Dissertation Abstract (html, pdf)

Working Papers

Divorce and Divorce Reform: A reconciliation of results at odds (Job Market Paper)
Abstract: I use an independent examination of divorce laws to estimate the effects of divorce reforms on state divorce rates and to reconcile contradicting empirical results. Previous studies have often focused on one specific divorce reform, but an independent examination of state divorce laws indicates that divorce reform cannot accurately be captured by any single variable. This paper provides a detailed classification of reforms based on state level divorce laws, revealing the complexity and problems of analyzing a single divorce reform variable. I use state level divorce rates from 1940-2005 to estimate the effects of various divorce reform variables. Previous studies using state divorce rates have failed to account for an appropriate error structure in their analysis. Once an appropriate estimator is used, I find that none of the divorce reforms estimates has a statistically significant constant effect on divorce rates. After I include a flexible specification, I find weak statistical evidence of a large long-term effect on divorce rates. 

Wage Dynamics of Single and Married Men (Joint with Maurizio Mazzocco)
Abstract: In the paper we describe using the PSID what we believe is a new empirical finding and analyze the implications of this data property. Men experience a growth in wages starting a few years before marriage and ending within a few years after marriage. During these years the wages grow by nearly 20%.   This wage growth at the time of marriage explains the observed difference in married and single men wages. In the paper we attempt to understand which forces generate such wage growth in proximity of marriage. To that end we first decompose the wage growth in two parts: labor supply growth and earnings growth. We find that both labor supply and earnings grow during this period, but earnings grow more rapidly. The wage growth is contained to men not covered by union collective bargaining agreements, and is driven by men that switch jobs. Using marriage market fluctuations we find evidence that marriage causes the observed wage growth and that this wage growth is not a mere result of selection.