

## Renata Gaineddenova

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CONTACT INFORMATION	Department of Economics University of Wisconsin - Madison Office 7230 1180 Observatory Drive Madison, WI, USA	Phone: +1 (608) 571-9020 E-mail: gaineddenova@wisc.edu Website: www.gaineddenova.com Citizenship: Kazakhstan
RESEARCH INTERESTS	Industrial Organization, Economics of Digitization, Applied Microeconomics	
ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE	<b>University of Wisconsin - Madison</b> U.S., Madison, WI Ph.D. in Economics 2022 ( <i>expected</i> ) M.S. in Economics 2017 Major: Industrial Organization, Minor: Econometrics, Macroeconomics	
	<b>Barcelona Graduate School of Economics</b> Spain, Barcelona M.Sc. in Economics 2014	
	<b>Higher School of Economics</b> Russia, Moscow B.Sc. in Economics ( <i>magna cum laude</i> ) 2013 Major: Corporate Finance	
JOB MARKET PAPER	<b>Pricing and Efficiency in a Decentralized Ride-Hailing Platform</b> <i>Abstract:</i> Asymmetric information about market participants' valuations and costs plays a crucial role in the efficiency of a platform's design. Using novel data from a ride-hailing platform called inDriver, I examine whether decentralizing the pricing mechanism improves market efficiency. Unlike its competitors, inDriver requires riders to offer a price for their requested trips, and allows drivers to either agree to the offer, ask for a higher price, or ignore the request. Under this mechanism, a rider with a high willingness to pay for a trip can offer a higher price to increase her chances of being matched. At the same time, under decentralized pricing, riders might not truthfully reveal their valuations, which can result in lower average prices on the platform. To understand welfare implications of decentralized pricing for riders and drivers, I develop an equilibrium model of a decentralized ride-hailing market and estimate its parameters using user-level data on the universe of ride requests in a single city. I then use the obtained estimates to compare welfare under a decentralized mechanism to an alternative mechanism in which prices are chosen by the platform. I find that decentralized pricing significantly improves efficiency in the studied market.	
WORK IN PROGRESS	<b>Enhancing Market-Thickness through Batching: An Experiment in a Two-sided Market</b> <i>Abstract:</i> Decentralized markets with high transaction frequency could suffer from a market-thickness problem: sellers can fail to form a match with sequentially arriving buyers and miss better opportunities in the meantime. A matching platform may therefore improve efficiency by implementing a batching system. To analyze the effects of such system, I partnered with a decentralized ride-hailing platform (inDriver), and we experimented with a batching mechanism. In treatment cities, instead of offering riders to drivers in real time the system accumulates several waiting buyers, pre-screens them, and then dispatches the requests. The effects of this change are in principle ambiguous: it could decrease time wasted on unsuccessful matching and allow the platform to real-	

ize benefits from a thicker market, but if sellers possess private information that cannot be successfully internalized at the pre-screening stage the batching system could hurt matching efficiency. Also, if buyers are sufficiently impatient, the platform could lose some of them at the pre-screening stage.

### **Work Flexibility and Labor Supply: Quasi-experimental Evidence from a Ride-hailing Platform**

*Abstract:* I examine the effects of a change in fee structure that was implemented by a ride-hailing platform, where drivers' fees were changed from an upfront charge for a fixed amount of time on the platform to a per-ride commission. The upfront participation fee leads to a less flexible arrangement, which is likely important for part-time workers. Exploiting the fact that the change was implemented as a city-wide staggered roll-out, I study how much the switch affected the number and types of participating drivers. I find that it led to a sharp increase (10%) in the number of drivers participating daily on the platform. Surprisingly, this influx of new drivers does not translate into major shifts in the platform's important metrics, like overall match rates. I test various hypotheses to explore this puzzle.

### **Search Costs and Price Dispersion: Evidence from Russian Pharmaceutical Industry**

ACADEMIC AWARDS	Caves Dissertation Fellowship, UW-Madison	2020
	Christensen Graduate Fellowship in Empirical Economics, UW-Madison	2019
	Juli Plant Grainger Summer Research Scholarship, UW-Madison	2019
	Scholarship from Barcelona GSE	2013
	Scholarship from Higher School of Economics	2010-2013
	National Research University-HSE Competition (Mathematics)	2009
CONFERENCES	NBER Digitization Tutorial, NBER Economics of Digitization	2019, 2020
	International Industrial Organization Conference (canceled due to COVID-19)	2020
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE	<b>University of Wisconsin - Madison</b>	
	Research Assistant, Jean-François Houde	2021
	Research Mentor, Masters Student Summer Working Group	2021
	Research Assistant, Lorenzo Magnolfi	2017 - 2018
	Teaching Assistant:	
	Introductory Econometrics	2019
	Statistics: Measurement in Economics	2016, 2017, 2018
	Introductory Microeconomics	2015, 2016, 2019, 2021
	<b>Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy</b>	
	Research Assistant, Andrei Simonov	2014 - 2015
	<b>Barcelona Graduate School of Economics</b>	
	Research Assistant, Maria Petrova	2013 - 2015
POLICY WORK	<b>Wisconsin Economic Development Corporation</b>	
	Economist, Wisconsin Export and FDI Profile	2018
COMPUTER SKILLS	R, Matlab, STATA, Python, L <sup>A</sup> T <sub>E</sub> X	
LANGUAGES	English ( <i>fluent</i> ), Russian ( <i>native</i> ), Kazakh ( <i>advanced</i> ), Spanish ( <i>basic</i> )	

## REFERENCES

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