since 'domination' designates precisely a particular and crucial relationship to the Other. Male-chauvinist sexist ideology should thus be seen as both an ego-ideology of maleness and an alter-ideology of femaleness. (This duality is inherent in every gender-specific subjectivity and is not necessarily sexist.) The same is true of positional-historical ideology. The ideology of a ruling bourgeoisie, for example, should be analysed both as an ego-ideology, forming the subjects of the bourgeoisie itself, and as an alter-ideology, dominating or striving to dominate the formation of other class subjects. In isolated primitive communities the inclusive ideologies tended to have no alter-dimension, what was outside their own world being chaos or nothingness. In more developed and interrelated social worlds, however, inclusive ideologies also have an alter-component in the 'infidels', the 'heathens', the 'aliens', and so on.

Alter-ideologies refer to the ideological dimension of the form in which one relates to the Other: to perceptions of the Other and of one's relationship to him/her. In relationships of power and domination, the alter-ideology of the dominating subjects is translated into attempts to mould the dominated according to the rulers' image of them, and into resistance to the opposition of the ruled. It is in this way that domination is ensured. The alter-ideology of the dominated, on the other hand, while also involving a perception and evaluation of the differences between ego and alter, tends towards resistance to the Other rather than towards forming him or her. This difference is inscribed in the asymmetry of domination.

Students of race or ethnic relations and of sexism have long recognized this duality in ideologies, though often without explicitly theorizing it. Much less attention has been paid to it in class analysis, but it is essential to an understanding of the ideological constitution of the subjects of class struggle and class collaboration.

II
The Historical Materialism of Ideologies

The question of the *material determination of ideology* is central to historical materialism (and to some other theories as well, like utilitarianism and the 'sociology of knowledge'). In the classical tradition this question was approached with the help of the 'base-superstructure' metaphor. But in contemporary Western Marxism not only the metaphor but also the question itself has tended to be cast aside. In the Althusserian tradition, emphasis was laid, first, on the science/ideology demarcation, then on ideology 'in general' and the operation of 'ideological state apparatuses'. In the neo-Gramscian problematic the emphasis has been on the creation and organization of ideological hegemony, seen primarily as a question of strategic political choice rather than as something whose possibilities are socially determined. Others still have had recourse to the Weberian conception of legitimacy, directing their interest to 'crises of legitimation' in the social order. Now, for Marxists this question of material determination cannot simply be bypassed. It is central to the corpus of historical-materialist theory, and has to be confronted, directly and explicitly.[21]

The explanatory tasks of a materialist theory of ideologies are twofold, concerning the *generation and change of ideologies* and the *patterning of the relationships between given ideologies*, relationships of predominance, inter-

dependence and subordination. The first, not broached at all in Althusser's essay, refers to the formation of new and the changes of existing forms of human subjectivity. The second aspect Althusser has analysed by means of the concept of 'ideological state apparatuses'. However, apart from the problem with the concept itself, this part of his theory is unrelated to his two other poles of analysis. It is not on a par with his theory of 'ideology in general', because ideology is a constituent part of all human societies whereas the state is not. On the other hand, it is not theoretically located in the analysis of historical social formations — though his illustrations refer to them — since the overall argument is structured around the reproductive logic of an exploitative mode of production.

1. The Structure of Ideological Systems

Let us start with a given system of ideologies and look at its patterning. We will first state two general propositions concerning its determination: one historical, the second material.

Proposition One: All ideologies exist only in historical forms in historical degrees of salience and modes of articulation with other ideologies.

This means that, while they are not reducible to the temporality of human history, existential ideologies operate only in historically determined forms. Today this may not be a very daring or original proposition, but at the time of the founders of historical materialism it was still very controversial. It went against the natural-law conceptions of bourgeois individualism, with its 'natural' or 'self-evident' individual rights, as well as against absolutist conceptions of religion as eternal, divine truth. Individuality, (fe)maleness,

religious doctrine and secular morality exist only in particular historical patterns and in articulation with historical-positional and historical-inclusive ideologies. These patterns are, then, subject to historical change, though the existence of existential ideology *per se* is not. One implication of this proposition would be that the operation of, say, Roman Catholicism across centuries and continents — its practice, acceptance or rejection and the struggles over it — has to be analysed in terms of its articulation with different historical ideologies and historical social forces.

Proposition Two: All ideologies operate in a material matrix of affirmations and sanctions, and this matrix determines their interrelationships.

All human activity is invested with meaning and all ideological interpellations have some kind of 'material' existence, in bodily movements, sounds, paper and ink, and so on. This does not mean, however, that it is impossible to distinguish, analytically, ideological from material, discursive from non-discursive dimensions of human practices. After all, there is some difference between being pronounced 'dead' by a hostile critic and being assassinated. We can, then, distinguish between practices in which the discursive dimension is dominant, like making a speech or writing an essay on ideology, and others in which the non-discursive predominates, like making love, war, revolution or automobiles. Provided we keep in mind that we are *distinguishing* analytically predominant dimensions and not substantially *separating* empirically intertwined phenomena, we may draw a shorthand distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices.

Against this background, I would argue that one aspect of the material determination of ideologies is brought about by the matrix of non-discursive practices in which the operation of every ideology is inscribed. A historical-

materialist conception of ideology, it would seem, involves the not very far-fetched assumption that human beings tend to have some capacity for discriminating between enunciation of the existence or possibility of something, or of its goodness according to given criteria, and the actual existence/occurrence of what is enunciated. In other words, ordinary human beings are capable of judging, at least under certain circumstances, whether a statement that the sun is shining, or that there is no unemployment, is true.

The material matrix of any ideology can be analysed as operating through *affirmations* and *sanctions*, such that ideologies become effective by being related to the one or the other. In an affirming practice, if an interpellated subject acts in accordance with the dictates of ideological discourse, then the outcome predicted by ideology occurs; while if the subject contravenes the dictates of ideological discourse, then he or she is sanctioned, through failure, unemployment, bankruptcy, imprisonment, death, or whatever. Parental love and punishment form another important part of the affirmation/sanctioning of ideologies — though not unfailingly, as is well known.

At this point we should recall the content of my argument about the matrix of affirmations and sanctions: the determination of the relationship between given ideologies as one of domination and subordination, relative growth, reinforcement, marginalization, and decline. The material matrix operates not as *a ménage à trois* involving men, ideology, and reality, but as a determinant in the competition and clash between different ideologies, between different interpretations of reality or different interpellations concerning what exists, is good, and is possible. If every ideology operates within a matrix of affirmations and sanctions, then the competition, coexistence or conflict of different ideologies is dependent on the non-discursive matrices. The power of a given ideology in relation to others

is determined by its pertinent affirmations and sanctions. However, all ideologies tend to have defence mechanisms that try to explain, or 'explain away', the non-occurrence of affirmations or sanctions. Specialized mechanisms of this sort, which tend to develop in all institutionalized ideologies, include symbolic affirmations and sanctions, rites or ritual practices; that is, particular non-discursive practices that have a meaning only within a given ideological discourse. Furthermore, institutionalized ideologies tend also to possess an important internal sanction: *excommunication*, often with the support of non-discursive sanctions.

There is one historically important form of ideology that poses special problems about its affirming-sanctioning matrix — supranaturalist religion. Karl Kautsky, whose classic *The Foundations of Christianity* is still one of the few Marxist works on religion, tells an illustrative story from the age of Marcus Aurelius. A Roman army, encircled by a superior enemy, was suffering from heat and thirst under a blistering sun. Suddenly rain started to fall upon the Romans and an awe-inspiring thunderstorm broke over the enemy. The imperial army was saved. How was the event seen in this age of competitive religion? To some, it was the action of Jupiter to whom the Emperor had appealed. Others gave thanks to Hermes, whom an Egyptian magician had conjured into action, while Christians saw the miracle as a vindication of their God, to whom the soldiers of the Twelfth Legion had prayed. Although the evidence of this particular case appears too thin to settle the dispute, it may be argued that the worldly fate of religious discourses is decided by their relationship to the non-discursive dimensions of mundane reality. In this respect there are at least two different questions. One is the religious phenomenon *per se* as an ideological form, the other is the importance of a particular religion in a particular society at

a particular point in time. Religions seem to derive their essential impetus from: (a) the answers they give to existential questions about the conscious human condition and the meaning of life; (b) their 'explanation' of historical origins, the natural order and contemporary events; and (c) the power they impart by affording 'true' knowledge of what governs the world. The first thrives above all on changes in material conditions that affirm the urgency of such existential questions as human suffering. The second and the third depend most directly on the lack or uncertainty of more mundane historical and natural explanations and technologies of production and control.

The victory of a certain religion over other ideologies always involves social struggles — whatever extra-terrestrial forces may be struggling as well. Therefore, the most immediate determinant in affirming a certain religion and sanctioning its rivals is the superior mundane power of the social forces with which it has become linked. The power of Christianity in the Roman Empire was decided by the victory of Constantine's army over Maxenius, and Islam was later spread by the victorious Arab sword. This intimate link between celestial and earthly power was tellingly expressed in the principle of settlement at the time of the Continental European wars of religion: *eius religio, cuius regio* (he who governs determines the religion).

However, even a brief aside on the material matrix of religions cannot rest content with this observation. We also know that religions have arisen and spread among the downtrodden and oppressed, and have gathered strength by their linkage with forces of social and/or national opposition. There is not only the religion of the existing powers, but also religious-cum-social dissent, as evidenced by the early Christians, the medieval German Anabaptists, the English Puritans, the reinforcement of Irish Catholicism under British rule, the Islamic revival in Iran during the

Shah's last period in power. To be able to account for these phenomena as well, we have to sketch the contours of the material affirmations and sanctions of religions somewhat more systematically.

On a very general level, religions constitute an alternative to naturalist sense-making of the world and to secularized morality. The latter derive their strength from the affirmations and sanctions discovered by natural science and produced by human organization, capitalist industry and markets, working-class collective organization. Before their development the life of the masses was largely governed by inscrutable natural constraints and calamities. These mysterious governing forces could then more easily be given sense by the invocation of divine powers. Up to the bourgeois revolutions of the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, religion constituted the dominant idiom for defining the meaning of the world.

Religions may further be materially affirmed by what they say or imply about the earthly capacities and practices of their respective non-believers, about their lack of power but also about their oppressive exercise of it, about their corruption or their misery. Religions may be affirmed by the mundane everyday succour of the preachers and the parish, and by the earthly effects of obeying the religious moral code. They may derive strength from the redress of material grievances, or from the defence of worldly positions that they promise, explicitly or implicitly. Religions have their deepest roots in the existential aspects of human subjectivity. But the strength or weakness of supranaturalist religion as well as the spread and decline of particular denominations and creeds are governed by their earthly affirmations and sanctions in their confrontations with other existential ideologies, religious or secular.

These two general propositions concerning the historicity and materiality of ideology, do not, of course, amount to

a historical-materialist theory of ideology in the strict Marxian sense. Historical materialism also asserts a class determination of ideologies: 'the ruling ideas of an epoch are always those of the ruling class'. If we accept the basic tenets of historical materialism, while rejecting the utilitarian traces in Marx and Engels, this thesis must entail at least two further propositions about the structuring of a given set of ideologies.

Proposition Three: All ideologies (in class societies) exist in historical forms of articulation with different classes and class ideologies.

This means that forms of individuality, (fe)maleness, religion, secular morality, geographic and ethnic positionality, and nationalism, are bound up with and affected by different modes of class existence and are linked to and affected by different class ideologies. According to this proposition male chauvinism, for instance, should be understood — and, from a non-sexist perspective, combated — in its links with different class modes of existence, class practices and class ideological discourses. But it does not entail that male chauvinism is the ideology and practice of the members of one class only.

Proposition Four: The patterning of a given set of ideologies is (within class societies) overdetermined by class relations of strength and by the class struggle.

This is the crucial and the most controversial proposition of historical materialism in this context. To sceptical minds it would require a long, empirically corroborated argument, impossible within the limits of this essay. Here I will have to confine myself to spelling out its meaning and implications.

The affirming and sanctioning matrix of ideologies is part of the system of economic and political power in a given society. Historical materialism analyses the system of economic power in terms of the mode(s) of production on

the bases of which classes, the agents of specific economic practices, are defined. Political power is seen as a condensation of the totality of social power relations — fundamentally, of class relations — and as crystallized in a particular institution, the state.

Ideological conflicts and competition are (usually) not directly determined by class relations and the class struggle. They operate through specific forms of social organization and process. Moreover, non-class ideologies have a historicity and a materiality that are intrinsically not reducible to those of the mode(s) of production. But as we have asserted, in Proposition Three, non-class ideologies are always linked with classes, and all ideologies are inscribed in an overall system of social power constituted by conflicting classes of varying strength. In this sense, the structure of the ideological system, its class and non-class elements alike, is overdetermined by the constellation of class forces.

'Class overdetermination' of an ideological structure means, to use an apt conceptualization developed by Erik Olin Wright, that different classes *select* different forms of non-class ideologies and that class constellations of force *limit* the possibilities of ideological interrelationships and of ideological change. Proposition Four implies, for instance, that if we want to explain the different relative positions of Catholicism and nationalism in contemporary France and Italy, we should look at how these ideologies have been linked with different classes, and at the outcome of the struggles between these classes. Nationalism became linked with the bourgeois revolution, as a revolutionary rallying-cry and weapon against the dynastic state and its principle of dynastic legitimacy. The Catholic Church and the Papacy, on the other hand, were historically closely allied with the dynastic state and its dominant social forces. Catholicism therefore became a banner of the counter-revolutionaries and their clienteles. The radical and victorious revolution of

the French bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie may then be seen to have led to the triumph of nationalism, whereas the weaker and more moderate bourgeois revolution in Italy would explain a much stronger Catholic legacy. The bourgeois and the petty-bourgeois classes on one hand, and the quasi-feudal classes on the other might be seen as having 'selected' nationalism and Catholicism, respectively, in a particular conjuncture (which then cancelled the reverse options), and their respective strengths and weaknesses as having posed 'limits' to supra-nationalist and secular ideologies.

The four propositions stated above do not share a single theoretical status. My own view is that the first two, concerning the historicity and the determining material matrix of all ideologies, are basic to any scientific study of the functioning of ideologies. The third, that in class societies all ideologies are differently linked with different classes, is an immensely fruitful guide to research and understanding which should always be kept in mind; while the last proposition — the structure of an ideological system is overdetermined by the class struggle — should perhaps be treated as a very important and fruitful hypothesis, whose explanatory power will remain an open question in any given empirical study.

2. The Generation of Ideologies and Material Change

A materialist theory of ideology will also have to confront the question: Where do ideologies come from? or, How did this particular ideology originate? A simple (or rather, naive) materialist answer would be: from the economic base. However, if we go through Marx's own formulations on the material determination of ideologies, in *The Communist Manifesto*, *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, the Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, *Capital* and *Theories of Surplus Value*, we will find that the architectural metaphor *per se* was not his central focus. Rather, his crucial point was that the ideological universe is predominantly class-determined, by class practices, class experiences, class ideologies and class power. Classes in turn are defined as the occupants of definite positions in the economic mode of production, the structure and dynamics of which determine the practices, experiences, ideologies, and power of different classes. About how this class determination operated Marx had relatively little to say. His clearest formulations were probably those of the third volume of *Capital* referring to the everyday economic conceptions of the capitalists, arising out of their practices and experiences as competitive market agents.

A century later we should not be contented with interpreting Marx. We should use him, for theoretical and political development and change. I will therefore take Marx's insights as a point of departure for an attempt at a more systematic theory. The explanatory pattern of determination within historical materialism is constituted by the combination of the forces and the relations of production and the classes determined by it. The following eight propositions will try to delimit what historical materialism can and cannot claim to explain about the generation of ideologies.

Proposition One: The generation of ideologies in human societies is always, from the point of view of social science and historiography, a process of change of pre-existing ideologies.

Proposition Two: Ideological change, and the generation of ideologies, is always dependent upon non-ideological, material change.

Proposition Three: The most important material change is

constituted by the internal social dynamics of societies and of their modes of production.

Proposition Four: Every mode of production requires specific economic positional ideologies, and every exploitative mode of production specific class ideologies.

Proposition Five: Every new mode of production will generate new economic positional ideologies.

Proposition Six: All human societies exhibit existential- and historical-inclusive as well as historical-positional ideologies.

Proposition Seven: The concrete forms of existential, historical-inclusive and historical-positional ideologies other than the economic are not directly determined by the mode of production, but changes in the former are overdetermined by the latter.

Proposition Eight: New modes of production and new classes will generate forms of existential, historical-inclusive and other historical-positional ideologies that are capable of supporting and reinforcing the new predominant class ideologies, if the former do not already exist.

As the reader will have noticed, the traditional base-superstructure problematic has been considerably reformulated here. As a simple relationship it figures only in Proposition Four, and then only in a functional argument: a mode of production requires a certain kind of ideology, alongside others, for human subjects to be able to perform its tasks. Instead the focus is on the determination of ideological change, for it seems that only in this way can the question of 'base and superstructure' escape circularity. Further, the fundamental problems of material determination have to be recast in the light of two fundamental considerations.

Any social-scientific and social-historical theory and analysis has to start from the 'always-already-constituted' existence of human society. Neither social science nor historiography can account for all the processes of evolution from groups of ape-like primates to societies of humans. A corollary is that any theoretical inquiry into the generation of ideologies will have to start by looking at the prerequisites for the reproduction and change of already existing ideologies in a given society, and for the generation of new ideologies from an existing set of ideologies and social relations. Furthermore, the ideological formation of a given set of human beings does not start from their confrontation with a particular natural and social environment, but from their being the offspring of particular mothers and familial relations in a particular society.

From what is known about the ideological plasticity of human beings and their creative capacities, we should expect the given ideologies to be almost completely reproduced in societies whose internal conditions and relationships to the natural environment and to other societies remain exactly the same from one generation to the next. (We would have to allow for only a small margin of individual 'misfits' stemming from the irreducibility of psychodynamic processes to complete social control.) A parental generation will always mould its children according to its own form of subjectivity; and if the ecological, demographic, socio-economic and any inter-societal relationships remain the same, the younger generation will face exactly the same affirmations and sanctions of the existing ideologies as the parental one. It follows that the explanation/investigation of the generation of ideologies will have to start from *processes of change in the structure of a given society and in its relationships to its natural environment and to other societies.* It is *these changes* that *constitute the material determination of the rise of ideologies.*

Idealist conceptions of history seem to be based implicitly on two dubious assumptions. First, they rely on what we might call the 'Munchhausen effect': the capacity of human beings to pull themselves up by their ideological bootstraps. This assumes that, simply through the power of ideological imagination, each new generation of humans can emancipate itself from ideological formation by its parents, even though facing exactly the same situations as the latter. Second, they presuppose that existential ideologies, among which primordial significance is usually given to the inclusive ideologies of religion and moral philosophy, themselves stand outside history but can — and do — none the less act as the movers of history. This is untenable.

The variety of forms of individuality, of male- and femaleness, of religion and morality, shows that existential ideologies always exist in concrete historical forms, but are never reducible to them. These historically determined existential ideologies must then be subject to the same laws of reproduction and change as all other ideologies. Further, idealist theories of history have usually focused on and attached overriding significance to ideological interpellations of what is good and right (and their opposites). But it follows from the intergenerational perspective on ideological formation that interpellations and experiences of what is, and of what is possible, are more important than changes of ideologies of what is good and right. They overdetermine such changes, even if they never fully absorb them.

The historical materialist conception of ideology, however, involves two further, quite fundamental, specifications of the general materialist conception. First, it implies that internal social dynamics, rather than natural phenomena like climatic change or natural disasters, are the most important key to change in a given society; that the internal social dynamic is governed by forces and relations of production rather than by, say, demographic food/

population ratios; and that the character and outcome of co-operation and conflict between societies — for example, the likelihood and the effects of conquest and subjugation — are mainly determined by the internal structure of the societies in question. Expressed in terms of our structural schema of the ideological universe, this means that the history of ideologies is not one of the victories and defeats, domination and subordination, of inclusive historical social ideologies: it is not the history of a succession of victorious and dominant *Volksgeister.*

When a given set of ideologies is reproduced in unchanged form, its overall matrix is a constant totality of social, eco-social, and inter-societal relations in which the enunciations of the parent generation are affirmed for the children's generation and any violations are sanctioned, in the same way as they were for the parent generation itself. Any changes in this totality, which form the matrix of the generation of ideological change, may be grouped into two basic categories. The first may be termed *disarticulating uneven developments*, that is, any developments that tend to fracture the previous totality — from demographic trends affecting the relation between population and means of subsistence to the appearance of new and powerful neighbours. The second of these categories is *contradictions.* Although in Marxist discourse this word is often extended to cover any kind of conflict, it should properly be restricted to the development of a particular kind of conflict, namely, between two elements forming an intrinsic whole. The effect of the development of a social contradiction, then, is to create a 'dilemma'.

Marxism has traditionally focused on one fundamental contradiction: that between the forces and the relations of production, directly pointing towards a change in the position of the classes and in the parameters of their struggle. But it is also quite possible for political and

ideological contradictions to develop — contradictions which, as I argued in *What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules?*, are essentially located between the relations of social *domination* and the forces of *execution* of societal tasks in the state, and ideologically, between *subjection* and *qualification*. Thus the ideological contradiction does not refer to any lack of logical consistency in a given discourse, which is nearly always of secondary significance to its social efficacy.

Earlier, we identified the process of ideological formation as an intrinsic unity of subjection and qualification. They are two sides of the same process and therefore always tend to correspond; indeed, there are always strategies of power to ensure their correspondence. But a contradiction may arise between the two as the dynamics of a society unfold. Either the subjection of the younger generation — or, if we take a synchronic view, of the dominated population — may for some reason change in form or strength while the tasks for which the new members have to be qualified do not change, or change in a different direction. Or else, there may be a change in the qualifications needed or given, while the forms of subjection do not change accordingly.

Generally, it is the latter form of contradiction that is dangerous to a given order. The former most often tends to produce underperformance, dropping out, or riots, whereas the second has potentially revolutionary implications of social transformation. In many societies with dynastic or colonial forms of subjection, the training of an intelligentsia with the qualifications of an advanced capitalist society has tended to generate revolutionary ideologies and practices. The student movement in the advanced capitalist countries during the late sixties came out of a similar contradiction, involving a massive increase in tertiary education and training to which the old forms of academic subjection no longer effectively corresponded in the given conjuncture. (As we all know, however, given the lack of assertiveness in

revolutionary working-class practice, the revolutionary student movement actually fizzled out.) The processes of capitalist de-skilling of workers, vividly pictured by Harry Braverman, can be seen as an attempt to maintain the correspondence of subjection and qualification. However, the basic Marxian hypothesis of social change is that the training of workers as free persons in an increasingly centralized labour-market and in an increasingly collective work process, will tend to conflict with bourgeois subjection and will generate revolutionary socialist ideology and practice.

The three fundamental types of contradiction are not independent, but are all interrelated. Marxism asserts that the political contradiction of domination-execution and the ideological contradictions of subjection-qualification are largely governed by, though not reducible to, the economic correspondence or contradiction between the relations and forces of production. Any given combination of forces and relations of production of course requires a particular form of ideological subjection-qualification of the economic subjects, and tends to ensure it through such sanctions as starvation, unemployment, bankruptcy — and their opposites, which affirm the correctness of the corresponding subjection-qualification. But if a contradiction develops between the relations and forces of production, no ideological formation can adequately and harmoniously subject-qualify the new economic subjects for the contradictory economic order. The old matrix of economic affirmations and sanctions then tends to crack.

Ideologies change and new ideologies emerge and spread when the old matrix of affirmations and sanctions changes through contradictions and other, disarticulating developments. The process of ideological formation does not take place in ideology alone. It is always a subjection to, and a qualification for, a particular social order with non-

discursive dimensions. When this order changes, the previous subjection-qualification is no longer adequately affirmed and sanctioned — a fact which tends to lead to more or less radical reformulations whose viability is determined by the extent to which they are then more effectively affirmed and sanctioned.

So far we have only treated three of the eight propositions set out above; these are the basic ones. Proposition Four, concerning the functional necessity of class ideologies, will be treated extensively in the next chapter. Proposition Five, that new modes of production will generate new economic positional ideologies follows from Proposition Four; and that it is thus, and not rather the other way around, follows from Proposition Three. Proposition Six merely repeats what was said in the previous chapter about the ideological universe.

Proposition Seven, that the concrete forms of ideologies other than economic positional ones are not directly determined by the mode of production, indicates the limitations of historical materialism. For example, no theory of the feudal mode of production can explain why feudalism was accompanied in Europe by Catholic Christianity and by Shintoism in Japan. But the assertion that all ideological changes are overdetermined by material ones, implies, at the same time, that the religious schisms and wars in Europe were overdetermined by changes in the class structure and by class politics.

The last proposition, that new modes of production will generate new forms of supporting existential- and historical-inclusive ideologies if they do not already exist, follows in part from what was said in the previous chapter about the historical forms of articulation of different ideologies. Since these ideological changes operate upon very different historical ideological systems, and since the rise of a given mode of production may come about through different

processes of transformation, we should expect the new ideological forms to differ considerably across countries dominated by the same mode of production. Nationalism, for instance, was vigorously and successfully generated both in France and in Germany as part of a struggle against dynastic principles of government, aristocratic institutions and traditional jurisdictions with their barriers to market and state unification. But whereas in France this nationalism developed in the clear-cut bourgeois direction, of Jacobinism and Republicanism with a Bonapartist interlude, in the Wilhelmine Reich bourgeois nationalism became fused with and increasingly subservient to the dynasty and the Junkers.[22]