

Problem Set 5: Due Wednesday, December 3.

Problem 1

In this problem, we will work through the problem of a firm that invests, but faces different prices in buying versus selling the investment good. At the start of the period t our firm is going to have capital k and productivity A . Its choice is over k' , how much capital to have at the beginning of the following period. Assume that the value function of the firm is given by:

$$\hat{V}(A, k) = \max_{k'} \frac{r}{\alpha(1+r)} A^{1-\alpha} (k')^\alpha - (k' - k) + \mathbf{1}_{k' < k} (1 - p_s) (k' - k) + \frac{1}{1+r} \mathbb{E} \left[\hat{V}(A', k') \right] \quad (1)$$

Note that, according to this formulation, capital is installed instantaneously (there is no one-period lag), and there is no depreciation. Also, $p_s < 1$ is the price at which the firm can sell the capital good, and 1 is the price at which the firm can buy the capital good. Finally, $\frac{1}{1+r}$ is the discount factor.

1. Let $z \equiv \frac{k}{A}$, $z' \equiv \frac{k'}{A}$, $\gamma \equiv \frac{A'}{A}$, and $V(A, z) \equiv \hat{V}(A, Az)$. Show that, according to these definitions, Equation (1) is equivalent to

$$V(A, z) = \max_{z'} \frac{r}{\alpha(1+r)} A (z')^\alpha + (z - z') A + \mathbf{1}_{k' < k} (1 - p_s) A (z' - z) + \frac{1}{1+r} \mathbb{E} \left[V \left(\gamma A, \frac{z'}{\gamma} \right) \right] \quad (2)$$

2. Argue why V is homogeneous of degree 1 in A . Using this fact, and the definition $v(z) \equiv \frac{V(A, z)}{A}$, write out the investment problem of the firm in terms of a single-state value function.¹
3. Assume $\log \gamma$ (the productivity growth rate) is Δ with probability π , 0 with probability $(1 - 2\pi)$, and $-\Delta$ with probability π . Assume also that $\pi e^{-\Delta} + (1 - 2\pi) + \pi e^{\Delta} < 1 + r$. Use the assumption on the values that γ can possibly take to write the value function $v(z)$ in terms of $v(z'e^\Delta)$, $v(z')$, and $v(z'e^{-\Delta})$.

¹Hint: Your answer, at this point, should be

$$v(z) = \max_{z'} \frac{r}{\alpha(1+r)} (z')^\alpha - (z' - z) + \mathbf{1}_{k' < k} (1 - p_s) (z' - z) + \frac{1}{1+r} \mathbb{E} \left[\gamma v \left(\frac{z'}{\gamma} \right) \right]$$

4. Conjecture that there is a region of inaction that has endpoints \underline{z} and \bar{z} , and that outside of the region of inaction the optimal policy is to go to the closest endpoint. In other words, conjecture that there exists two numbers $\underline{z} < \bar{z}$ such that if $z \in [\underline{z}, \bar{z}]$ then $z' = z$; if $z > \bar{z}$ then $z' = \bar{z}$; and that if $z < \underline{z}$ then $z' = \underline{z}$. Use this conjecture, and your answer to part 3, to re-write your value function $v(z)$, for now just for the z within the inaction region (where $z \in [\underline{z}, \bar{z}]$).
5. Verify that the solution to your answer to part 4 takes the form $v(z; c_1, c_2) = \kappa z^\alpha + c_1 z^{\rho_1} + c_2 z^{\rho_2}$ where $\kappa = r [\alpha r + 2\alpha\pi - e^{(1-\alpha)\Delta}\alpha\pi - \alpha\pi e^{-(1-\alpha)\Delta}]^{-1}$; and ρ_1 and ρ_2 are the two roots of the equation $\pi e^{-(1-\rho)\Delta} + (r - 2\pi) + \pi e^{(1-\rho)\Delta} = 0$,² and where c_1 and c_2 are two constants which we will solve for.
6. Maintain our conjecture that $z' = \bar{z}$ if $z > \bar{z}$. Explain why $\frac{\partial v(z; c_1, c_2)}{\partial z} = p_s \forall z \geq \bar{z}$. Hint: It should be easy to argue, just with words, why $\frac{\partial v(\bar{z}; c_1, c_2)}{\partial z} = p_s$. To get the derivative of the value function for $z > \bar{z}$, start by writing $v(\bar{z})$ and $v(z)$ for an arbitrary $z > \bar{z}$, then take the difference between these two value functions.
7. Using the same logic, explain why $\frac{\partial v(z; c_1, c_2)}{\partial z} = 1 \forall z \leq \underline{z}$. The equations that you've written in parts 6 and 7 are called the *smooth pasting conditions*.
8. So far we have just taken \underline{z} and \bar{z} as given, not explaining how they are determined. Now suppose that \underline{z} and \bar{z} are chosen optimally (instead of being dictated by some arbitrary rule). From parts 6 and 7, we know that

$$\frac{\partial v(\bar{z}; c_1, c_2)}{\partial z} = p_s; \quad \frac{\partial v(\underline{z}; c_1, c_2)}{\partial z} = 1$$

Totally differentiate the previous two equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial^2 v(\bar{z}; c_1, c_2)}{\partial z^2} + \frac{\partial^2 v(\bar{z}; c_1, c_2)}{\partial z \partial c_1} \frac{\partial c_1}{\partial \bar{z}} + \frac{\partial^2 v(\bar{z}; c_1, c_2)}{\partial z \partial c_2} \frac{\partial c_2}{\partial \bar{z}} &= 0 \\ \frac{\partial^2 v(\underline{z}; c_1, c_2)}{\partial z^2} + \frac{\partial^2 v(\underline{z}; c_1, c_2)}{\partial z \partial c_1} \frac{\partial c_1}{\partial \underline{z}} + \frac{\partial^2 v(\underline{z}; c_1, c_2)}{\partial z \partial c_2} \frac{\partial c_2}{\partial \underline{z}} &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

²The solutions to the latter equation are:

$$\begin{aligned} \rho_1 &= \frac{1}{\Delta} \log \left[\frac{e^\Delta}{2} \left[\frac{r}{\pi} - \sqrt{\left(\frac{r}{\pi}\right)^2 + \frac{4r}{\pi}} \right] \right] \\ \rho_2 &= \frac{1}{\Delta} \log \left[\frac{e^\Delta}{2} \left[\frac{r}{\pi} + \sqrt{\left(\frac{r}{\pi}\right)^2 + \frac{4r}{\pi}} \right] \right] \end{aligned}$$

A necessary condition of choosing the cutoffs optimally is that a small change in \underline{z} and \bar{z} won't change the value of c_1 or c_2 . In other words, if \underline{z} and \bar{z} are chosen optimally, then $\frac{\partial c_1}{\partial \bar{z}} = \frac{\partial c_2}{\partial \bar{z}} = \frac{\partial c_1}{\partial \underline{z}} = \frac{\partial c_2}{\partial \underline{z}} = 0$.

Thus, at the optimum \underline{z} and \bar{z} ,

$$\frac{\partial^2 v(\bar{z}; c_1, c_2)}{\partial z^2} = 0 \text{ and } \frac{\partial^2 v(\underline{z}; c_1, c_2)}{\partial z^2} = 0 \quad (3)$$

These are called the *super contact conditions*. Use these two equations, in addition to the two equations you wrote out in parts 6 and 7 (namely $\frac{\partial v(\bar{z}; c_1, c_2)}{\partial z} = p_s$ and $\frac{\partial v(\underline{z}; c_1, c_2)}{\partial z} = 1$) to solve for the four unknowns c_1 , c_2 , \underline{z} , and \bar{z} .³

Once you have solved for c_1 , c_2 , \underline{z} , and \bar{z} , you can use parts 5-7 to write out $v(z)$ only in terms of parameters. Do so using $(p_s, r, \alpha, \pi, \Delta) = (0.5, 0.1, 0.3, 0.03, 0.01)$. Plot out $v(z)$ as a function of z .

Problem 2

I have sent you, via e-mail, links to four job market papers, written by your peers from other schools. Write a two-to-three page referee report on the paper of your choice. As a reminder, here is a link to Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry's guidelines on how to write a referee report:

<http://are.berkeley.edu/courses/ARE251/2004/assignments/RRGuidelines.pdf> .

³Hint: There are many ways to numerically solve for these four unknowns. One relatively easy way that I found was using *Mathematica*. You can use the Solve command to solve for c_1 and c_2 for arbitrary values of \underline{z} and \bar{z} using the equations from parts 6 and 7. Then with c_1 and c_2 solved for, you can solve for \underline{z} and \bar{z} using Equation (3) and the FindRoot command.