Trade Policy Uncertainty and Import Prices

Latest version

Andy Lehrer*

November 4, 2022

Abstract

This paper studies how trade policy uncertainty (TPU) affects the pass-through of import tariff and exchange rate changes into import prices. Little is known about the effects of tariff changes accompanied by TPU on import prices, especially when price rigidities are present. Using a dynamic model of exporting with costly price adjustments and variable markups, I show that TPU significantly increases tariff pass-through into the tariff-inclusive import price. TPU raises tariff pass-through via two channels relative to a one-time permanent tariff increase. First, TPU decreases the likelihood of costly price adjustment on impact ("wait-and-see" effect), which immediately induces high tariff pass-through. Second, TPU leads exporters to set higher markups due to a precautionary pricing motive, resulting in higher tariff pass-through even after prices are adjusted. Conversely, exchange rate pass-through is unaffected by TPU and remains low and incomplete. Quantitatively, high TPU accounts for half of the gap between the puzzling complete pass-through estimated for U.S. tariffs on China in 2018-2019 into U.S. import prices and the prediction of a standard model without TPU, increases tariff deadweight loss by 51% and increases the share of tariff incidence borne by U.S. importers by 36%.

Keywords: Trade Policy Uncertainty, Tariffs, Import Prices, Price Rigidity, Variable Markups, Exchange Rates.

JEL codes: D81, E31, F12, F13, F31, F41, L11

*Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Sewell Social Sciences Building, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison WI 53705, nlehrer2@wisc.edu, www.ndlehrer.com. I am especially grateful to Charles Engel, Kim Ruhl, and Louphou Coulibaly for their invaluable advice, guidance and support. For very helpful advice and comments, I am grateful to Dmitry Mukhin and Kenneth West. For useful comments, I thank Manuel Amador, Dean Corbae, Javier Cravino, Illenin Kondo, Annie Lee, Emi Nakamura, Mengqi Wang, and seminar and conference participants at MEA 2022, WEAI 2022, IAES European Conference 2022, UWM/UMN International and Macro PhD Students Workshop Spring 2022, and UW-Madison International Economics Workshop.
1 Introduction

Who bears the incidence of import tariffs is a crucial question in the design of trade policy. U.S. importers pay a tariff-inclusive import price at the dock, which includes a border price set by the foreign exporter and an ad-valorem tariff set by the U.S. government.\(^1\) In standard models of a large open economy like the U.S., a tariff increase leads to some border price adjustment and less than one-for-one increase in the import price. In 2018-2019, the U.S. imposed tariffs on imports from major trading partners, culminating in large tariff increases on almost all imports from China, on a scope unseen between the world’s largest economies since the 1930s. U.S. tariff-inclusive import prices rose by nearly the full tariff increase (close to 100% pass-through rate of the tariff into tariff-inclusive import prices), while the border prices exclusive of tariff set by Chinese exporters barely changed. That is, U.S. importers bore the overwhelming share of the tariff incidence.\(^2\) This finding is puzzling since it contradicts standard models. Moreover, the lack of response in Chinese exporters’ border prices is at odds with past empirical findings about other tariff changes and about exchange rate fluctuations, which imply that some decrease of border prices in response to the tariff increase should have occurred.

A salient feature of the 2018-2019 tariffs was that they were accompanied by extremely high levels of trade policy uncertainty (TPU).\(^3\) Yet, little is known theoretically or empirically about the effects of TPU on prices in international transactions, especially in the short- to medium-run when prices adjust infrequently. Could the observed extreme level of TPU explain the puzzling high tariff pass-through of the 2018-2019 tariffs? More generally, what is the effect of TPU on (i) import prices and (ii) the pass-through of tariffs and other shocks into these prices? I address these questions using a dynamic model of exporting to the U.S. that builds on findings from the international prices literature and incorporates TPU and tariffs. I calibrate the model to U.S. import prices and show that TPU substantially increases tariff pass-through into import prices, tariff deadweight loss, and the tariff incidence on U.S. importers.

I start by constructing a partial equilibrium dynamic model of exporting to the U.S. with price rigidities, tariffs and TPU. In the model, I connect the literature about sticky international prices with the literature about trade policy uncertainty. The literature about

\(^{1}\)This is a somewhat simplified definition of the import price, since other duties or costs could be levied on the importer, but it is fitting for the focus of this paper which is ad-valorem tariffs and uncertainty about that specific policy.

\(^{2}\)This finding is documented in Amiti et al. (2019), Amiti et al. (2020), Fajgelbaum et al. (2020), and Cavallo et al. (2021).

\(^{3}\)In fact, by multiple measures, uncertainty regarding U.S. trade policy reached its all-time high during this period. See Caldara et al. (2020), Hassan et al. (2021), and Benguria et al. (2022).
the effects of TPU focused mostly on medium- or long-run outcomes, especially investment and exit / entry of exporters, and assumes that prices adjust freely.\textsuperscript{4} However, in the short-run, border prices of imports to the U.S. are highly rigid, with a median duration of a border price around one year.\textsuperscript{5} Price rigidity is important for understanding the effect of tariffs and TPU on import prices in the short-run, when prices adjust infrequently. However, price rigidity alone cannot account for the high tariff pass-through in 2018-2019 which lasted for at least one year, since during this period substantial price adjustment should have occurred. Therefore, the observed high tariff pass-through is also a result of a high desired pass-through rate for Chinese exporters, which they maintain even once they adjust the border price.

In the model, domestic (American) and foreign (Chinese) competitive monopolists sell their differentiated final goods in the U.S. The model includes tariffs and TPU, and several key components that account for well-documented facts about U.S. import prices. First, price adjustments incur a fixed adjustment cost, which makes price setting a dynamic problem affected by expectations about future shocks, and thus by TPU. Second, Chinese exporters set their (potentially rigid) border prices in dollars, which insulates the American exporters from exchange rate fluctuations.\textsuperscript{6} Third, variable markups arise from a Kimball (1995) demand structure with variable elasticity. This simple demand structure captures price complementarities, where a firm does not want to deviate too much from the price of competitors. Variable markups are an important channel for explaining incomplete exchange rate pass-through into border prices, since they adjust to absorb shocks that affect the border price. However, variable markups also lead to some decrease of the border price in response to a tariff increase, and as a result, incomplete tariff pass-through into the import price. This theoretical prediction in a model with variable markups makes the 2018-2019 near-perfect tariff pass-through puzzling, and this paper presents a plausible explanation.

I show how the model with TPU can increase tariff pass-through into import prices. A tariff on imports is set exogenously by the U.S. policy maker. In the model, the tariff level can be low (the case before 2018) or high (the case since 2018). In the absence of TPU, tariff changes are a one-time permanent change.\textsuperscript{7} When TPU is present, firms perceive tariff changes as transitory and volatile. I model TPU as a simultaneous decrease in the

\textsuperscript{4}See Handley and Limão (2022). Conversely, Alessandria et al. (2019) examine short-run decisions by exporters under TPU, but focus on inventories. Caldara et al. (2020) embed TPU in a New-Keynesian model with nominal rigidities, but their setup is considerably different than the one in this paper since their main focus is on the effect of TPU on investment.

\textsuperscript{5}See, e.g., Gopinath and Rigobon (2008); Nakamura and Zerom (2009); Schoenle (2017).

\textsuperscript{6}Dollar pricing is an assumption in the model, and it relies on the stylized fact that over 90% of U.S. import prices are set in dollars (Gopinath and Itskhoki, 2011; Gopinath, 2015).

\textsuperscript{7}A tariff change can be transitory but certain if the policymaker clearly communicates what is the duration of the policy. To the extent that the duration of the tariff is prolonged, this policy will have the same effect on prices as a one-time permanent change.
persistence of the tariff regime, and an increase in the unconditional variance of the tariff forecast error.

The pass-through rate of a tariff change into the import price is determined by how much the exporter adjusts their border price in response. I show that an increase in TPU in the model affects the pass-through rate of a tariff increase into import prices via both the extensive and the intensive margin of border price adjustment. First, on the extensive margin, a mean-preserving increase in TPU reduces the likelihood of border price adjustment. Since price adjustments are costly, an increase in TPU increases the option value of waiting (“wait-and-see” effect). If there is no border price adjustment, the import price rises one-for-one with the tariff - complete tariff pass-through.

Second, conditional on adjustment, the optimal reset border price increases with TPU due to a precautionary pricing motive that leads to a higher markup - the intensive margin of price adjustment. Even once the border price is reset, the precautionary markup effect leads to a smaller decrease in the border price, and thus larger increase in the import price, relative to a one-time permanent tariff increase. The intensive margin effect increases the desired tariff pass-through into the import price over longer horizons, and not just on impact.

The effect of TPU on the intensive margin of price adjustment arises from the combination of variable markups and costly price adjustment. The tariff is paid by American importers, and therefore affects the relative import price directly, and as a result the demand for foreign goods. When markups are variable, a mean preserving increase in uncertainty about the future tariff level affects the exporter’s expected profit. The expected profit function is not symmetric: setting the border price “too low” leads to greater losses than setting the border price “too high” when the future level of tariff is uncertain. That is, marginal profit is convex in the tariff. The result is a precautionary increase in markup and in the border price, which increases with the level of uncertainty.\(^8\) The convexity of the marginal profit relies on variable markups in combination with costly price adjustment. I show that these effects hold for various levels of markup elasticity, and increase with the size of the price adjustment cost.

I calibrate the model to U.S. import prices and estimate the effect of TPU on pass-through quantitatively. I estimate tariff and exchange rate pass-through into U.S. import prices in the simulated data and compare the results to the empirical findings from the trade war tariffs. In the model, a one-time permanent 10% increase in tariff raises import prices.

\(^8\)Precautionary markups play an important role in other studies of uncertainty that involve price rigidities (Kimball, 1989; Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2015; Oh, 2020; Caldara et al., 2020; Born and Pfeifer, 2021). My setup differs in that it looks specifically at uncertainty about a demand shifter that does not affect the firm’s costs. In this setup, variable markups play an important role in creating the precautionary markup motive.
prices by 5.9% after one year, while in the data a similar size of tariff increase raises import prices by 9.9%. When high TPU is present, tariff pass-through increases and a 10% tariff increase raises import price by 8.1% in the model. This represents an increase of more than 20 percentage points in the tariff pass-through rate. Conversely, exchange rate pass-through remains low and is unaffected by the level of TPU: a 10% real depreciation of the U.S. dollar raises import prices by 3.8%-3.9% after one year, both in the data and in the model. TPU does not affect exchange rate pass-through since the exchange rate is a volatile process, disconnected from tariff changes or TPU. The effect of TPU on pass-through is robust to different specifications of the tariff process, across various levels of tariff rate increases, and to a case where tariffs are also imposed on imported intermediate inputs. Therefore, TPU can account for up to a half of the gap between the tariff pass-through rate observed in 2018-2019, and the rate predicted by a standard model in the absence of TPU.

Finally, I analyze policy implications of a tariff increase accompanied by TPU. Over one year, the deadweight loss created by tariff increases by 51% when high TPU is present, relative to a similar tariff increase without TPU. Government revenue is almost unaffected by an increase in TPU. However, the tariff incidence shifts towards American importers, from a share of 58.6% with a one-time permanent tariff increase to 79.8% when TPU is high. These results point towards unintended, undesirable effects of TPU that might be counterproductive to the goals policymakers wish to obtain by imposing a tariff.

This is the first paper to incorporate tariffs accompanied by TPU in a dynamic framework with costly price adjustments and variable markups. I contribute to both the literature about international prices and their reaction to shocks in the short- and medium-run, and the literature about tariffs and TPU. Understanding how import prices react to trade policy with uncertainty is crucial for the design of trade policy, and for our understanding of the effects of tariffs on the macroeconomy. Furthermore, in this work I show that TPU affects the level of price rigidity and therefore potentially affects monetary non-neutrality and is thus relevant for monetary policy.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next subsection reviews the related literature. Section 2 provides an institutional background for the 2018-2019 trade war and the high levels of TPU, and explains the high tariff pass-through puzzle. Section 3 presents a dynamic model of exporting to the U.S. Section 4 presents policy functions and inspects the mechanism. Section 5 describes the quantitative analysis conducted using simulated data from the model, including tariff and exchange rate pass-through estimation, and shows that TPU can explain a large part of the high tariff pass-through observed in 2018-2019. Section

---

9There are ample evidence for the disconnect of exchange rates from macroeconomic fundamentals, let alone from tariff changes. See for example Engel and West (2005) and Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021).
6 presents policy implications from the quantitative analysis. Finally, Section 7 concludes.

1.1 Related literature

The focus of this paper is the effect of TPU on tariff and exchange rate pass-through into import prices. It connects to the literature about exogenous shock pass-through into import prices, the effects of tariffs on exporters, and the effects of TPU.

Relatively few studies focus on estimating the pass-through of tariffs into tariff-inclusive import prices. These studies have shown varied results. Overall, tariff pass-through into tariff-inclusive import prices in different settings appears to be fairly high but far from complete, an indication for the existence of variable markups (Feenstra, 1989; Edmond et al., 2015; De Loecker et al., 2016; Ludema and Yu, 2016; Fontagné et al., 2018; Irwin, 2019; Chen and Juvenal, 2022).¹⁰ Importantly, these papers do not take the uncertainty around the tariff change into account.¹¹ The relationship between tariffs and prices also connects to the international elasticity puzzle, presented in Ruhl (2008). The international elasticity puzzle states that export participation, internationally traded quantities, and export revenue are much more responsive to changes in tariffs than to exchange rate fluctuations (an observation documented in several empirical studies, for example in Fitzgerald and Haller (2018) for Irish firms).

Several studies have examined empirically the effects of the 2018-2019 trade war on the U.S. and China economies. One shared result among these studies was a nearly complete pass-through of the U.S. tariffs into U.S. tariff-inclusive import prices, roughly 95%-100% for more than one year (Amiti et al., 2019, 2020; Cavallo et al., 2021; Fajgelbaum et al., 2020). While tariff-inclusive import prices increased, quantities of imported goods subject to these tariffs declined sharply.¹² Cavallo et al. (2021) also find that the effect of the tariffs on retail prices of imported goods within the U.S. was much smaller. Conversely, Flaaen et al. (2020) examine the reaction of washing machines’ retail prices to the 2016 anti-dumping duties and

¹⁰Estimates of tariff pass-through into import prices have been quite variable. Feenstra (1989) finds U.S. tariffs on Japanese autos in the 1980s were passed-through between 58%-100%, with a wide variation between different types of differentiated goods. Fontagné et al. (2018) estimate tariff pass-through of around 65% for French exporters to various destinations and in various product markets. Chen and Juvenal (2022) estimate tariff pass-through for Argentinian wine exporters to be around 80%-90% and depend on the quality of the product. When taking product quality into account, Ludema and Yu (2016) find that tariff pass-through into tariff-inclusive import price crucially depends on the level of differentiation and product quality. Irwin (2019) finds that U.S. tariff increases on sugar at the end of the 19th century were passed-through at around 40%. The results are quite varied, but a common interpretation in the literature is that they point towards the existence of variable markups.

¹¹As a matter of fact, some papers have emphasized the fact that they treat tariff changes as permanent (Feenstra, 1989).

¹²It should be noted that the level of product differentiation probably played an important part (Amiti et al., 2020; Cavallo et al., 2021).
then to the 2018 tariffs and observe a much higher pass-through of more than 100% for the 2018 tariffs (where this effect includes increases in the price of dryers as a complementary good and in the prices of domestic competitors). These results emphasize how much is yet to be uncovered about the effects of tariffs on import prices. The effect of TPU on tariff pass-through and on import prices has not been explored yet, and this paper is a first step towards filling this gap.

Sticky import prices have not been the main focus of the tariffs literature, which usually focuses on the medium-run when prices adjust freely. A literature that has focused on rigid prices in the short-run is the one that examines why the pass-through of exchange rate shocks into import prices is incomplete. Dornbusch (1987) and Krugman (1986) suggested that variable markups are an important factor in explaining incomplete exchange rate pass-through. The higher is the elasticity of the markup, the more likely a firm is to limit exchange rate pass-through into the import price (and absorb the shock in its revenue). A large literature developed this variable markup channel theoretically and provided ample empirical evidence for its existence (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2005; Engel, 2006; Gopinath and Itskhoki, 2010; Gopinath et al., 2010; Amiti et al., 2014; Cao et al., 2015; Goldberg and Tille, 2016; Devereux et al., 2017; Mukhin, 2022). Variable markups can arise from multiple sources, such as demand structure that induces variable elasticity, oligopolistic competition where strategic price complementarities between firms are present, or distribution costs (Atkeson and Burstein, 2008; Berman et al., 2012; Chatterjee et al., 2013; Burstein and Gopinath, 2014; Corsetti et al., 2018; Crowley et al., 2018; Amiti et al., 2019). Another factor limiting exchange rate pass-through is price linkages created by the use of imported intermediate inputs. A higher share of imported intermediate inputs is associated with a lower desired pass-through into import prices and higher tendency for setting prices in a local or a vehicle currency (Gopinath et al., 2010; Amiti et al., 2014; Chung, 2016; Mukhin, 2022). The choice of currency is an important aspect in the determination of exchange rate pass-through, since the currency of invoicing mitigates the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on prices when the price is sticky in that currency (Devereux and Engel, 2002; Devereux et al., 2004; Engel, 2006; Gopinath et al., 2010, 2020; Mukhin, 2022). Referring to the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on prices of U.S. imports from China in 2018-2019, it is important to note that due to the size of its economy and the dominant currency role of the dollar, the vast majority of both imports and exports in the U.S. are priced in dollars. This limits the pass-through of exchange rate fluctuations into U.S. import prices. There is also indication that Chinese exports are widely invoiced in dollars (e.g., Corsetti et al. (2018) for exports to the U.K., Ito et al. (2018) for exports to Japan). The well-established existence of variable markups should lead to incomplete tariff pass-through into tariff-inclusive import prices, making the
A high tariff pass-through observed in 2018-2019 puzzling. This paper introduces tariffs and TPU into a framework with variable markups, imported intermediate inputs, and dollar pricing, and shows that tariff changes accompanied by TPU can lead to high tariff pass-through even when markups are variable.

Many studies have examined the role price adjustment costs in firms’ pricing decisions, which leads to price rigidity in the short-run (see Klenow and Malin (2010) for an extensive survey). Over the past couple of decades new high-frequency micro-level data shed new light on the existence of price adjustment costs and their magnitude in domestic markets (Golosov and Lucas, 2007; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008; Midrigan, 2011; Karadi and Reiff, 2019; Bonomo et al., 2020). Price adjustment costs in international trade have been proposed as a leading reason for price stickiness (e.g., Delgado (1991)). Studies have found that price adjustment costs are larger in international markets than in domestic markets, in a way that contributes to the lower frequency of price adjustments in international transactions relative to domestic ones (Wolf and Ghosh, 2001; Gopinath and Rigobon, 2008; Nakamura and Zerom, 2009; Gopinath and Itskhoki, 2010; Schoenle, 2017). I rely on this literature in including fixed price adjustment costs in the model in order to explain infrequent price adjustments. These costs play an essential role in explaining the sluggish and incomplete price adjustment in the short-run in response to exogenous shocks in international prices.

Finally, a growing literature examines trade policy uncertainty (TPU) in the context of U.S. trade policy towards China at the beginning of the 21st century (Handley and Limão, 2017; Crowley et al., 2018; Alessandria et al., 2019; Handley et al., 2020; Alessandria et al., 2022; Benguria et al., 2022). These studies show that TPU affects exporters’ decisions, such as entry / exit from export markets, investment, and inventories, and especially the timing of these decisions. However, the TPU literature focuses on medium- and long-run decisions by firms, and assumes that import prices are fully flexible. The effects of TPU on import prices in the short-run, when prices adjust infrequently, received almost no attention thus far. This paper fills this gap. Caldara et al. (2020) and Hassan et al. (2020) develop empirical measures for TPU based on textual analysis of news and firms’ reports. They find a significant increase in uncertainty around the 2018-2019 trade war. Caldara et al. (2020) build a general equilibrium two-country model with nominal rigidities and show that increased TPU has a chilling effect on economic activity, especially on investment. This paper builds on these findings and their formulation of TPU and shows how including TPU in a standard model of infrequent price adjustments with variable markups can decrease the size of ex-tariff border price adjustments in reaction to changes in tariffs. This paper also relates to the wider literature about the effects of uncertainty on firms (Kimball, 1989; Bloom, 2014; Born and Pfeifer, 2014; Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2015; Bloom et al., 2018;
Hassan et al., 2019). The response of prices to TPU in this paper is in line with findings from this literature. Namely, the convexity of marginal profit together with prices rigidity creates the mechanism that increases markups in response to an increase in uncertainty. This paper extends some of the findings about broad uncertainty to the case of TPU and tariffs.

2 The 2018-2019 U.S.-China trade war: Institutional background and tariff pass-through puzzle

2.1 The 2018-2019 tariffs and record high TPU

Since the negotiation and signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, trade liberalization and removal of trade barriers have been a consensus position in U.S. politics. Between the mid-1990s and 2016, there was relatively little change in U.S. trade policy. This is evident in the news-based trade policy uncertainty index constructed by Caldara et al. (2020), which was around or slightly below its long-run mean throughout this period (Figure 1). The news-based index measures the joint salience of trade-related and uncertainty-related terms in major U.S. newspapers.\textsuperscript{13} The index captures two aspects of uncertainty about trade policy. First, uncertainty could arise from an increase in the probability of a regime switch from from high to low trade barriers, or vice versa. Second, uncertainty could be an increase in tail risk or concerns about heightened volatility of tariffs. Both of these aspects are captured in the TPU index.

The ascent of candidate, and then president, Donald J. Trump brought this era of trade policy stability to an abrupt end. Trump campaigned in 2015-2016 urging the withdrawal of the U.S. from NAFTA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which had been signed by President Obama in 2015.\textsuperscript{14} Trump’s election in November 2016 was perceived as a major shock to U.S. trade policy, with the TPU index sky-rocketing 2.5 standard deviations above its long-run mean - a level unseen in this index, surpassing the NAFTA negotiations in the early 1990s (event (a) in Figure 2).

Upon his election and throughout the transition period, Trump promised to enact a trade policy of “America First”, reconsidering all U.S. trade agreements and relations. Upon

\textsuperscript{13}I normalize the TPU index for its entire availability period, from 1960 through the end of 2019, so that changes in the index represent higher or lower levels of TPU relative to the long-run mean. I use the news-based index, but a similar narrative arises from other TPU indices, such as the earning calls index in Caldara et al. (2020), or firms- and industry-level indices constructed by Hassan et al. (2019), Hassan et al. (2021), and Benguria et al. (2022).

\textsuperscript{14}2015-2016 was characterized by a wider, global shift away from the free trade paradigm. The most notable event that cause a spike in trade policy uncertainty was the Brexit referendum in 2016 which catapulted the UK and the EU into years of trade negotiations.
taking office in January 2017 (event (b)), Trump immediately withdrew from the TPP.

TPU levels remained elevated in the first quarter of 2017, as the administration announced a reexamination of NAFTA and of trade relations with the European Union and China. TPU levels declined throughout the rest of 2017, but in 2018 the administration started taking steps to execute its trade agenda. Specifically, a series of investigations by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITR) that were initiated in 2017 came to conclusion at the beginning of 2018.

In the early months of 2018, the administration announced a series of tariffs on a limited and relatively small set of products. In January 2018, the administration announced it would impose tariffs on washing machines and solar panels (event (1)). In March 2018, the administration announced tariffs on steel and aluminum imports, which went into effect in April 2018 (event (2)). In both cases the tariffs were not directed at one country in particular, but rather encompassed products imported from multiple trading partners. As can be seen clearly in Figure 2, these tariffs were limited in scope and did not have a meaningful effect on the overall average U.S. tariff rate on Chinese imports, since the affected products make up a very small share of Chinese exports to the U.S.

\[15\] The washing machines and solar panel tariffs were issued under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, and the steel and aluminum tariffs were issued under Section 232.
Figure 2: Average U.S. tariff on imports from China and normalized news-based TPU index, 2016-2019

Tariff changes
1. Solar & washing machines
2. Steel & Aluminum
3. 1st wave of Section 301 tariffs ($34B)
4. 2nd wave of Section 301 tariffs ($16B)
5. 3rd wave of Section 301 tariffs ($200B)
6. 15% rate increase on 3rd wave products
7. 4th wave of Section 301 tariffs ($112B)

TPU events
a. Trump wins presidential elections
b. Trump takes office
c. USTR section 301 report
d. List 3 ($200B) news
e. News of trade negotiations
f. Talks fail
g. List 4 ($300B) news

Parallel to these more limited actions, in March 2018 the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced the conclusion of a Section 301 investigation against China (event (c)). The report found China conducted unfair trade practices, and in response the administration announced tariffs of 25% on $34 billion of Chinese imports, which went into effect in July 2018 (event (3)). Additional tariffs on $16 billion of Chinese products went into effect in September 2018 (event (4)). A third list of 10% tariff was announced in June 2018 (event (d)) and went into effect in October 2018 (event (5)). This list was much larger in scope, containing around $200 billion of Chinese imports. This list also contained many more final consumption products than the first list, which was almost entirely composed of intermediate inputs. Trade policy uncertainty during this period soared to its highest level on record, nearly 8 standard deviations above its long-run mean. TPU remained highly elevated throughout 2018.

After the two initial tariff waves on Chinese imports, an attempt to start trade negotiations between the U.S. and China was announced in December 2018 (event (e)). During the trade talks, TPU levels steadily declined. However, in May 2019 the talks collapsed (event (f)), sending the TPU index back to extreme levels of 8 standard deviations above its long-run mean. After the failure of the negotiations, the U.S. increased the tariff rate on list 3 products by an additional 15% (event (6)). Finally, a fourth list of 25% tariffs on $300 billion of products was announced in August 2019 (event (g)) and went into effect in September 2019 (event (7)). TPU levels remained elevated through the end of 2019, until the Phase 1 deal between the U.S. and China was reached. This deal halted further tariff increases, but almost all of the Section 301 tariffs remained in effect well into 2022. It should be noted that all the tariff actions taken by the U.S. were retaliated by China, which imposed tariffs on U.S. imports shortly after each wave of U.S. tariffs. The average tariff rate on Chinese imports had increased from less than 3% at the beginning of 2018 to almost 16% at the end of 2019.

The events of the “U.S.-China trade war” of 2018-2019 were unprecedented and signaled a sharp break from the longtime trend of trade liberalization and openness. The unilateral tariffs imposed by both countries were the largest in scope and magnitude between the world’s two largest economies since the 1930s. Furthermore, the use of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose these tariffs was unprecedented. Since the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, the U.S. used Section 301 investigations on a limited scope and mostly to build cases and dispute settlements at the WTO. In contrast to previous U.S. administrations, the Trump administration used Section 301 for unilateral

---

16Between 2000 and 2017, there were only 6 investigations opened under Section 301, compared to 5 since 2018. For a comprehensive analysis of Section 301 and its history, see Schwarzenberg (2020).
measures which were openly touted as a tool to bring forth a new trade regime with China that would correct what the administration described as unfair practices.

Therefore, exporters in both countries were subject to unprecedented trade policies. Furthermore, it was unclear whether the new tariffs were a *permanent regime change*, to a prolonged state of higher tariffs, or whether they were merely a punitive *transitory* policy aimed at initiating negotiations which would lead to a reversion back to a permanent state of low tariffs. Furthermore, the administration refrained from stating any expected duration for this policy. This high uncertainty is clearly captured by the TPU index in Figure 2. Anecdotal evidence from Trump’s twitter account and media statements also contributed to the high uncertainty surrounding U.S. trade policy during this era.

2.2 High tariff pass-through puzzle

The economic impact of the 2018-2019 U.S.-China trade war has been studied extensively in recent years. In this subsection, I focus on the effect of the 2018-2019 tariffs on U.S. import prices. Ad-valorem tariff is a tax levied directly on the product’s price which is paid by the importer at the dock. Therefore, it stands to reason that it would have an impact on the border price exclusive of tariff set by the exporter. Indeed, both standard models of a large open economy such as the U.S., and models of imperfect competition in imports, predict that the border price would decline in response to a tariff increase. Therefore, some of the tariff incidence would be borne by the exporters (Amiti et al., 2019).

In contrast, Amiti et al. (2019), Amiti et al. (2020), Fajgelbaum et al. (2020), and Cavallo et al. (2021) have found that the 2018-2019 U.S. tariffs on China had virtually no effect on border prices. That is, tariff-inclusive import prices rose nearly one-for-one with the tariff.

---

17 The inability to assess how long tariffs will be imposed has been clearly demonstrated by the steel and aluminum tariffs on Canada. Initially, the tariff was imposed in March 2018 but with exemptions for Canada. In April 2018, the examination was extended, but then ended in June 2018 and the tariffs were imposed on Canadian imports as well. During the USMCA trade negotiations, the tariffs were lifted in May 2019. Aluminum tariffs were then re-imposed on Canada in August 2020, only to be lifted again in September 2020. These tariffs represent a case of high realized volatility, but high uncertainty was present for all other tariffs as well.

18 For example, on 8/1/2019 it was reported by Fox Business: “And 10 percent could just be the beginning, Trump warned. He told reporters on Thursday that he could "always do much more" or he could "do less" with respect to tariffs, depending on what happens with the trade negotiations. He added the 10 percent rate could be lifted in stages to "well beyond 25 percent," though his administration is not necessarily looking to do that."

19 Different areas of research included investment (Amiti et al., 2020), the effect on Chinese exporters (Jiao et al., 2020; Benguria et al., 2022), agricultural and food products (Carter and Steinbach, 2020), supply chains and reallocations (Huang et al., 2019; Flaaen et al., 2020; Grossman and Helpman, 2020; Fajgelbaum et al., 2021), the exchange rate (Jeanne and Son, 2020), and consumption (Waugh, 2019).

20 For example, Broda et al. (2008) find that export supply elasticities imply upward-sloping supply curves.
(close to 100% tariff pass-through into the import price).\textsuperscript{21} At the same time, the tariff increases had a substantial impact on the quantity of U.S. imports from China, where the imported quantity of targeted varieties fell by more than 30%. These findings are puzzling in light of the theory: Why did Chinese exporters keep their border prices unchanged and allow the import price to increase by nearly the full amount of the tariff while suffering a huge decline in demand?

A natural explanation is that in the short-run, prices are rigid due to high adjustment costs (Ball and Romer, 1990; Ball and Mankiw, 1994; Bils and Klenow, 2004; Zbaracki et al., 2004; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008; Midrigan, 2011; Kehoe and Midrigan, 2015; Klenow and Willis, 2016).\textsuperscript{22} While directly observed product-level evidence of international price rigidities are scarce due to data limitations, it appears that prices of imports to the U.S. are much more rigid than prices of U.S. domestic goods (Gopinath and Rigobon, 2008; Gopinath and Itskhoki, 2010; Schoenle, 2017). However, border prices remained unresponsive to the tariff increases over a period of at least one year. This time span is greater than the documented median duration of a border price of imports to the U.S. Thus, if the source of this unresponsiveness was price rigidity, a substantial adjustment should have occurred within the first year, which it did not.

A different explanation is that there are no good substitutes to Chinese imports due to the dominance of China in production. If Chinese products are highly differentiated and do not have close substitutes, then there is little pressure on Chinese exporters to adjust their border prices even as tariffs increase. However, if Chinese products are highly differentiated then exchange rate pass-through into the border price should be significantly higher than its observed levels. Since border prices of imports to the U.S. are overwhelmingly set in U.S. dollars (Gopinath et al., 2010; Gopinath, 2015), the price paid by the importer is stable and does not fluctuate with the exchange rate. However, the revenue received by the exporter fluctuates one-for-one with the exchange rate, since the border price needs to be converted back into the exporter’s currency. If imports from China cannot be substituted easily, Chinese exporters could pass-through exchange rate fluctuations at a substantially higher rate than that which is observed. Cavallo et al. (2021) document that a depreciation of the U.S. dollar during the trade war was passed-through at a rate of 25%-40% into border

\textsuperscript{21}Using micro data from two large retailers, Cavallo et al. (2021) document that the tariffs were passed-through at a much lower rate into the retail prices paid by U.S. consumers. It is possible that the retailers dispersed the tariff increase across many affected and unaffected products’ prices. Another possibility is that the retailers absorbed this tariff increase in their own profit margin. The discrepancy between the import prices and the retail prices is outside the scope of this work which focuses on import prices at the dock and does not model a retail sector.

\textsuperscript{22}Price adjustment costs can arise from various sources, such as managerial attention, information accumulation, communication, and physical costs (“menu cost”).
prices, in line with previous estimates for imports to the U.S. These findings indicate that variable markups absorb some exchange rate fluctuations, and should therefore absorb some of the tariff increase as well.

In this paper, I propose an alternative explanation to the unresponsiveness of border prices to the tariff increases during the trade war: the high levels of uncertainty that surrounded trade policy during this period. A growing literature studies the effects of TPU on economic activity (see Handley and Limão (2022) for an extensive survey of the literature), but the effect of TPU on the price of imports has received little attention in the past. This is especially true for the short-run, when border prices adjust infrequently. One reason for the absence of sticky prices from the TPU literature is that trade policy is often complicated and slow to change, for example due to multilateral aspects of any policy decision. Many realized tariff changes in the past were associated with a resolution of uncertainty, rather than with an increase in uncertainty.23 The 2018-2019 tariffs were a sharp break from this paradigm, where each policy announcement and change in tariffs were associated with extreme levels of uncertainty. At no point was it clear if the tariffs are permanent or transitory. Furthermore, there was a large increase in realized tariff volatility, as the Trump administration changed tariff rates on many products multiple times in a period of less than two years.

The combination of relatively frequent tariff changes with very high levels of uncertainty about the policy itself makes the 2018-2019 trade war a unique opportunity to motivate the theoretical examination of the effect of TPU on import prices.24 Furthermore, if TPU increases tariff pass-through into import prices, this could be an important factor in explaining the observed high tariff pass-through.25 There is no guarantee that the 2018-2019 trade war was the last episode of extremely uncertain trade policy in the near future. There is much to

23 An example which has been studied extensively is the annual vote that the U.S. congress used to take in the 1990s to renew normal trading relations with China. The vote itself resolved uncertainty about the policy. Tariff changes in the 1990s-2000s were also overwhelmingly associated with gradual tariff reductions and removal of barriers to trade.

24 Another episode of tariffs that were perceived to be transitory was the Bush steel tariffs in 2002-2003. These tariffs were much more limited in scope and the rhetoric that accompanied them was substantially different than the 2018-2019 tariffs, which can be seen in their muted effect on the TPU index. Nevertheless, these tariffs were communicated as a temporary measure with uncertain duration. Cox (2022) finds that import quantities responded strongly to these tariff changes, but border prices did not respond in a statistically or economically significant manner. That is, tariff pass-through into import price was very high. These patterns are quite similar to the 2018-2019 tariffs.

25 It should be noted that exchange rates are highly volatile but also highly persistent. Engel and West (2005) establish that exchange rates follow a process almost indistinguishable from a random walk. That is, changes in the exchange rate are actually perceived to be permanent. Uncertainty around exchange rates that resembles TPU would be more along the lines of uncertainty about the future policy of managed exchange rates or interventions in FX markets, rather than around free-floating currencies like the dollar. It should be emphasized that during the relevant period there wasn’t any exceptional uncertainty about the PBOC’s exchange rate policies as the RMB was following a managed float relative to a basket of currencies and this policy has remained stable for years.
be uncovered, theoretically and empirically, about the relationship between TPU and prices in international trade.

In the rest of this paper, I establish how increased levels of TPU can lead to high tariff pass-through into import prices while maintaining low exchange rate pass-through into the same prices. On the extensive margin of price adjustment, when TPU is high, the likelihood of a border price adjustment decreases. On the intensive margin of price adjustment, once the firm decides to reset its border price, high levels of TPU lead the firm to keep a precautionary markup which increases the border price. Both margins lead to higher tariff pass-through into the tariff-inclusive import price when TPU is present, on impact and even after the border price is reset. In the next section I present the dynamic model of price setting and exporting to the U.S.

3 Dynamic model

In this section, I present a simple sectoral partial equilibrium dynamic model of exporting to the U.S. I include tariffs and TPU in the model following Handley and Limão (2017). I discuss how exporters’ prices react to changes in tariffs and to cost shocks, and how these reactions change when TPU is present. I calibrate the model to pre-2017 U.S. moments of frequency of price adjustment from the Bureau of Labor Statistics import prices microdata. I then show that the model can account well for exchange rate pass-through into U.S. import prices, but it generate a counterfactually low tariff pass-through rate into tariff-inclusive import price in response to a one-time permanent tariff change. I discuss how trade policy uncertainty increases tariff pass-through while not affecting exchange rate pass-through and how this corresponds to patterns observed in the data.

The model focuses on demand in the Home country (e.g., the U.S.). A continuum of domestic and foreign competitive monopolists produce varieties which they sell in the Home country. Producers use Home and Foreign intermediate inputs in production. The prices of varieties produced by both Home and Foreign firms are set in the Home unit of account (dominant currency pricing in “dollars”), which is overwhelmingly the case for the U.S. and China (Gopinath and Rigobon, 2008; Gopinath et al., 2010; Gopinath, 2015; Gopinath et al., 2020). Thus, Home producers are not directly exposed to exchange rate risk since all of their input prices are set in their own unit of account, but Foreign producers are exposed to the real exchange rate twice: They must convert the revenue from the Home unit of account into their own Foreign unit of account; and the imported intermediate inputs they are using

---

26 The model is standard and based on Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010). It includes components used widely in the literature about sticky international prices, with variable markups and imported intermediate inputs.
are also priced in the Home unit of account, which exposes their cost of production to real exchange rate fluctuations. The Home country may impose an ad-valorem tariff on the foreign exporters’ varieties. I explore the effect of different tariff regimes on prices. Firms might perceive a tariff change to be a deterministic one-time and permanent change, but alternatively they might perceive tariffs to be transitory and following some Markov process where there is uncertainty about the future rate of the tariff (TPU).

3.1 The Firm’s Problem

Demand There is a continuum of Foreign and Home competitive monopolists in a specific sector who sell their varieties in the Home market. The set of all firms in the sector is \( \Omega \), with size \(|\Omega|\). Each firm sells one differentiated variety, thus \( \omega \in \Omega \) indicates both a firm and a variety. The demand function that the firm \( \omega \) faces is derived from a Kimball (1995) homothetic aggregator. The main advantage of using this aggregator is that it is a “reduced form” way of introducing pricing complementarities into the firm’s problem, since markups are variable and thus the firm’s optimal price depends on other firms’ prices and not just its own marginal cost.\(^{27}\) This demand structure also leads to a “smoothed kink” demand function, where there is a cutoff price above which demand for the firm’s variety is zero (“choke price”). This feature allows some varieties to “disappear” from the market without modeling exit and entry explicitly as costly decisions. This is a desirable feature in a short-run model, where costly exit and entry do not occur in large numbers but some varieties are not observed in the data for long periods of time (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008).

Individual varieties are aggregated into a consumption bundle which is defined implicitly by

\[
\frac{1}{|\Omega|} \int_{\omega \in \Omega} \Upsilon \left( \frac{|\Omega| Q_{\omega,t}}{Q_t} \right) d\omega = 1
\]

where \( \Upsilon (\cdot) \) is a twice continuously differentiable function that satisfies \( \Upsilon (1) = 1, \Upsilon' (\cdot) > 0, \Upsilon'' (\cdot) < 0; \) \( Q_\omega \) is Home demand for variety \( \omega \), and \( Q \) is (exogenous) Home aggregate consumption level. Assume that the measure of domestic varieties is 1, and the measure of imported varieties is of size \( m < 1 \), such that \(|\Omega| = 1 + m\). This formulation is a simple way of capturing home bias.

This consumption aggregator gives rise to a demand function of the form

\[
Q_{\omega,t} = \frac{1}{|\Omega|} \psi \left( D_t \frac{(1 + \tau_t) P_{\omega,t}}{P_t} \right) Q_t
\]

\(^{27}\)In the limit, the aggregator nests a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) structure.
where $\psi \equiv \Psi^{\prime -1} (\cdot)$, $D_t \equiv \int_{\omega \in \Omega} \Psi^{\prime} \left( \frac{\Psi_H Q_{\omega, t}}{Q_t} \right) \left( \frac{Q_{\omega, t}}{Q_t} \right) d\omega$ is an aggregate demand factor which is exogenous from the firm’s perspective, $^{28}$ $\tau_t$ is ad-valorem tariff on imported varieties for final consumption, $P_{\omega, t}$ is the border (net of tariff) price of the variety in the local (Home) unit of account, and $P_t$ is the Home sectoral price index of all varieties. $^{29}$ The import price inclusive of tariff is therefore $(1 + \tau_t) P_{\omega, t}$. The sectoral price index is defined by

$$P_t Q_t = \int_0^1 P_{\omega, t} Q_{\omega, t} d\omega + \int_1^{1+m} (1 + \tau_t) P_{\omega, t} Q_{\omega, t} d\omega$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.3)$$

Thus, changes in tariff $\tau_t$ affect the sectoral price index directly through the tariff-inclusive import price paid by importers and indirectly by the reaction of all other ex-tariff border and domestic prices to a change in tariff rate (which arises from pricing complementarities).

**Real exchange rate**  The unit of account in each country is its price of aggregate consumption, which is exogenous. The real exchange rate, $\mathcal{E}_t$, is defined as the ratio of Foreign price of aggregate consumption in Home unit of account, to Home price of aggregate consumption in Home unit of account. Thus, an increase in $\mathcal{E}_t$ is an increase in the number of units of Home aggregate consumption it takes to buy one unit of Foreign aggregate consumption - a Home real depreciation. $^{30}$ The real exchange rate follows a highly persistent AR(1) process in logs, $e_t \equiv \log \mathcal{E}_t$, given by

$$e_t = \rho_e e_{t-1} + \sigma_e \varepsilon_t^e, \quad \varepsilon_t^e \sim \text{i.i.d.} \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.4)$$

**Marginal cost**  Firms use a constant returns to scale technology with domestic and imported intermediate inputs, given by

- **Foreign exporters:** $Y^*_{\omega, t} = e^{a^*_{\omega, t}} (X^*_{\omega})^{1-\phi} X^*_{\phi}^\phi$  \hspace{1cm} (3.5)
- **Home producers:** $Y_{\omega, t} = e^{a_{\omega, t}} X^{1-\phi} (X^*)^\phi$  \hspace{1cm} (3.6)

where $Y_{\omega}$ is the firm’s output, $X_{\omega}$ is an intermediate input, $\phi \in [0, 1]$ is the share of imported inputs in production, and $a_{\omega, t}$ is an idiosyncratic firm $\omega$ productivity level. Variables with an

$^{28}$Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) prove that deviations of $D_t$ from the average $\bar{D}$ are nil, and this factor does not affect demand substantially.

$^{29}$All prices are relative to the Home aggregate CPI which is normalized to 1 at all periods, relying on the partial equilibrium environment.

$^{30}$Formally, Let $P^H_C$ denote Home price of aggregate consumption, and $P^*_C$ denote Foreign price of aggregate consumption expressed in Home unit of account. I normalize $P^H_C = 1$, then the real exchange rate is $\mathcal{E} \equiv P^*_C / P^H_C = P^{*H}_C$. 

18
asterisk (*) denote Foreign variables. In partial equilibrium and in the short-run, I make the simplifying assumption that firms do not change the makeup of their intermediate inputs, which are common across all firms.\footnote{Handley et al. (2020) find evidence in Chinese firms for firm-variety level sunk costs in imported intermediate inputs’ adoption that lead to input hysteresis over several years.} The idiosyncratic productivity level for firm $\omega$ follows an AR(1) process in logs, given by

$$a_{\omega,t} = \rho_a a_{\omega,t-1} + \sigma_a \varepsilon_{\omega,t}^a, \quad \varepsilon_{\omega,t}^a \sim \text{i.i.d.} \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$$

where I assume that $\rho_a$ and $\sigma_a$ are identical in the Home and the Foreign countries.

This production function results in a marginal cost which is constant in quantity. Let $W_t$ and $W_t^*$ denote the price of Home and Foreign inputs in their domestic units of account, respectively, and let $W_t^*H$ denote the price of the Foreign input in the Home unit of account.\footnote{Recall that all international prices are set in the Home unit of account.} The marginal cost is thus given by

$$MC_{\omega,t}^* = \tilde{\phi}^* e^{-a_{\omega,t}^*} (W_t^*)^{1-\phi^*} (W_t/E_t)^{\phi^*}$$

$$MC_{\omega,t} = \tilde{\phi} e^{-a_{\omega,t}} (W_t)^{1-\phi} (W_t^*H)^{\phi}$$

for Foreign and Home firms, respectively, where $\tilde{\phi}$ and $\tilde{\phi}^*$ are constants that result from cost minimization.

I make the following simplifying assumptions to reduce the size of the state space. Relying on the short-run focus of the model and the partial equilibrium setting, input prices are taken as exogenously determined and do not vary over time. This assumption relies on the fact that producer price indices in the U.S. and its major trading partners are an order of magnitude more stable than the exchange rate, especially over short horizons.\footnote{See e.g. Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021) for wage-based real exchange rates.} The exchange rate, conversely, follows a volatile and highly persistent AR(1) process, close to a random walk.

**The profit function** Foreign and Home firms’ profit functions in their domestic units of account are given, respectively, by

$$\Pi^* (P_{\omega,t}; a_{\omega,t}^*, P_t, E_t, \tau_t) = \left( \frac{P_{\omega,t} (a_{\omega,t}^*, P_t, E_t, \tau_t)}{E_t} - MC_{\omega,t}^* (a_{\omega,t}^*, E_t) \right) Q_{\omega,t} (P_{\omega,t}, P_t, \tau_t)$$

$$\Pi (P_{\omega,t}; a_{\omega,t}, P_t, E_t, \tau_t) = \left( P_{\omega,t} (a_{\omega,t}, P_t, E_t, \tau_t) - MC_{\omega,t} (a_{\omega,t}) \right) Q_{\omega,t} (P_{\omega,t}, P_t, \tau_t)$$
the sectoral price index and their relative price. Firms are price setters, and choose the price
to satisfy any level of demand for their variety, $Y_{\omega,t} = Q_{\omega,t}$.

**The firm’s dynamic problem** The state vector for firm $\omega$ is given by $S_{\omega,t} = (a_{\omega,t}, P_{\omega,t-1}, \tau_t, \epsilon_t, \tau_t, P_t)$.
The firm has full knowledge of the stochastic processes that drive $\epsilon_t$, $a_{\omega,t}$, and $\tau_t$ (described in the next paragraph). At the beginning of every period, the firm observes the realization of $S_{\omega,t}$. Then, the firm has to decide whether to reset the border price, $P_{\omega,t}$, and pay a fixed cost $\kappa$, or keep last period’s border price, $P_{\omega,t-1}$, and avoid paying the fixed cost. As common in models with price adjustment costs, I define $\kappa$ as a percent of steady state revenue (Midrigan, 2011; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008). The system of Bellman equations that define the firm’s problem is

$$V^N(S_{\omega,t}) = \Pi (P_{\omega,t-1}; S_{\omega,t}) + \beta \mathbb{E} [V(S_{\omega,t+1}) | S_{\omega,t}]$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.12)

$$V^A(P_{\omega,t}; S_{\omega,t}) = \max_{P_{\omega,t}} \{ \Pi (P_{\omega,t}; S_{\omega,t}) + \beta \mathbb{E} [V(S_{\omega,t+1}) | S_{\omega,t}] \}$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.13)

$$V(S_{\omega,t}) = \max \{ V^A(P_{\omega,t}; S_{\omega,t}) - \kappa, V^N(S_{\omega,t}) \}$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.14)

where $V^N(S_{\omega,t})$ is the firm’s value with no prices adjustment, $V^A(P_{\omega,t}; S_{\omega,t})$ is the value with price adjustment, and $\beta \in (0,1)$ is the discount factor.$^{34}$

The firm’s policy function yield two margins of price adjustment. On the **extensive margin**, the firm has to decide whether to adjust the border price or not:

$$P_{\omega,t} = \begin{cases} P_{\omega,t-1} & \text{if } V^A(P_{\omega,t}; S_{\omega,t}) - \kappa > V^N(S_{\omega,t}) \\ P_{\omega,t-1} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.15)

On the **intensive margin**, the firm has to decide what is the optimal reset border price:

$$\overline{P}_{\omega,t}(S_{\omega,t}) = \arg \max_{P_{\omega,t}} \{ \Pi (P_{\omega,t}; S_{\omega,t}) + \beta \mathbb{E} [V(S_{\omega,t+1}) | S_{\omega,t}] \}$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.16)

Importantly, the Foreign firm’s problem is to set the ex-tariff border price in “dollars”. That is, the exporter sets a price which is potentially sticky for several periods and might not adjust to tariff or exchange rate changes. Therefore, the exporter must form expectations about future levels of the tariff and the exchange rate when setting the price today. These expectations affect both the extensive and the intensive margin of price adjustment.

$^{34}$The constant discount factor follows from the partial equilibrium setting of this problem.
3.2 Tariff and trade policy uncertainty

I now discuss the modeling of tariff and TPU. It is often assumed that tariff is a static variable determined by the policy maker. A change in tariff is then a regime change. It does not induce uncertainty since once the level is set, it is constant over time. As described in Section 2, this was not perceived to be the case with the 2018-2019 tariffs imposed by the U.S. Rather, this episode was accompanied by very high levels of uncertainty about the path of the policy in the future. The time period between an announcement about a new tariff and its implementation was relatively very short (Bown, 2021). There was a high degree of uncertainty surrounding the persistence of the tariff and its future level.

I model TPU as a Markov process that firms believe tariffs are following. The actual realized tariff rate, however, is set by the policy maker and might not end up being very volatile. This was indeed the case with the 2018-2019 tariffs after the initial waves of tariff increases. While the level of uncertainty about its future path was high, the tariff rate was in fact stable from late 2019 and until at least mid 2022. The TPU literature emphasizes that the uncertainty is about the probability of tariff changes, but that the actual realized volatility of tariffs might be very low since they tend to change infrequently (Caldara et al., 2020). This was the case even in 2018-2019 when U.S. tariffs changed several times over two years, but these changes were still infrequent relative to high-frequency volatile processes, such as the exchange rate, and even relative to other taxes (Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2015).

Let \( \tau_t \) denote the rate of net ad-valorem tariff in period \( t \). \( \tau_t \) can be low or high, \( \tau \in \{ \tau^L, \tau^H \} \), where \( \tau^L < \tau^H \). Let \( \gamma \equiv \Pr (\tau_t = \tau^j | \tau_{t-1} = \tau^i), i \neq j \) denote the probability the tariff rate switched from the previous period. A state \( i \) is absorbing and induces no uncertainty if \( \gamma = 0 \). The tariff transition matrix is given by

\[
\Lambda (\gamma) = \begin{bmatrix}
1 - \gamma & \gamma \\
\gamma & 1 - \gamma
\end{bmatrix}
\] (3.17)

The higher is \( \gamma \), the higher is trade policy uncertainty. If \( \gamma = 0 \) then firms just perceive the tariff rate to be completely stable. A change in the tariff when \( \gamma = 0 \) is akin to changing a parameter in the model, a one-time deterministic permanent change. However, if \( \gamma > 0 \) then there is some probability that the tariff will switch to the other state. In that case, the change is perceived to be transitory and there is uncertainty about the future level of tariff.

I explore an alternative formulation for TPU and the tariff process, discussed in Section 35. This formulation builds on the TPU process presented Handley and Limão (2017) and resembles the fiscal regime uncertainty in Aizenman and Marion (1993).
5.5. The different specifications do not alter the mechanism or the main results.

This process captures uncertainty in two ways. First, the persistence of the policy, defined as its asymptotic autocorrelation, $\text{Corr}(\tau_t, \tau_{t-1})$, is given by $|2\gamma - 1|$. Persistence decreases with $\gamma$ and reaches its minimum when $\gamma = 1/2$. Second, the unconditional variance of the forecast error, $\text{Var}(\tau_t - \mathbb{E}[\tau_t|\tau_{t-1}])$, increases with $\gamma$ and reaches its maximum when $\gamma = 1/2$. Additionally, the volatility of tariff increases with $\gamma$. I limit my attention to $\gamma \in [0, 1/2]$, where larger values of $\gamma$ seem unrealistic. In the data, the period in the 1990s-2000s could be thought of as $\gamma \to 0$, while Trump’s election and subsequent policies represent a sharp increase in $\gamma$, as depicted in Figure 1.

### 3.3 Sectoral equilibrium

A sectoral equilibrium is a path of sectoral price levels $\{P_t\}$ consistent with optimal pricing policies of firms $\{P_{\omega,t}\}$, where the firm satisfies any level of demand for its chosen price $Q_{\omega,t} = Y_{\omega,t}$, given exogenous shocks $\{a_{\omega,t}, a^*_\omega,t, E_t, \tau_t\}$.

To ensure the consistency of the sectoral price level, $P_t$ and $\{P_{\omega,t}\}$ must satisfy (3.3).

### 3.4 Functional form and pass-through

I adopt the Klenow and Willis (2016) specification for the Kimball aggregator. This yields the demand function

$$\psi(p_\omega) = \left[1 - \varepsilon \ln \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} p_\omega\right)\right]^{\sigma/\varepsilon} \quad (3.18)$$

where $p_\omega \equiv D^{(1+\tau)p_\omega}$, and $\sigma > 1$, $\varepsilon \geq 0$ are parameters that govern the price elasticity of demand, and the price elasticity of the elasticity (“superelasticity”), respectively.\(^\text{36}\)

The price elasticity of demand and the superelasticity are given by

$$\sigma(p_\omega) \equiv \frac{\partial \log \psi(p_\omega)}{\partial \log p_\omega} = \frac{\sigma}{1 - \varepsilon \ln \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} p_\omega\right)}, \quad \varepsilon(x_\omega) \equiv \frac{\partial \log \sigma(p_\omega)}{\partial \log p_\omega} = \frac{\varepsilon}{1 - \varepsilon \ln \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} p_\omega\right)} \quad (3.19)$$

The firm’s markup is given by

$$\mathcal{M}(p_\omega) \equiv \frac{\sigma(p_\omega)}{\sigma(p_\omega) - 1} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1 + \varepsilon \ln \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} p_\omega\right)} \quad (3.20)$$

\(^\text{36}\)When $\varepsilon = 0$, the demand function collapses to a CES demand function.
and the price elasticity of the markup is given by
\[
\Gamma (p) \equiv - \frac{\partial \log M(p)}{\partial \log p} = \frac{\varepsilon}{\sigma - 1 + \varepsilon \ln \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} p \right)} \tag{3.21}
\]

Thus, both the price elasticity of demand, and therefore the markup, depend on the firm’s relative import price. This leads to variable markups, which can be thought of as a “reduced form” way of capturing strategic price complementarities between firms (for example, those arising from oligopolistic competition as in Atkeson and Burstein (2008)).

If there is no tariff on imported varieties, the mean values of shocks are \( \bar{\tau} = \tau^L = \bar{\pi}_\omega = 0 \). The firm’s corresponding border price is \( P_\omega = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \), which is identical for all firms in the economy. Therefore the sectoral price level is also \( P = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \). The demand for the firm’s product is \( Q_\omega = \frac{C}{|\Omega|} \), and therefore \( D = \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \). We can thus think about \( \sigma \) and \( \varepsilon \) as the elasticity and the superelasticity when \( \bar{\tau} = \tau^L = \bar{\pi}_\omega = 0 \).

Next, I briefly describe why variable markups leads to counterfactually low tariff pass-through into the import price when there is no TPU. If the firm could set its optimal border price each period without any adjustment cost, this optimal flexible desired border price would satisfy the familiar condition of markup above marginal cost, \( \tilde{P}_{\omega,t} = M(p_{\omega,t}) MC_{\omega,t}(a_t, \mathcal{E}_t) \).

A one-time permanent shock in either tariff or the real exchange rate would be passed-through into this desired border price.

It can be shown that the pass-through rate of a one-time permanent change in tariff or exchange rate into the tariff-inclusive flexible desired import price of a Foreign firm is approximately given by
\[
\Phi^\tau_\omega \equiv \frac{\partial \log \tilde{P}_{\omega,t}}{\partial \log (1 + \tau_t)} \approx \frac{1}{1 + \Gamma (\tilde{p}_{\omega,t})} \in [0, 1] \tag{3.22}
\]
\[
\Phi^e_\omega \equiv \frac{\partial \log \tilde{P}_{\omega,t}}{\partial \log \mathcal{E}_t} \approx \frac{1 - \phi^*}{1 + \Gamma (\tilde{p}_{\omega,t})} \in [0, 1] \tag{3.23}
\]
holding all else constant.

The strength of price complementarities in the form of the elasticity of the markup, \( \Gamma (\tilde{p}_{\omega,t}) \), pulls these pass-through rates in opposite direction. Exchange rate pass-through and tariff pass-through into the desired import price decrease with the elasticity of the markup. However, this means that while exchange rate pass-through into the desired border price also decreases with the elasticity of the markup, tariff pass-through into the desired border price actually increases with the elasticity of the markup. As long as \( \varepsilon > 0 \) then \( \Gamma (\tilde{p}_{\omega,t}) > 0 \), there will always be incomplete tariff and exchange rate pass-through (i.e., lower than 1
in absolute value). Intuitively, when markups are variable the firm wants to limit the size of deviations of its import price from the prices of competitors. The competitors include both other Foreign exporters, but also domestic Home producers who are not affected by tariff or exchange rate changes. If markups are constant, \( \varepsilon = 0 \) and \( \Gamma (\tilde{p}_{\omega,t}) = 0 \), and there are no pricing complementarities, then the border price would not react to tariff changes. This creates complete tariff pass-through into the import price, \( \Phi^T = 1 \), but at the price of counterfactually high exchange rate pass-through. This is why the empirical findings about complete tariff pass-through into import prices vis-a-vis low exchange rate pass-through are puzzling.

While there is no closed-form analytical expression for pass-through with uncertainty when variable markups are present, in the next section I show numerically how an increase in uncertainty leads to an increase in tariff pass-through, while still maintaining variable markups.

### 3.5 Calibration and Model Solution

The model does not have closed-form solution and has to be solved numerically. I use standard methods of value function iteration. Since there are idiosyncratic productivity shocks, two aggregate shocks, and endogenously determined sectoral price level, I use the Krusell and Smith (1998) method to estimate the firms’ forecasting rule for the sectoral price level. The solution method is described in detail in Appendix A.

To calibrate the model’s parameters, I rely on values adopted in previous studies, and moments from studies that examined firm-level data of imports to the U.S. (mostly data from the International Price Program (IPP) database of the BLS). Parameter values are summarized in Table 1.

The duration of a period in the model is one month. The discount factor is set at the conventional level of \( \beta = 0.96^{1/12} \) which implies a 4% annualized interest rate. The size of the continuum of imports is set at \( m = 0.2 \), which implies that the steady state share of U.S. imports in manufacturing is \( m/(1+m) = 16.7\% \), in line with average values calculated from OECD input-output tables. The value of \( \phi^* = 0.25 \) is taken from estimates of imported foreign value-added content of gross exports in Chinese production. While there are several methods of estimating this share (see Kee and Tang (2016)), I rely on the average of OECD estimates. As mentioned above, intermediate inputs used by U.S. firms in production are overwhelmingly invoiced in U.S. dollars, which eliminates Home producers’ exposure to exchange rate shocks, thus the value of \( \phi \) has no effect on their marginal cost in the baseline model. The U.S. real exchange rate follows a highly persistent process with
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Baseline Value</th>
<th>Targeted moments</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discount factor $\beta$</td>
<td>0.96$^{1/12}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>4% annual interest rate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure of Foreign varieties $m$</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>$m/(1+m) \approx 17%$ Share of imported goods in U.S. manufacturing from I/O tables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of imported inputs, $\phi$ and $\phi^*$</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign value-added content of gross exports, OECD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price elasticity of substitution parameter $\sigma$</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Broda and Weinstein (2006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superelasticity parameter $\varepsilon$</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unit markup elasticity in Amiti et al. (2019)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real exchange rate AR coefficient $\rho_e$</td>
<td>0.985</td>
<td></td>
<td>Real dollar exchange rate data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real exchange rate standard deviation $\sigma_e$</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Baseline Value</th>
<th>Targeted moments</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Productivity AR coefficient $\rho_a$</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>Autocorrelation of new prices</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productivity standard deviation $\sigma_a$</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>Median absolute size of price adjustment</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>7.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menu cost $\kappa$</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>Median annual frequency of price adjustment</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
\( \rho_e = 0.985 \) and \( \sigma_e = 0.025 \). These parameters values are also in line with the mean estimates for U.S. real exchange rate vis-a-vis a set of other countries, reported in Schoenle (2017).

For the consumption aggregator parameters, I set \( \sigma = 5 \), in line with standard estimates of trade elasticities (for example, Eaton and Kortum (2002), Broda and Weinstein (2006), and Simonovska and Waugh (2014)). I set \( \varepsilon = 4 \) in the baseline calibration. These parameter values imply a stochastic steady state price elasticity of the markup of \( \Gamma = 1 \), and a measure of price complementarities equal to \( 1/2 \).\(^{37}\) Directly measuring the strength of price complementarities and the elasticity of the markup in international markets is highly challenging due to data limitations. However, these value are in line with the findings in Amiti et al. (2019). Furthermore, parameter values that lead to unit elastic markups are commonly used in recent international macro models, such as Gopinath et al. (2020) and Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021).

The parameters that govern price rigidity cannot be observed directly in the data and have to be calibrated. I use simulated method of moments to jointly calibrate the fixed price adjustment cost \( \kappa \), the persistency of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks \( \rho_a \), and their standard deviation \( \sigma_a \), to match moments of U.S. imports price adjustment from the BLS international prices program microdata. The data is from before the 2018-2019 and therefore not affected by any temporary disturbances caused by the tariffs.\(^{38}\) A detailed description of the database is is presented in Gopinath and Rigobon (2008), Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010), and Schoenle (2017). I target the following moments: Median duration of import prices of 11 months, autocorrelation of new (reset) import prices of 0.77, and median size of reset import price changes of 7.5%. The calibrated parameter values are \( \kappa = 4.1\% \), \( \rho_a = 0.98 \), and \( \sigma_a = 0.04 \).\(^{39}\) The size of the price adjustment cost is well within the conventional range

\(^{37}\)The steady state absolute value price elasticity of the markup is unitary, \( \Gamma \equiv \frac{\varepsilon \sigma}{\Gamma} = 1 \). This leads to the price complementarities measure \( \alpha \equiv \frac{\Gamma}{\Gamma + 1} = 1/2 \). The log deviations of the price from the mean values of the shocks can be expressed as \( p_t = \alpha \mu_t + (1 - \alpha) mc_t \), where \( \mu_t \) is the variable markup. Therefore, approximately 1/2 of a cost shock are absorbed in the markup while approximately 1/2 of the shock affects the price directly. In this model, the exchange rate shocks do not affect the marginal cost perfectly, but rather imperfectly due to the share of intermediate inputs. The final result is that exchange rate pass-through is roughly \( (1 - \alpha)(1 - \phi^*) = 0.375 \).

\(^{38}\)Furthermore, the working paper version of Cavallo et al. (2021) which also uses BLS data reported no observable change in the frequency of price setting during the trade war.

\(^{39}\)Note that this idiosyncratic productivity process is highly persistent relative to estimates of domestic U.S. prices (for example in Klenow and Willis (2016)), but also does not require a huge standard deviation to match the moments, an issue that plagued the literature modeling fixed price adjustment costs. Other studies tend to have much lower persistence of idiosyncratic shocks, which requires lower standard deviations (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008; Karadi and Reiff, 2019; Midrigan, 2011). Overall, the parameters of the idiosyncratic process are within the same order of magnitude as those in other models with menu costs. This is a result of targeting the absolute median size of price adjustment, while other studies target moments such as the standard deviation of relative price. The idiosyncratic productivity process is also only 1.6 times more volatile than the real exchange rate process and is still able to generate considerable heterogeneity in price dispersion.
used in calibration of similar models, and implies a cost of 0.37% of annual profits.

I solve the model separately for different values of $\tau^H$ and $\gamma$ that characterize different economies. $\tau^L = 0$ in all cases. For $\tau^H$ I create a grid with $\tau^H \in \{1\%, 2\%, ..., 20\%\}$. These values are in line with the range of U.S. tariffs imposed on different varieties. Namely, they are in line with the 2018-2019 tariff increases, as documented in Bown (2021). I take the baseline case to be $\tau^H = 10\%$ as this was the initial rate imposed on Chinese imports in 2018.

For trade policy uncertainty variation, I choose different values of $\gamma \in \{0, 0.1, \ldots, 0.5\}$. There is no clear method of calibrating or estimating $\gamma$ or its comparable parameters in the literature. The issue of parameterization of TPU is discussed in recent papers, including Handley and Limão (2017), Alessandria et al. (2019), Alessandria et al. (2021), and Handley and Limão (2022). Rather than choosing a baseline parameter, I conduct several comparative quantitative exercises with different values of $\gamma$ to show the effect of TPU on prices.

4 Inspecting the mechanism: Equilibrium pricing policies

A shock’s pass-through rate into the import price can be interpreted as the elasticity of the import price with respect to that shock. For tariff, we can define pass-through into the import price as $1 + \Delta \log P_\omega / \Delta \log (1 + \tau)$. Thus, for a given change in tariff level, $\Delta \log (1 + \tau)$, the pass-through rate is determined by the change in the ex-tariff border price $\Delta \log P_\omega$. TPU affects tariff pass-through into the import price through the change in the border price.

To break down the mechanism of the response of an exporter’s border price to tariffs and TPU, I first examine a representative Foreign exporter’s policy functions. When there is a fixed cost to resetting the price, a firm faces a two-tiered decision. First, whether to reset the border price - the extensive margin. Then, if it is optimal to reset the border price, what the new reset border price should be - the intensive margin. In this section, I show that TPU affects both margins. On the extensive margin, a tariff increase accompanied by TPU increases the firm’s inaction regions and makes price adjustment less likely. On the intensive margin, TPU induces precautionary markup which increases the border price, relative to a case without uncertainty about tariffs.

Figure 3(a) presents the policy function for a change in tariff. Initially, $\tau^L = a = e = \gamma = 0$, and the corresponding border price (which is also the sectoral price level) is $P_0 = \frac{a}{\sigma - 1}$.

Alessandria et al. (2022) use a structural model to estimate TPU related to U.S.-China trade relations since the 1960s. However, their specification and data are not applicable to this paper’s topic.
Figure 3: Optimal (including nonadjustment) and reset border price, without TPU

(a) An increase in tariff from $\tau^L = 0$ to $\tau^H$, for $\gamma = 0$

(b) Cost shock $(1 - \phi^*) e - a$, for $\tau^L = \gamma = 0$

Note: Change in the optimal border price and the reset border price of a representative Foreign firm, from log $P_0$ with $a = e = \tau^L = 0$ and no TPU $\gamma = 0$. In panel (a), tariff increases to various levels of $\tau^H$, holding all other shocks, TPU, and the sectoral price level constant. Panel (b) depicts different levels of the cost shock $(1 - \phi^*) e + a$ (the marginal cost is expressed in Home unit of account), holding tariff, TPU, and the aggregate price level constant.

The policy function depicts an increase from $\tau^L = 0$ to $\tau^H$ without an increase in TPU ($\gamma = 0$), while holding all else constant. The figure presents the change between the new log border price and the initial border price, $\Delta p_\omega \equiv \log P_\omega - \log P_0$, both the optimal price including nonadjustment and the optimal reset border price (the policy function in equation (3.15)). The firm’s reset border price (the dashed red line) decreases with the size of the tariff increase. There is a wide inaction region, and the firm resets the price only for very large values of $\tau^H$ (the solid blue line). This wide inaction region results from the fact that cost shocks are much more volatile than tariffs. Here, cost shocks remain at their mean level, and therefore the firm would prefer to wait and see if there will be larger cost shocks in the future and only then reset its price. Note that for all levels of $\tau^H$ the reset border price decreases by roughly 60% of the size of the tariff increase. This incomplete pass-through is the result of price complementarities. Since the aggregate price levels remains $P_0$, the firm does not want to let its tariff-inclusive import price increase too much, and must decrease the border price to do so. As I show later, the size of the decrease in the border price increases with the elasticity of the markup (determined by $\varepsilon$), and decreases with uncertainty, $\gamma$.

Figure 3(b) presents the policy function for a change in the cost shock, $(1 - \phi^*) e - a$ from the initial level $a = e = 0$ with corresponding border price $P_0$, while holding tariff and TPU constant at $\tau^L = \gamma = 0$, and also the sectoral price level. The inaction region covers values of the cost shock that occur in this case with probability of about 0.78, which is in line
Figure 4: Optimal border price response, tariff $\tau^H = 10\%$, with no TPU ($\gamma = 0$) or high TPU ($\gamma = 0.5$)

Note: Optimal border price of a representative Foreign firm, $P_{\omega,t}$, as a function of its initial border price, $P_{\omega,t-1}$, with tariff $\tau^H = 10\%$ and $a = e = 0$, holding sectoral price level at $P_0$. The solid blue line depicts the policy functions without uncertainty, $\gamma = 0$. The dashed red line depicts the policy function with uncertainty, $\gamma = 0.5$.

the parameterization of the model. Over time, cost shocks accumulate to the point where the firm finds it optimal to reset the price. The new price will reflect the new level $e$ and $a$. This causes a delayed response of the firm’s price to cost shocks and rigidity of the price. Note again that the reset price does not change by the full size of the cost shock, but rather by around 38%-40% of the cost shock. This again is due to price complementarities. Recall that $a$ is an idiosyncratic shock, $e$ does not affect domestic firms directly, and the sectoral price level is held constant. Thus, the exporter wants to limit deviations of the relative price from the sectoral price level as much as possible.

Next, I examine the border price policy function in the baseline scenario of a tariff increase from $\tau^L = 0\%$ to $\tau^H = 10\%$. In Figure 4, I compare an exporter’s border price policy function when $\gamma = 0$ (no uncertainty about $\tau$) relative to the case when $\gamma = 0.5$ (0.5 probability that $\tau$ will go back to $\tau^L$ next period). Other exogenous variables are held at
their mean level, $a = e = 0$, and the sectoral price level is held at $P_0$. The diagonal part of the policy functions is the inaction region. If the initial border price of the exporter is close enough to the optimal reset price, the exporter prefers to avoid paying the fixed cost and will not adjust the price. There is an increase in the inaction region (the extensive margin) when TPU is present, as the firm has an incentive to postpone the costly price adjustment if there is a non-negative probability that the tariff will go back to 0% the following period. The horizontal part of the policy function is the optimal reset border price. When the initial price is far enough from the reset price, the exporter pays the fixed adjustment cost and resets the border price to this level. The reset border price when TPU is present (the dashed red line) is higher than the reset border price when there is no uncertainty (the solid blue line). As a result, the tariff-inclusive import price is higher and more of the tariff would be passed-through into the import price.

To decouple the effects of the extensive and the intensive margins in response to TPU, I first look at an indicator of the optimal border price adjustment decision of a Foreign exporter, and then at the optimal reset border price (regardless of the optimality of adjustment itself). Figure 5(a) presents a Foreign firm’s decision whether to adjust or not to adjust the border price in response to an increase from $\tau_L = 0$ to $\tau_H$. There is a large nonadjustment region. The likelihood that the firm will adjust the price increases with the size of the tariff increase, $\tau_H$, and it decreases with the level of TPU, $\gamma$. It is important to emphasize that the unconditional mean of $\tau$ remains constant as $\gamma$ and $\tau_H$ increase, therefore the changes here represent a mean preserving spread and should not be affected by an expected mean effect. Higher $\gamma$ makes $\tau_H$ less persistent and increases the variance of the exporter’s forecast error. Both of the effects make it more likely that the firm will find it optimal not adjust the price now, but wait for next period to see if the value of $\tau$ changes, something that might require an additional costly price adjustment. This “wait-and-see” effect in price is setting is in line with the literature that finds similar extensive margin effects of TPU on other costly decisions, such as entry / exit from exporting, inventories, and investment (Handley, 2014; Handley and Limão, 2017; Crowley et al., 2018; Alessandria et al., 2019; Caldara et al., 2020).

If the exporter decides no up adjust the border price, then $\Delta \log P_\omega = 0$. This immediately leads to 100% tariff pass-through into the tariff-inclusive import price. Therefore, high TPU $\gamma$ increases the likelihood of high tariff pass-through on impact, after a tariff increase.

Figure 5(b) presents the optimal change in the reset border price of a Foreign exporter for an increase in tariff from $\tau_L = 0$ to selected levels of $\tau_H \in \{5\%, 10\%, 15\%, 20\%\}$, and for

---

41 This nonadjustment region depends on parameters of the model that determine the size of the price adjustment cost, $\kappa$; the firm’s exposure to the real exchange rate, $\phi^*$; and the volatility of the cost shocks, $\sigma_a, \sigma_e$. 

30
Figure 5: Policy functions: Extensive and intensive margins

(a) Border price adjustment indicator in response to a tariff increase from $\tau^L = 0$ to different $\tau^H$ (horizontal axis), and a TPU increase from $\gamma = 0$ (vertical axis)

(b) Optimal reset border price change for an increase in tariff to selected values of $\tau^H$ for different levels of TPU $\gamma$

Note: Panel (a) presents nonadjustment vs. adjustment of the border price of a representative Foreign firm, from $\log P_0$ with $a = e = \tau^L = 0$ and no TPU $\gamma = 0$, to various levels of $\tau^H$ and TPU $\gamma$, holding all other shocks, and the aggregate price level constant. Panel (b) presents the optimal reset border price change in logs of a representative Foreign firm, from $\log P_0$ with $a = e = \tau^L = 0$ and no TPU $\gamma = 0$, to selected values of $\tau^H$ and different value of $\gamma$, holding all other shocks, and the aggregate price level constant.
various levels of TPU, γ, holding all else constant. That is, the figure depicts the optimal decrease in the reset border price, Δ log Pω, in response to a tariff increase, regardless of whether it is actually optimal to adjust the price. The size of the price change in absolute value, |Δ log Pω|, increases with the size of the tariff increase, τH. Importantly, |Δ log Pω| decreases with γ for all values of τH.42 A smaller change in the ex-tariff border price, |Δ log Pω|, means higher tariff pass-through into the tariff-inclusive import price. Therefore, TPU γ increases tariff pass-through into the import price even after the border price has been reset. The effect of TPU on tariff pass-through is not just on impact after a tariff increase, is lasts into the post-adjustment period as well.

The effect of TPU on the optimal reset border price at the intensive margin is due to a precautionary pricing motive, sometimes referred to in the literature as “precautionary markup” (Kimball, 1989; Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2015; Oh, 2020; Born and Pfeifer, 2021). Precautionary markup arises since the exporter’s (static) marginal profit is convex in the tariff, τ. The fixed price adjustment cost, κ, creates an element of pre-commitment in the exporter’s pricing decision. Since price adjustments are costly, the exporter must take into account today that they might be “stuck” with the current border price in the next period. Therefore, when the tariff increases today from τL to τH, there are two “risks” the exporter must weigh when resetting the border price. First, if the border price is reset “too low” and the tariff goes down next period to τL, the exporter will be forced to supply a sub-optimally high demand at a low price. Second, if the border price is reset “too high” and the tariff remains at τH next period, demand for the exporter’s demand might be choked off. With marginal profit convex in the tariff, the “too low” price is more damaging than the “too high” price. An increase in γ exacerbates this problem because it changes the curvature of the expected profit function and makes the “too low” price even more damaging. In Appendix B I discuss this precautionary markup effect in more detail, using a simplified static model. The convexity of the marginal profit depends crucially on two parameters of the model: the fixed price adjustment cost, κ, and the superelasticity, ε. Next, I show how these parameters affect the intensive margin.

First, consider the effect of a change in the fixed price adjustment cost κ. Figure 6(a) presents the change in the optimal reset border price when tariff increases from 0% to 10% for different levels of uncertainty, γ, and different values of the adjustment cost, κ. When κ = 0, prices are fully flexible. In this case, the level of uncertainty has no effect on the optimal reset border price since the firm’s price setting problem becomes static. As κ increases, the effect of an increase in γ becomes more pronounced. This manifests in a smaller decrease in the optimal reset border price, |Δ log Pω|, in response to the increase in tariff. As price

42The full set of policy functions for different values of τH is presented in Appendix XX.
Figure 6: Optimal reset border price change for an increase in tariff to $\tau^H = 10\%$ and an increase in TPU from $\gamma = 0$, different values of price adjustment cost $\kappa$, markup elasticity $\Gamma$.

Note: Optimal reset border price change of a representative Foreign firm, from $\log P_0$ with $a = e = \tau^L = 0$ and no TPU $\gamma = 0$, to $\tau^H = 10\%$ and different value of $\gamma$, holding all other shocks, and the aggregate price level constant. The baseline parameter values are $\kappa = 0.041$ and $\Gamma = 1$ (corresponding to $\varepsilon = 5$).
adjustment become more costly, it is not only the extensive margin that is affected, but also the intensive margin. Recall from equation (3.16) that the firm takes into account the discounted expected value of its profit in all future periods. Costlier price adjustment increases the precautionary markup motive as the probability of getting stuck with a “too low” pre-committed border price increases.

Next, figure 6(b) presents the effect of varying the superelasticity parameter \( \varepsilon \), and as a result the elasticity of the markup \( \Gamma \), on the change in the optimal reset border price, \( |\Delta \log P_\omega| \), in response to an increase in tariff from 0% to 10% for different levels of \( \gamma \). When \( \varepsilon = 0 \) and \( \Gamma = 0 \), demand had constant elasticity of substation (CES). The exporter maintains a constant markup and the precautionary markup motive disappears, since the tariff only affect the exporter’s markup and not its cost of production. When \( \varepsilon = 0 \), an increase in \( \gamma \) has no effect on the border price. Furthermore, since the tariff does not affect the markup in this case, the increase in tariff has no effect on the border price at all (which would also cause counterfactually high exchange rate pass-through, as discussed in Section 3). When \( \varepsilon > 0 \) and therefore \( \Gamma > 0 \), markups are variable and precautionary markups play a role in the firm’s price setting decision. Specifically, when \( \varepsilon > 0 \) the marginal profit is convex in tariff, and an increase in \( \gamma \) changes the curvature of the expected profit function in a way that increases the optimal reset border price. It is interesting to note that an increase in uncertainty leads to smaller reset border price reduction in all cases where variable markups are present, even when the markup is very elastic (\( \varepsilon = 20 \)). For a given \( \gamma \), the size of the border price reduction increases with the elasticity of the markup. This is a result of an increase in price complementarities, as demand for the firm’s variety become more responsive to changes in its relative price.

5 Quantitative Analysis

In this section, I present results for quantitative exercises conducted with the dynamic model. The main takeaway is that in the absence of TPU, a 10% tariff increase which is perceived to be a one-time permanent change is passed-through into the tariff-inclusive import price at around 59% after one year. When TPU is present, however, tariff pass-through increases up 81% with the level of uncertainty. At the same time, exchange rate pass-through is roughly 39% and is almost unaffected by the presence of TPU. These results indicate that TPU has an important role in explaining the high tariff pass-through vis-a-vis low exchange rate pass-through observed for the 2018-2019 tariffs.

I simulate 1,000 economies\(^{43}\) from the model, each with 1,200 domestic firms and 240

\(^{43}\)An economy is a random draw for the processes of \( a \) and \( e \).
foreign firms for 240 months (a period in the model is one month). All economies start at tariff rate \( \tau_L = 0 \) with no TPU (\( \gamma = 0 \)). This was approximately the state of the U.S. prior to 2017. In the baseline case, at period \( t = 145 \) there is an unexpected increase in tariff to \( \tau_H = 10\% \). If \( \gamma = 0 \) after the shock, then firms perceive this change to be a one-time permanent policy change. However, if there is an increase in TPU to \( \gamma \in (0, 0.5] \) in addition to the tariff increase, firms expect the tariff level to revert back to \( \tau_L \) at some point in the future. Thus, the tariff shock is seen as transitory and there is uncertainty because the policy has lower persistence and the variance of the forecast error increases. I compare different levels of \( \gamma \) that create different levels of uncertainty and constitute a mean preserving spread. In all cases, while firms might expect tariffs to change, the exogenous policy maker keeps the tariff at the same level after the shock. This approximates the state of the U.S. after March 2018, where TPU was very high and there was uncertainty about the persistence of the tariff increases in 2018-2019, but ex-post the tariff was in place at a steady level for over four years.

5.1 Impulse response functions

I follow the standard procedure in the literature in computing impulse response functions (IRFs). The IRFs are in log deviations from the stochastic steady state with \( \tau_L \) and \( \gamma = 0 \). Full details of the computation of the IRFs are in Appendix A.

Prices Ceteris paribus, following an increase of tariff to 10\%, the tariff-inclusive import price paid by importers increases. As a result, demand for the imported Foreign varieties decreases. Since Foreign exporters are competing against domestic producers, whose varieties are not taxed and who make up 83\% of available varieties, the relative import price of Foreign varieties paid by the importer jumps up. Exporters now face pressure to reduce their border price and absorb some of the tariff increase, so that their relative import price will not increase so dramatically. Since price adjustments are costly, this process does not necessarily happen immediately at the time of the tariff increase. Instead, different exporters adjust their prices at different points in time, so that the sectoral import price index adjusts gradually. The speed of price adjustment also depends on the realization of the more volatile cost shocks: the exchange rate and the productivity level.

This process is depicted in panel (a) of Figure 7. The dynamic response of firms has the same direction at all levels of uncertainty: an initial jump in the import price when the tariff increases, but by less than the full amount of the tariff since some exporters adjust their border price on impact. Then, a gradual adjustment follows over 11-12 months as all exporters eventually adjust their border price. The fact that there is always some absorption
Figure 7: IRFs for a 10% tariff increase, various levels of uncertainty $\gamma$

Note: IRFs computed from 1,000 simulated economies with 1,200 domestic and 240 foreign firms each. All economies start with $\tau_L = 0\%$ and $\gamma = 0$ until period $t = 145$ when the tariff unexpectedly jumps to $\tau^H = 10\%$. The aggregate tariff-inclusive import price, aggregate exporter markup, aggregate imported quantity index are computed as the geometric mean of log variables of each exporter. The aggregate variables from all economies are averaged. The import share is calculated as the aggregated quantity imported out of total consumption and averaged across all economies. For import prices, imported quantity, and exporter’ markup, the figure shows the percent deviation of the cross-economy average from its value in the last period before $t$. The IRFs for the share of imports is in percentage points change from period $t - 1$. IRFs are presented for selected values of $\gamma$. The black dashed line shows the log value of tariff, $\log (1 + \tau)$. 
of the tariff by the exporters is due to pricing complementarities created by variable markups, and the fact that exporters do not want to let their import price deviate too much from the aggregate sectoral price level.

Panel (a) of Figure 7, shows clearly that the import price increases with the level of uncertainty, $\gamma$. As discussed in the previous section, this is the result of the effect of uncertainty on the two margins of price adjustment. On impact, at the shock period $\bar{t}$, the likelihood that a firm adjusts its price decreases with $\gamma$. This is the “wait-and-see” effect on the extensive margin. Until the firm adjusts its price, the import price will automatically increase by the full amount of the tariff. On average, the import price increases on impact by 7.4% when firms perceive the tariff increase to be a one-time permanent change ($\gamma = 0$), and this rate increases to 8.1% when $\gamma = 0.1$, and to 8.7% when $\gamma = 0.5$. When the firm finally adjusts the price, the new optimal reset border price increases with $\gamma$. This is the precautionary markup effect on the intensive margin. After 12 months, the average import price increases by 5.5% when $\gamma = 0$, relative to period $\bar{t} - 1$, and by 6.5% and 7.6% when $\gamma = 0.1$ and $\gamma = 0.5$, respectively. Both of these channels lead to higher border prices, and therefore higher import prices.

**Markup** Panel (d) of Figure 7, shows the effect of precautionary markups and its relationship with uncertainty explicitly. In this figure, I compute the IRFs for the log markup $\mu_\omega = \log (\sigma (p_\omega) / (\sigma (p_\omega) - 1))$. The average markup adjusts over time and declines as firms adjust their border prices. After 12 months, the largest decline in markup of 3.6%, relative to the markup at period $\bar{t} - 1$, occurs when there is no uncertainty about the future path of tariff ($\gamma = 0$). When $\gamma = 0.1$, the markup decline by 2.7%, and when $\gamma = 0.5$ the markup declines by only 1.6%. That is, the markup is significantly higher when TPU is present. It should be emphasized that this markup is variable and chosen by the firm. This emphasizes the role of precautionary markups even further relative to similar arguments made in the literature in environments with Calvo pricing and CES demand, where variable markups were only a temporal side effect of time-dependent price rigidities (Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2015; Oh, 2020; Born and Pfeifer, 2021).

**Quantities** Given that import prices soar after the tariff increase, it is not surprising that demand for imported varieties plummets. Panel (b) of Figure 7 shows that demand for imports collapses on impact as the tariff and the import price increases. Over time as firms adjust their border prices, the import price declines somewhat and demand for imports inches back upwards. Demand in this model is not affected directly by TPU, only through the effect TPU has on import prices. When $\gamma = 0$, demand decreases after 12 months by
Figure 8: Change in frequency of price adjustment, various levels of uncertainty $\gamma$

Note: Change in the average frequency of price adjustment computed from 1,000 simulated economies with 1,200 domestic and 240 foreign firms each. All economies start with $\tau^L = 0\%$ and $\gamma = 0$ until period $\bar{t} = 145$ when the tariff unexpectedly jumps to $\tau^H = 10\%$. The frequency of price adjustment is calculated as the share of exporters in each period adjusting their price. The frequency from all economies is averaged.

19.6% relative to its level at $\bar{t} - 1$, and when $\gamma = 0.1$ and $\gamma = 0.5$, demand decreases by 23.6% and 29.2%, respectively. The size of these decreases is in line with findings in Amiti et al. (2019) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2020), who estimate around a 30% decrease in U.S. imports from China after a similar size tariff increase.

It is not only the absolute quantity of imports that decreases after the tariff increase, but the composition of the consumption basket changes as well. Panel (c) of Figure 7 shows that 12 months after the tariff increase, the share of imports in consumption decreases by 3 percentage points when $\gamma = 0$, relative to its share at $\bar{t} - 1$ (from 16.7% to 13.7%). When $\gamma = 0.1$, the share of imports decreases by 3.6 percentage points, and when $\gamma = 0.5$ it decreases by 4.4 percentage points. Expenditure switching from Foreign to Home varieties causes this effect, as well as an increase in the number of exporters who prefer not to sell any positive quantity rather than decrease their border price drastically.

**Frequency of price adjustment** To illustrate the effect of uncertainty on the extensive margin of price adjustment, I calculate the average frequency of price adjustment across all economies. Figure 8 shows the average cross-economy frequency of price adjustment around the tariff increase shock for selected levels of TPU. When the tariff increase is perceived to be a one-time permanent change ($\gamma = 0$), the share of firms adjusting their border price on impact jumps from 0.094 to 0.26 but then almost immediately returns to its original level. In contrast, under both $\gamma = 0.1$ and $\gamma = 0.5$, there is less adjustment of the border price
on impact (0.19 and 0.13, respectively). Additionally, there is also a small but meaningful decrease in the frequency of price adjustment in all future periods (0.081 and 0.077, respectively). This decline in frequency is important as it represents an increase from an average price duration of 11 months to 12.3 and 13 months, respectively. TPU not only decreases the likelihood of price adjustment to the tariff increase on impact, it also increases price rigidity while it is present.\footnote{While outside the scope of this work, this model prediction opens up an interesting avenue for both empirical and theoretical research about monetary non-neutralities amplified by TPU. Specifically, periods of high TPU could have implications for monetary policy. This might be especially relevant for FX interventions during times of heightened TPU.}

\subsection*{5.2 Tariff and exchange rate pass-through estimation}

Next, I estimate tariff and exchange rate pass-through into import prices in the simulated data. I follow the specification laid out in Cavallo et al. (2021). This is a standard pass-through regression that has been used extensively in the literature. For comparability with the 2018-2019 tariff pass-through estimations, I limit the sample used in the regression to 24 months before and after $t$.

In each economy, I estimate the following panel regression:

$$\Delta \log (1 + \tau_t) P_{\omega,t} = \sum_{l=0}^{L} \beta^\tau_l \Delta \log (1 + \tau_{t-l}) + \sum_{l=0}^{L} \beta^e_l \Delta e_{t-l} + \epsilon_{\omega,t}$$  \hspace{1cm} (5.1)

where $\Delta$ denotes the first lag, $L$ is the number of lags (up to 23), and $\epsilon_{\omega,t}$ is a firm level error term.\footnote{Note that unlike Cavallo et al. (2021), I do not include a firm-level fixed effect, since all the variation in the model is coming from $a_{\omega,t}$ which has the same mean and variance for all firms. Therefore there are no time-invariant differences between the firms. In a robustness check, I estimate the regression while also controlling for $L$ lags of $a_{\omega,t}$. This does not affect the estimates of $\beta^\tau_l$ or $\beta^e_l$ in a meaningful way.} I estimate the regression with $L = 11$ in each simulated economy.\footnote{I also estimate the regression with $L = 23$, but since almost all of the adjustment happens within the first year after a change in either tariff or the exchange rate, I relegate the results with $L = 23$ to Appendix XX.} I then average the estimators across all simulated economies.

For each log variable $x \in \{\tau, e\}$, the coefficient $\beta^x_l$ measures the pass-through rate of the $l$-lag of a change in the variable into the import price. $\sum_{l=0}^{L} \beta^x_l$ measures the cumulative pass-through rate over the duration $L$. This regression equation has a structural interpretation that arises from equations (??)-(??). I compare results from the simulated model to the findings in Cavallo et al. (2021). It should be emphasized that the model is calibrated to pre-2017 (before the 2018-2019 tariffs) moments of U.S. import price adjustment, and does not target exchange rate pass-through
Table 2: Tariff and exchange rate pass-through into import prices estimation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trade policy uncertainty</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Simulated model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>γ = 0</td>
<td></td>
<td>γ = 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>γ = 0.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>γ = 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Markups

1 year cumulative tariff PT $\hat{\beta}_{\tau}^{1}$

$\sum_{l=0}^{11} \hat{\beta}_{\tau}^{l}$

1 year cumulative exchange rate $\hat{\beta}_{e}$

$\sum_{l=0}^{11} \hat{\beta}_{e}^{l}$

Note: The empirical estimation results under the “Data” column are taken from Cavallo et al. (2021). Robust standard errors in parentheses. The regression in the BLS data controls for PPI in the exporter’s country, as well as dummy variables for Chinese varieties affected and unaffected by the tariffs, and includes sector fixed effects. Adjusted $R^2 = 0.018$. The estimation results of the of regression equation (5.1) in the simulated data is averaged across 1,000 simulated economies. The regression is estimated for a tariff increase to $\tau^H = 10\%$, and for different levels of uncertainty, $\gamma$. In the baseline model with Kimball aggregator, the superelasticity parameter is $\varepsilon = 4$ and the elasticity parameter is $\sigma = 5$. In the CES specification, $\varepsilon = 0$ and $\sigma = 5$.

Cavallo et al. (2021) estimate the regression using ex-tariff border prices, therefore their estimator is 0.006. To get the pass-through estimate into the import price, I subtract this estimate from 1. The original estimator is not statistically significant.

or tariff pass-through. Table 2 presents the estimates from the BLS data alongside four specifications of the model: three with the baseline Kimball aggregator parameterization and varying levels of TPU (no TPU, intermediate TPU, and high TPU), and one without TPU but with CES demand. The model can generate incomplete exchange rate pass-through rate well, as evident from the model columns (1)-(3). Column (1) highlights how this standard model, absent TPU, yields counterfactually low tariff pass-through rate. The presence of TPU raises tariff pass-through significantly, and it increases beyond 80%. Column (4) shows that CES demand can lead to very high tariff pass-through in the simulated data, but at the cost of counterfactually high exchange rate pass-through, almost double its estimated rate in the data. This paper does not claim that the presence of TPU was the sole contributor to the high observed tariff pass-through during 2018-2019, but rather that it was one important, and overlooked, contributing factor. Other important factors beyond the scope of this model could be related to the level of differentiation of Chinese exports to the U.S. and the unique role that China plays in the global supply chain as the production powerhouse of the world.

Figure 9(a) presents the estimator of $\sum_{l=0}^{11} \hat{\beta}_{\tau}^{l}$ as it evolves over one year after the tariff increase. Tariff pass-through into the import price is highest on impact ($l = 0$). Then, as more firms adjust their border price, pass-through decreases until it reaches its desired level.
Figure 9: Tariff and exchange rate cumulative pass-through into the tariff-inclusive import price estimation in the simulated model

(a) Tariff pass-through estimation, $\sum_{t=0}^{11} \hat{\beta}_t$

(b) Exchange rate pass-through estimation, $\sum_{t=0}^{11} \hat{\beta}_e$

Note: Estimation of regression equation (5.1) in the simulated data.

approximately 11 months after the initial increase. Tariff pass-through increases significantly with the uncertainty level, $\gamma$. When there is no uncertainty about the future level of tariff, $\gamma = 0$, firms pass-through 59.5% of the tariff increase into the import price after one year. This rate increases to 69.2% when $\gamma = 0.1$, and to 81.1% when $\gamma = 0.5$.

These large differences in tariff pass-through as a result of increase in uncertainty have only a marginal effect on exchange rate pass-through. Figure 9(b) presents the estimator of $\sum_{t=0}^{11} \hat{\beta}_e$ during the comparable period. When the real exchange rate depreciates (an increase in $\epsilon$), the firm’s marginal cost in Home currency increases, which leads the firm to increase its border price. On impact, a real depreciation is passed-through at an average low rate. Then, as more firms adjust their prices over time, the average pass-through rate reaches its desired level. The estimated real exchange rate pass-through into the import price is on average 39%-40% after one year, regardless of the level of uncertainty about the tariff. The fact the exchange rate pass-through is almost unaffected by the level of tariff uncertainty is not surprising. Since the desired level of exchange rate pass-through is determined mostly by the parameters that govern demand and by expectations about future levels of the exchange rate, TPU has only an indirect effect of exchange rate pass-through. Since higher TPU is associated with higher import prices after the tariff increase, and a higher markup, this will affect the (variable) price elasticity of the markup. However, this effect is not large enough to change the desired level of exchange rate pass-through drastically. Therefore, TPU can increase tariff pass-through substantially without affecting the low and incomplete exchange rate pass-through.
5.3 Calibration of TPU parameter $\gamma$

The estimation results presented above indicate that when TPU reaches its highest level, $\gamma = 0.5$, tariff pass-through increases significantly, relative to the no-TPU case, $\gamma = 0$. However, even this substantial increase to over 80% pass-through is not enough to replicate the observed near 100% tariff pass-through in the 2018-2019 data. For this reason, I do not use the pass-through estimates to calibrate $\gamma$, since it is clear that there are other factors affecting pass-through that are not captured in this simple model.

However, qualitatively, $\gamma = 0.5$ should not be seen as an extreme or unrealistic value. $\gamma = 0.5$ assigns a 50% chance every period that the tariff will go back down to 0%. While this is a very high probability, it is entirely plausible. Recall that TPU levels according to several empirical indices during this period were at an all-time high, as depicted in Figure 1. Given the volatile news and tweets emanating from the Trump administration during some months in 2018 immediately after the first couple of tariff waves, at the time it seemed entirely possible that the tariffs will be lifted shortly if a deal is reached. As a matter of fact, the steel and aluminum tariffs on Canada followed a highly volatile path during the same period, being lifted and then re-imposed several times. During the first half of 2019, trade negotiations between the U.S. and China started with the goal of reaching a deal. These trade talks advanced quickly and were about to culminate in an agreement, but on the eve of signing the agreement in May 2019, the talks collapsed and the trade war resumed in full force. These events point towards a very high probability of resolution of the trade war and a decrease in tariff before May 2019, in a way that is consistent with $\gamma$ close to 1/2.

5.4 Variation in the size of tariff increase and in uncertainty

Next, I explore whether changes in the expected level of the tariff affect the pass-through rate. For a given level of $E\tau$, an increase in $\gamma$ is a mean-preserving spread, since the transition matrix is symmetric. Thus the unconditional mean of tariff remains the same when $\gamma$ changes. In a subsequent section, I show that an alternative specification which ensures that the conditional mean of tariff is held constant when $\gamma$ increases yields similar results. To show the effect of different values of $\tau^H$, which determine the unconditional mean of tariff $E\tau$, I solve the model separately for each combination of $\tau^H$ and $\gamma$. For each combination, I use the same 1,000 simulated economies as in the baseline case. In each economy I estimate the pass-through regression 5.1.

Figure 10(a) presents the tariff pass-through estimator on impact, $\beta^\tau_0$. That is, during the same period of the tariff and TPU increase. Figure 10(b) presents the cumulative tariff pass-through over one year, $\sum_{i=0}^{11} \beta^\tau_i$. When the tariff increases from 0% to $\tau^H$ and the change is
Figure 10: Tariff pass-through into the tariff-inclusive import price estimation in the simulated model, variation in $\tau^H$ and $\gamma$

(a) Tariff pass-through estimation, contemporaneous $\hat{\beta}^\tau_0$
(b) Tariff pass-through estimation, one year $\sum_{l=0}^{11} \hat{\beta}^\tau_l$

Note: Estimation of regression equation (5.1) in the simulated data for different levels of the tariff increase to $\tau^H$, and for different levels of uncertainty, $\gamma$.

perceived to be permanent ($\gamma = 0$), pass-through on impact into the import price decreases with the level of $\tau^H$, from 80.7% when $\tau^H = 1\%$ to 70.9% when $\tau^H = 20\%$. The larger is the tariff increase, the more likely it is to trigger an adjustment of the border price immediately, which leads to lower pass-through into the import price on impact. After one year, however, the effect is opposite, where tariff pass-through increases with the size of $\tau^H$, from 54.2% when $\tau^H = 1\%$ to 61.9% when $\tau^H = 20\%$. There are two reasons for this pattern. First, pricing complementarities play an important role. When the tariff increase is small, the effect on the sectoral price level is very small and domestic firms barely react to the increase. This puts pressure on foreign exporters to absorb more of (small) tariff increase in their border price. When the tariff increase is larger, there is a more pronounced increase in the sectoral price index. This incentivizes domestic producers to increase their untaxed prices. As a result, foreign exporters actually face less pressure to reduce their border price. Second, with the Kimball demand structure, firms have a “choke price”. They can choose to set the border price at a level that leads to 0 demand and 0 profits, rather than set the border price at a lower level which would lead to positive demand but negative profits. The number of firms who choose to “opt out” of selling a positive quantity increases with the size of the tariff increase, where fewer firms find it optimal to reset an increasingly lower border price. As a result, pass-through into the tariff-inclusive import price rises with $\tau^H$. The latter is of lesser quantitative importance, as removing firms with zero quantity from the regression does not change the results dramatically.

This pattern diminishes as $\gamma$ increases. When uncertainty is fairly low but the tariff is perceived to be transitory ($\gamma = 0.01$), the pass-through rate on impact and after one year...
is close to its level when $\gamma = 0$. But the more $\gamma$ increases, a different pattern emerges. For all values of $\tau^H$, an increase in $\gamma$ increases tariff pass-trough - both on impact and over one year. When $\gamma = 0.1$, the decrease in pass-through rate on impact as $\tau^H$ increases is clear (from 86.3% when $\tau^H = 1\%$ to 77.7% when $\tau^H = 20\%$). But after one year instead of an increase in pass-through rate with the level of $\tau^H$, there is now overall a stability of the pass-through rate across levels of $\tau^H$, albeit with a slight decline (from 68.6% when $\tau^H = 1\%$ to 66.4% when $\tau^H = 20\%$). This pattern is even more pronounced when $\gamma$ increases to higher levels. When $\gamma = 0.5$, there is a very slight decline with $\tau^H$ on impact (from 93.5% when $\tau^H = 1\%$ to 91.2% when $\tau^H = 20\%$), and over one year (from 84.4% when $\tau^H = 1\%$ to 80.7% when $\tau^H = 20\%$). The effect of the increase in TPU and the high $\gamma$ leads to higher border prices. The combined effect of both the “wait-and-see” motive and the precautionary markup motive is strong across all levels of $\tau^H$ for a given large $\gamma$, and leads to roughly the same pass-through rate at all levels. At every given level of $\tau^H$, however, the increase in tariff pass-through with $\gamma$ is clear and pronounced.

5.5 Alternative tariff process specification

The tariff process and TPU formulation presented in Section 3.2 follow the conventional setup of TPU in the literature. It maintains a constant unconditional expected value of tariff, $E\tau$, as $\gamma$ changes (and therefore, as $Var(\tau)$ changes). A potential issue with this setup is that the conditional mean of tariff, $E[\tau_{t+1}|\tau_t]$, changes when $\gamma$ changes - even as the unconditional mean remains constant. This might mean that results are driven by a conditional expected mean effect rather than the increase in uncertainty as it is reflected in the variance.

To address this concern, I alter the tariff process in the following way. I keep $\tau^L = 0$ as before, but instead of a symmetric transition matrix as in (3.17), I allow the low state to be absorbing. That is, the transition matrix is now

$$\Lambda^*(\gamma) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ \gamma & 1 - \gamma \end{bmatrix}$$

(5.2)

such that the firm perceives a switch from $\tau^L$ to $\tau^H$ as an unexpected regime change. If $\gamma > 0$, the firm expects the tariff to revert back to the low state in the future, and when it does the firm expects the tariff to remain low indefinitely. This setup is based on the process in Handley and Limão (2017). With this process, the unconditional mean of tariff is always $E\tau = 0$, and the conditional mean, upon observing $\tau^H$ today, is $E[\tau_{t+1}|\tau_t = \tau^H] =$
Figure 11: Tariff pass-through into the tariff-inclusive import price estimation, $\sum_{t=0}^{11} \hat{\beta}_t^f$, in the simulated model with alternative tariff process

Note: Estimation of regression equation (5.1) in the simulated data with the alternative tariff process presented in Section 5.5.

$(1 - \gamma) \tau^H$. I choose $\gamma$ and $\tau^H$ jointly to keep the unconditional mean at 10%. The conditional variance, $Var(\tau_{t+1}|\tau_t = \tau^H) = (1 - \gamma)(\tau^H)^2$, is increasing with $\gamma$. Therefore, any effect that an increase in $\gamma$ has in this setup is due to a pure risk effect since there is no expected mean effect (conditional or unconditional).

Figure 11 presents the estimation results of tariff pass-through into import prices in the simulated data with the alternative tariff process. Keeping the conditional expected level of tariff constant does not change the results in a meaningful way. An increase in $\gamma$ still increases tariff pass-through substantially. Tariff pass-through after one year increases from 59.7% when $\gamma = 0$ to 66.6% when $\gamma = 0.1$, and 76.8% when $\gamma = 0.5$.

5.6 The role of costly price adjustment and price complementarities

Two key elements in the model capture important characteristics of price setting considerations of exporters. The fixed price adjustment cost, $\kappa$, makes the price setting problem a dynamic one. Firm’s expectations about future realizations of shocks and their persistence matter for current price setting decisions. The superelasticity parameter, $\varepsilon$, determines how much the price elasticity of demand for the firm’s variety is affected by the firm’s tariff-inclusive relative price. It therefore captures how variable markups are, and as a result how strong pricing complementarities are. In this subsection I explore how these parameters

47For example, when $\gamma = 0.1$ the tariff increase that keeps the unconditional mean at 10% is $\tau^H = 11.1\%$. 

45
Figure 12: Tariff pass-through into the tariff-inclusive import price estimation in the simulated model: Variation in price adjustment cost and in strength of price complementarities

(a) Price adjustment cost, $\kappa$  
(b) Price complementarities, $\varepsilon$

Note: Estimation of regression equation (5.1) in the simulated data. Panel (a): selected levels of $\kappa$ (in the baseline model $\kappa = 0.041$); panel (b): selected levels of $\varepsilon \in \{0, 4, 10, 20\}$ that correspond to markup elasticity level $\Gamma \in \{0, 1, 2.5, 5\}$ (in the baseline model $\varepsilon = 4$).

affect the results.

**Variation in price adjustment cost $\kappa$** I solve the model and estimate the pass-through regression with different levels of $\kappa \in \{0.01, 0.025, 0.041, 0.05, 0.075\}$. First, an increase in $\kappa$ intuitively affects the extensive margin of price adjustment since it makes price adjustment more costly. This is apparent in the left panel of Figure 12(a), where immediately after a tariff increase, tariff pass-through into the import price rises with $\kappa$ as the frequency of price adjustment decreases. Second, an increase in $\kappa$ also has an effect on the intensive margin of price adjustment since it affects the optimal reset border price (conditional on price adjustment). This is shown in the one year cumulative tariff pass-through in the right panel of Figure 12(a). In line with the analysis of policy functions with different levels of $\kappa$ in Section 4, when $\gamma = 0$ there is no effect of the value of $\kappa$ on the optimal reset border price. Tariff pass-through after one year remains stable around 59% even as $\kappa$ increases. This is intuitive, since if there is no uncertainty about the tariff then the price setting problem with respect to the tariff is in fact static. Conversely, when $\gamma > 0$ then an increase in $\kappa$ increases the optimal reset border price due to precautionary markup. The greater is $\kappa$, the more costly it is to adjust the price, and thus firms would like to avoid making multiple costly price adjustments by setting a higher border price today in anticipation of a decrease in tariff in the future.
**Variation in strength of price complementarities** \( \varepsilon \)  
Next, I solve the model for different levels of \( \varepsilon \in \{0, 4, 10, 20\} \). These values correspond to stochastic steady state price elasticity of the markup \( \Gamma \in \{0, 1, 2.5, 5\} \), where the case of \( \Gamma = 0 \) is CES. Figure 12(b) shows estimation results of tariff and exchange rate pass-through over one year in the simulated data. Changes in the price elasticity of the markup do not affect the extensive margin, but they do affect the intensive margin of price adjustment. As mentioned above, with CES demand there are no price complementarities since the price elasticity of demand is unaffected by changes in the relative price of the firms. In this case, an increase in tariff has no effect on the constant markup that a firm charges and tariff pass-through into the import price is nearly complete, very close to 100%. However, as discussed before, exchange rate pass-through is counterfactually high at 65%. For the other levels of positive markup elasticity, there is a large effect of TPU on tariff pass-through and very small effect on exchange rate pass-through (if at all). When \( \Gamma \) increases, price complementarities strengthen. The size of the decrease in the border price in response to a tariff increase is greater as the firm tries to keep its price closer to the sectoral price level. As a result, tariff pass-through into the import price decreases with \( \Gamma \). The effect of an increase in TPU from \( \gamma = 0 \) to \( \gamma = 0.5 \) on tariff pass-through is sizable in all cases of \( \Gamma > 0 \): an increase of 21.6 percentage points when \( \Gamma = 1 \), 30.8 percentage points when \( \Gamma = 2.5 \), and 22.2 percentage points when \( \Gamma = 5 \). The effect of an increase in \( \gamma \) on exchange rate pass-through remains very small in all cases. This result is quite interesting, as it demonstrates that the marginal profit function remains convex in tariff even for large values of \( \varepsilon \), and therefore there is a precautionary markup motive for exporters over a wide range of parameterizations of the Kimball aggregator. This is an important result, since Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) and Amiti et al. (2022) show that exporters differ in their markup variability. This plays an important role in rationalizing observable patterns of exchange rate pass-through and of currency of invoicing choice in international trade. I demonstrate here that even as exporters differ in the strength of pricing complementarities, the effect of TPU on their price setting decision is the same.

### 5.7 Tariff on imported intermediate inputs and retaliation

The tariff considered so far is imposed on final goods purchased by Home importers. However, the early waves of the 2018-2019 tariffs were imposed mostly on imported intermediate inputs before subsequent waves expanded the tariffs to final goods. Furthermore, China imposed retaliatory tariffs on U.S. imports in each wave. Tariffs on imported inputs are different from tariffs imposed on final goods since they increase a firm’s cost of production rather than the output price paid by the consumer. I now address this type of tariffs.
In the short-run, it is costly and difficult to change the mix of inputs used in production by the firm. Thus, when a tariff is imposed on imported inputs, a firm cannot necessarily switch to domestic or third country inputs instead. For this reason, I introduce tariffs on imported inputs in a rather simplistic way: The same tariff $\tau_t$ is now imposed not only on imported final varieties, but also on the intermediate input $X^*_t$ used by Home firms. In retaliation, the Foreign country imposes a similar size tariff, $\tau_t^* = \tau$, on Home inputs used by Foreign producers, $X_t$. This setup is in line with the findings of Flaaen and Pierce (2019) who find that the 2018-2019 U.S. tariffs increased the cost of imported inputs for American firms, which led to an increase in producer prices. As a result, the marginal cost of Home and Foreign producers is now

\begin{align}
MC^*_{\omega,t} &= \phi^* e^{-a^* t} ((1 + (1 + \tau_t) / E_t) \phi^* (5.3) \\
MC_{\omega,t} &= \phi e^{-a_{\omega,t}} (1 + \tau_t) \phi (5.4)
\end{align}

The increase in tariff on both final goods and imported inputs affects prices through different channels. First, the import price of Foreign varieties increases as it did before. However, now the marginal cost of both Foreign and Home producers increases as well, by approximately $\phi \tau$. In the case of a 10\% tariff increase, this is roughly an increase of 2.5\%. Foreign exporters now face competing pressures on their reset border price. On the one hand, the relative import price increases because of the final good tariff, which pushes exporters to decrease their border price. On the other hand, the marginal cost increases (albeit by a lower amount since only a small share of inputs are imported), which pushed exporters to raise the border price. At the same time, Home producers now face an increase in their marginal cost, which pushes them to raise their prices. This elevates some of the price complementarity pressure on Foreign exporters to reduce their border prices. As I show next, the overall effect is a smaller decrease in the border price, relative to the case of tariff imposed on the final good alone. This leads to even higher tariff pass-through.

Figure 13 presents pass-through estimation results from the simulated model. The 10\% tariff increase now affects final imported varieties, and imported inputs. Additionally, there is a parallel retaliatory tariff on imported inputs used by Foreign exporters. Panel (a) presents cumulative tariff pass-through estimates through one year after the tariff increase. In all cases, tariff pass-through into the import price is higher relative to the baseline case. The effect of TPU is clear and present when a tariff is imposed on imported inputs as well. However, the size of the increase in tariff pass-through that results from an increase in TPU is smaller, since the rate of tariff pass-through when there is no uncertainty is quite high to

\footnote{See Handley et al. (2020).}
begin with. Immediately after the tariff increase, tariff pass-through into the import price is 90.4% when $\gamma = 0$, and when TPU is present this rate increases to 91.7% and 93.8% (for $\gamma = 0.1$ and $\gamma = 0.5$, respectively). After one year, tariff pass-through is 83.8% when $\gamma = 0$, 84.5% when $\gamma = 0.1$, and 88.4% when $\gamma = 0.5$. Panel (b) shows that exchange rate pass-through is unaffected by changes in TPU, and remains around 39% after one year in all cases.

To understand why an increase in TPU has a smaller effect on tariff pass-through in this case, we have to take into account how TPU affects Home producers’ prices when there is a tariff on imported inputs. Tariff pass-through into Home producers’ prices decreases with TPU due to the same mechanism described earlier. Home producers are more hesitant to adjust the price when TPU is present because price adjustment is costly. When they do reset, they take future profits into account, and the probability that the tariff will go back to its low level and their marginal cost will decrease. As a result, tariff pass-through into the Home producers’ prices decreases from 30.6% when $\gamma = 0$ to 21.1% when $\gamma = 0.5$. Therefore, with a tariff on imported inputs the pressure on Foreign exporters’ to decrease the border price is greater when TPU is present. This counteracting force is not enough, however, to offset the other channels in which TPU pushes exporters to curb their border price decrease. The overall result is that tariff pass-through increases with TPU.
6 Policy implications

In the last part of the paper, I conduct a simple exercise to gauge the effect of TPU on deadweight loss created by a tariff increase. In the canonical framework for analyzing the effects of tariffs on welfare in a large economy, when a country is large enough to affect the world price then the foreign exporters should bear some of the tariff incidence due to a terms of trade effect. A deadweight loss is still created by the imposition of the tariff in this framework. I use this partial equilibrium framework to illustrate the effect of a tariff increase accompanied by an increase in TPU on the size of the deadweight loss. It should be stressed that this is not a welfare analysis (which requires a general equilibrium framework), but rather an illustration of the effect that TPU could have on deadweight loss.

Consider the basic aggregate demand and supply for Foreign imports in the Home country. Figure 14 presents such a market, with the aggregate quantity of Foreign imports on the horizontal axis, and the sectoral aggregate price index on the vertical axis. $D$ is the demand curve for Home importers of the Foreign good, and $S^*$ is the aggregate supply curve of Foreign exporters.\footnote{For the following analysis of the deadweight loss, it is not crucial if the supply curve is more elastic or upward sloping.} An increase of the tariff by $\tau$ decreases the quantity of imports from

\[ Q_1^M (1 + \tau) \]
Table 3: Deadweight loss, tariff revenue, and tariff incidence in units of consumption of the Home country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>γ = 0</th>
<th>γ = 0.1</th>
<th>γ = 0.5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deadweight loss</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>4.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government revenue</td>
<td>24.73</td>
<td>24.39</td>
<td>23.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tariff incidence - importers</td>
<td>14.50</td>
<td>16.64</td>
<td>18.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tariff incidence - exporters</td>
<td>10.23</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Measures of deadweight loss, government revenue, and tariff incidence from an increase of 10% in tariff on imported varieties in the simulated model under three level of TPU from 1,000 simulated economies. The sectoral import price index and the aggregate quantities after the tariff increase are calculated one year after the shock, relative to the last period before the shock. See the text for further details.

$Q^M_0$ to $Q^M_1$, raises the import price from $P^M_0$ to $P^M_1 (1 + \tau)$, and decreases the border price from $P^M_0$ to $P^M_1$. As a result, the Home government raises revenue equal to the area $A + D$, and a deadweight loss equal to the area $B + C$ is created. If a terms of trade effect occurs, the area $D$ represents the tariff incidence borne by exporters and transferred to the Home government.

I follow Amiti et al. (2019) in using this basic framework to sketch the effect of TPU on the deadweight loss created by the tariff. While this is a “back of the envelope” exercise, Amiti et al. (2019) show that their empirical estimates of the deadweight loss using this framework are quite close to the welfare loss estimates derived in Fajgelbaum et al. (2020) using a general equilibrium structural model. In the simulated data, I calculate the quantities associated with $Q^M_0$ and $Q^M_1$, and the sectoral border price index associated with $P^M_0$ and $P^M_1$. Table 3 presents the value of the deadweight loss, total government revenue, and importer and exporter tariff incidence associated with a tariff increase from 0% to 10%, in three different levels of TPU: $\gamma \in \{0, 0.1, 0.5\}$. The values are given in units of consumption in the Home country. An increase in TPU from $\gamma = 0$ to $\gamma = 0.5$ increases the deadweight lost approximately by 51%, while the government revenue remains unchanged. The increase in TPU shifts much more of the tariff incidence to the Home importers than to the Foreign exporters. While the model presented in this paper is not equipped for deep welfare analysis, these preliminary results point towards a potentially important welfare effect of TPU. A tariff increase that is perceived to be a permanent policy change could be associated with a smaller deadweight loss than a similar tariff increase that is perceived to be transitory. This result is in line with previous findings about the adverse welfare consequences policy uncertainty. It is possible that optimal trade policy should take uncertainty into account and consider a

50I take period “1” to be one year after the tariff increase, and period “0” to be the last period before the tariff increase. Thus, in period “1” almost all of the price adjustment to the tariff has already occurred.
form of trade policy forward guidance.

7 Conclusion

In this paper, I incorporate tariffs and trade policy uncertainty (TPU) into a workhorse model of exporting to the U.S. with price rigidities and variable markups. Variable markups are an important channel for explaining low and incomplete exchange rate pass-through into U.S. import prices. At the same time, variable markups also lead to incomplete pass-through of a one-time permanent tariff change into tariff-inclusive import prices. This model prediction contrasts estimates of a complete tariff pass-through into U.S. tariff-inclusive import price during the 2018-2019 U.S.-China trade war. Quantitatively, I show that TPU increases tariff pass-through into import prices significantly from 59% to 81%, without affecting exchange rate pass-through which remains below 40%. High TPU can explain up to half of the gap between the observe tariff pass-through rate during the trade war and the prediction of the standard model without TPU. Additionally, TPU increases tariff deadweight loss and the tariff incidence on U.S. importers from a tariff increase over one year.

The effect of TPU on exporters’ border price setting decision occurs via two channels. On the extensive margin of price adjustment, an increase in TPU makes border price adjustment less likely (“wait-and-see” effect), which increases tariff pass-through into tariff-inclusive import prices immediately after a tariff increase. On the intensive margin, when the exporter chooses to adjust the border price in response to a tariff hike, TPU decreases the size of the border price reduction, due to a precautionary markup motive. The intensive margin effect leads to higher tariff pass-through into the import price even in the medium-run, once the border price is reset.

The effect of TPU on exporters’ price setting decisions in the short- and medium-run is an important area for future research, as the experience of the U.S.-China 2018-2019 trade war has demonstrated. This paper gives rise to several testable hypotheses. Testing these hypotheses empirically is an important next step. Furthermore, understanding the effect of TPU on import prices is not only crucial for the design of trade policy and the assessment of its welfare effects, but it could also be informative for monetary policy makers. TPU in this model appears to increase price rigidity, and affect import prices even in the medium-run. Therefore, TPU could potentially enhance and affect monetary non-neutralities, in addition to its effect on import price inflation.
References


Appendix

A Model Solution and Computational Details

The model has no analytical solution, therefore I use numerical methods. For a given sectoral price level, the firm’s value functions and policy functions can be found via a standard method of value function iteration. However, the sectoral price level is endogenous and affected by the price setting decision of each firm, which is determined by both an idiosyncratic stochastic process and by aggregate stochastic processes. To find the firm’s forecasting rules for the sectoral price level, I use the method introduced by Krusell and Smith (1998).

The firm’s problem is solving the following system of Bellman equations:

\[
V(S_t, s) = \max \{ V^A(P_{\omega,t}; S_t, s) - \kappa, V^N(S_t, s) \}
\]

\[
V^N(S_t, s) = \Pi_t (P_{\omega,t-1}; S_t, s) + \beta \mathbb{E} [ V(S_{t+1}, s) | S_t ]
\]

\[
V^A(P_{\omega,t}; S_t, s) = \max_{P_{\omega,t}} \{ \Pi_t (P_{\omega,t}; S_t, s) + \beta \mathbb{E} [ V(S_{t+1}, s) | S_t ] \}
\]

where \( S_t = (P_{\omega,t-1}, a_{\omega,t}, P_t, e_t, \tau_t) \) is a vector of state variables and \( s = (\sigma, \varepsilon, \phi^*, \kappa, \beta, \gamma) \) is a vector of parameters.

I use grid search and iteration methods to solve the value function, where the grid size is \( N_{\omega} \times N_P \times N_a \times N_e \times N_\tau \). For the firm’s price, I set the grid points to be no more than 0.005 log points apart (this implies that \( N_{\omega} = 187 \)), and for the sectoral price level I set the grid points to be no more than 0.002 log points apart (which implies \( N_P = 51 \)). The boundaries are set based on the static analytical solution for the optimal border price with maximum values of the shocks. I discretize the idiosyncratic productivity process \( a_{\omega} \) using the Tauchen method with \( N_a = 11 \) grid points. For the exchange rate process \( e \), since the dollar exchange rate follows a highly volatile and persistent process close to a random walk, I discretize the process by letting the exchange rate jump one standard deviation up or down with probability 0.5 every period (a month), in a band of \( \pm 7\sigma_e \), as detailed in Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010). The tariff process \( \tau \) and its transition matrix \( \Lambda \) are constructed as detailed in the main text.

The value function iteration algorithm is as follows:

1. Find static profits for all points on grid of price, state variables, given parameters:

\[
\Pi_t^{(\bar{i})} = \Pi \left( P_{\omega,t}^{(\bar{i}),\omega}, a_{\omega,t}^{(i_\omega)}, P_t^{(i_P)}, e_t^{(i_e)}, \tau_t^{(i_\tau)}; s \right)
\]
2. This is the initial guess for $V^N$:

$$V_t^{N(0)} = \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \Pi_t$$

3. Find maximum static discounted profits and the optimal price:

$$\hat{P}_{\omega}^{(i_{P\omega})} \left( a_{\omega,t}^{(i_{a})}, P_t^{(i_{P})}, e_t^{(i_{e})}, \tau_t^{(i_{\tau})}; s \right) = \arg \max_{i_{P\omega}} \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \Pi \left( P_{\omega,t}^{(i_{P\omega})}, a_{\omega,t}^{(i_{a})}, P_t^{(i_{P})}, e_t^{(i_{e})}, \tau_t^{(i_{\tau})}; s \right)$$

and use this optimal flexible price to compute the value with adjustment, $V^A$:

$$V_t^{A(0)} = \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \Pi \left( \hat{P}_{\omega,t} \right)$$

4. Initial guess for $V$: $V_t^{(0)} = \max \left\{ V_t^{A(0)} - \kappa, V_t^{N(0)} \right\}$.

5. While $\sup \| V^{(n)} (S_t, s) - V^{(n-1)} (S_t, s) \| > \epsilon$

   (a) Update expected value function, using given forecasting rule $P_{t+1} = f (P_t, e_t, \tau_t; s)$:

   $$E \left[ V_t^{(n)} (S_t, s) | S_{t-1} \right] = \sum_{i_P,i_{a},i_{e},i_{\tau}} \pi_a \left( i_{a} | j_{a} \right) \pi_e \left( i_{e} | j_{e} \right) \pi_{\tau} \left( i_{\tau} | j_{\tau} \right) V_t^{(n-1)} \left( f (P_{t+1}, e_{t+1}, \tau_{t+1}; s), S_t, s \right)$$

   (b) This gives the optimal value without adjustment:

   $$V_t^{N(n)} (S_t, s) = \Pi_t \left( \hat{P}_{\omega,t-1} \right) + \beta E \left[ V_t^{(n)} (S_{t+1}, s) | S_t \right]$$

   (c) Find optimal reset price:

   $$\overline{P}_{\omega,t}^{(n)} = \arg \max_{P_{\omega,t}} \left\{ \Pi_t (P_{\omega,t}; S_t, s) + \beta E \left[ V_t^{(n)} (S_{t+1}, s) | S_t \right] \right\}$$

   which gives the maximum value with adjustment:

   $$V_t^{A(n)} \left( \overline{P}_{\omega,t}^{(n)}; S_t, s \right) = \Pi_t \left( \overline{P}_{\omega,t}^{(n)}; S_t, s \right) + \beta E \left[ V_t^{(n)} (S_{t+1}, s) | S_t \right]$$

   (d) Find optimal price updating indicator:

   $$\mathbb{I}^{(n)} (S_t, s) = 1 \left\{ V_t^{A(n)} \left( \overline{P}_{\omega,t}^{(n)}; S_t, s \right) - \kappa > V_t^{N(n)} (S_t, s) \right\}$$
(e) Find policy function:

\[ P_{\omega,t}^{(n)} = \Pi^{(n)}(S_t,s)\overline{P}_{\omega,t}^{(n)} + (1 - \Pi^{(n)}(S_t,s))\dot{P}_{\omega,t-1} \]

This constitutes the first step of the model solution. Once policy functions are obtained, I use them to execute the Krusell and Smith (1998) method to find the forecasting rule \( f(P_t, e_t, \tau_t; s) \). Following the literature, I use a linear forecasting rule. I verify that adding higher order terms and lags does not add any meaningful explanatory power, which is evident in the linear regression’s \( R^2 = 0.999 \). The algorithm to find the forecasting rule is as follows:

1. Start with a guess for the forecasting rules \( \delta^{(0;s)} = \left(\delta_0^{(0;s)}, \delta_1^{(0;s)}, \delta_2^{(0;s)}, \delta_3^{(0;s)}\right) \) used by firms:

\[
\mathbb{E}_{t-1} \ln P_t = \delta_0^{(0;s)} + \delta_1^{(0;s)} \ln P_{t-1} + \delta_2^{(0;s)} e_{t-1} + \delta_3^{(0;s)} \tau_{t-1} + \epsilon_{t-1} \quad (A.1)
\]

Thus, we have \( N_\gamma \) forecasting rules for each possible state of current uncertainty level, because this level affects the formation of the aggregate price level. This follows Bloom et al. (2018) in their solution method.

2. Given \( \delta^{(0;s)} \), find value and policy functions as detailed above.

3. Use value function and policy function to simulate \( B \) panels of \( N \) firms over \( T \) periods.

4. For each \( i_B = 1 \ldots B \) estimate (A.1). Find the median estimators and update: \( \tilde{\delta}^{(n;s)} = \left(\tilde{\delta}_0^{(n;s)}, \tilde{\delta}_1^{(n;s)}, \tilde{\delta}_2^{(n;s)}, \tilde{\delta}_3^{(n;s)}\right) \).

5. Calculate a measure of convergence \( \Delta \) (I use \( \chi \)-statistic). If \( \Delta < \epsilon \), stop. Otherwise, use \( \tilde{\delta}^{(n;s)} \) and repeat steps 2-5.

6. Once converged, use the new forecasting rule \( \delta^{(\infty;s)} \) to find value and policy functions.

To compute impulse response function while taking non-linearities into account, I use the following standard algorithm.\(^{51}\) Let \( \omega = 1, \ldots, \Omega \) denote heterogenous firms in an economy, let \( n = 1, \ldots, N \) denote an economy, and let \( t = 1, \ldots, T \) denote a period in an economy. For each economy \( n \), I simulate a panel of \( \Omega \) idiosyncratic productivity shocks \( \{a_{\omega,t}\} \), an aggregate real exchange rate process \( \mathcal{E}_t \), for \( T \) periods. For each economy \( n \), the tariff rate is \( \tau_t = \tau^L \) and there is no TPU, \( \gamma = 0 \), for \( t < \bar{t} \). Then, consider two cases. First, there is no tariff and TPU shock at period \( \bar{t} \), so the economy continues with \( \tau_t = \tau^L \) and \( \gamma = 0 \) for \( t \geq \bar{t} \). Denote this first case by \( \tau^0 \). Second, there is a tariff increase and also TPU increase

\(^{51}\)This procedure is widely used in model with uncertainty shocks, see Gilchrist et al. (2014) and Bloom et al. (2018).
at period \( t \) so that \( \tau_t = \tau^H \) and \( \gamma \geq 0 \). Denote this second case by \( \tau_t^1 \). The rest of the shocks (\( a_{\omega,t}, E_t \)) are identical in both cases.

The impulse response of variable \( Z_t \) (import price, quantity, etc.) for a tariff increase together with a TPU increase over horizon \( L \) is denoted \( \hat{z}_t \). It is computed by aggregating the log of \( Z_t \) over all relevant firms (exporters, domestic producers, all firms) and averaging over simulations for \( \tau_t^1 \) and comparing this log variable to the one with \( \tau_t^0 \). Formally,

\[
\hat{z}_t = \frac{\sum_{n=1}^{N} \sum_{\omega=1}^{\Omega} \log Z_l(\tau_t^1)}{\sum_{n=1}^{N} \sum_{\omega=1}^{\Omega} \log Z_l(\tau_t^0)}; \text{ for } l = \bar{t}, \ldots, t + L
\]

(A.2)

I use \( \Omega = 1,440, M = 1,000, T = 240, \) and \( L = 24, \) with \( \bar{t} = 145 \).

### B A Static Model of Price Setting Under TPU: Precautionary Markups

In this appendix, I present a simple static model of a competitive monopolist exporter constrained to set its border price before observing the realization of shocks. The model illustrates the effect of tariff uncertainty on a preset (completely sticky) price. This exercise build on Kimball (1989), who showed that when a monopolist must set the price in advance, an increase in demand uncertainty could lead to precautionary markup and a higher price if the marginal profit is convex in the demand shifter.\(^{52}\)

Convex marginal profit means that the price-setting firm faces the following problem. The price is set today, but the realization of demand next period is unknown. On the one hand, if the price is set too low today, next period the firm must supply more units of its product at a “too low” price, which is not optimal. On the other hand, if the price is set “too high”, demand next period would be sub-optimally low. The convexity means that the high price, which compensates for the low demand, leads to smaller losses than the low price, which leads to undesirably high production. This tradeoff arises from price complementarities induced by the demand structure, so that the optimal price is not just a constant markup above marginal cost but also depends on the price of competitors. I show that pricing complementarities and variable markups are necessary for the effect described above, which does not arise in the case of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) demand.\(^{52}\)

\(^{52}\)A similar argument has been made by Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015), Oh (2020), and Born and Pfeifer (2021) about various sources of uncertainty in a general equilibrium framework.
Simple stylized model of exporting  Consider a Foreign exporter producing a differentiated variety which it sells in the Home country. The exporter takes all aggregate variables as given, and must set its relative border price, $P$, in advance and exclusive of tariff. All prices are denoted in the Home country’s unit of account.

Demand $Q$ for the firm’s variety is given by

$$ Q = \psi (\tau P) $$

where the demand function $\psi (\cdot)$ is continuously differentiable, $\psi' (\cdot) < 0$, $\psi (1) = 1$, and $\tau$ is gross ad-valorem tariff which is drawn from some probability distribution with mean $\overline{\tau}$ and variance $\sigma^2$.

The firm produces using a constant returns to scale technology. Its marginal cost, $\mathcal{MC}$, is constant in quantity. Assume for simplicity that $\mathcal{MC} = \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}$, where $\sigma > 1$ is a constant.

The firm’s static profit is then

$$ \Pi (P, \tau) = (P - \mathcal{MC}) \psi (\tau P) \quad (B.2) $$

The firm’s optimal preset border price solves the problem $\overline{P} = \arg \max_P \mathbb{E} \Pi (P, \tau)$, where the expectation is over the probability distribution of $\tau$. Expected marginal profit is given by

$$ \mathbb{E} \Pi_P (P, \tau) = \mathbb{E} \left\{ \frac{\psi (\tau P)}{P} [((1 - \sigma (\tau P)) P + \sigma (\tau P) \mathcal{MC}] \right\} \quad (B.3) $$

where $\sigma (\tau P) \equiv -\frac{\partial \log \psi (\tau P)}{\partial \log (\tau P)}$ is the price elasticity of demand. $\overline{P}$ satisfies the first order condition $\mathbb{E} \Pi_P (\overline{P}, \tau) = 0$.

Marginal profit $\Pi_P$ is strictly convex in the tariff if its second derivative w.r.t. $\tau$ is positive, $\Pi_{P\tau} > 0$. If $\Pi_P$ is strictly convex, then from Jensen’s inequality it follows that $\mathbb{E} \Pi_P (\tau P) > \Pi_P (\mathbb{E} \tau P)$. This leads to precautionary markup when facing a mean-preserving spread around $\mathbb{E} \tau$, and a higher preset border price. Whether $\Pi_P$ is convex depends on the structure of demand and how it reacts to a change in the tariff.

To illustrate how uncertainty about $\tau$ affects the optimal preset price, I consider two cases: constant elasticity of substitution (CES, Dixit-Stiglitz) demand, and a general homothetic Kimball demand.

---

53 The following setup is based on a standard market structure in international trade (e.g., Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010)).
CES  The CES demand function is given by $Q = P^{-\sigma}, \sigma > 1$. In this case $\sigma (\tau P) = \sigma, \forall \tau, P$. It is clear that $P$ is independent of the expected value of $\tau$, and

$$P^C_{E} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}MC = 1$$  \hspace{1cm} (B.4)

where the markup is constant and unaffected by the realization or the distribution of the tariff. The marginal profit is unaffected by $\tau$, and $\Pi_{P\tau} = 0$. A mean-preserving spread around $\tau$ would not affect $P^C_{E}$.

Kimball demand  Next, consider the demand function that arises from Kimball (1995) homothetic general aggregator. Under this specification, $\sigma (\tau P)$ varies with both the tariff and the price, so a mean-preserving spread around $\tau$ affects the optimal preset border price:

$$\mathbb{E} \left\{ \frac{\psi (\tau P^K_{IM})}{P^K_{IM}} \left[ \left( 1 - \sigma (\tau P^K_{IM}) \right) P^K_{IM} + \sigma (\tau P^K_{IM}) MC \right] \right\} = 0$$  \hspace{1cm} (B.5)

Since $\tau$ affects the relative border price that the consumer pays for the firm’s variety, a mean-preserving spread would affect the optimal markup that the firm sets in advance. Generally, it is not guaranteed that $\Pi_P$ with this demand structure is convex. 54 I use a numerical illustration of the effect of convex profit for simplicity. As will be clear throughout this paper, convexity of marginal profit in the tariff is the case with plausible parameterization of the Kimball aggregator.

Preset price and uncertainty  I use the Klenow and Willis (2016) functional form for the Kimball aggregator, $\psi (\tau P) = \left[ 1 - \varepsilon \log (\tau P) \right]^{\sigma/\varepsilon}$. I set $\sigma = 5$ and $\varepsilon = 4$ so that the level of markup elasticity with $\tau = 1$ is unity. These parameter values are used as the baseline parameterization of the dynamic model. Figure 15 illustrates the effect of an increasing mean-preserving spread in tariff on the optimal preset price. The figure depicts three levels of expected profit, $\mathbb{E} \Pi$, with $\tau = 1.1$. The first case is that of $\tau = 1.1$ with certainty. The two other cases are mean-preserving spreads around this expected value of tariff, with $\tau = 1$ with probability $\gamma$, and $\tau^H$ with probability $1 - \gamma$. I set $\gamma$ and $\tau^H$ to maintain $\mathbb{E} \tau = 1.1$. Panel (a) illustrates that the increase in uncertainty does not affect the optimal preset border price with CES demand. Panel (b) illustrates that the preset border price increases with the level of uncertainty, as would be expected since the marginal profit is convex.

54 The Kimball aggregator function $\Upsilon (\cdot)$ is defined as strictly increasing and strictly concave, $\Upsilon' (\cdot) > 0, \Upsilon'' (\cdot) < 0$. The demand function is defined as $\psi (\cdot) \equiv \Upsilon^{\tau - 1} (\cdot)$. Without a further assumption about the sign of the third derivative of the aggregator, $\Upsilon''' (\cdot)$, it is not guaranteed that the demand function will be
Figure 15: Stylized example of price setting with tariff mean preserving spreads

(a) CES

(b) Kimball

Note: Expected profits of the firm with CES (panel (a)) and Kimball (panel (b)) demand, as a function of the firm’s relative price. In all cases, the expected tariff level is $\mathbb{E}\tau = 1.1$ and $\mathbb{E}\delta = 0$. Each line represents expected profits with different level of mean-preserving spread of $\tau$: $\gamma \times 1 + (1 - \gamma) \times \tau^H$, where $\gamma$ and $\tau^H$ are chosen to keep $\mathbb{E}\tau = 1.1$. The Klenow and Willis (2016) functional form of the Kimball aggregator is used, $\psi(\tau P) = \left[1 - \varepsilon \log(\tau P)\right]^{\sigma/\varepsilon}$, with $\sigma = 5$ and $\varepsilon = 4$. In the CES case, $\varepsilon = 0$. The dashed black lines indicate the optimal preset price for each expected profit function.

Figure 16: Marginal profit for different levels of gross tariff $\tau$, with $P = 1$ and $\delta = 0$

Note: Marginal period profit of the firm with CES and Kimball demand, as a function of gross tariff $\tau$, holding $P = 1$ and $\delta = 0$. The Klenow and Willis (2016) functional form of the Kimball aggregator is used, $\psi(\tau P) = \left[1 - \varepsilon \log(\tau P)\right]^{\sigma/\varepsilon}$, with $\sigma = 5$ and $\varepsilon = 4$. In the CES case, $\varepsilon = 0$. The dashed black lines indicate a mean preserving spread of $\tau$ with $\mathbb{E}\tau = 0.5 \times 1 + 0.5 \times 1.2 = 1.1$. 
Figure 17: Optimal preset border price and realized tariff pass-through into import price, different levels of uncertainty $\gamma$, and $\tau^H$ with $E\tau = 1$

(a) Optimal preset border price, $P$

(b) Realized tariff pass-through into import price with $\tau^H$

Note: Panel (a) presented the optimal preset border price of the firm with CES and Kimball demand, as a function of gross tariff uncertainty $\gamma$, holding $E\tau = 1$. The parameter $\gamma$ represents an increasing mean preserving spread, $E\tau = \gamma \times 1 + (1 - \gamma) \tau^H$, where $\tau^H$ is chosen to keep $E\tau = 1.1$. Panel (b) presents the realized tariff pass-through into the tariff-inclusive import price when $\tau^H$ is realized, $\Delta \log (\tau P) / \Delta \log \tau$. The Klenow and Willis (2016) functional form of the Kimball aggregator is used, $\psi(\tau P) = [1 - \varepsilon \log (\tau P)]^{\sigma / \varepsilon}$, with $\sigma = 5$ and $\varepsilon = 4$. In the CES case, $\varepsilon = 0$.

Figure 16 presents the period marginal profit of the firm, $\Pi_P$, for different levels of $\tau$, holding the border price constant at $P = 1$ and the cost shock at $\delta = 0$. The marginal profit with CES demand is flat at 0, and thus there is no effect of uncertainty in $\tau$ on the optimal preset border price. However, with Kimball demand the marginal profit is convex, and therefore the optimal preset border price with a mean-preserving spread of $\tau$ would be higher. This represents a precautionary markup motive for the firm that stems entirely from uncertainty, as the expected value of $\tau$ remains the same.

Finally, Figure 17(a) presents the optimal preset border price of the firm as a function of the mean-preserving spread $\gamma$ around $E\tau = 1.1$. With CES demand, the preset border price is stable at $P^{CES} = 1$. With Kimball demand, if $\gamma = 0$ then $\tau = 1.1$ with certainty. In this case, the firm sets the border price at its lowest level, accommodating the reduction in demand caused by the tariff. As $\gamma$ increases, there is an increasing probability that the realization of the gross tariff would be 1, and a decreasing probability that the realization would be $\tau^H > E\tau$. As can be seen clearly, the firm’s optimal preset border price increases with $\gamma$ as the probability of low tariff increases.

Figure 17(b) presents the implication of this mean-preserving spread for tariff pass-convex or concave. This is a desirable feature of most functional specifications of the Kimball aggregator.
through into the tariff-inclusive import price, $\tau P$. Tariff pass-through is constructed from the following exercise. Initially, there is no tariff, $\tau = 1$, and the optimal border price is $P_0 = 1$. Then, the firm learns that a tariff might be imposed. It has to choose a preset border price, $\bar{P}$. After the tariff $\tau$ is realized (0 or $\tau^H$), the tariff pass-through rate into the tariff-inclusive import price is

$$\frac{\Delta \log \tau P}{\Delta \log \tau} = \frac{\log \tau + \log \bar{P} - \log P_0}{\log \tau} = 1 + \frac{\log \bar{P}}{\log \tau}$$

Figure 17(b) depicts this tariff pass-through rate into the import price when $\tau^H$ is realized. Tariff pass-through into the import price increases with $\gamma$, as the preset border price increases with $\gamma$.

This simple structure captures the mechanism that leads to precautionary markup when there is uncertainty about tariffs. The basic idea presented here drives the intensive margin effect of TPU on border price resetting in the dynamic model.