurately trace out the implications of social changes being proposed may not be so much an example of short-circuited thinking as an indication of man's chronic inability to forecast the future with any degree of certainty. In fact, all social planning has some elements of short-circuited reasoning if by this is meant a failure to link proposed general changes with their anticipated, specific implications.*

It should not be assumed that all social movements are motivated by total ideology either. Movements of the new left, for example, are characterized by a kind of militant pragmatism, which distinguishes them from the more ideologically governed old left. The emphasis in the new left has been on immediate and detailed improvements in housing, education, and employment. And the new left may well be typical in this respect. There is some reason to suppose that, at least as far as political movements are con-

* Margaret Sanger presented a well-reasoned analysis of the promised consequences of the birth control reforms she advocated, which modern demographers have proved to be substantially correct, including a reduction of maternal mortality, a lessening of malnutrition and poverty, and, rather less certainly, an enhancement in the emotional level of the conjugal family (Kennedy, 1970:109).

cerned, this shift away from total ideologies is part of a larger social change. The increasing concreteness and immediacy of social movement goals, as evidenced not only in the new left but also in the civil-rights movements, may well reflect feelings about the increasing complexity of social life and the constantly shifting exigencies of rapidly changing societies. It may indeed be the case that the "end of ideology" has come—in the sense of social movements mobilized by a doctrinal framework or all-embracing theory. This is not to say that social movements are not impelled by a dream. They do envisage a better world but it is not given ideological treatment, especially in the initial stages of protest, when people may well be united only in a common hope for a better tomorrow. Once again it is necessary to recall that the ideological impulse behind social movements is a matter of degree. They are quite capable of developing and formulating specific, pragmatic programs within the loose framework of their ideology and thus come to resemble a political party more than a social movement. The reverse also applies. A political party instituted for the pursuit of a legislative program under a sober manifesto may occasionally enter periods during which extravagant promises and wild hopes gain general currency. Parties might transform themselves, in this respect, into ideological movements. According to Koenig, this is what happened to the People's party toward the end of the last century. Although its platform was an amalgam of common Populist demands, the party was gripped with "silver fever" for a time. Such was the misery of the midwest farmer that he became willing to "accept simple explanations of causality and [was] receptive to almost childlike conceptions of the environment in which evil [the remote bankers] conspired against and chased away good [the white metal, silver], whose return to its former place would restore a once-known day of prosperity" (Koenig, 1971:176). The same collectivity can move back and forth, so to speak, between the identities of social movement and political party. Generalized belief is always, therefore, a matter of degree.

A reform orientation is exemplified in antiwar, civil-rights, and student-rights movements and also in some movements for women's liberation. This is the list of demands made by the first of the contemporary wave of women's movements, the National Organization for Women:

- I. Equal Rights Constitutional Amendment
- II. Enforce Law Banning Sex Discrimination in Employment
- III. Maternity Leave Rights in Employment and in Social Security Benefits

- IV. Tax Deduction for Home and Child Care Expenses for Working Parents
- V. Child Day Care Centers
- VI. Equal and Unsegregated Education
- VII. Equal Job Training Opportunities and Allowances for Women in Poverty
- VIII. The Right of Women to Control Their Reproductive Lives (Morgan, 1970:512)

While some of these demands might appear unrealistic in the light of the present power distribution, this does not mean that they reflect nonlogical or short-circuited thinking. In concluding this section of prognosis, then, it is appropriate to repeat that although prophecies, dreams, and visions are common stuff in all social movements, their relation to action is a problematical one. Elements of an if-only mentality can almost always be found in the writings and speeches of social movement leaders. They serve important symbolic purposes by establishing a framework within which the more specific goals of the movement can be considered.* It is uncertain, however, that they perform a semimagical function as Smelser seems to be implying. It is probably nearer the truth to say that such reasoning is important to sustain commitment and mobilize support but that it must be

* Rhetoric is used to "sell" the movement's program. It is understandable that such rhetoric will greatly simplify the nature of cause and effect relationships in order to accentuate them. Thus one of the most skillful and meticulous of social planners, Robert Owen, did not hesitate to make extravagant claims for his proposed reforms. In a speech before the U.S. House of Representatives, he declared that his plans for utopian reform would overcome all the causes of evil in the world. "By arrangements as simple and desirable as they will be beneficial for everyone," he foretold, "all will possess, at all times, a full supply of the best of everything for human nature . . ." (Weinberg and Weinberg, 1968:34). Ideologies should therefore be judged at one level as rhetorical devices. At another level they are myths, as Turner (1969:399) has pointed out: "It is important to recognise that all conceptions of rights are myths in the sense that they are practically unattainable. The idea of full participation by all people in determining their destiny is surely a myth. We know that no system of representation can truly promise complete embodiment of the myth. Likewise we know that a doctrine such as 'from each according to his ability to each according to his need' is more effective as a slogan than it is as a measure of the working of a system." Fernandez's (1970:455) comments are appropriate here. "It must be admitted that an instrumental bias runs through Western analyses of protest movements. It may be, simply, that we are always more interested in politics than we are in religion. It is surely because we are more interested in meaningful change in the objective world of resource and power distribution than in largely subjective changes of state."

supplemented by more pragmatic reasoning, the utility of which each member can judge by its fruits for him.

Rationale—Who Must Do the Job

Locating both the source of present troubles and the key to a better future, the social movement ideology at the same time that it intensifies discontents raises hopes of their eventual alleviation. Inducement to become active in the cause (mobilization) will not be effected, however, unless the individual can be convinced, first, of the need for collective action and, second, of the need to support one particular movement. Ideologies are thus also a "call to arms" in the most general sense and a specific rationale for a particular strategy in the narrower sense. Just as the ideology convinces people that their complaints are not idiosyncratic, so it is able to convince them that the cure for them must be collective. For instance, "many women still believe in the efficacy of fighting a lone battle." It is the object of the women's liberation propagandists to convince them otherwise by pointing out the political advantages of collective action. "More and more women are realizing that only collective strength and action will allow us to be free to fight for the kind of society that meets basic human needs. Collective activity has already had an enormous effect on our thinking and on our lives. We are learning not to dissipate our strength by using traditional methods of exerting power—tears, manipulation, appeals to guilt and benevolence" (Dunbar, 1970:478).*

More specifically, the discontented must be convinced of the appropriateness of certain forms of collective action, not just the need for collective action per se. Therefore, the movement must present some kind of self-justifi-

* One thing a movement must do is convince people that their individual acts will redound to their permanent and the public's general good. Individual acts will appear to do so if they are either symbolically potent or part of an aggregate action. It is often difficult to persuade people that their own particular actions will have general consequences, especially if they are accustomed to powerlessness. For instance, draft resistance is an individual act. It is hard to convince people that refusing induction can be a political act as well. Thus organizers of the antidraft movement in the United States have found mobilization extremely difficult in the ghettos and the slums, where opposing the draft means "beating it" in any way possible. Acts such as renouncing deferments for the sake of principle are not understood in lower-class neighborhoods (Ferber and Lynd, 1971:102).

cation. Often this is the ingredient that the leader adds to an already current set of beliefs—he and his group will "take over" an ideology and reinterpret it to suit particular times and circumstances. Thus Hitler's SS, engaged in brutal anti-Semitic behavior, were invited to think of themselves variously as "the angelic hosts overthrowing the powers of darkness, or a collective St. Michael killing the dragon, or even as a collective Christ overthrowing Anti-Christ" (Cohn, 1967:265). It is easy to see how people caught up in a movement such as this can become gripped with what Cohn calls a "megalomaniac sense of mission" (1967:265).

In its most elaborate form this self-justificatory part of a movement's teachings addresses three themes: the placing of the movement in a historical context—where does it fit into important historical patterns?; plotting the destiny of the movement—what part will it play in bringing about a better tomorrow?; and some identification of who joins and what it means to be a member—what is the true status of those who have grasped the truth?

In placing the movement in a historical context the leader seeks to escape the label of "fad" or "craze" which tends to be placed on new and deviant ideas and practices. He also thereby endeavors to make the movement respectable by linking it with the society's tradition (Cf. Turner and Killian, 1957:328). Thus Robert DePugh named his modern group of sup-patriots after a band of settlers who distinguished themselves near the start of the Revolutionary War against the British, in this way firmly aligning himself with the staunchest and earliest defenders of American ideals. DePugh claimed that one of his ancestors had fought with the Minutemen and had been hanged as a traitor. By thus tracing himself and his movement back to the very foundation of the country, he symbolized his commitment to its foundation ideals and by referring to the labeling of his ancestor he succeeded in casting doubt on the badge of traitor which modern extremists such as himself continually court. A similar procedure is found among movements which make their appeal to "the people," claiming to represent and speak for the masses. In this context the concept of "the people" means not mere public opinion but some quasi-mystical conception of the "soul" or ineffable "spirit" of the lower orders. Many demagogues (William Jennings Bryan is a conspicuous example) have attracted huge followings on the basis of their claims to be close to the hearts and minds of the people. "In the name of the people" thus becomes the ulti-

mate justification of the movement's actions, and a way of avoiding partisan or particularistic identifications.

Movements which have a mythical base trace out a mythical history for themselves. Thus in 1933 Arthur Bell told his newly formed Mankind United that the idea for the movement had been broached as long ago as 1875 when a "small group of generous and deeply sincere men and women met for the purpose of dedicating their lives and their fortunes to the establishment of a world-wide commercial organization which would by its "works" as well as its "words" fittingly commemorate the birth of mankind's greatly beloved exemplar and way-shower—Christ Jesus" (Dohrman, 1958:2). The actual establishment of the movement then became part of an overall plan, long laid down, and its members found themselves embroiled in something altogether more important than their meager numbers and flimsy organization would suggest.

Leaders, especially those espousing total ideologies, invariably proclaim a "mission," by which they mean to convey an inevitable and preordained link between their movement and the task ahead. The most profound sense of mission is one which has been divinely given. The millennial tradition within Christianity has proved a rich mine for such ideas. Although it is true that millennialism embraces the idea of supernatural intervention in world affairs, there is strong potential for activism in these beliefs. The sense of mission imparted by a belief in having been chosen to usher in the new age gives a profound sense of operating in accordance with a predetermined divine plan.

A sense of mission is important even for those movements which pursue limited changes. Townsend encouraged his supporters to think of themselves as Christian Crusaders and went further than the slogan "God is on our side" to claim that the Townsend plan was "God's Plan" and would "Never know defeat" (Holtzman, 1963:57). Movements on the right which are fighting progressive politics under the guise of a defense against Communism have also co-opted the crusading image; the organization run by Billy Hargis calls itself the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade (Wolfinger et al., 1964). Even some of the leaders of Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament made the claim that CND had been "raised up by God" to fill a morality gap in British society.

Finally, the ideology contains some definition of the "elect." This definition has the effect of establishing an identity for the movement's member-

ship, one which usually stresses the wisdom and courage of those who join the movement and their inevitable embroilment in the most crucial events of the times. Would-be members are told either that they have been chosen and therefore must join (a Calvinistic notion of "choice") or that, in the decision to join, they will be demonstrating the wisdom and prudence necessary for inclusion in the elite.

An extremely fruitful source of ideas of election and chosenness is the Bible, particularly the Old Testament ideas of the Israelites as the Chosen People and the New Testament ideas of the "Church of God" on earth. The chosen people myth has achieved its most literal interpretation in the legends about the lost ten tribes of Israel which tell of the dispersion of the ancient Israelites by the Romans and their subsequent loss of identity and consciousness. The idea that there must be somewhere inheritors of God's covenant has proved irresistibly attractive to many deprived people influenced by Christianity. The radical sects of the English Puritan Revolution, the Ranters and Fifth Monarchy Men, firmly believed their descentance from the lost tribes (Wilson, 1968:73-74); Joseph Smith believed the American Indians to be the Israelites and treated them with great reverence. The Ras Tafari brethren regard the Negro race as the lost tribes, exiled to the West Indies as punishment for their transgressions of the law. It is reported that the belief was current among the Zulu and even some of the followers of the Congolese prophet Kimbangu endorsed this belief (Lanternari, 1963:42). There is a group of Blacks which, even in contemporary Harlem, cling to the belief that they are descendants of the tribes of Israel. The Commandment Keepers Congregation of the Living God is the latest in a long line of movements appealing to the Harlemite on the basis that the Black person is in truth an Ethiopian Jew and therefore part of the divinely chosen race. In accordance with their belief in Jewish identity, they speak Hebrew as a sacred language, espouse a form of Judaism, eat Kosher foods, adhere to Old Testament dietary rules, and celebrate Jewish holidays. The notion of electness, of the change of identity and consciousness which this entails, is so important to this group that it has become their overriding concern, overshadowing all other aspects of the religion. "In terms of this myth they have a new conception of themselves as no longer despised pariahs but rather as a chosen people, with a proud past and a triumphant future" (Brotz, 1970:89).

It is readily understandable that the gratifications afforded by the convic-

tion that one is part of the elect or chosen few become so highly valued that the *purposes* for which one has been chosen are lost sight of. The sense of election thus becomes an end in itself. There is certainly an intrinsic appeal in this reworking of a people's ancestry, especially when times are out of joint and continuity and a sense of the present relevance of the past is in short supply. This appeal is especially potent for social groups burdened with seemingly inescapable, negative, present identities. There are in it comforts of a direct, therapeutic kind that go only with the idea of election which, in the general enthusiasm of the past it releases, provides an agreeable diversion from the troubles of the present. Fernandez has called the construction of myths about divine ancestry "The elaboration of a microcosm in which to dwell" (1970:440). Another movement which illustrates this idea equally well is the Moorish-American Science Temple, founded in Newark, New Jersey, in 1913 by Timothy Drew, and still active. Drew styled himself Noble Drew Ali and claimed to be a prophet ordained by Allah. Drew Ali conceived the idea that American Negroes could achieve salvation simply by making themselves into Asiatics, specifically by claiming ancestry from the ancient Moabites (Fauset, 1944).

The idea of having been specially chosen to perform the task or mission the movement proclaims is rarely taken so literally, however, and most religious movements have been content merely to define themselves more spiritually as the "congregation," "church," or "army" of God and therefore as the elect in terms of grace and favor. Probably the best known case is the Jehovah's Witnesses, who claim that only 144,000 will be granted a place in heaven. Other movements have made similar claims, arguing that not only do they occupy a special place in history (and *must* be supported for that reason) but the people who do have sense enough to accept their truth are, by that token, members of the elect. Thus the Christadelphians, a movement with a keen anticipation of the end of the world, believe that "only those who have been acquainted with the essential truths as Christadelphians understand them, are eligible for resurrection" (Wilson, 1961:225). As a means of inducing people to join together in collective protest, the promise of being "in the vanguard" has at least a bandwagon effect by its implicit threat that those who join late might be excluded. If the movement can generate a bandwagon feeling, then it is likely to be highly successful in its mobilization efforts, for people must not only be convinced that this movement and no other association provides the solu-

tion to their problems but that there are strong reasons for them joining with it now. The most powerful inducement of this kind is the idea that it might soon be too late to enjoy the benefits offered by the movement. Lofland has shown how effective this suggestion can be in getting people mobilized behind a millennialist belief. The message of the Divine Precepts he studied was that those who joined before the end of the world became *too* evident would attract special attention from God. As one member put it: "Those who get in early, will be in on the ground floor of something big" (1966:48-49). The vanguard idea performs another important mobilizing function. As the potential convert looks at the movement he is being invited to join he might be dismayed by its lack of numbers and think joining it is a hopeless venture. Social movements thus experience the difficulties faced by all minority groups of reconciling their often minute size with the grandiose schemes they have laid out for themselves. Ideas of special election can achieve this reconciliation by using a kind of "yeast" analogy. In other words, although the movement is small (and is perhaps destined to remain so) and the task is huge, only a small band of dedicated, skilled, and active people are needed for its accomplishment. Such a belief can also rationalize relatively small increments in support and assuage disappointments at losses. Occasionally, the promise is much more extravagant, however. It is reported that joining the movement and learning its formulas will infuse the convert with supernatural powers. If successful, this achieves mobilization in its most literal sense because people are not only activated but also prepared for battle. In some admittedly extreme examples, the Sioux became convinced that donning the ghost shirt would give them protective powers against the white man's bullets (Kobben, 1960:121). The rebelling Maoris of New Zealand believed that the same result could be achieved in the face of colonial Englishmen by shouting the word "Hau!" (Burridge, 1969:12). Alice Lenshinas' followers in the Lumpa movement are said to have believed during their armed resistance of 1964 that crying "Jericho!" would turn bullets into water (Roberts, 1970:554).

Quasi-magical beliefs such as these are a rather extreme manifestation of what is quite a common phenomenon. The fact is that to mobilize people to action, especially those not normally politically or socially aware, it is usually necessary to alter people's self-conceptions, to change their minds about what things they are capable of doing. The initial breakout of Black youth in the South came about only when a new political identity (fostered

greatly by the independence of many African nations) had been gained. A new nationalism revived old feelings of Black strength, pride, and competence. For many, then, an overwhelming sense of political impotence stands in the way of mobilization. For others, it is more a sense of shame or embarrassment. It was certainly an obstacle to the mobilization of Suffragette women and it has reappeared among militant homosexuals. Today's homosexual community is beseeched with calls to action by movements like the Gay Liberation Front. Their task is essentially to accomplish a shedding of shame by an isolated and ridiculed people (Teal, 1971:35).

Beliefs of electness add to the mobilizing power of the ideology; if they are accepted, disinterest is inconceivable—it is impossible to stand on the sidelines and watch. They also introduce worthy altruistic motives for becoming active. Being told that one is a world saver is a difficult invitation to resist and one that proves a potent source of identification with a movement in secular as well as religious cases.* Thus the curious and troubled individual listening to Robert DePugh's speeches about the Minutemen is told that the movement (and he too if he joins it) is "America's last line of defense" (Jones, 1968:411). In much the same way, ideologies can help mobilize waverers by presenting strongly Manichean images of society in which a dichotomous categorization of people is the dominant motif. He who is not openly for the cause *must* be against it. Although this does not make people any more ready to believe a given set of teachings, it does make those who have accepted them more ready to align themselves actively and openly with the cause.

In summary, the ideology performs its mobilizing function by connecting immediate social burdens with general ethical principles and thereby stimulating people to action. Day-to-day, routine activities, a necessary component of working for change, are thus meaningfully related to future hopes. Social movements, which cannot turn to coercive or economic incentives for recruitment or commitment, rely heavily on ideological pronouncements to provide the necessary fuel for activism and hard work. Ideology is indispensable in relating the irksome duties of the social activist in whatever cause with the grand scheme of things which is the movement's main appeal.

* "Commitment to the Bruderhof cause is . . . engendered in two ways: through the desire to be on the winning side, and through the feeling that one's services are desperately needed" (Zablocki, 1971:29).

The ideology is a message which speaks to the deprived, the lonely, and the anxious. The ideology brings new hope, new meaning, and new assurance, but it also demands action. Ideology is, therefore, the vital bridge between attitude and action, between thinking and doing. Ideology is, however, only a set of ideas, symbolically expressed in writings, speeches, and other modes of transmission, to which the discontented must be exposed before they can be mobilized to action. A simple but necessary additional part of the process of mobilization is contact. Contact can be made in a number of ways, depending on structural conditions (Is there freedom of association?), on the way the ideology is spread (Is there widespread dissemination of the movement's teachings?) and on the leadership of the movement. If it is ideas that raise consciousness, it is the carrier of these ideas that effects the mobilization to action. Thus, it is, for example, the leader *and* his message ("I am the way, the truth and the light") which mobilizes people for collective action. In this sense, the leader plays a crucial role in creating movements out of diffuse activities.

To describe the circumstances under which attitudes become action, it is necessary to look closely at the process of becoming a member. This means that attention must be paid to patterns and processes of interaction, for although the ideology, as a system of ideas, does much to generate focused responses to discontent such that people become convinced that a particular social movement is the answer to their troubles, this understanding is not necessarily translated into action on behalf of that movement. Disaffected people have to meet, air opinions, and express their feelings before collective action can get under way. This interactive phrase is a formative process in its own right, seriously affecting the outcome.

There is statistical evidence which indicates that for most people the act of joining is facilitated by established friendship or associational ties between the members of the movement and the potential convert. In other words, mobilization depends as much on interpersonal contact through channels which have favorable connotations for the individual as it does on a more remote ideological appeal. Evidence is presented in a number of studies which suggests that people who join social movements do so partly because people in the groups to which they already belong have begun to do so.* It seems that in the process of becoming a member, participation in

* In Pinard's view (1971:182-183), this point can be generalized to include all "intermediate groupings." In other words, social movements are much more likely

one group facilitates entrance into another (Orum, 1971:13-14). In their studies among Pentecostals, Gerlach and Hine found the establishment of contact with the movement through "a neighbor to be extremely important in understanding how people made the decision to join." They studied several Pentecostal assemblies to investigate this phenomenon and found that:

Of the twenty-one members, three had been brought up in a Pentecostal church and had therefore been recruited by parents. Four of the adult converts had been drawn in by a relative, a brother, a spouse, a mother, and an aunt. Five experienced their first contact with the movement through a couple whom they had all known previously and intimately in a fundamentalist religious service organization. One came into Pentecostalism because of the witness of a neighbor, one had been a friend of the pastor and his brother, and one was introduced to the idea of the Baptism of the Holy Spirit by a close friend with whom she had both worked and spent most of her leisure time. Six young people who had been a closely knit social group for several years were recruited by one of their number who lived for a time with the pastor and his family.

In another group, a larger, independent church, the sample of fifty-six represented about three-fourths of the total membership. Of these, fifty-two percent had been converted to Pentecostalism through a relative, twelve percent by friends, eight percent by an employer-employee or similar over-relationship. Only four percent reported that they had been introduced to Pentecostalism through the radio broadcasts sponsored by the church or because they had simply wandered by the church and stopped in. Twenty-four percent reported that they had been drawn into the movement by the direct action of God (1970:79-80).

Gerlach and Hine were sufficiently convinced of the widespread significance of such contacts to conclude that a "close association with a committed 'witness' is empirically far more explanatory than facilitating conditions such as 'deprivation' and 'social disorganization'" (1970:82). They also found that although many people had been attracted into Pentecostalism by siblings, this had happened only when the relationship had been very positive. Lofland discovered a similar phenomenon. Members of the Divine Precepts had been induced to join through prior friendships with those al-

to get off the ground where there exist organizations and social networks which have communication effects. This amounts to a rejection of the mass society thesis (Kornhauser, 1959) which sees movements as being more common where there are no intermediate groupings. Parkin (1968:16) also rejects the mass society idea. His CND respondents appeared to be well integrated into a broad range of social activities and institutions.

ready in the group (1966:53). In a slightly different context (in this case the decision to vote for a third party), support for a third party was found to be very much influenced by one's primary group holding favorable attitudes toward the party (Pinard, 1971:200).

These few findings advise a much closer look at the process of becoming a member. The subjective meaning of the social movement for those who are actively involved or in the process of becoming involved has been ignored for too long. In recognition of this neglect Lofland has formulated a model which sets out the interactive process through which mobilization is typically negotiated. This model does not picture structural tensions and personal frustrations "pushing" people into social movements. Instead it concentrates upon the situational aspects of the mobilization process. To illustrate, once discontent has been aroused, the next necessary step would be "the development or presence of some positive, emotional, interpersonal response" (Lofland, 1966:51). Final conversion seems to be as often as not a matter of "coming to accept the opinion of one's friends" (Lofland, 1966:52). The ultimate goal of mobilization (to make the individual a "deployable agent" of the movement) is achieved only once a pattern of intensive interaction with people already in the movement has been established (Lofland, 1966:57).

At this point, it is necessary to ask: If ideology and discontent are such a vital conjuncture, is it correct to anticipate the appearance of social movements whenever the two are found together? The answer to this question is no, for, clearly, the discontented do not receive the ideology in a vacuum and their response to it is not totally unconditioned by the options and choices for action to which they have already been accustomed. The extent to which collective action is energized by the ideology, the extent to which collective sentiments can coalesce in a new and public form, depends very much on the social circumstances in which the message is heard. The social structure determines whether social unrest coalesces in new forms, is channeled off into activities which do not threaten the status quo, or simply remains diffused and underground. Even where social movements do emerge, the social structure will influence their shape and scope. The question must be put, then: What are the structural determinants of the nature of social protest?

According to Smelser, there are three aspects of social structure which have been historically influential in the rise of social movements. The first

is the extent and character of structural differentiation; the second is the presence or absence of institutionalized opportunities for the expression of grievances and the reconciliation of conflict; and third is the state of the channels of communication (1963:278–287; 319–338). Each of these structural features has something to say about the extent to which social unrest becomes crystallized in collective protest action. It is important that they be considered in turn.

Structural Differentiation

Structural differentiation is a concept used to describe the way in which societies tend to become differentiated into separate substructures. This happens both horizontally and vertically. Horizontal differentiation is a functional separation of norms and values; vertical differentiation is a functional separation of specialized institutions. The question in the first case is simply that of judging the extent to which a society customarily regards its social rules as expedients which can be rationalized by its values but which are not necessarily implied by them or as being a part of the sacred order itself and therefore indistinguishable from values with regard to how inviolable they are thought to be. The last condition is most typical of theocracies in which the most particular social rules—concerning work, diet, and etiquette—are thought to be part of the divine order. It is also a condition found in societies with ideological systems such as Communism in which great care must be taken to obtain an ideological sanction for changes to be made in even the most particular rules. Even in highly pluralistic societies, however, there exist “pockets” of this type of fundamentalism in which people identify particular norms with the values of the society to such an extent that they react indignantly to reform at the normative level as if it were a subversion of fundamental values. Under conditions of low structural differentiation of this kind, no attempt at normative change will be allowed to remain at that level even if it is originally conceived as such. Thus, movements to reform the tax privileges of the clergy during the Middle Ages were interpreted as heresy; the early trade unionists were labeled revolutionaries, Anarchists, and Communists; and modern Catholics agitating for abortion law reform are called heretics. The distinction between norms and values is thus extremely variable and not always clearly

known. Although the separation of norms and values is greater in modern societies than in traditional ones, it is not always possible to organize collective protest against a given law simply because it is thought to be a fundamental constituent of the society's value system. Those seeking change are thus forced into an all-or-nothing situation in which they have to set themselves outside the pale of society altogether in order to change just a part of it. For some, this step is too big. The rest are pushed into revolution.

The second type of structural differentiation refers to:

... the ways through which the main social functions of the major institutional spheres of society become disassociated from one another, attached to specialized collectivity and roles, and organized in relatively specific and autonomous symbolic and organizational frameworks within the confines of the same institutional system (Eisenstadt, 1964:376).

In societies which are highly differentiated it is possible to seek to alter one institution without posing a threat to the other—as, for instance, with movements which seek educational reform without attempting to alter the political structure. Where differentiation is low, revolutionary movements are likely. Landsberger suggests that peasant movements are more likely to be revolutionary where there is no clear separation between economic institutions and noneconomic sectors such as in the case where the church and government are landowners (1969:32–33).

A high degree of vertical differentiation has two consequences. The first is that social divisions are less likely to coalesce—the boundaries of conflicting groups, such as race, religion, class, and politics do not coincide. The second is that the Establishment is not monolithic—there is no power elite but a number of centers of authority, one of which can be challenged without threatening the others. The overall consequence is a structure which facilitates the emergence of reform-oriented movements rather than those seeking total change. Thus, Landsberger notes that “peasant organizations in modern societies are likely to set goals more modest and more specifically confined to the economic sector than peasants in a feudal type of society” (1969:35). Even in the most highly differentiated societies, value-oriented movements are not absent, of course, but noticeably they arise in “pockets” of lack of differentiation or during periods when the differentiation is thought to have broken down.

Channels of Protest

If there exist plentiful and "efficient" channels for the expression of grievances then it is unlikely that a social movement will arise at all. If there are no opportunities to express dissatisfaction in a way which will influence the authorities, then agitation will be forced outside the system altogether. If the channels do exist but they are thought to be clogged, inefficient, or too slow, then one object of protest will be the creation of new forms of interest articulation (but without attempting to undermine the whole system). Norm-oriented movements are likely in the last case. They arise because institutional methods of reform are felt to be inadequate. This is the case where interest groups and parties do not perform their function of interest articulation and aggregation and as a consequence demands reach the polity in a "raw" form. Both the Townsend movement and CND, for example, lacked trust in the channels traditionally provided for the expression of grievance although they did not lose all faith in the ways decisions were made. For a long time Townsend carried hopes of winning over a majority of congressmen, and CND at one stage sought and won the support of the Labor party.

Where channels of protest are completely closed, then those seeking change (if they are to collectively pursue their objectives) must operate in an uninstitutionalized manner and will be pushed toward the pursuit of more radical goals. Cole, in his history of Chartism (1941), relates how working men were driven into this movement by the successive closure of other opportunities for redressing grievances such as the franchise, the law, and trade unionism. Other workers expressed their disillusionment in a different way by supporting the utopianism of Robert Owen. Gaston Rimmlinger (1960) has shown how the existence of a tradition of political and religious dissent in England made it possible for the British miner to protest his conditions of employment without attacking the basic character of political institutions and authority. The lack of such legitimate channels in Germany made the protest of miners there much more revolutionary, pushing them toward a much more definite break with society.

In a completely different context, Worsley describes how responses to colonialism in Melanesia took many forms, including armed uprising, strikes, and cooperatives, but as each of these were suppressed by the authorities, so

the people became more susceptible to the appeals of the Cargo cult and its supernatural solutions (1968:46-48). As a final example, Cohn suggests that the significant factor in the recurrence of millennial movements during the Middle Ages was that the marginal population of landless, unskilled, and underemployed who made up the bulk of the membership of these movements had no regular institutionalized channels for voicing their grievances and pressing their claims (Cohn, 1970a:315).

Lest too much emphasis be placed on the negative aspects of the factor of structural conduciveness it is important to note that the social structure may not merely allow noninstitutionalized social protest but actually encourage it as well. Take as an example California, a state long known for its susceptibility to mass movements. During the 1930's and 1940's, much of the discontent of old people with their financial position was channeled through the Townsend organization in a movement which began in California. By the 1950's, that movement had largely faded from the scene and its role was assumed by a movement led by George McLain. The continued vitality of the tradition of dissent and, of course, the prior existence of many other similar movements in the state such as Technocracy, Epic, and "Ham 'n' Eggs" suggests that here is a social structure particularly conducive to mass politics.* Pinner has offered some suggestions as to why this should be so (1959:7-10).

1. Political parties are traditionally weak in California, which means that nonpartisan movements find it much easier to attract the support of the voters than in many other states.
2. Californians are highly mobile both geographically and socially. The result is that ties to orthodox political groups are attenuated, thus freeing many people to support new movements.
3. The California constitution is susceptible to comparatively easy amendment by popular majority, thus encouraging a style of politics based on direct appeals and popular agitation, rather than mediated through regular channels.

* Technocracy was founded in 1933. It was a movement advocating that the administration of the country be put in the hands of engineers and the monetary system be based on measurements of energy, in the belief that the solution of economic problems was basically an engineering one, a matter of efficient coordination of the output of energy. Its founder was Howard Scott who expounded his views in a book called *Science Versus Chaos* (1933). EPIC (End Poverty in California) was a movement headed by Upton Sinclair, who advocated a plan to relieve unemployment by setting up self-sustaining production and distribution cooperatives. He also made proposals to change the tax system in favor of the poor and give pensions to old people (Sinclair, 1933).

4. The constitution provides for an initiative referendum whereby issues can be placed on the normal ballot by popular demand.

The overall result is that people are much more disposed to become impatient with traditional methods of protest and to see noninstitutionalized methods as encouraging and attractive. As Pinner's analysis suggests, in looking for structurally conducive factors, one must look not only for the lack of inhibiting circumstances but also for the presence of encouraging features in the social environment.

Channels of Communication

Unless there are channels of communication open, the dissemination of ideas and the mobilization of opinion is restricted. In many societies, for example, attempts have been made to control ideas through propaganda, censorship, and strict control of the means of communication. During the Middle Ages, the Church entered into an alliance with the state to impose religious uniformity largely through these means. More recently, societies such as Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and most of the Communist countries have sought to exercise control over the channels of communication, using up-to-date and highly technical means to do so.

In the reverse case, where channels of communication are open, where the number of channels is great and where the number of people reached by them is large, the spread of unorthodox ideas and beliefs is much facilitated because people are much more visible to one another and the news of new movements and personalities disseminates with greater speed. This situation is characteristic of most modern democratic societies which possess norms of freedom of speech and association.

Although channels of communication may be sufficiently open to allow new ideas and information to be spread, this in itself is not a sufficient condition for the regular interchange of ideas which is the prerequisite of movement growth. Close observation of a number of movements suggests that, in addition to a general freedom of communication, more specific, preexisting channels are usually necessary, especially in the early days of the movement's growth. In other words, young movements typically borrow channels of influence developed by older organizations in order to

reach a wider constituency. For example, the first of the contemporary civil-rights movements among Blacks in the USA such as SCLC made use of communication channels already in existence. News of the movement and its activities was spread through the literature and the personnel of the Negro churches (King, 1958:70). The same communication channels (the churches, in this case Methodist) are thought to have played an important part in the crystallization of workers' movements in nineteenth-century England (Wearmouth, 1937), and more generally in the formation of the Prohibition movement (Gusfield, 1963). It seems likely that CND owed its rapid growth to its use of the contacts and literature of left-wing political groups and some of the more progressive religious denominations like the Quakers and Unitarians. The left-wing also considerably assisted the birth control movement in this way, the Wobblies helping Margaret Sanger distribute copies of *Woman Rebel* (Douglas, 1970:49).*

Structural conditions also play a part in deciding whether a social movement will make its appeal in religious or secular terms. Although recently the emphasis has been on the similarities between religious and secular movements (Cf. Yinger, 1971:190-191), the problem still remains of explaining why one type of response rather than another occurs. It is important to know under what circumstances people react to deprivation directly and under what circumstances their reaction takes other channels which are institutionally different but functionally equivalent. There is an increasing awareness that discontent in itself is no reliable indicator of the type of ideology which gains currency as an interpretation of it. It seems that to a considerable degree, the extent to which the movement is infused with religious imagery is dependent on the nature of the society in which the discontent originates.

Religious ideologies tell people how to achieve salvation. Religious responses to social distress are more likely to occur in societies where a religious world view is diffused and where secular opportunities for the ex-

* SDS arose out of the old League for Industrial Democracy and was encouraged in its early days by the old left. The first of its big conventions was held at the United Automobile Workers' center at Port Huron in Michigan. Landsberger (1969:56) notes the use of dissident religious sects as communication links in the early stages of the German Peasant movements of the fifteenth century. In another case, in a completely different context, the failure of a social movement to grow beyond a local community organization has been attributed to the absence of these kinds of communication channels (Jackson et al., 1960).

pression of grievances have not separated out. This helps to explain, for instance, why the expression of early nationalist sentiments in the countries of Africa was cast in essentially religious terms. To the African until about the 1930's, the language of politics *was* the language of religion and there was no separate vocabulary. It was natural that any movement which hoped to stir the mass of Africans would couch its message in religious symbols and use a religious metaphysic to justify the cause (Hodgkin, 1956:46). Examples abound in colonial Africa of social movements which couched their nationalist aspiration in religious terms. This was only partly a defense and subterfuge against the possibility of European suppression.* The most prominent of these movements were Kimbanguism, a millennialist movement which arose in the Belgian Congo during the 1920's, and various "Kitawala" or Watchtower movements which arose in a number of African countries as a response to the teachings of the Jehovah's Witnesses' missionaries (Cf. Lauternari, 1963). Though apparently religious phenomena, these movements rapidly assumed a political aspect, becoming the basis of a rudimentary form of nationalism. The apocalyptic teachings of the Watchtower movement in particular proved well adapted to providing mythical support for attempts at subversion. Kimbanguism was, in effect, the starting point of national awareness in the Congo in its conscious striving to transcend the limits of clan and tribe. Movements among the Jews under Roman colonialism such as the Essenes and the Christians can quite convincingly be interpreted as movements of religious nationalism (Cf. Brandon, 1966).

Drawing on a wide range of comparative material, both Cohn and Worsley note that, in addition to their claim to divine status or privilege, leaders of religious movements have usually sought to establish a political identity as well. In the colonial situation, the likelihood of a religious response to distress is enhanced not only by the religiosity of the indigenous culture but also by the colonial authorities. The first missionaries, for instance, not only established an ethic whereby conversion and religious zeal were rewarded in material terms but also brought with them a religious in-

* In other words, in many societies of Africa the fusion of political and religious appeals is not a "problem" because the distinction has never been made. "Most Africans are religious, and it is hardly surprising that indigenous dissatisfactions with colonial rule should have found a variety of religious contexts within which to elaborate and seek redress for generalized and quite specific sources of discontent" (Rotberg, 1970:xxiii).

terpretation of European culture. Needless to say, the same situation prevailed in the theocracies of medieval Europe where many political-religious movements flourished. In undifferentiated societies, the likelihood is, then, that all political protest will be expressed in religious terms. But the reverse does not apply. It is not necessary that all religious protest be interpreted as covert political protest. Political protest, if that means criticism, opposition, and hostility to the colonial authorities, was largely absent from one of the most famous and best reported of African protest movements, the Aladura Church of the Lord which arose in Nigeria in the 1920's. This movement attracted a wide following among the Yoruba and persists to this day. By most of its interpreters the movement is seen as a response to pure religious strains, caused by the clash of Yoruba and Christian cultures. It has not become a political protest because strain in the religious systems did not coalesce with strains at other points in the system (Mitchell, 1970:492-493).*

If the social situation can be described as one in which a religious world view is widely diffused such that it permeates most of social life, if traditions exist which interpret individual and social problems in religious terms, and if secular channels for reconstituting the social structure are absent, then the likelihood of religious responses to social distress is very great. This is clearly the case in most premodern societies. But religious movements continue to arise in modern, apparently secular, societies. How is this to be accounted for? There are two circumstances which encourage the growth of religious movements in contemporary society. The first is the persistence of structurally undifferentiated subcultures where religion remains a pervasive and meaningful referent in the daily lives of the people. Regional examples are the Appalachian South, which provided a fertile seedbed for the snake-handling cults described by La Barre (1962) and perhaps the whole of the Bible Belt, in which religion and politics remain closely fused. Or such a subculture may persist in ethnic communities. Here

* It is quite common for religious movements to be attributed latent functions of political mobilization, having their chief appeal to oppressed social groups. It would be wrong, however, to assume that this is always the case. Schwartz (1970:111) points out that the intensely held millennialist beliefs among the Seventh Day Adventists have not increased their political mobilization but have led to a heightened concern for one's position in the world, in which life is worth living actively and purposively. He detected "no disguised appeal to oppressed strata to overthrow these who exploit them."

the West Indian community in London may be cited as an example, for these migrants brought with them a religious world view from the West Indies which they have not surrendered to the ambient secular society. Calley observed a proliferation of Pentecostal sects among these people (1965). An American example, which is much more widespread, is the storefront church which, according to Fauset, is populated by the Black migrant to the urban North, looking for new forms of community and escape from the alien city (1944).

The second circumstance under which religious responses arise in secular contexts is a biographical one. For many people, even in the most modern society, the religious response to problems of meaning is something they have always known and see no reason to dispense with. In-depth studies of cult adherents in two movements suggest very strongly that "seekership" plays an important role in leading people to religious movements. Thus, Lofland's "Divine Precepts" group was made up of people who had rejected conventional religions as inadequate sources of meaning for them, but retained their general propensity to place religious interpretations on events (1966). In a quite similar group, known as the "Seekers," the leader and her initial converts came from deeply religious backgrounds and had long histories of seeking, always in a religious problem-solving perspective. The founder, Mrs. Keech, had successively immersed herself in Theosophy, the "I Am" movement, Oahspe, Scientology, and a flying saucer cult. Her two most important converts, a husband and wife, had engaged in a similar odyssey of occult searching, passing successively through Hinduism, Oahspe, Theosophy, Rosicrucianism, New Thought, the I Am movement, a flying saucer cult, and finally to the millennialism of the Seekers (Festinger, 1964:33-41).^{*} The religious movement thus remains a potent force even in contemporary society, for both those living in social worlds where religion is still the most immediate and everyday response and for those deeply troubled by personal tribulations but unable to rest content with orthodox religious messages.

The formation of religious movements as a response to social unrest may

^{*} The leader of the Divine Precepts in America, Yoon Sook Lee, had undergone an odyssey of similar proportions. She had "surreptitiously participated in a variety of little Korean tongues-speaking and prophetic groups, attended Swedenborgian churches while in Canada, and was an ardent student of all manner of heterodox figures" (Lofland, 1966:45).

still be common in modern times, but it is probably true that, in general, the likelihood of social movements occurring with strong religious imagery and symbolism is declining and that discontent is becoming secularized. The state has usurped the churches' role as the institution of ultimate responsibility. Thus when people revolt, they revolt against the state just as they used to split off from the church. And yet, despite this trend, it is important that the role played by religious preconceptions in modern culture is not lost sight of. They continue to govern the nature of the response to social discontents which people will make. The search for economic security and political power are undoubtedly of increasing importance as motivational factors generating many instances of social protest, but motives such as these can be exaggerated at the expense of the creative and expressive gratification, many of them expressed in religious symbolism, which protest movements afford. Religious movements should not be looked upon as aberrant and irrational responses to discontent, at least no more so than many political reactions to stress. Not only is a religious interpretation of tribulations still the first at hand for many people but an available secular alternative may appear even more remote and impractical. It is *not* therefore something for which extraordinary "pushes" have to be found. The secular response is often no more "rational" (as far as the observer is in a position to judge) than the option of some supernatural solution. It is rarely the case that social problems are experienced in a vacuum of tradition and prior notions, which usually means that the kind of solution endorsed will be affected to a greater extent by the culture and social structure than by people's ability to "correctly" diagnose their problems.

A final, but very important, influence on the formation of social movements is the attitude taken by other people toward the first signs of social unrest. Social movements do not grow so much as emerge as properties arising out of conflict situations in which the definition of the legitimacy of the movement and its objectives is a matter to be negotiated. The public at large plays a diffuse role in this process of emergence, but it is only as an audience for the struggle between two combatants, between the embryonic social movement and either a hostile government or (where the government chooses to remain aloof) countermovements.

The position taken by the authorities on the activities of dissenters varies widely, depending mainly on the extent to which they are seen as a threat to the legitimacy of government operations. There are some circumstances

under which the government will see the social movement as an ally or at least as a tool which the government can use. This is the case where those in power agree with the movement's aims (at least in part) but cannot overtly or strongly support it. The Prohibition drive benefited from the support of the state and local governments even if this was sometimes tardily and covertly given. The temperance workers in turn saw themselves as on the side of the government and the religious establishment, helping them to enforce their own stated ideals. Much the same could be said of the civil-rights movement which received late, and rather half-hearted, support from a government which seemed to be aiming more to please both sides of the conflict at the same time rather than resolve the issue one way or another. It was only after one side, the state of Alabama, had escalated the conflict that the federal government stepped in.

If the authorities see no utility in the movement and feel no threat, then the movement will be "officially" ignored. But if they feel uncertain about the ultimate significance of a movement they will, while openly tolerating it, try to inhibit its activities. The Townsend movement was restricted by the government. President Roosevelt considered the plan a fraud and ordered a congressional investigation which seriously impaired the movement's growth. The congressional committee was extremely hostile to Townsend and tried to discredit him in the eyes of the general public by using quotations out of context, tricking witnesses into damaging confessions and exposing Townsend's economic ignorance (Holtzman, 1963:161). Because of the widespread support of this movement, however, including its endorsement by certain congressmen, the government could hardly suppress the movement outright. The authorities were faced with the same dilemma with regard to the Suffragette movement. In its nonmilitant phase, this movement was not seen as a serious threat and was largely ignored by governments on both sides of the Atlantic. When it became militant, the government attempted to forcibly restrain its activities, albeit with considerable hesitancy. Part of the support for the movement came from members of the aristocracy, and many left-wing politicians in England were sympathetic to the cause. In England, the Conservative government also took a hostile attitude toward CND but, knowing that many of its supporters were powerful Labor party politicians and influential spokesmen in the universities, they moved with extreme caution against it. A religious movement which received similarly ambivalent treatment from the Establishment and

thus found itself forced into a marginal position was MRA. The orthodox churches did all they could to prevent the spread of Buchman's teachings and yet many significant personages came forward to give the movement their support and endorsement. The Church of England could not totally condemn MRA when an uncle of the King was an active worker for the cause.

The initial response of the authorities can affect the radicalism of social movements. If government officials "overinterpret" the demands or the threat imposed by a reform movement and adopt coercive measures as a response, a mild, reformist movement might be pushed into more revolutionary aims. The French government's coercive response to demands for academic reform by Parisian students in May 1968 helped push many students into more revolutionary activity. Smelser believes that the Indian mutiny of 1857 provoked such harsh countermeasures on the part of the British colonial authorities that reform movements were effectively stifled. The result, paradoxically, was a successful national independence movement (1963:309).

When the government sees the movement as a fundamental threat to its legitimacy, then it will attempt to eliminate the group. The Black Panther Party has been defined as revolutionary by the American government, hence its subjection to all sorts of repressive measures—police harassment, wire tappings, raids on branch offices, and so on. Similarly, the reaction of the British government to the Chartists' proposals was to define the movement as revolutionary. In 1839, Chartist groups were banned as seditious, greatly intensifying the militancy of the movement. This move also provoked the establishment of a much more firmly based organizational structure. Religious movements which have posed a threat to government legitimacy have also been suppressed. Millennial movements in medieval Europe were customarily extinguished after being labeled as heretical. The Anabaptists' attempt to set up the Kingdom of God through the forcible occupation of Munster was very quickly nipped in the bud. The Flagellants, another branch of the Anabaptist movement, were also condemned as heretical in a Papal Bull issued in 1349 and quickly suppressed. According to Barrett, the Ras Tafari brethren, which began in Jamaica as a purely religious sect, has undergone much the same kind of treatment. Its early activities were greeted in a hostile fashion by the colonial administrator who tended to see the movement as a political threat. As a consequence, its

leaders became increasingly aware of the political nature of their position and secularized their message to the extent of deemphasizing the notion of a return to Ethiopia and accentuating the idea of politically bettering conditions in Jamaica (1968:74). Religious movements in secular societies are not usually seen as mounting a political threat, however, and they are therefore more or less tolerated. It is only when, like the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Doukhobors, they come into direct conflict with government ordinances that some attempt is made to control them. Even then it is not so much the substantive issue that is important as its function as a symbol of the potential weakness of the authorities.

Social control is usually vested in official institutionalized agencies such as the law courts, the police, the military, and those who have authority over them. But social control may also be exercised less formally and even illegally. Where the powers of the state have been limited, many movements have been subjected to intense pressure to cease their activities. The Mormons were twice forced to flee in the face of physical harassment and Joseph Smith was lynched by a vigilante group. The Quakers have long been the subject of public hostility; in seventeenth-century England they were subjected to arson and physical assault in the absence of police protection. In New England in the same century periodic witchhunts were mounted to weed out nonconformists; in the American South in the 1950's, white participants in the Black civil-rights movement found themselves beaten and insulted by the state police; and during the period of the greatest trade union formation in both England and the United States, factory owners set up unofficial and harshly oppressive police forces to obstruct the picketing and soliciting of the unions.

Just as government action is a response to the activities of the movement, so the movement in turn reacts to these responses by modifying its public posture. Social movements are, then, a process rather than a product, constantly being shaped by, and responding to, their environment. In this sense the authorities act as an interactive component in the etiology of social movements. The government's authority, not only to control the movement but also to define it on behalf of the general public, is the source of tremendous power. Largely because of this the Black Panther Party has not succeeded in establishing itself as a force for the defense and establishment of autonomy for the Black community, but has instead appeared as a small but powerful and determined group of barely literate, weapon-wielding, vi-

olent revolutionaries, bent on destroying the American system. FBI Director Hoover described the Panthers as a "black extremist organization" consisting mostly of "hoodlum type revolutionaries"; Vice President Agnew referred to them as a "completely irresponsible, anarchist group of criminals" and Attorney General Mitchell stated that "the Panthers are a threat to national security" (Foner, 1970:x). The attitude of the authorities can thus play an important part in determining the direction in which the movement will go. The Kimbangu millennial movement, for instance, contained in its final flowering militaristic, antiwhite aspects which were not present in the movement at the beginning. These were elicited in part by the Belgian authorities' alarm at the militant phraseology of the Salvation Army-inspired movement. Innocently dressing themselves up in military uniforms as the "Soldiers of Christ," the followers of Kimbangu were treated as potential revolutionaries and harried and suppressed by the colonial administration. As a reaction, much of the religious imagery of the movement was replaced by political rhetoric, which the authorities then interpreted as a confirmation of their earlier suspicions.

If government action is swift and forceful *and effective*, the movement is likely to be driven underground into subversion. Where the government takes an uncompromising position *but is relatively weak*, then the movement is likely to openly challenge the government's position. This must have been the case with the Anabaptists in Munster. If the government attitude is one of vacillation, then the movement is likely to grow. An ambivalent stand by authorities, a reflection of divided counsels or uncertainty, results in erratic reformism (one step forward and two back) which creates uncertainty and frustration in the population, directly related to a strengthening of support for change. Ambivalence may, of course, be a reflection of weakness rather than indecision. Thus even millennial movements, which are anathema to political regimes in their questioning of the sacred aspects of society, will flourish where "tolerance is a euphemism for the kind of regime which is either not powerful enough to suppress the activities, or which for a variety of reasons is inhibited from deploying the power at its disposal" (Burrige, 1969:34). In a sense, it is essential that a movement encounter *some* degree of opposition, for the voices of orthodoxy help define the stand of the movement even as they denounce it. In so doing, they play an important part in strengthening the group consciousness of the movement and each participant's identity as a member of it. The opposition of

the established churches to the various Pentecostal sects, for instance, seems not to have injured them unduly and in some ways has furthered their cause. The condemnation of tongues-speaking among those already at least partly convinced of its necessity for salvation increases the bridge-burning aspect of the experience. This in turn increases the willingness of the Pentecostal to "step out in the faith" and take risks in other areas of his life (Gerlach and Hine, 1970:183).

Although social control is an important factor in the emergence of social movements, it is not always easy to assess what its significance has been. If the authorities succeed in crushing a movement, then there is no social movement. If the authorities oppose a movement but fail to suppress it, then its growth is likely. But the only way the failure of the forces of social control can be measured is through the emergence of the movement—which is tautological. If it is to function as a predictor variable it should be possible to identify the action of the forces of social control and measure its strength independently of the outcome of the movement. Such a measure is conceivable in theory although there are a number of problems with operationalization. It might be possible to look at (1) the number of specialized agencies available to the government such as the police, the National Guard, or the Army; (2) the efficiency of the government's tools and organization, such as the state of its armory and the skill of its personnel; (3) the extent to which the government makes channels of protest available; (4) the extent to which the government has been successful in the past. Presently, however, the conceptual tools to assess the effects of the forces of social control on emergent social protest are lacking. Predicting the outcome of a particular stance of a particular government to a particular social movement is therefore an extremely hazardous business. The techniques used by the government are frequently so clumsy in the absence of this knowledge that they serve to stimulate rather than contain the movement's influence. The effects of imprisoning versus co-opting leaders, allowing demonstrations as opposed to preventing them, and the usefulness of compromise are all matters about which very little is known at present.

In summary, mobilization is the process whereby action is generated and formed out of social discontent. It has its spark in social conditions which create personal frustrations, intergroup conflicts, and widespread loss of orientation and meaning but is conditioned by a number of factors in the course of its expression. Most important of these is ideology, but of conse-

quence also are mobilizing agents such as leaders, friends, and other group ties. The effectiveness of these mobilizing agents is determined by social structural conditions which govern the extent to which social unrest is allowed expression and how much freedom or encouragement is given for the formation of new collectivities which express deviant norms. Finally, but by no means least important, the emergence of social movements is dependent upon the attitude taken by the forces of social control to the initial expression of discontent in occurrences of social unrest. The public definition of this unrest and the presence or absence of countermovements is also of importance here.

The purpose of this chapter has been to show how, once given the existence of social discontents and given the right conditions, social movements emerge as new social realities, expressing new ideas and performing new actions which provide a more meaningful microcosm for those caught up in the turmoil of change. Implicit in the discussion has been a process model stressing the interaction between social discontents, the circumstances in which they are experienced, the interpretation given to them, and the attitude of those merely witnessing them. There is some sequence implicit in the list of variables presented. As a result of Smelser's work, it is possible to think of these variables or "causes" as being related to one another in some sort of phase sequence such that the presence or absence of an item too soon or too late may make it irrelevant to the process (1963:18-20). The most obvious example is that of the leader who "calls the people out" before their consciousness has been raised by the ideology. Attention must therefore be drawn towards the necessary cumulation of factors, each building upon the other and each in a sense dependent on the other for its relevance and appropriateness.

There are three principal advantages of the process model over a static one (in which the causes of social movements are merely listed), each of which adds greatly to the understanding of social movements (Lofland, 1969:296-297). Social movements are multicausal; the last two chapters have presented a list of these causes. The first advantage is that the process model gives a rationale to the ordering of these variables, emphasizing the fact that prior conditions act conjointly to produce the outcome. Particular attention has been paid, therefore, to the cumulation of factors. The second advantage of the model is its interaction emphasis, the concern it has for the action and reactions of the people involved. Social movements are made

up of people; they are formed by, and grow as the result of, the efforts of people who are conscious, willing agents, perceiving and selecting from their social world. It is necessary, then, in any account of social movement emergence, to take into account the definition of the situation of those people caught up in the eye of the storm. Social unrest and the crystallization of social movements out of it are the action and reaction of people to their subjective experiences of the world around them. The study of social movements thus demands a certain degree of subjectivism to tap the interactive character of their emergence. Finally, the model emphasizes proximate variables, highlighting those happenings which are close to the given outcome, on the assumption that immediate interaction situations are important in influencing the final product—hence the stress on the importance of friendship ties as a variable affecting conversion. Individual conversions or commitment decisions are, of course, how social movements are formed. They are the product of many discrete but interconnected decisions to enter a new life, adopt a new creed, alter an identity. Social movements are not, therefore, things that are “produced” as “units” but are the result of infinitely variable “let’s get together and do something about it” decisions. In the second part of this book, the object is to take a close look at social movements to see how these decisions are made, what effect they have on the lives of the people who make them, and the problems and trials involved in sticking to them.

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