

## 7 Conclusion to Chapters 4–6: The emergence of classes and nations

Many have hailed the half century beginning in 1770 as a revolutionary epoch in both Europe and the Americas. Some identify this with class and democracy – the “era of democratic revolutions” is Palmer’s (1959) label – others with the revolutionary rise of nations across the two continents (Anderson 1983). Some countries did move toward nationalism and democracy; but most revolutions did not succeed, the French Revolution remained incomplete and the American was only ambiguously revolutionary. Moreover, these events inspired other regimes to avoid revolution by compromising with rising classes and nations. Their compromises proved of world-historical significance, for they were institutionalized in enduring forms. This chapter sums up what proved to be the main creative phase of modern Western history. The four greatest modern state crystallizations – capitalism, militarism, representation, and the national issue – were institutionalized together. And far from being opposites, classes and nations rose together, structured by all four sources of social power; and though rival segmental and local-regional organizations were diminished, they survived, transformed.

To explain all this, I start from the three power revolutions of the period. First, the economic revolution turned more on capitalism than on industrialism. Only in Britain (and lesser regions of Europe) did industrialization occur now, yet British distributive power changes were no greater than elsewhere. Chapter 4 shows how British industrialism was molded by a commercial capitalism that was already institutionalized. In this period industrialization greatly enhanced collective and geopolitical power only in Britain. Its impact on distributive power was minor everywhere else: Manufacturing capitalists and workers barely figured in my narrative. A more broadly diffused agrarian, proto-industrial and commercial capitalism generated denser networks of organization as well as new bourgeois and petit bourgeois classes whose confrontation with the old regime was the period’s main domestic power struggle.

Second, intensifying geopolitical militarism spurred massive state growth and modernization. In earlier centuries, state expenditures had consumed under 3 percent of gross national product in peacetime, perhaps about 5 percent in wartime. By the 1760s this had risen to 10 percent in peacetime and 20 percent in wartime (30 percent in Prussia),

and during the Napoleonic Wars it rose to 30 percent to 40 percent (see Table 11.3). Almost all the increase went to armed forces, in peace and war alike. Military manpower doubled across midcentury and doubled again during the Napoleonic Wars, reaching 5 percent of total populations. (See Table 11.6.) These exactions, far higher than those of any Western state today, are identical with those of the most militarized societies of 1990: Iraq in expenditures, Israel in manpower. If we consider the transformations such military commitments wrought in Iraq<sup>1</sup> and Israel, we can appreciate their impact on eighteenth-century Europe: States became far more significant to their subjects; regimes desperately economized and modernized; and political protest broadened into extensive and political class struggle, displacing segmental organization, and into national struggle, displacing local-regional organization. Representation and the national question came fully onto the Western agenda, the product of increasing state militarism.

Third, the entwined growth of capitalism and states fueled a revolution in ideological power, already begun by churches. Their joint demands expanded and transformed networks of discursive literacy – the ability to read and write nonformulaic texts – which then developed autonomous powers. After the church-led phase, discursive literacy grew in two ways. One, predominant in Britain and its American colonies, was mostly stimulated by commercial capitalism; the other, predominant in Austria and Prussia, was mostly stimulated by the growth of militaries and state administrations. France mixed both. These capitalist and statist routes to discursive literacy were preconditions of the development of class and nation as extensive communities.

Concerning classes and nations, I adhere more to “modernism” than “perennialism” or “primordialism” (for these distinctions, from the literature on nationalism, see Smith 1971, 1979: 1–14). A nation is an extensive cross-class community affirming its distinct ethnic identity and history and claiming its own state. Nations tend to conceive of themselves as possessing distinct claims to virtue, and many have gone one step farther into persistent aggressive conflict with other, “inferior” nations. Nations, aggressive or not, arose only from the eighteenth century in Europe and America, and much later elsewhere, as most writers have agreed (e.g., Kohn 1944; Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Hroch 1985; Chatterjee 1986; Hobsbawm 1990). Before then, dominant classes, but only rarely subordinate classes, could organize extensively and politically. As dominant class culture had been largely insulated from the culture of peasant masses, few political units were defined by

<sup>1</sup> This was written before the Gulf War of 1990–1, after which Iraq was militarily transformed in other ways.

the sharing of culture, as occurs in nations (see Volume I of this work: 527–30; see also Gellner 1983, chapter 1; Hall 1985; Crone 1989: chapter 5). Beneath an extensive and political dominant class had descended particularistic segmental networks whose building blocks were localities and regions, not classes.

These broad assertions need qualifying. As we saw in Volume I, class struggle could develop in unusual societies like classical Greece or early Republican Rome; elsewhere it could appear if structured heavily by religious communities. As Smith notes, “ethnic consciousness,” the sense that a population shares a common identity and history (usually mythical), was not uncommon in prior history, especially given the presence of a shared language, religion, or political unity. Then (as in England, with all three) a diffused sense of “nationality” might emerge. Yet this was only one among several “specialized” identities, considerably weakened by local, regional, corporate, and class identities.

Before the French Revolution the term “nation” generally meant a kin group sharing a common blood connection. A term like “political nation,” found in eighteenth-century Britain, referred to those with franchise and office-holding rights (conferred by blood connections and property). Nations were as yet predominantly (in Smith’s term) “lateral,” confined to dominant classes. Smith also identifies “vertical” (i.e., cross-class) ethnic communities, which he claims were common in agrarian societies, thus advancing a compromise “perennialist” theory (as does Armstrong 1982). I generally disputed such perennialism in Volume I – and indeed Smith agrees that “nationalism, both as ideology and movement, is a wholly modern phenomenon” (1986: 18, 76–79).

Yet I concede some “premodern” history of the nation. I identify two “protonational” phases in the development of nations already underway before my period begins. I label these the religious and the commercial-statist phases. Then I argue that the “long nineteenth century” turned protonations into fully fledged nations in two further phases, the militarist and the industrial capitalist phases. In this chapter I fully discuss the militarist phase, dividing it into two subphases, pre-1792 and post-1792. The fourth, industrial capitalist, phase is reserved for future chapters; its history is summarized in Chapter 20.

In the first, religious, phase, beginning in the sixteenth century, Protestantism and the Catholic Counter-Reformation created two kinds of potential protonation. First, the Christian churches spread networks of discursive literacy laterally across the reach of each major native vernacular language and (more variably) downward to middling class persons. Whereas Chaucer and his contemporaries wrote in three languages (English, Anglo-Norman French, and Latin), Shakespeare and his wrote only in English, a language that became fully standardized

in its written form by the late seventeenth century. In most countries the written vernacular of regime and church spread gradually out from the home counties at the expense of other dialects and languages, principally because it was the language of God. Provincial and border languages like Welsh and Provençal were left to the lower classes on the periphery. Where the triumphing vernacular roughly corresponded with state territories as a whole, this somewhat increased a sense of shared community among its literate subjects. Second, where different churches organized different states or regions, their conflicts could attain a more popular protonational force, as they did in the Wars of Religion. Yet both “naturalizing” tendencies were highly variable, as most churches (and the entire Catholic church) were essentially transnational, whereas state, linguistic, and church boundaries only sometimes coincided.

If we look at Western history teleologically, from present to past, then this religious phase of nation building appears as a massive imposition of ideological power upon the world. Yet, in itself, it produced only rudimentary protonations. Even in England, where state, language, and church probably coincided more than anywhere else, the sense of being “English” in the seventeenth or early eighteenth century was still somewhat limited by class and deeply infused by Protestantism and by its schisms. The state was not yet sufficiently relevant to the whole of social life to be fused with, and reinforce, such a protonational identity. Yet the most important legacy of this phase was probably in the realm of mobilizing what I call “intensive power.” The churches had long been deeply implanted in the rituals of the family life cycle and the community seasonal cycle, especially in the villages. By inculcating literacy, churches were beginning to link the intimate, moral sphere of social life with broader, more secular social practices. I will chart the growing significance of this mobilization, as the broadest “family” unit eventually became the nation.

In the second, commercial-statist, phase, begun around 1700, this limited sense of shared community was further secularized as commercial capitalism and military state modernization took over much of the expansion of literacy, each predominating in different countries. Contracts, government records, army drill manuals, coffeehouse business discussions, academies of notable officials – all these institutions secularized and spread slightly downward the shared literate culture of dominant classes (as earlier chapters demonstrate in detail). Because all states now ruled by law, an elementary shared “civil citizenship” had also diffused farther across state territories, and shared religions variably diffused more universal solidarities. Yet under capitalism, the discursive literacy of dominant classes and churches re-

mained somewhat transnational, and "naturalization" remained limited. Anderson's "print capitalism" could as easily generate a transnational West as a community of nations. The nation still did not mobilize society.

The transformation of such protonations into cross-class, state-linked, and finally aggressive communities began in the third phase covered by this chapter. By 1840, all the leading Powers contained quasi nations, but of three different types. Mainland British and French nations reinforced existing states; they are examples of the nation as state-reinforcing. In Prussia-Germany, nation was bigger than any existing state and was moving from an apolitical to a state-creating (or pan-state) role. In Austrian lands, nations were smaller than state boundaries and became state-subverting. Why did nations develop, but in these varying forms? My answer centers on the insertion of the increasing militarism of this third phase into different economic, ideological, and political power relations.

The central drama for classes was the French Revolution. Chapter 6 shows that this was not initially a class struggle, but it became the principal example of class struggle in Marx's sense – extensive, symmetrical, and political. Yet it was the only such event of its era, its main emulator being the slave revolt of Haiti. In America, capitalist liberalism rose up, but revolution there was less class-based and less socially revolutionary. The French was the only bourgeois revolution to succeed largely on its own merits. Others were assisted by French armies and faded when they left. (We saw a similar sequence occurring from 1945 to 1989 in Eastern Europe.) Having analyzed more moderate reform outcomes in Britain and America, and anticipating my later discussion of more conservative Germany and Austria, I assess in comparative perspective Marx's vision of class struggle between feudalism and capitalism and between old regime and rising bourgeoisie. How was a bourgeois revolution seemingly possible in France, but not elsewhere? I argue that such varied class and national outcomes were closely entwined. I explain their joint emergence in four stages, beginning by focusing more on classes and then on nations.

### 1. From feudalism to capitalism

As Marx saw, capitalism was revolutionary, accelerating the forces of production, first in agriculture and commerce, then in industry, and diffusing its freer market relations and its production relations of absolute private property more universally across civil society. Capitalism also helped spread discursive literacy (print capitalism) and its common ideological messages more extensively. Collective powers

became revolutionized, fairly uniformly. Nor could any regime survive without accommodating to capitalism's distributive powers, wielded by its emerging classes; their struggles provided much of the period's drama, including most of the politics of representation. These arguments are too familiar to belabor.

But Marx was wrong to suggest that the transition from feudalism to capitalism revolutionized distributive power in the sense of bringing extensive and political class conflict between "feudal lords" and "capitalist bourgeoisie." In Germany (as, later, in Japan) and to some extent in Britain, such lords actually *became* capitalists in agriculture and commerce, then in industry, changing their power base without social upheaval. Class tensions remained latent, sometimes disruptive, but local and apolitical. Even where lords spurned capitalism, conflict remained surprisingly quiescent. In eighteenth-century France, as later in Austria-Hungary and Russia, bourgeois capitalists were subordinated to old nobles, yet reacted with manipulative deference within segmental organizations rather than with class hostility. True, they came to terms with the old regime partly because both feared "people" and "populace" below. But this was not the overriding concern it was to become in 1848. The lack of such fear, and of a broad "party of order," made the French Revolution possible. Lacking their own extensive organizations, bourgeois capitalists used those of the old regime to achieve their goals. They ingratiated their economic practices and their sons and daughters into the old regime, buying patronage, offices, titles, and noble marriage partners. They were not sacrificing wealth for status, but getting inside the regime to secure the fruits of state offices and secure privileges against market uncertainties.

The point can be broadened. The capitalist mode of production requires only private property ownership and market competition. It has little extensive organization beyond law courts and the market and tends not to revolutionize but to accommodate to other distributive power organizations. If, say, ethnic differences are institutionalized as apartheid, or if patriarchy is already institutionalized, then capitalists build them into their market calculations. Alternatively, in other circumstances they calculate around assumptions of ethnic and gender equality. Their manipulations may reinforce old regimes, apartheid, and patriarchy, but capitalists are not responsible for these. If those distributive power organizations begin to crumble, then alert capitalists shift their manipulative strategies so as to make profits without them. Capitalism was not such a powerful transformer of distributive power relations as Marx believed – nor is any mode of economic production.

Nowhere in this period did the substantial bourgeoisie conceive of itself as belonging with the petite bourgeoisie in a class struggle of

bourgeoisie against a feudal old regime. The bourgeoisie in Marx's classic sense, uniting "grande" and "petite" fractions, was not a significant power actor – in the very period when it should have been. Although a few substantial bourgeois railed against feudalism, they did so in alliance with a modernizing old regime faction rather than with the petite bourgeoisie (unless noneconomic power relations intervened, as detailed later). This was not a failure of class consciousness but of class organization. Capitalists were inserted in old regime political economy, buying court or parliamentary influence to win commercial monopolies and privileges, acquiring tax farms and government offices, and using marriages to enter patron-client networks. True, these "corrupt" practices gradually declined, but more from pressure by old regime modernizers-become-capitalists than by an independent bourgeoisie. The new manufacturing capitalism was based on a plethora of small enterprises linked by a diffuse market. The manufacturing bourgeoisie lacked authoritative organization. The bourgeoisie was only a "latent class." Those who might have belonged to it did not need class or their own state to achieve their goals.

Petit bourgeois capitalists exhibited more class identity and organization. As McKendrick, Brewer, and Plumb suggested for England, Soboul for France, and Nash for the American colonies, small shopkeepers, traders, and artisan masters smoldered at how the corruption and parasitism of the old regime economy subordinated their labor and the markets on which they sold their products to privilege. In crises this sense of production-cum-market class identity and opposition could erupt into political denunciations of "old corruption" and "aristocratic plots." Yet perceptions of direct economic exploitation occurred more through market than production relations. Petit bourgeois eruptions, especially if supported by the populace below, were most often precipitated by bread riots. These were market-centered, mobilized through intense petit bourgeois penetration of their local communities, aided by discursive networks of communication through broadsheets, pamphlets, and other print materials. This involved families, women alongside men, organizing locally, by street and neighborhood, more than by employment. The integration of intimate family with extensive politics (also evident in conscription riots) gave such movements considerable moral force.

But these class eruptions had limited goals: to demonstrate grievance to the old regime and to seek pragmatic concessions, not new structures of representation, still less revolution. They were locally organized, although rioting in the capital might be directed at the central state, and if the state distributed or priced bread it was more politicized. Bread riots might worry, even destabilize, old regimes; they did not

institute bourgeois ones. If politicized, most came under the control of cross-class power organizations centered on the transmission of discursive literacy (discussed later). Yet, as this assisted extensive and political protest, it also tamed its moral ferocity, lowered its intensity, and narrowed its base, especially by excluding women. (I pursue this argument further in Chapters 15 and 17.)

So combining the economic organizations of production and market can explain latent class conflict plus intensive local protests that might lead toward regime concessions. But it cannot explain extensive, still less political, classes or structural democratic reform or revolution. Petits bourgeois operated within diffuse markets whose broad parameters were set diffusely by their betters, with only limited state assistance. The resentment they sometimes displayed was a necessary condition for all further class conflict, but it did not directly, "purely," produce the period's extensive and political class conflict. Because states were not central in economic life, the capitalist revolution did not unaided propel forward popular "nations." Petit bourgeois malcontents did struggle against old regime and for citizenship; their struggles did generate "national" consciousness. Yet they were stirred into action as militarism and ideologies intervened.

## 2. Pre-1792 militarism

Why *should* a class organize extensively and politically? Marx thought this was obvious: Class organization emerged directly from the relations of production. He was wrong. As we have seen, the bourgeoisie was more likely to choose segmental than class organization. Later chapters reveal more proletarian class organization but always in competition with sectional-segmental or local-regional organizations. Yet it should surprise no one that political organization by classes also has specifically political causes, involving the institutional particularities of states.

These institutional particularities now centered on state militarism. I first discuss the pre-1792 subphase, before the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. Tilly (1975, 1990) and I (in Volume I) have shown that for centuries political struggles had been structured by fiscal crises induced by war making. Similarly, we have seen that in this period petits bourgeois organized extensively and politically only when states, pressured by the manpower and fiscal needs of Great Power rivalry, failed to obtain resources by institutionalized means and sought to levy novel taxes, loans, and conscriptions. As state extraction increased and became more regressive, social tensions were forced to the "national" political level. Discontent focused on state costs (taxes and military service) and benefits (profitable office holding, economic monopolies,

bondholding, and tax and conscription exemptions). These, not the production and market relations of capitalism, constituted the most contentious political economy of the period. Let me make one point perfectly clear: I am not asserting that these discontents were greater than discontent leveled against direct economic exploitation; in fact, they were almost certainly lesser in the lives of most people. But I am asserting that such discontent more consistently evoked *politics*.

Militarism also encouraged monarchical state elites to rationalize administration and attack the costly particularistic privileges hitherto sustaining them. Political struggles thus began with semiprincipled elite and party conflict *within* old regimes. Further fiscal and conscription pain and the opportunity presented by regime faction fighting then forced broader tax-paying classes out of their historic political indifference to question state legitimacy. If state institutions could not resolve elite-party factional fighting, petit bourgeois ideologists and organizations appeared, extending two demands of the regime modernizers. They claimed civil citizenship to freely protest political economy, and when protest was ineffective, they demanded political citizenship.

Only this route might potentially lead toward revolution because only it could mobilize the populace – urban and rural laborers and small peasants – behind the demands of the propertied people. Neither the French nor the American Revolution could have succeeded without the support of the populace. The French peasant revolt of 1789 pressured regime modernizers Leftward into structural reform; urban sans-culottes kept up the pressure. The American urban populace and small farmers provided troops and supplies to win the war and pressured rebel notables Leftward throughout the 1780s. Their main target was political economy – taxation, bondholding and economic privileges, debt laws, and monopolies and prices conferred by the state. The class alliance of petite bourgeoisie, peasant farmers, and sometimes the urban poor was politicized by the institutional particularities of states.

Fiscal crises had two components. First, the rate of increase in exactions had to be substantial to cause discontent. But given rates did not produce identical political reaction. Britain was the most highly taxed country, Prussia the most highly conscripted, followed by France and Austria, with the American colonies the least taxed or conscripted. This ranking by level of exaction does not correlate with degree of political outrage. Tax rates are particularly poor predictors of revolution or riot in the period, for most tax rates were rather stable. The majority of increased expenditures were financed by loans.

Thus, second, the degree to which a state had institutionalized elite-party conflicts also explains the severity of crisis. In terms of the distinctions expressed in Table 4.1, those regimes – Britain and Prussia

– that had centralized infrastructural coordination between state elites and parties of the dominant classes could steer higher revenues through these institutions, reducing old regime factional disputes. In Britain Parliament continued to vote taxes and the bank continued to raise loans – the one to pay off the other. Negotiations over both were institutionalized, with ultimate sovereignty located in Parliament, where state elite, “in” parties, and “out” parties interacted. In Prussia sovereignty lay in the relations between king and nobles, institutionalized within state administration at all levels. They had agreed to extract taxes from the rest jointly. The king could also extract considerable resources from the institutionalized management of his own domains.

Yet, in France and the American colonies, supposedly sovereign state institutions were less embedded among local notables. Attempts to levy moderate (France) or even mild (America) increases hit notable parties “from outside,” to end their privileges or levy new taxes on them. Austria lay in the middle. Though its central state was but feebly embedded among local notables, it had institutionalized particularistic contracts with provincial notables whereby taxes and conscription could be increased in wartime, though only up to a point.

Loans, when taken to a vast scale, created distinctive equity problems. Because wealthy bondholders were paid off by the mass of taxpayers, loans were regressive. This situation endured beyond the war itself, and it became less easy to legitimate. Britain and France borrowed more than the others and so invited more peacetime discontent in this respect.

Thus exaction crises differed among states. Prussian exactions were managed through existing fiscal institutions. Prussia also had the most statist church among the countries, with little moral grounding of discontent in religion. Protest resulted, but it was largely expressed “within” the state in the form of an administrative reform movement and in the final fusion of the two Protestant churches into a single state church. This secured new rules for access to administrative office (and also to local representative assemblies), fused state elite and propertied class parties, and insulated their politics and morality from broader class discontent. Because the Prussian state borrowed little, taxpayers were not subsidizing bondholders. In Britain substantial exactions were levied by state elite and “in” parties, but regressive borrowing and indirect taxes caused discontent among “out” and “excluded” parties. These could mobilize large emerging classes now capable of collective organization, especially the petite bourgeoisie, ideologically grounded in the notion of the “Protestant constitution,” morally reinforced by everyday religious rituals. But its class organization never quite became autonomous, remaining torn between alliances with “out” and even

“in” parties composed of old regime modernizers and the excluded populace below, its religious organization also generating ambiguous moral messages. Democratic reform resulted, often turbulent but not revolutionary.

Austrian exactions eventually exceeded the capacities of institutionalized provincial arrangements. Crisis appeared as plural provincial struggles rather than as singular and centralized. Discontent was expressed less by classes than by regional-nations (as we shall see soon). But in the American colonies and France old regimes began to disintegrate under protest at uninstitutionalized, “illegitimate” fiscal exactions and reforms, morally grounded in lower-level church discontent (France) and Protestant sects (the American colonies). The excluded petite bourgeoisie and peasant farmers then appeared, initially encouraged by old regime modernizers, then autonomously.

Without fiscal-military crisis the state and “national” politics were not sufficiently salient to popular experience to provoke class struggle over representation. Without such politicization, capitalists could ingratiate themselves segmentally into old regime economies, enfeebling autonomous class organization. Most persons would probably prefer to continue ignoring the state. Now, willy-nilly, they were “caged,” politicized, and “naturalized” by state fiscal exactions.

As in most comparative macrosociology there are few cases on which to base such sweeping generalizations. However, I am emboldened by comparable variations in the early twentieth century. By then these fiscal-military pressures were no longer the principal mechanism by which classes were politicized. But an analogous mechanism had developed as the logic of military geopolitics had shifted state extraction toward mass mobilization of manpower. In the aftermath of World War I the degree of revolutionary turbulence, instigated this time by the proletariat, varied directly with the severity of regime breakdown in mass mobilization warfare. Between these two major revolutionary phases in Western history the Paris Commune and the Russian Revolution of 1905 resulted from comparable pressures. With the exception of the 1830 revolution in France and the Low Countries and of some failed revolutions of 1848,<sup>2</sup> all Western revolutions have had a similar triggering mechanism: military geopolitics putting class pressures – first fiscal, then manpower – on state institutions. Given the vagaries of

<sup>2</sup> The French revolution of 1848 was not so caused, nor were most of the German disturbances; but the most severe disturbances, in the Austrian lands, were primarily a fiscal-constitutional crisis (see Chapter 10) and Chartism in Britain was partly so caused (see Chapter 15).

history and the uniqueness of cases, it is as consistent a relationship as we find in macrosociology.

Many of these same processes also propelled the first *nations* beyond the protonational level into cross-class self-consciousness. Those capable of resisting state exactions were property owners; but their numbers were now exceeding the capacities of traditional particularistic segmental politics, which in any case did not respond promptly to their demands. They turned toward universal rallying cries like “people” or “nation.” If fiscal crisis was averted, as in Prussia, these barely appeared. Where fiscal compromise occurred, as in Britain, their radical import could be weakened. But in America, and even more in France, fiscal crises politicized “people” and “nation.” In both Britain and France the nation was thus state-reinforcing. “Nation” broadened its meaning from blood to citizenship. Yet it retained family metaphors – the nation became “motherland” or “fatherland” to all, joined in a single national family, along with other national families. Instead of kings, nobilities, and clerics symbolizing the family of kin, in the French Revolution they were formally excluded from the family of citizens. The abbé Volfius declared, “The true *patrie* is that political community where all citizens, protected by the same laws, united by the same interests, enjoy the natural rights of man and participate in the common cause” (Kohn 1967: 43).

Fiscal crises drove forward what might be called “rising class-nations.” Self-conscious nations were thus essentially born of the struggle toward representative government. Whatever atrocities were later committed in the name of the nation, we should not forget that its emergence lay with those democratic ideals of this period that we most value today.

Yet the nation’s dark side arose precisely because democratic ideals were born of war. Without the pressures of conscription, war taxes, and regressive war loans, the “people” would have remained apolitical, content to largely ignore the state. Now a limited “people” was in partial control of the state – yet the state’s main function was war making. Thus the nation became a little more aggressive. Foreign policy could not remain quite so limited, dynastic, and private. The eighteenth-century struggle between Britain and France became supported by extra-regime pressure groups and patriotic demonstrations, though state exactions also brought popular opposition to war. Networks of discursive literacy generated stereotypes of one’s national virtues and the enemy’s national vices (as both Newman and Colley, referred to in Chapter 4, indicate). Nations had the qualities of intimate individuals and were loved and hated. Aggressive nationalism had not gone far by 1792, even in these countries, but it had emerged.

Yet the pre-1792 part of the militarist phase also began to generate a

major, enduring complication. The drive for political citizenship created both a representative and a "national" issue, bifurcating nations into state-reinforcing and state-subverting. Mainland Britain and France were examples of the former; the Austrian case exemplifies the latter. The Austrian fiscal crisis was distinctive, not in its scale, but in its organizational consequences. Most military spending derived from taxes known as the "military contributions" of what were called the historic provinces; most of the rest was borrowed (Dickson 1987). But the contributions' formulas (usually fixing the numbers of troops that could be raised) proved insufficient, and the monarchy's credit was poor (it declared bankruptcy in 1811). Higher exactions had to be negotiated through the unwieldy confederal structure of provincial diets and administrations. Thus Austrian dissidents organized by region.

Slogans of "no taxation without representation" came from notables entrenched in provincial assemblies and administrations. In fact, in the 1780s, Joseph II actually had provoked the first two "patriot" movements in Europe – one in the most economically advanced province, the Austrian Netherlands, the other in one of the most backward, Hungary. What they shared was powerful provincial political organization, in the Netherlands among all propertied classes, in Hungary confined to the nobility. As yet only the so-called nations with histories (i.e., of political autonomies) organized dissent. From such diverse regional actors the first state-subverting nations would emerge.

This early militarist phase of the emergence of self-conscious nations built on the two protonational phases. For example, Austrian provincial movements did not emerge from nowhere – they resonated amid ancient Magyar, Bohemian, Moravian, and similar nobilities and churches (with burghers added in the Austrian Netherlands and richer peasants and other middling strata intermittently elsewhere). But what was distinctive about this period (and here I depart from Anthony Smith's "perennial" theory of nationalism) was the exponential growth of the vertical nation existing across class lines. Cross-class nations were propelled forward more by the states' military than by their capitalist crystallizations. Because fiscal-military pressures hit states more directly and more uniformly than did commercial or industrial capitalism, nations appeared amid all of them with regional political institutions, not only in the more economically advanced. Nations appeared in different guises because state institutions differed: state-reinforcing, as in Britain; state-subverting, as in Austria. But emerging nations shared with classes a further emergent commonality: They mobilized unusually fervent ideologies. Since this impacted considerably, if variably, on post-1792 militarism, I pause to discuss ideological power.

### 3. Ideological power

Even when inflamed by the fiscal and conscription consequences of militarism, the petite bourgeoisie and the "people" still needed further organizational resources. To struggle successfully as a class or nation requires a meaning system embodying ultimate values, norms, and ritual and aesthetic practices. It requires ideology in the dual sense of immanent collective morale and a transcendent message to confer morality on one's own collective identity, to deny it to the opponent, to totalize the struggle, and to conceive of an alternative society worth the struggle. Indeed, the moral force of classes and especially of nations has been perfectly evident. "Interest-driven" theories of society – like Marxism or neoclassical economics or rational choice theory – cannot explain why members of collective organizations such as classes and nations are swept by intense collective emotions, break strong taboos about torture, killing, even genocide, and sacrifice their own lives on the barricades or in the trenches. The only serious attempt to explain the emotional force of nationalism has come from the "primordialist" and "perennialist" schools – nationalism is so strong because it is so old, so deeply rooted (Armstrong 1982; Smith 1986). But I do not believe this is correct.

I claim to do a little better. I say "a little better" because a full explanation requires more rigorous analysis of the intimate sphere of social life than I undertake here. We see in this volume that extensive classes and nations have possessed more moral fervor, more passion, when they can also mobilize the more intensive networks of their members. I shall trace a decline in proletarian class fervor when its roots shifted away from family and local community toward employment relations. In this early period, as we have seen (and will see again in Chapter 15), lower and middling class protest was most passionate and riotous when exploitation was of families, when it concerned men and women together, and when its organization was fundamentally that of street, village, and neighborhood. Protest was more passionate because the injustice of bread prices, of regressive sales and land taxes, and of conscription immediately concerned not merely self but also intimate loved ones. The family was the principal moral and emotional agent because it was the site of most socialization, including the experiencing and social channeling of love and hate. Nationalism also everywhere generated a fictional family: The nation is supposed, erroneously, to be a community of descent; it is also our symbolic mother or father. I believe the moral fervor of nationalism derived from its ability to link family, local community, and extensive national terrain. \*

Intensive family and community organization may generate strong emotions, perhaps rick burning or rioting, but not extensive solidarity across entire class and nation. This intensity must be mobilized by more extensive power organizations. This is where the first two protonational phases of the nation proved so significant. Churches had long dominated the linkages between family, neighborhood, and the arena of extensive power. They had long monopolized formal social morality; their rituals centered on the stages of the individual and family life cycle (baptism, marriage, death); "class" and regional discontent had been expressed through heretical and schismatic mobilization from the Albigensians to the English Civil War. More recently churches had become the principal teachers of socially useful knowledge by sponsoring mass literacy. This instruction was also moral because its main instrument, the book, remained dominated by the Bible, homilies and sermons.

Church hierarchies were too closely associated with old regimes to encourage directly either class or national identities, but regimes from Henry VIII to Napoleon expropriated church property and substituted royal for canon law. Now they were also encroaching on church education. The most extensive protonational power relations were being secularized. Churchmen who were influential in states were increasingly seen as secular and immoral, often by their own clerical subordinates or parishioners, as were late eighteenth-century French and English bishops. Eighteenth-century religious innovators and dissident sects were generally less interested in doctrinal transformation of the church, more concerned with local social improvement, than had been their earlier counterparts (Jansenism would be an exception to this). The Great Awakening, Methodism, alienated French village curés – all were linking their moral concerns to popular social practices while religiously performing the rituals that implanted them in the family and community cycles. Religion had begun the retreat into local-regional power relations that I chart in later chapters, but it was leaving a large legacy of moral communication among family, locality, and more extensive power relations.

In the second protonational phase commercial capitalism and military states displaced churches as the principal communicator of messages between the intensive and the most extensive levels of power. Yet neither's own authoritative organizations proved suitable for the task. Commercial capitalism provided only tiny productive organizations linked by a diffuse, amoral market. The military state's growing authoritative organization was experienced as exploitative and immoral. Thus both capitalism and state mobilized less directly, principally through the expanding networks of discursive literacy they had gen-

erated. Writing, reading, and oral assembly networks became the principal links between the intensive and the extensive, between the secular instrumental and the sacred moral; and because churches and religiosity remained influential, an ideological contest between religious and secular moralities proceeded within these networks. A disputatious intelligentsia arose, providing ideological power resources for class and national development. As we saw, their ideologies were not just advanced as scientific principles; they were extraordinarily moralizing.

Preceding chapters show that much of the ideology and leadership of rising class and national movements came from outside the petite bourgeoisie, especially where they became radical. I assessed radicals' social backgrounds. They are typified by this list of occupations of a Vonckist cell (radical patriots in the Austrian Netherlands) rounded up by the Brussels police in the 1780s: 8 lawyers, 4 doctors or apothecaries, an architect, 3 merchants, 3 rentiers, 3 wig makers, 3 coffee shop proprietors, 2 printers, and 3 priests (Palmer 1959: I, 353). Only the merchants and rentiers seem at the heart of major social classes, and they were split equally between bourgeoisie and old regime. Can this really be a rising bourgeoisie? The other patriots were all at least semiprofessional ideologists. Their work presupposed discursive literacy and learning; their premises were vital to networks of communication. The wig makers (active radicals in several countries) puzzled me until I realized that their shops (like coffee shops and taverns) stocked journals and pamphlets, to be read and discussed during the long process of wig fitting. Chapters 5 and 6 show that revolutionary leaders in France and America were extraordinarily well educated. Many French revolutionaries had written nonpolitical essays and literary works. Many political organizations were "literary" – the pamphlets, mass petitions, and letter-writing networks, the societies of correspondence, the oratorical devices of the revolutionaries. These radicals seem less bourgeois than literati, an intelligentsia in the sense of a distinct stratum of moralizing intellectuals.

An ideological vanguard led bourgeoisies and some nations – a rather Leninist scenario. To paraphrase Lenin on the working class (discussed in Chapter 18): Left to itself the bourgeoisie was only capable of economism – in the eighteenth century of segmental manipulative deference. Revolutionary consciousness, said Lenin, presupposed leadership by vanguard intellectuals from outside the class. He did not explain where they came from. The Marxist Lucien Goldman (1964) tried to do this. Although the contradiction between modes of production underlay social crises, Goldman believed, it was best articulated not by the rising class but by intellectuals experiencing

“maximum possible consciousness” by virtue of their exposed position and their professional ideological role. But, he says, the rising class then appropriated their ideas and dispensed with them. This argument needs broadening because the contradictions were not merely economic. An ideological vanguard might articulate best the experience and needs of other power actors (economic, military, and political), but its ideology was then appropriated by them. Alternatively, we might credit the vanguard with autonomous power: Its ideas and solutions were articulated and imposed from within its own discursive networks rather than from the contradictions of classes or states.

I explored both rival arguments most fully in discussing the French Revolution. Both had some force, varying among countries. Ideologists’ slogans and principles were adopted as plausible solutions to the real problems of economic, military, and political power actors. Yet the recourse to ideology also involved two emergent powers conferred by expanding networks of discursive literacy.

1. Ideologists’ principles were transitive, transgressing the essentially particularistic and segmental nature of old regimes. Knowledge was universal: The same principles could be applied across all human experience to philosophical, moral, aesthetic, scientific, sociological, or political problems. Discursive networks diffused not only rational but also moral reconstruction. Old regimes were aware of the danger and censored, licensed, and patronized, seeking to insulate each infrastructure and prevent transitivity. The old regime would be safely modernized if lawyers confined themselves to the courts, if peasant and petit bourgeois literacy meant better accounts and contracts, if church schooling increased the reading of homilies, if newspapers posted shipping arrivals and official communiqués. Particularistic patronage, corruption, and coercion could discipline each segmental infrastructure. But insulation did not succeed; eighteenth-century infrastructures contained three transivities:

a. Specialized became generalist moralizing knowledge. Homilies and sermons concerned broad social morality, not just dogma. Homilies, sermons, novels, social essays, pamphlets on everything – all enjoyed mass sales. Questions of meaning and social morality were entwined in theology, in philosophy, in poetry whose meter was adapted to the native vernacular, in large circulation satiric stories like *Candide*, and in satiric paintings, reproduced with novel printing techniques, like Hogarth’s. Legal training became entwined with the humane education of a gentleman, and legal concepts became universal rights. Newspapers discussed and advertised everything.

b. Discursive literacy diffused through and down from the old regime. Regime modernizers articulated reform ideologies in disputes with

conservative factions at court, in law courts, parliaments, state administration, academies and salons, officer corps, and churches. If their factional dispute could not be institutionalized, they appealed downward for support. Religious sects, coffee shops, taverns, some academies, and newspaper and pamphlet sales of five thousand mobilized middling farmers, artisan masters, traders, schoolteachers, priests, officials, officers, and women.

c. Networks of discursive literacy used comparative reference points, relativizing social practices. Religious, especially Protestant and Puritan, networks exhorted members to live the simple unadorned lives of the early Christian communities. The secular Enlightenment practiced cultural anthropology, comparing Europe, its colonies, and its contacts with other cultures. How the English, the French, the Americans, the Persians (Montesquieu’s *Persian Letters*), even the Huron Indians (Voltaire’s *Ingénue*) supposedly behaved was considered relevant to how we should behave. In fact, these supposedly factual portrayals were actually moral and political tracts. The Huron were not so ingenuous, so naturally virtuous. Voltaire’s point is that *we* should renounce luxury, deceit, and corruption. Thus networks of literacy discussed what Bendix (1978) has termed alternative “reference societies.” The American and French revolutions then supplied two particularly attractive or unattractive reference societies (depending on one’s perspective) for political modernization.

Yet transitivity varied between ideological infrastructures and according to the intensity of fiscal-military crisis. The transitivity of religious infrastructures usually stopped short of explicit class or national politics, though they had political implications. The literacy drive of the Gallican church, the Great Awakening in the American colonies, and the growth of English Methodism all implicitly democratized religion, vesting ultimate knowledge in the individual and ultimate morality in an improved family and local community and desacralizing old regime hierarchies. In any case, state encroachments in secondary education and family law and appropriation of church property also desacralized hierarchy. The Catholic church moved toward being a transnational confederation of local-regional power networks, intensely implanted in family and communal life, dominating rituals of the family life cycle and the seasonal cycle of the rural community, and controlling most elementary education. Minority Protestant churches mostly did likewise, though established Protestant churches retained greater statism. Popular ideologies thus remained more susceptible to religious influence than Enlightenment intellectuals realized. But that influence might not merely reinforce old regimes.

Austrian and Prussian statist infrastructures generated ideologies

like cameralism and “enlightened absolutism,” attacking the particularism of churches, aristocracies, and privileged corporations, but limited by absolutism. The intelligentsia sometimes proposed radical reforms, but rarely publicized them to potential class movements. They did not become popular or “national.” Thus statist transitivity was limited.

Statist and commercial capitalist routes intersected in the legal profession. Emerging from royal control, legal practice increasingly concerned civil contracts and rhetoric generalized this. Rights and liberties resided less in particularistic customs of corporations and communities, more in universal rights of property and person. Though incorporated into Austrian and especially Prussian statism, lawyers were important in moderate reform: in the early phases of English reform and of the French Revolution and in the American Revolution. In their practice American, British, and French lawyers felt the clash between old and new modes of production and political regimes (though they rarely articulated it so). They articulated a kind of “half-ideology” – semioppositional, semiprincipled. But as regimes learned to cope with capitalism, they incorporated this into the practices of state institutions like the U.S. Supreme Court, Napoleon’s Civil Code, or the Prussian *Rechtsstaat*. By the 1840s, law had lost its destabilizing, half-ideological role and supported the new regimes.

Commercial capitalism was the major generator of most other infrastructures of discursive literacy – networks of discussion (academies, reading circles, taverns, and coffee houses), newspapers, pamphlets and journals, and the literary media. In Britain, especially when reinforced by religious moralizing, they disseminated cross-class reformism and “improvement,” a pragmatic program of personal achievement and social and political reform. Where commercial capitalism became entwined with military absolutism, across western continental Europe, the Enlightenment program proper emerged – metaphors of struggle justifying principled social changes toward a better form of society. Its mottos were the transitivity of knowledge, the *Sapere aude* (Dare to be wise) of Kant, the *Ecrasez l’infâme* (Crush the infamy, i.e., superstition) of Voltaire. It combined comparative politics, sociology, and ethics, encouraging the downward spread of cultivated, moralizing reason. It did not carry explicit class messages, and its radicalism was limited by absolutism; but where fiscal crisis deepened out of institutionalized control by practical elite and party politicians, as in France, the Enlightenment spawned alternative, principled ideologies espoused by a professional intelligentsia.

Discursive literacy was generated first by churches and then by states and capitalism, but it developed an emergent power transitivity. Without this the separate tensions of modernizing church, economy, military,

and state could remain segmental, insulated from each other. Bourgeois men grumbling at economic privilege could believe there was no alternative to manipulative deference, liberal aristocrats could retreat to improve their estates, questing clerics could adopt Jansenist retreat and meditation. Remember Vadier, the discontented small-town notable lawyer-soldier who read Enlightenment texts and drifted toward politics, eventually to become the Revolution’s police chief. Transitivity became a potent ideological weapon. Ideologists could find allies to outflank old regimes, expose their particularistic corruptions to moral principles, mobilize democratic sentiments, and relativize sacred traditions.

Emergent classes and nations were actually rather disparate. The petit bourgeois movement comprised small merchants, shopkeepers and small traders and middlemen, lesser professionals, small manufacturers, artisan masters, and artisan men. Their relations of production were diverse and sectionalized. Most were independent entrepreneurs employing little labor, but many lesser professionals (teachers, journalists, lawyer officials, pamphleteers) were employed, and many artisans were employed by other artisans. Only limited class identity, alongside sectional and segmental identities, might derive from such relations to the means of production. Much more class identity was generated by fiscal crisis. But the transitivity of ideological infrastructures encouraged moral, principled notions of systemic conflict between old and new societies, between the particularism, dependence, sophistication, idleness, and corruption of feudalism and the sturdy independence, honesty, and hard work of the industrious classes and the nation. Contemporaries usually pluralized the bourgeoisie into industrious or middling classes; but the entwining of rising classes with fiscal political crisis and ideological infrastructures could on occasion make them one community, one class, and one nation.

Classes, even when generated by capitalism, are not “pure.” The class actors of this period were not merely economic but were created by the added entwining of ideological, military, and political power relations in a sort of “trialectic” among class, fiscal-military crisis, and ideological principles. Ideologists helped integrate the disparate experience of “middling” families into a coherent petite bourgeoisie. The battle between new and old forms of society was joined primarily through ideological, not economic, organizations, and the first emergent autonomy of ideological power went beyond Goldman’s reductionist notion of “maximum possible consciousness.” The intelligentsia did not merely aid an existing class and nation to develop immanent morale. It also helped imagine and so create that class and nation.

2. Only in rare revolutionary crises, when practical politics failed, did a second emergent ideological power appear – an ideological van-

guard with powers over other power actors. Ideologists had confidence in superior, principled knowledge and morality. Morality, science, and history were on their side; they despised pragmatists and trimmers. Practical politicians knew that not principles but compromises, corruptions, and coercion governed the world. But as the fiscal-military crisis worsened and the regime refused to budge, their practical institutionalizing skills became played out, escalating resort to principles and those who wielded them. Privilege *could* be abolished, the nation summoned to arms, superstition abolished – by declaring so. True, the rhetoric of Barnave, Brissot, Danton, and Robespierre was often calculated. But with practical politics in abeyance, they possessed a distinctive ideological power – the ability to move people into self-fulfilling actions by invoking principles and emotions flowing between written and verbal infrastructures generated by the crisis.

The mob, the pamphlet, and classical rules of composition and rhetoric came together in the French revolutionary assemblies as speeches, motions, and galleries interacted amid intense emotions. Here the enunciation of principle attained an emotional, ritualistic, and ethical content that would have been ridiculed in nonrevolutionary situations. It went too far even in France. For Robespierre and Saint-Just the pursuit of “virtue” and “purity” became obsessive, contributing to their downfall. Often rejecting practical compromise, they were suspected of plotting dictatorship, yet remained curiously passive as the Thermidorian coup developed against them.

Thus the second level of ideological power in France and sometimes in America rested on the ability to move people with self-fulfilling principles. Ideologists manipulated and morally coerced followers into bold declaratory, initiatory steps, past points of no return, from which retreat was difficult. Once privilege was declared abolished, no politician in the Revolution could be seen to support it. Practical politicians could backtrack over details but not over the principle of abolition. France was permanently changed. Once aristocratic or propertied neighbors were declared traitors to the nation or the cause, they could be dragged to the tumbrels, their property confiscated, shattering segmental deference networks. Louis was executed as a traitor to the nation, so declared the National Assembly, thus polarizing Europe into two armed camps. The nation was declared armed, and was armed, with global consequences. Constitutions were written, embodying the grandest principles, the fundamental rights of all persons. The American Constitution still constrains practical politics. Nineteenth-century French class struggles turned on rival constitutions.

In these “moments,” ideological power elites arrived at principled messages that they derived partly from their prior experience in net-

works of discursive literacy. The Americans turned to predominantly legal and Protestant principles, the French to moral Enlightenment ones. Of course, there was also a substantial economic-political content to “self-evident” rights, to a nation equal without privilege, to a nation in arms. They had resulted as taxpaying classes generalized their discontents. But generalization occurred as the writings and speeches of the ideological vanguard interacted with the slogans of the popular assemblies, the pamphlets, and crowds. In this dynamic interaction of written and verbal communications, ideologists stumbled upon and exploited simple formulas and popular emotions, devising a power technique for implementing ideological principles. They had discovered “transcendent” principles of power organization.

Naturally, revolutionaries depended on economic, military, and political organizations to institutionalize their rule. But their ideology also changed these. French and, to a lesser extent, American transcendence fused economic and political power into a more active citizenship mobilizing class and nation, especially in armies, as in modern revolutions in general. This nation-state mobilized greater collective power than old regimes could muster. They had to reform in self-defense. Ideological power could only sway revolutionary moments, but they proved world-historical moments.

Yet Central Europe had developed more conservative ideologies, diffused more through statist channels. Lutheranism, traditionally state-reinforcing across North Germany, confirmed this; most churches cooperated more uneasily with states and became increasingly divided at lower levels. Administrations, church schools, armies, and capital cities grew faster than commercial capitalism. Discursive literacy flourished among the clients of old regimes, less among the petite bourgeoisie. The German literacy rate was only around 25 percent, though increasing steadily. Academies, clubs, and newspapers were dominated by officials, officers, teachers, and clerics (Blanning 1974). Radical ideologies had limited appeal to the employees and clients of absolutist regimes, though many referred to a conflict between education and privilege and referred to themselves interchangeably as the *Mittelstand* or *Bildungsstand* – “middle estate” or “educated estate” (Segeburg 1988: 139–42). Fiscal discontent was low in most German states (though not in Austria) because they drew more of their revenue from regalian rights and crown lands (see Chapter 11). Thus German political reformers, sparked as everywhere by fiscal and conscription issues, were less enraged than elsewhere.

Still, networks of discursive literacy were beyond state control in another sense in Central Europe. Unlike in Britain and France, state boundaries and linguistic communities did not roughly coincide among

the propertied classes. The Austrian state was bigger than any language community; German states were much smaller. Austria ruled over nine major languages plus many minor ones. Germany had more than 300 states plus 1,500 minor principalities in 1789; 39 survived in 1815. Both contained at least two major religious communities, Protestant and Catholic (in Austria there were also Eastern Orthodox churches). So in Austria (at first) and Germany, unlike in Britain or France, discursive literacy was in a sense apolitical, not oriented positively or negatively toward the state, producing what is usually described as a less worldly, more narrowly "cultural" national ferment among a smaller intelligentsia.

In the German and Central European Romantic movements, intellectuals explored emotions and the soul more than reason and politics. Schiller defined German "greatness" as deriving less from politics than from "delving into the spiritual world." The absence of a central state left intellectuals free to invent a "world spirit": *Bildung* (combining formal education and moral cultivation) not geopolitics would triumph. For Hölderlin the "priestess Germania" would guide "peoples and princes." Germany would wield ideological not military or political power – a cosmopolitan ideal. Schiller and Goethe jointly wrote, "Forget, O Germans, your hopes of becoming a *nation*. Educate yourselves instead . . . to be human beings" (from Segeburg 1988: 152).

German intellectuals studied history, literature, philosophy, and the medium of communication itself, language. They grammaticized and codified German and were imitated across Central Europe as others codified Polish and Magyar, then Czech, Slovak, and other Slav languages. The materials for their task lay, of course, in existing linguistic communities. Czechs of various regions and classes did speak dialects of a mutually intelligible language, which gave them some sense of shared community; but overall, as Cohen (1981) shows, few Czech speakers imagined this was a total, "national" identity. Czech was the language of specialized identities emerging from the private household and the local community, German the language of specialized identities arising from the public sectors of capitalism and state. Those using the latter often classified themselves as "Germans," despite having Czech surnames. Intensive and extensive identities were not one. Philologists and protonationalist intellectuals did not seem to threaten states. Indeed, states, churches, and even some old regime nobles favored language standardization to ease their rule. But it subtly subverted state powers because it encouraged community identities that cut across or subverted state boundaries.

The "national" identities of these ideologists were ostensibly apolitical, yet they carried varied political implications. They imbibed

Enlightenment advocacy of reason, education, and literacy to modernize, usually with liberal political implications. But other ideological currents had conservative implications (Droz 1966). German Romantics saw progress carried less by the individual than by the community, the *Volk*. Herder discovered a *Volksgeist* expressed in folk songs and vernacular dialects and projected it back into history. He believed he was reviving, not creating, the German nation. In a different political context this might encourage radical-bourgeois demands for limited democracy, but amid German statism, clericalism, and lower fiscal discontent, it often romanticized a past order: The absolute ruler articulated a spiritual union among ruler, ancient community, and religion. Austrian and Catholic Romantics idealized a Holy Roman Empire of community comprising emperor, church, and estates.

All this might have mattered little. Central European protonationalism concerned small groups of intelligentsia, mostly loyal to their rulers, busying themselves with abstruse forms of knowledge. Hroch (1985: 23) calls this "Phase A nationalism (the period of scholarly interest)," later developing into "Phase B (the period of patriotic agitation)" and then "Phase C (the rise of a mass national movement)." He rigorously pursues economic and class explanations, admitting they yield few simple conclusions. Unfortunately, he ignores most political and all geopolitical causes. The latter is especially odd because the scholars made their first dramatic impact as French revolutionary militarism intensified class and national identities across Europe.

#### 4. Post-1792 militarism

Britain, then briefly America, had begun what Bendix termed "reference societies" for modernizers, but after 1789, French influence dwarfed theirs. The Revolution attracted modernizers, but when it turned violent and attacked old regimes abroad, France became a terrible example except for radicals. From then on, old regimes and substantial bourgeoisies realized that their factional fighting might lead into the abyss. This caused them to compromise, mobilizing more "national" state administrations and armies. France was defeated, but by half-nations.

France became a nation-state quickly, then slowly. A purely bourgeois counterrevolution might have adopted the American strategy and decentralized France as a precaution against future "mobs." But Napoleon represented himself, not the bourgeoisie. He was a general and dictator, relying on a formidable national army and a central state, expanding both. The Directory's legal reforms were developed into the Code Napoléon, a comprehensive legal code; the revolutionaries' attempts to centralize administration were partly implemented

(Chapter 14); education became centralized; and church and state hierarchies were reconciled. Napoleon institutionalized the nation-state while emasculating political citizenship. After his fall the nation-state was weakened up to 1848 by monarchism and more enduringly by a clericalism forced back to the local-regional level. From the 1870s, the Republican nation-state began its final triumph.

British and Russian social structures were the least directly affected by French armies. Neither experienced routine occupation, and neither was militarily humiliated. Their traditional military formations proved adequate – the British navy, plus paying Europeans to do much of the land fighting; and the Russian autocracy, helped by “General Winter,” leading nobility and peasants in defense of the homeland. The Terror and Bonaparte made France a negative reference society, slowing domestic reform. Autocracy allowed Alexander to switch from reform to reaction without causing serious unrest or encouraging a Russian nation.

During the wars, the British petite bourgeoisie split and radicals were repressed. But fiscal pressures eventually forced economic and political reform. Petite bourgeoisie and old regime compromised, and political citizenship was granted to property owners. The new “ruling class-nation” saw itself as uniquely capable of compromise and gradual evolution, morally qualified to rule the global empire of uncivilized and “colored” peoples now under its sway. With laissez-faire institutionalized, the British nation appeared pacific; already enjoying global power, it had less need of aggression. Its nationalism was complacent, achieved – only turning nasty in far-off colonial places. The British conversion from national to full nation-state proceeded relatively smoothly. (See Chapter 16.)

The French impact was much greater on the Continent. France propagandized freedom of opinion, of the press, and of association, equality before the law, an end to privilege, expropriation of church property, freedom of worship, economic freedom from guilds and other corporate bodies, and political citizenship for propertied males. Bonaparte abrogated political but not civil citizenship. In 1808 he wrote to his brother Jerome, just created king of Westphalia:

In Germany, as in France, Italy and Spain, people long for equality and liberalism. The benefits of the Code Napoleon, legal procedure in open court, the jury, these are the points by which your monarchy must be distinguished. . . . Your people must enjoy a liberty, an equality unknown in the rest of Germany. [Markham 1954: 115]

Much of Europe was ruled by distant dynasties. Discontent smoldered among powerful local-regional aristocracies and burgher oligarchies

and where the local church was not that of the dynasty. Here intensive local-regional power relations did not reinforce the extensive state. Across much of Italy, the Austrian Netherlands, Poland, and Ireland, nobilities or substantial bourgeoisies – relying at village level on clerics – rallied local forces to greet the French as “national” liberators. Their “nations” were often traditional, segmental, and particularistic: Notables united by common territorial residence and blood relationships should govern themselves. Yet bourgeois and petit bourgeois groups in economically advanced areas – the Netherlands, parts of Switzerland, and some Italian towns – embraced more secular and democratic Jacobinism. The nation should embody civil and political citizenship for all males or all male property owners. By the 1790s, few even of these areas were industrialized, but they were commercial and urban. Their radicals believed that rule should pass from dynasties, aristocracies, and particularistic clients to the universal propertied “people.”

Among conservative clerical and radical “patriots” alike, just as among class movements, leaders were drawn disproportionately from the ideological professions – priests, lawyers, professors, printers, and journalists – often with students and seminarians as shock troops. In backward Ireland this presented the curious spectacle of Wolfe Tone, a Protestant lawyer and zealot for the secular Enlightenment, leading a peasant-clerical revolt against the British. Almost everywhere in patriot movements the “rising bourgeoisie,” that is, the manufacturing bourgeoisie, was poorly represented. So were Germans. None of the several hundred German states (including some feeble ones) were toppled by patriots, only by French armies. The predominantly statist, Lutheran route to discursive ideologies in Germany had created few patriots (Blanning 1974: 305–34).

Elsewhere patriots mobilized locally intensive transnational federations of discursive literacy networks. As the French army neared, networks of Masonic lodges, clubs of illuminati, Jacobins, and secret societies exploded. Though small and unrepresentative (only in the Austrian Netherlands did they organize a large popular party, the Vonckists), their risings distracted the local states. Later they formed auxiliary militias and client administrations. Around French borders patriots staffed “sister republics” protected by French arms.

A second, intensive linguistic spark was sometimes added. Appealing downward for local support, patriots expressed their demands in the local written language, often not the language of the ruling dynasty. Nor was it the spoken language of most of the populace, whose many dialects were often mutually intelligible. That the patriot appeal was rather restricted led them into greater linguistic activity. The French revolutionaries had sought to extend the French language downward.

The abbé Grégoire's linguistic survey of 1790 had revealed that three-quarters of the population knew some French, but only just over 10 percent could speak it properly. As the Committee of Public Safety declared in 1794:

The monarchy had good reason to resemble the Tower of Babel; but in a democracy, to leave the citizens ignorant of the national language and incapable of controlling the government means to betray the fatherland. It means to fail to recognize the blessings of the printing press, for every printer is a teacher of the language and the legislation. . . . In a free people language must be one and the same for all. [Kohn 1967: 92]

In Italy, the Low Countries, and Poland this enhanced the political relevance of the linguistic community, of clerics still providing the most education, and of obscure philologists.

The term "nationalism" seems to have been used first in Germany in 1774 and in France in 1798. It was not yet used aggressively. The leaders of France, described as *la grande nation* from 1797, did not consider themselves opposed to other nations; nations were allied against reactionary dynasties in a struggle to establish universal freedom and peace (Godechot 1956; Mommsen 1990). But as the wars intensified mass mobilization, two developments occurred. First, fiscal and manpower needs forced limited economic and political reforms. These inched states away from segmental particularism, seen increasingly as immoral "corruption," toward more universal principles of administration, military service, and morality. Second, the scale of war mobilization – 5 percent of total populations conscripted, perhaps half agricultural and manufacturing surpluses fed into the war machines – meant whole "peoples" were organized to fight each other. In Britain and France, the most advanced combatants, this fed popular aggressive nationalism after about 1802 – after British Jacobinism and French counterrevolution had faded and when it became clear that the two states would fight unto death. Negative national stereotypes of the enemy became more widely shared. Local legend has it that the citizens of West Hartlepool, finding a ship's monkey in a uniform washed up on their beach, hung it for a Frenchman.

The growth of nationalism on the Continent was more complex.<sup>3</sup> At first, most populations were split, especially in more advanced areas. Many French reforms were popular, particularly civil law codes.

<sup>3</sup> Hobsbawm (1962 101–16) provides a fine short overview of these nationalisms, Palmer (1959) a fine longer one. Godechot (1956) is good up to 1799; thereafter for detailed cases see Dunan (1956), Connelly (1965), Devleeshowwer et al. (1968), and Dovie and Pallez-Guillard (1972). For a contrasting study of the Rhineland, loyal to France, see Diefendorf (1980).

Napoleon's Confederation of the Rhine allowed medium-sized states (like Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria) to modernize and mop up tiny states, counterweighting Austrian power. Industries benefited from the French demand for uniforms, guns, and fodder. But the French fueled local nationalisms as "liberation" turned into imperialism. Bilateral trade treaties favored France. Wealth, inventions, and skilled workers were often simply carted off to France. By 1799, revolts against the French were widespread. Some attacked under the conservative banners of old regimes and religions, some radically proclaimed national self-determination. As in England, contrasting stereotypes of "national character," based on individual character, appeared. Germans characterized themselves as open, upright, and God-fearing, the French as sly, frivolous, and unreliable. The nation and *la grande nation* were no longer one.

Bonaparte worsened the contradiction. His own career inspired radical patriots across Europe, proof that bourgeois birth plus merit could rule. Yet he opposed nationalism and helped patriot movements only when they suited his personal interests (Godechot 1988: 23–6). He favored a dynastic empire, not a confederation of sovereign national states. He appointed his family and marshals as kings and married them into the royal families of Europe, and he divorced Josephine to marry Francis of Austria's eldest daughter in 1810. As the Viennese ditty expressed it:

Louise's skirts and Napoleon's pants  
Now unite Austria and France.

[Langsam 1930: 142]

As imperial rule descended into cycles of revolt and repression, even his client-kings advised concessions to patriots. But Bonaparte only tightened his despotism. This would have mattered less had it brought peace and prosperity, but wars brought taxes, conscription, and British blockade. By 1808, nearly all patriots were turning against the French; after 1812, even active collaborators were deserting a losing cause.

But to whom could they turn? Conservative patriots – nobles and clerics mobilizing peasants – could mobilize segmental, intensive, local-regional guerrilla warfare in backward Spain and mountainous Switzerland and the Tyrol. Elsewhere big armies were required to kick out the French. As in the Revolution, and as later in the century, war between large armies favored the "one and indivisible" state. A Milanese patriot perceived the military weakness of Italian federalism:

The ease with which Italy can be invaded, the . . . national jealousies which actually arise between confederated republics, the slowness with which federations operate, lead me to reject the federalist plan. [Italy] needs to be given a

form of government which can offer the strongest possible resistance to invasion; and the only such government is a *republic one and indivisible*. [Godechot 1988: 23]

He recommended an Italian constitution modeled on the 1793 constitution of France – the state that had most successfully resisted foreign invasion.

What was utopian in Italy could be reality in Central Europe under the powerful states, Prussia and Austria. German patriots had realistically to choose French rule or to support these absolute monarchies. The auspices were not good for either the smaller German states or for radical patriots, compromised by their support for Bonaparte, weakened by his downfall. Liberalism seemed allied with the particularism and military failure of smaller states. Liberalism and radical nationalism had only just got going in Germany; by 1815, they were badly faltering.

The decisive French victories at Ulm and Austerlitz and at Jena and Auerstadt had, respectively, devastated Austria and Prussia in 1805–6. Yet the two monarchies were not finished. They were shocked by defeat to contemplate reform, learning to harness a modicum of nationalism to absolutism. In Central Europe, the French had rarely abrogated noble privileges (they had needed noble support). But the Civil Code and sale of common and church lands had created a more capitalist environment for nobles and bourgeoisies alike. In France, the Revolution had encouraged capitalism plus legal and political liberalism. With careful regime management, German modernization might secure more capitalism and more bureaucracy but no more liberty. Administrative, not parliamentary, representation might suffice.

Prussian reformers, mostly university-educated officials, made headway after Jena, then had to compromise (Gray 1986; for more details, see Chapter 13). Their plan to enfranchise all property owners in a national assembly was defeated but partly implemented at the municipal level. Central administration was rationalized, subjected to the law and opened to the educated bourgeoisie. Public education was expanded and German discursive literacy extended downward under Lutheran and Prussian leadership. Serfs (and Jews) were emancipated and corvée labor abolished. In return, peasants handed over one-third of their land to their nobles. Nobles now had free landless laborers, not serfs. Agrarian capitalism advanced. In the army general conscription, meritocratic promotion rules, and staff colleges were introduced. All subjects were permitted for the first time to wear the Prussian colors as a national cockade. The Landwehr militia was created, in pale imitation of the French citizen army. (See Chapter 12.) In 1813, the king declared war against France, appealing “to my people” – “My” and “people”

being somewhat contradictory. The enthusiasm of the Landwehr during the campaigns of 1813–15 raised liberal hopes. Hegel, a supporter of Bonaparte in 1806, now saw the Prussian bureaucracy as a “universal class” realizing the potentialities of the human spirit. Though this seems bizarre to us, many German liberal nationalists looked hopefully toward Prussia.

Some reaction occurred after 1815. As in Austria, monarch and court were fearful of arming the rabble. The commander of the guard corps and the minister of police warned; “To arm a nation means to organize and facilitate rebellion and sedition” (Ritter 1969: I, 103). Yet many professional officers favored change, so the Landwehr stayed, but as a reserve force not a permanent militia. There developed a Lutheran Prussian-German national identity, linking religious and national sentiments to loyalty to a strong state.

The Habsburgs had different options. When somebody was recommended to Emperor Francis as a patriot for Austria, Francis replied, “He may be a patriot for Austria, but the question is whether he is a patriot for me” (Kohn 1967: 162). The Habsburgs could not rule a national state. They were dynasts ruling a multilingual, multiprovincial empire, in some provinces aided by the Catholic church. Though the Austrian core was Germanic, most of the population spoke other languages. But the dynasty had possessed the titular headship of the Holy Roman (German) Empire for almost four hundred years and Austrians could conjure up an alternative German nationalism. Here is a French report on the activities of a confidant of Archduke John and later a leader of revolts against the French:

Baron Hormayr . . . has undertaken the editorship of a periodical called *Archives of Geography, History, Politics and Military Science*. Under this rather innocuous-sounding title he continues to ape Thomas Paine in the preaching of revolutionary doctrines. These doctrines, he claims, should bring about the regeneration of Germany and the reunion of that vast country under one new constitution. Rarely does M. de Hormayr himself speak. Instead, he very cleverly quotes from many justly esteemed German writers who thought of anything but revolution. Even Luther is laid under contribution. . . . The favorite themes of these extracts are the *unity* and *indivisibility* of Germany, and the conservation of its *mores*, its usages and its language. As historian and imperial archivist, M. de Hormayr has access to many details regarding the ancient unity of Germany of which we are entirely ignorant. [Langsam 1930: 49]

Thus could an archivist worry an army of occupation – but he also worried his own emperor.

Francis wanted to be rid of the French but not on popular terms. He compromised, reforming the army, creating a Landwehr in Austria and Bohemia, promising general reform (which he never implemented), and in 1809, launching an uprising against the French, appealing to the

“German nation” as “allies” and “brothers” of the Habsburgs and Austria. Archduke Charles inflicted the first major battlefield defeat on Napoleon at Aspern, a defeat that broke the myth of invincibility. Napoleon recovered, grinding down the Austrian generals to sue for peace. Yet Austria remained the leader of German resistance, with the largest armies, able to appoint Archduke Charles as the supreme allied commander in the final pursuit of Napoleon. As Habsburg military power revived, the “German card” was resisted. Francis refused the German imperial crown. Officials were instructed to refer only to Austrian patriotism – and even to speak respectfully of Napoleon “since, after all, he is the son-in-law of our monarch” (Langsam 1930: 160). Segmental dynasticism had revived.

But Austria’s regional-national problems had been worsened by the wars. The Habsburgs suffered most from Jacobin patriots, in the Netherlands, Poland, and Italy. The departure of Napoleon eased the pain briefly, but dissidents were emboldened throughout the Napoleonic period and their grievances remained. Through the next (and last) century of their rule the Habsburgs were assailed by nationalists asserting that a people, defined by ethnic-linguistic culture but ruled by foreigners, should have its own state. Eventually these state-subverting nations triumphed.

The movements in the Austrian lands were not directly caused by the development of capitalism or industrialism (as Marxists and Gellner 1983: chapter 2 argue) because they appeared among diverse economies and classes. Nationalism arose right across Europe amid different levels of capitalist and industrial development (Mann 1991) – and this is the only perverted sense I can make out of the revisionist Marxist notion that nationalism resulted from “uneven development” (as advocated by Nairn 1977). Nationalists said virtually nothing about classes or capitalism or industrialism (until mass peasant nationalisms appeared far later). Why, then, should we believe them reducible to these forces?

Hroch (1985) gives the most careful analysis of economies and classes, relying mainly on samples of the adherents of nationalist societies in eight state-subverting small nations across Europe (including two Austrian minorities, Czechs and Slovaks). His Phase B nationalism, when significant patriot movements began popular agitation but before they had mass followings, roughly corresponds to the first half of the nineteenth century across most Austrian lands. Hroch sustains some generalizations. Most cases still involved the intelligentsia (its clerical wing now usually fading), and most disproportionately involved literate urban occupations at probably the highest levels to which the oppressed minority could reach. The directly productive bourgeoisie was under-

represented as were almost all manufacturing sectors. But nationalists were usually more active in areas where markets were most developed.

Yet Hroch’s countries do not include the most advanced and state-subverting regions in the Austrian lands, the Austrian Netherlands and northern Italy. They were commercialized and urbanized at the time of their first patriotic ferment (so were the Czechs by the time ferment reached them). But Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Balkans hosted nationalist movements while they were still far more agrarian and backward. There was probably a threshold level of market-aided literacy and communication beyond which patriots could credibly organize – as Hroch seems, finally, to conclude. But beyond that level of mobilization there was economic and class diversity. Indeed, Hroch’s nationalist societies were not always the most significant actors. In the Revolution of 1848, most leaders of provincial “national” movements were nobles seeking representation only for themselves (Sked 1989: 41–88). The Magyar nobles remained in control, though most nobilities did not. As Hroch observes, mass state-subverting nationalism (his Phase C, mostly occurring in the later nineteenth century) acquired a peasant base. What common class motivation could possibly lead them all to proclaim themselves nationalists (cf. Sugar 1969)?

My explanation centers on the political impact of the militarism and ideologies discussed earlier. Most grievances concerned the political economy of the state: its growing fiscal and manpower exactions and its office-holding spoils – costs and benefits. But fiscal discontent was here expressed territorially, by region. This had unfortunate consequences for the state’s “national” crystallization. Fiscal or manpower discontent in Britain might produce class riots that local gentry and yeomanry could handle. But territorially based discontent led to revolts by provincial notables, wielding militias, sometimes regular troops, with initial sympathy from lower-level clerics, and mobilizing intense local sentiments that families and homes were under attack from strangers. Political representation was structured as much by local community and region as by class – *where* to locate citizenship was as important as *who* would obtain it.

Austria was not unique, for the United States was also riven by regional-national struggles. During the mid-nineteenth century in the United States, states’ rights mobilized intense local passions, dominated politics, and ended in civil war. Across the Austrian lands, civil disturbances peppered the nineteenth century – in 1821, 1830, 1848–9, 1859, 1866, and 1908 – usually abetted by foreign Powers. Local-regional resistance to a centralizing state recurred in all five countries, though only in these two did it generate civil war.

Yet Austrian regional nationalism also uniquely (among the five

countries) involved linguistic issues, especially through office spoils. Two issues arose: What should be the language of the public sphere, especially government, and what languages should be taught in public schools? As Gellner (1983) argues, literacy was cultural capital, realizable in employment in army, civil administration, law courts, and capitalist economy. As capitalism and states expanded, they were staffed by more non-German speakers. More nobles, bourgeois, and petit bourgeois had a vested interest in the local language's being the state's. The Habsburgs were not unsympathetic, encouraging bilingualism in the army. Yet to extract taxes they turned intermittently to repression, pushing them to depend on the mainly Austro-German officer corps and central administration. Other linguistic communities were blocked from administration and law courts, so the revolutionaries of 1848 protested (Sked 1989: 41–88).

Yet linguistic nationalism was not just an instrumental demand (as in Gellner's model). As clerics and philologists labored to produce standardized local vernaculars, these became the cement of public local-regional interaction networks, reproduced in elementary schools, churches, and market exchanges. Language gradually became a unifying ideology of a locally rooted cross-class community, pointing to the contrast between "us," speaking intelligibly, and "alien" unintelligible conquerors. Movements legitimated themselves in terms of the "nation" even where (as in Hungary) they permitted only the nobility political citizenship, even where (as in Slovakia) the "nation" was invented by a handful of intellectuals. The fusion of regional and linguistic identities meant the Habsburgs came to be assailed less by classes than by passionate, state-subverting "nations."

In this post-1792 part of the militarist phase revolutionaries and Bonaparte had loomed large. Though the nation's rise seems inexorable when viewed teleologically from the twentieth century, in this period it advanced contingently, as decisions made by leaders of the principal aggressor Power had enormous geopolitical repercussions. Had Louis XVI compromised, had the Brissotins foreseen that war would destroy them, had the French troops at Valmy run away (as they were expected to do), had the Directory not produced a consummate general who proved an insensitive conqueror and who made one terrible decision to invade Russia . . . these and other "might have beens" might have stemmed the national tide.

Events in 1815 seemed to reverse the tide anyway. With the defeat of France concerted political decisions strove to cut down nationalism. The Concert of Powers and the Holy Alliance of dynasts acted decisively against radical patriots (see Chapter 8). Though Britain was becoming a nation-state, it did not advocate national principles of government

for Europe. The Prussian regime might be tempted to play the German card in its rivalry with Austria, but for the moment, fear of the people kept its state true to segmental dynasticism. Habsburg power was self-consciously dynastic; Russia knew only dynasticism. The United States was an ocean away, no longer infecting Europe with democratic germs. The world seemed embarked on cautious modernization, ruled by two transnationalisms, old regime dynastic networks and the global, liberal British economy.

But there were three reasons why nationalism would not be dispelled. First, the many contingencies of this short subphase had transformed power organizations. Britain, France, and the United States were now national states and could not return to being particularistic old regimes. Though the United States remained regionally confederal, Britain and France were increasingly centralized. Though the Austrian and Prussian situations were more open-ended, nations within them had also been strengthened. Second, capitalism and state modernization were unstoppable, identified with material and moral "progress," making states better at fighting wars. Their conjunction meant that classes and nations would continue to develop extensive and political organization. It was not inevitable that democratic nation-states would dominate, for more statist Prussia and more confederal Austria long survived. But the old particularistic, segmental order had substantially declined. Third, industrial capitalism was later to increase the density of social interaction and to transform state functions. The unintended consequences of this fusion produced full-fledged nation-states in the fourth phase of development, chronicled in later chapters.

### Conclusion

This period saw the emergence of classes and nations. As Marx perceived, eighteenth-century capitalism did (roughly) displace what was now called feudalism, and there was extensive and political class struggle between old regime and bourgeois elements. Yet this almost always involved the petite bourgeoisie, not the bourgeoisie as a whole. The bourgeoisie, Marx's historical paradigm case of the rising class, was largely absent from the macrohistorical record. We shall see that Marx also exaggerated the powers of his other rising class, the proletariat. Even in the capitalist mode of production, classes proved far less extensive and political than he and many others have asserted.

Little old regime–petit bourgeois conflict emerged directly from an economic dialectic. Militarist state crystallizations intervened, generating fiscal crisis and severe conflict between state elites, "in" and "out" parties, the "people," and the "populace." Direct relations of

economic production were more particularistic, diverse, and amenable to segmental and sectional compromises. Most conflict between petite bourgeoisie and old regime derived from the political economy of the state. Expanding networks of discursive literacy then helped some regime modernizers and emerging petites bourgeoisies to transcend their conflict and modernize the state. Where elite-party conflict was not institutionalized, fiscal crisis deepened, permeating class structure and generating class hostilities. Revolutionaries wielding ideological powers then might seize command and transform social structure. The French Revolutionaries then marched on all old regimes. The French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars intensified militarism and thickened the heady, impure brew.

No revolution was fully completed, most class conflict remained muted and partial, and nations only half emerged. Party democracy tottered unsteadily and unevenly forward as emerging classes and nations compromised with old regimes. Regimes became more capitalistic, as classes were partially incorporated into their segmental and local-regional organization. States and militaries modernized, professionalized, admitted highly educated sons of professionals, and became less particularistic and corrupt. Inter-marriage between old regime, substantial bourgeoisie and professionals increased. British capitalism retained an old regime commercial tinge, German capitalism acquired statist tinges. Nineteenth-century nouveaux riches in all countries were incorporated into both national regimes and local-regional and segmental power networks.

The incorporation of the petite bourgeoisie (and later of the middle class; see Chapter 16) seemed more problematic. Their numbers were far greater and their demands for citizenship more radical. The regime did not want to marry its sons to *their* daughters. Yet even their loyalties could be bound by full individual civil and partial political citizenship. Legal codes enshrined "possessive individualism" combining personal and property freedoms, although regimes varied in their concessions of more collective civil rights like freedom of association or of the press (none allowed workers untrammelled organizing rights). Limited, varying degrees of party democracy were conceded to the petite bourgeoisie.

Now began the era of "notable" political parties, predominantly segmentally controlled by substantial property owners, using bribery, patronage, status deference, and mild coercion (usually the ballot was not secret) to persuade middling classes to vote for their betters. The United States was pushed to adult male suffrage outside the South, but region, religion, and ethnicity crosscut class and kept its parties segmental and notable. In Britain two notable parties extended the

franchise to "dish" each other. Austria and Prussia lagged, but eventually conceded some local and then central representation. Two noted antidemocrats, Bismarck and Napoleon III, were the first to introduce universal adult male suffrage (though to assemblies of limited sovereignty). Notable parties segmentally incorporated most of the petite bourgeoisie (although in Austrian provinces they were often antiregime). The massive increase in social density and the emergence of classes and nations meant greater collective and distributive power mobilization. The "people" and the "populace" had more direct relations with old regimes. But these remained more cooperative and more varied than either Marx or any of the other dichotomous theorists referred to in Chapter 1 realized.

I have presented a predominantly modernist theory of the emergence of the nation into world history. Nations are not the opposite of classes, for they rose up together, both (to varying degrees) the product of modernizing churches, commercial capitalism, militarism, and the rise of the modern state. Thus my theory has combined all four sources of social power. Ideological power had dominated the first protonational phase, as churches diffused broader social identities through sponsorship of mass discursive literacy. In the second protonational phase, varying combinations of commercial capitalism and modernizing states continued to diffuse more universal protonational (and class) identities, enveloping particularistic economic roles, localities, and regions. In the decisive third, militarist phase, the increasing costs of eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century geopolitics propelled broader identities toward the national state, just as they politicized class and regional grievances. Intensifying geopolitical rivalries gave national identities the first aggressive sentiments toward each other. Thus protonations became actual self-conscious, cross-class, somewhat aggressive nations. Yet emerging nations (and classes) also mobilized a distinctive moral passion, as ideological power relations linked intense familial and local community networks to perceptions of extensive exploitation by capitalism and military state. Extensive and political class and national discontent were principally organized by discursive literacy networks staffed by secular and religious intelligentsia.

Emerging classes and nations now influenced, and were themselves influenced by, state institutions. Galvanized by militarism, their moral passions intensified by ideologies, classes and nations demanded more representative government and aimed toward democracy. Thus nations essentially originated as movements for democracy. However, nations were at this point confronted by a choice: to democratize a central state or to reduce the powers of a central state and seek to democratize

local-regional seats of government. Their choices were principally determined as political and ideological power relations entwined.

Politically, the choices depended on whether state institutions were already fairly centralized. British ones were; Austrian and American colonial ones were not. In the latter, advocates of representation could fall back on local-regional institutions that they felt were more controllable than would be any central state. Ideologically, the legacy of the first two protonational phases was now strongly felt because political territories related variably to religious and linguistic communities, both able to mobilize local intensity for extensive purposes. The language issue also generated the politics of public education and qualifications for public office. If these political and ideological power relations centralized the entire (or the core) state territories, state-reinforcing nationalism resulted, as in mainland Britain and (after revolutionary vicissitudes) France. Where they decentralized state-subverting nationalism resulted, as in Austria. The United States and Germany represented intermediate cases. The United States had political decentralization without much ideological reinforcement, and so its sense of "nation" remained ambiguously poised between the two. Germany was a different intermediate case because political decentralization lay within a broader ideological community. Its nationhood also remained ambiguous, although it soon moved down the third, state-creating, track.

Most theories have explained nationalism in terms of either economic or political power relations or both. Yet nations emerged as all four sources of social power entwined. Relations among these sources changed over the period. Before and at the beginning of this period geopolitics had generated a military revolution causing repeated state fiscal crises that politicized and "naturalized" class relations. The last and deepest crisis came at the end of the eighteenth century. Earlier states had been relatively puny at home; though often fairly autonomous even from dominant classes, they had exercised few powers over them. The nature of state elites or of state institutions had mattered little for society. Now they mattered a great deal. The rise of citizenship is conventionally narrated as the rise of modern classes to political power. But classes are not "naturally" political. Through most of history subordinate classes had been largely indifferent to or had sought to evade states. They were now caged into national organization, into politics, by two principal zookeepers: tax gatherers and recruiting officers.

Throughout the same period, and beyond, class relations were also revolutionized by commercial, then industrial capitalism. Capitalism and militarist states began to shape ideologies around classes and

nations. As yet they were much influenced by moral-religious mobilization of intensive power, but at the beginning of the period it is perhaps possible to isolate two sources of social power, the economic and the military, as in a sense "ultimately primary."

Yet the entwined military and economic revolutions had generated the modern state, which proved to have emergent power properties. On the representative issue states crystallized at various positions between more mobilized authoritarian monarchy and an embryo party democracy (plus colonial settler variants). On the national issue they crystallized between centralized nation-states and confederalism. The last phase of fiscal-military crisis vastly increased the scale of states and politicized and naturalized classes. This did not increase the distributive power of state elites, but it did increase the collective structuring powers of state institutions, enhancing the relevance of what I called institutional statist theory. Thus ultimate primacy arguably may have shifted toward a combination of economic and political power. Later chapters show that whereas capitalism continued to revolutionize economic life, political institutions exerted conservative effects. The institutions by which early class representation and national conflicts were resolved—the American Constitution, the contested French constitution, British old regime liberalism, Prussian authoritarian monarchy, and Habsburg dynastic confederalism—endured. They interacted with the Second Industrial Revolution to determine the outcomes of the next phase of class struggle, between capitalists and workers.

Finally, I have shown that modern societies have not strained toward democratic and national citizenship as part of some general human evolution toward the realization of freedom. Rather, modern societies reinvented democracy, as the ancient Greeks had reinvented it, because their states could not be escaped, as medieval states could be escaped. What we call "democracy" is not simply freedom, because it had resulted from social confinement. Giddens describes the modern state as a "power container." I prefer the more charged "cage." In the early modern period people became trapped within national cages and so sought to change the conditions within those cages.

This had also happened in two earlier phases of state growth, described in Volume I. The first permanent states, in the world's "pristine civilizations," resulted from caging by alluvial and irrigated river valley cultivation. Those first states seem to have had representative institutions, later subverted by warfare, trade concentration, and the emergence of private property. A second phase, Greek democracy, was also the product of caging, partly economic, partly by hoplite warfare. In Volume I, I argue that Greeks were not necessarily politically freer than their great adversaries, the Persians. The despotism of the Persian

Great King mattered less than would despotism in Greek city-states, because Persian subjects had weaker relations with their state than did Greeks. In all three cases – the pristine civilizations, Greece, and the late eighteenth century – the cage tightened. As it did so, the same popular reaction occurred: The inmates cared more about conditions within their cages than about the cages themselves.

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