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Organizational Repertoires and Institutional Change: Women’s Groups and the Transformation of U.S. Politics, 1890–1920

Elisabeth S. Clemens

University of Arizona

Although social movements are often presumed to cause change, the dominant theoretical accounts lead to the opposite conclusion. To explain how challenging movements do produce institutional change, this article introduces the concept of organizational repertoires. Groups marginalized by existing political institutions have an incentive to develop alternative models of organization. These alternative models, in turn, are more likely to be adopted by other political actors to the extent that they embody familiar, but previously nonpolitical, forms of organization. This argument is illustrated with an analysis of political innovation by women’s groups in the United States at the turn of the century.

Although we commonly think of social movements as agents of change, the dominant accounts of the relation of movements to politics lead to the opposite conclusion. While movements are often credited with limited substantive achievements—the passage of legislation or the defeat of a particular politician—at an organizational level we have come to expect co-optation, conservative goal transformation, and the “iron law of oligarchy,” all operating to minimize differences between a challenging social movement and existing political institutions (Jenkins 1977; Michels [1911] 1962). Even in the case of social revolution, as Tocqueville ([1856]

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1955) argued, insurgent movements may only intensify already emergent patterns of state authority. In each of these contests between established political institutions and oppositional social movements, the existing institutions endure even if the substance of policy is altered. But analytically, we are left with the question of how political institutions change. What accounts for transformations in the basic models or conventions that inform political organization and action?

Such a broad question is most easily approached in a specific context. In the decades immediately before and after the turn of the century, the institutions of American politics underwent “one of the more significant governmental transformations in American history—the emergence of meaningful regulatory and administrative policies” along with “a series of lasting changes in the nature and structure of political participation; party voting declined and interest-group politics became more important” (McCormick 1986, p. 83). These changes in the basic models of political participation came in the wake of efforts by agrarian groups and organized labor to secure greater leverage in a polity where the formal equality of white male citizens seemed increasingly irrelevant. At the same time, women mobilized to secure the vote for the one half of the adult population that was formally disenfranchised. But the connections between changing political institutions and the wave of popular political mobilization remain unclear.

In the scholarly division of labor, these two problems have been addressed by separate literatures: the study of social movements and the history of party systems or electoral regimes. Of late, however, women’s historians have questioned this partitioning of inquiry, arguing that as more “is learned of the magnitude and centrality of women’s contributions in these years, the more likely it seems that understanding them will provide a basis for the comprehensive analysis of progressivism that has eluded historians until now” (DuBois 1991, pp. 162–63). In order to arrive at such an analysis, however, two theoretical assumptions that have led us to discount social movements as sources of change must be reconsidered.

First, some movement organizations may be comparatively immune to pressures to adapt to the existing institutional environment. To establish this possibility, I will identify the logics of political incorporation implicit in the classic models of political sociology—specifically those of Robert Michels and Max Weber—and then apply them to a set of social movement groups known collectively as the “woman movement” of the late

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2 Southern blacks were the great exception to this expansion of the polity as poll taxes and restricted registration were successfully used to remove African-American males from the electoral rolls (McAdam 1986, pp. 68–69).
Women's Groups

19th and early 20th centuries in the United States. This movement was rooted in the antebellum proliferation of female benevolent societies and abolitionist activities. When the Civil War amendments failed to provide for their enfranchisement, women gradually regrouped around the causes of temperance and woman suffrage, while constructing an impressive network of nationwide, federated women's organizations (Scott 1991). By the 1880s, women's organizations and causes were established along-side, but largely apart from, the nation's formal political institutions. The next decades saw increasing political mobilization of women as well as a series of legislative gains that compared favorably not only with the successes of women in other nations but also with the victories of labor and agrarian insurgents in the United States (Clemens 1990a; Skocpol and Ritter 1991). The ability of women's groups to enter the political arena without being fully co-opted suggests that processes of conservative organizational transformation are conditioned by both the social identity of those organized and the character of existing political institutions.

Second, at least some of the interactions between social movements and existing political institutions must be capable of producing changes in those conventions that inform political action and organization. After presenting an alternative model of the interaction of movements and institutions, I will argue that the organizational dynamics of the American woman movement help to explain one of the most important institutional changes in U.S. political history: the shift from the 19th-century "state of courts and parties" to a political regime grounded in legislative activity and interest-group bargaining (Skowronek 1982; McCormick 1986). While internal struggles and electoral tactics were central forces in the decline of the parties and the preeminent position of electoral politics (McGerr 1986; Shefter 1983), voluntary associations played a key role in elaborating a new style of politics focused on specific issues, interests, and legislative responses. A rapidly growing literature now documents the widespread involvement of women's groups in a political project that moved from the "municipal housekeeping" of the 1890s to the development of formidable state and national lobbies during the 1910s and the 1920s. While rarely producing a pure expression of womanhood, these efforts did span lines of race, ethnicity, class, and region (Baker 1991; Frankel and Dye 1991; Muncy 1991; Scott 1991). Women's groups were not alone in this organizational innovation, but because of their marginal position with respect to electoral politics, their efforts to create an institutional alternative are particularly clear.

The central point, then, is to replace the focus on bureaucratization that characterizes work in the Michels-Weber tradition with a recognition that the social world offers multiple models of organization as well as conventions concerning who may use what models for what purposes.
Models of organization comprise both templates for arranging relationships within an organization and sets of scripts for action culturally associated with that type of organization. Thus, models may be thought of as being intermediate to abstract dimensions of organizational form (e.g., degree of hierarchy) and to examples of specific organizations. Models can refer to "organizations of that type" or to "organizations that do that type of thing." Mention of either an attribute or an action may invoke a shared model or form of organizing.

Women's groups, along with others, were politically successful insofar as they adapted existing nonpolitical models of organization for political purposes. Rather than adopting a single bureaucratic form, these groups made use of multiple models of organization—unions, clubs, parliaments, and corporations—each of which articulated in different ways with existing political institutions. This finding requires that the scope of the standard Michels-Weber account of social movement development be delimited by a more elaborated analysis of social organization. Drawing on current debates in organization theory, I will argue that our understanding of the relation of social movements to political change has been handicapped by the twin assumptions that the choice of organizational form is governed primarily by considerations of efficacy and that classic bureaucratic hierarchies are the most effective form for achieving political goals. The choice of organizational models may also be governed by "logics of appropriateness" (March and Olsen 1989, pp. 23–24) or institutional norms (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and, given variations in environment, composition, and organizational goals, bureaucratic forms may well prove less effective than network arrangements, solidary groups, or other conceivable alternatives (Powell 1990). Finally, when deployed in novel ways by unfamiliar groups, even the most familiar organizational models can have unsettling consequences for political institutions.

The set of organizational models that are culturally or experientially available may be thought of as an "organizational repertoire." This concept integrates the theoretical vocabulary of organization theorists sensitive to diversity of form with the cognitive or cultural framework of

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3 For the sake of terminological clarity, I have used "organizational model" to refer to the cognitive or "blueprint" definition of "organizational form." But whereas Hannan and Freeman (1986, p. 56) have argued against this approach on the grounds "that blueprints for organizations are not observable," during periods of organizational change debates over the choice of appropriate models do provide evidence of the basic templates that constitute a group's repertoire of organization. Institutional change reflects the interplay of organizational diversity at the cognitive and material levels: "When efforts to implement novel forms succeed, they can result in a blurring of the boundaries among a set of forms or in the rise of a distinctly different form" (Hannan and Freeman 1986, p. 63).
"repertoires of collective action" put forward by social movement scholars attuned to historical variation (Tilly 1978, 1986). As in social constructionist accounts, institutionalization, and by extension institutional change, is understood as the product of habitualization, the self-reproduction (or failure thereof) of a particular social pattern (Jepperson 1991). But rather than focusing on a "shared history" of interaction as the primary source of reciprocal typifications (Berger and Luckmann 1966, pp. 53–67), this analysis argues that consensus may also result as actors make use of a common, culturally available (rather than situationally constituted) repertoire of alternative models for interpreting a situation or acting in it. By deploying multiple organizational models in diverse institutional fields, social movements can be a source of institutional change even if they themselves undergo transformations of a more or less conservative nature.

In developing a model of institutional change, this argument draws on contemporary organization theory while requiring a shift in focus away from the centers of institutionalized organizational fields and toward their peripheries. Rather than attributing the disruption of organizational fields to various exogenous shocks, this account suggests that strategic political action as well as the search for collective identities produces migrations of organizational models and, potentially, the disruption of organized fields of action. The institutions of modern society are understood to be "potentially contradictory and hence make multiple logics available to individuals and organizations" (Friedland and Alford 1991, p. 232). These movements of organizational models are patterned in at least two ways: by the distribution of multiple memberships in organizational fields—the Simmelian web of group affiliations—and by the cultural logics informing the deployment of organizational repertoires. In developing a theory of organizational choice, James March pointed to the role of imitation as a component of "sensible foolishness," arguing that "in order for imitation to be normatively attractive we need a better theory of who should be imitated" (1979, pp. 75–76). Earlier generations of political actors found just such a theory embedded in their repertoires of organization, the cultural understandings linking organizational models to actors and purposes.

THE WOMAN MOVEMENT: SCOPE AND SOURCES

The potential of social movements or voluntary associations to transform institutional politics is evident in a striking—although, until recently, underappreciated—case of political organization by a comparatively disadvantaged group. The American "woman movement" of the late 19th and early 20th centuries drew together women who were relatively privi-
leged in terms of economic standing and education (Blair 1980; Sklar 1985), yet suffered from formal and informal exclusionary practices that limited their ability to cultivate political skills or to exercise those skills if they were somehow acquired. Notwithstanding their formal disenfranchisement in much of the nation (the Nineteenth Amendment was not ratified until 1920), middle-class and upper-middle-class women constructed an impressive array of voluntary associations that were a significant force in the public life of the nation. Eighteen years after its founding in 1874, the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) numbered 150,000 members (Bordin 1981, pp. 3–4) and exerted influence on legislation ranging from temperance to woman suffrage. The General Federation of Women’s Clubs (GFWC) was founded in 1890 and had perhaps 500,000 members by 1905 and over 1 million by the end of the decade. In addition to these groups, associated charities, civic clubs, auxiliaries to fraternal orders, and suffrage associations filled out a dense network of women’s organizations. As a key element of the era’s social reform constituency, these groups contributed to the founding of America’s distinctively “maternalist” welfare state, a policy regime emphasizing programs such as mothers’ pensions rather than unemployment and old age insurance (Gordon 1990; Skocpol 1992).

At an institutional level, women’s groups were central to a broader reworking of the organizational framework of American politics: the decline of competitive political parties and electoral mass mobilization followed by the emergence of a governing system centered on administration, regulation, lobbying, and legislative politics. This change involved the invention of new models of political participation outside the established parties and the articulation of interests and demands that could be addressed by legislation and the active intervention of state agencies. Although the invention of modern interest-group politics may not have been intended by women activists, it was one of the most important consequences of this period of experimentation with political organization.

Although women’s organizations of the period realized that some form of political action would be needed to advance many of their causes, politics as usual was out of the question. In addition to their formal exclusion from electoral activity, women’s associations joined in a broader cultural attack on political methods. According to Mrs. Croly, the first president of the GFWC: “If I were to state what seems to me to be the great hindrance to club life and growth, it would be the employ-

4 The calculation of exact membership figures is impossible since totals were typically given by clubs and some women held multiple memberships (Wilson 1979, pp. 100–101; Wood 1912, pp. 131, 154).
ment of political methods, of political machinery and wire-pulling to bring about results. Politics can never be purified until its methods are changed, while its introduction into our club life subverts the whole intention and aims of club organization" (Croly 1898, p. 128).

Politics itself was not rejected, only the existing forms of political organization, the models of the electoral party and patronage machines. To construct an alternative, women's groups drew on models of organization that were culturally or experientially available in other areas of social life. Borrowing from this broader repertoire of social organization, these groups helped transform the repertoire of political action in the Progressive Era.

No formal listing of such repertoires exists, but the range of culturally available models of organization can be reconstructed from the debates that groups conducted over what sort of organization they wanted to be. Convention proceedings are a rich source of this information, since any change in organization or strategy usually entailed formal motions complete with statements of the facts (the "whereas" clause) and an argument for some alternative model for group action. For example, factional divisions might be explained in terms drawn from the worlds of business and political reform. In 1911, one Wisconsin suffrage group proclaimed its intention to "bust the suffrage trust" (the national suffrage associations) and to found an alternative organization "with a commission form of government" (Milwaukee Evening Wisconsin, October 10, 1911, Wisconsin Woman Suffrage Scrapbooks). Business methods also defined new political strategies. Discouraging the use of public debates—a centerpiece of 19th-century political life—one California suffragist argued in 1913 that "I think we must frankly acknowledge that people are not all convinced through reason, and that although the proposition that women should vote is seriously and profoundly true, it will, at first, be established with this class of people much as the virtues of a breakfast food are established—by affirmation" (California Equal Suffrage League of Northern California [hereafter CESLNC] 1913, p. 11)."
To reconstruct the repertoires of organization employed during this period, this study draws on an extensive reading of the proceedings of women’s organizations. The material in this analysis is drawn primarily from a comparative study of political organization and strategies of labor, agrarian, and women’s groups in three progressive states (California, Washington, and Wisconsin) between 1890 and 1920 (Clemens 1990a). Because this analysis is concerned with innovation in political organization, these cases were selected from those states recognized for innovation with respect to political procedure and for their substantive social policies. While a number of eastern states did pass progressive social legislation, on the whole they were significantly slower to adopt procedural reforms such as the initiative, referendum, and recall that undermined the power of party organizations to control political agendas and outcomes (Phelps 1914, p. xlv; Shafter 1983). Struggles within national organizations also frequently took the form of a regional split between an eastern leadership committed to established methods and midwestern or western factions more open to direct political action or state intervention. In addition to the convention proceedings and official publications of various state federations, I draw upon organizational debates as they were reported and analyzed in women’s papers and in the histories published by and about different associations (e.g., CESLNC 1913; Croly 1898; Gibson 1927; Park 1960; Ruddy 1906; Simpson 1909, 1915; Spencer, n.d.; Williamson 1925; Winter 1925; Womans [sic] Parliament of Southern California 1892; Wood 1912). Throughout these accounts, the extent of awareness and mimicry among groups is clear. Rather than asserting that political innovation was grounded in the distinctive characteristics of individual states, this argument takes the process of organizational imitation and innovation as central to an understanding of the institutional changes of the period.

Focusing on repertoires of organization, the analysis seeks to establish strategies of those most opposed to corporate power even prior to the decline of patronage politics. As one California Granger argued: "It stands us in hand, as Patrons, to study well the lesson which these great corporations that dominate the country are teaching, not only the farmer, but mankind, viz. That in unity, in intelligent cooperation, there is strength, there is power; but in divided effort, there is weakness, there is disintegration. . . . We must do as the corporations are doing—meet combinations of capital and brains with like combinations" (California State Grange 1889, p. 43).

7 Among the women's papers are the Wisconsin Citizen (monthly, 1887–1900, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison), Club Life (published monthly in San Francisco, 1902–6, Library of Congress), the Western Woman Voter (Seattle, 1911–13, available on microfilm at the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley), and the women's page of the Wisconsin Equity News (biweekly, 1911–17, Wisconsin Historical Society and University of California, Berkeley).
mechanisms for such changes by locating the interaction of social movements and politics within a broader social system that embraces alternative models of organization and multiple institutions that may promote organizational conformity or isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). While applications of the neo-institutionalist model that examine a single focal institution (usually the state or the professions) tend to emphasize how isomorphic processes promote stability and homogeneity, the opposite outcome is also possible. When familiar organizational forms are deployed in unfamiliar ways, insurgent groups may well destabilize existing institutions and ultimately contribute to the institutionalization of new conventions for political action. Organizational heterogeneity is reflected in the repertoires of organization; this is an account of cultural "tool kits" whose potential to create change flows from the complex organization of modern societies rather than from "unsettled" times (Swidler 1986). Rather than rejecting the classic Michels-Weber model, I will use the case of the woman movement to identify scope conditions for that model and, by extension, to provide criteria for identifying the types of movements most likely to contribute to significant institutional change in the political arena.

THE IRON LAW RECONSIDERED

Political organization can have profoundly ironic effects. As Robert Michels argued in his classic study of the Social Democratic Party in Wilhelmine Germany, "Organization is the weapon of the weak in the struggle with the strong." But this leverage is gained at a high price: "Organization is . . . the source from which the conservative currents flow over the plain of democracy, occasioning there disastrous floods and rendering the plain unrecognizable" ([1911] 1962, pp. 61–62). Hierarchical bureaucratic organization is necessary to compete effectively in the formal political arena, yet the processes of competition and organization distance the leadership from the interests of their followers and from the organization's initial commitment to the transformation of the political system.

Although the inevitability of such conservative transformations has been challenged within the literature on social movements, immunity is associated with forms of insulation—economic independence, membership exclusivity, and ideological or professional purity (Jenkins 1977; Selznick 1960, pp. 23, 77, 153; Zald and Ash 1966). Furthermore, these studies have tended to focus on the internal dynamics of voluntary organizations rather than on their interactions with political institutions. For Michels, however, these may well be the exceptions that prove the rule. In his original analysis, ongoing interaction of radical political organizations with the institutions of formal politics and the economic environ-
ment was the primary engine of conservative transformation. Thus, we are left with a paradox, one that has been central to critiques of political pluralism (McAdam 1982, pp. 5–6, 18–19). To the extent that organized groups committed to political change seek to secure change through political processes—the give-and-take of coalition building and electoral mobilization—they seem doomed to fail as their goals of social change are sacrificed to the constraints of political process.

In this article, my central claim is that turn-of-the-century women’s organizations—along with other associations—did cause substantial changes within American politics. Therefore, my first task must be to explain why women’s organizations were comparatively immune from the logics of conservative transformation described in Michels’s analysis. In Union Democracy (1956), the famous deviant case analysis of the International Typographical Union, Lipset, Trow, and Coleman argued that the “internal politics” of the union (the organization of work, the strength of locals, and a distinctive history of political conflict) contributed to its relative immunity from Michels’s iron law. To understand the transformative potential of the women’s groups of the Progressive Era, however, three aspects of external politics must be examined. The first two concern the relation of an organizational model to broader social structures. Michels’s argument builds on two distinctive logics of incorporation—economic and political—that assume an organizational membership of enfranchised heads of households. Consequently, the effects of organization may vary with the social identity of those who are organized. The third point involves the symbolic rather than instrumental aspects of organizational models; the appropriation of an established model by marginal groups may have consequences that are less than entirely conservative. Given the economic and political situations of their members, women’s groups were less likely to be drawn into established forms of political organization. Insofar as they did adopt these established models, however, heightened contradiction rather than effective co-optation was often the result.

The Logic of Economic Incorporation

One of the rules of investigative journalism is to follow the money. This rule also plays an important part in political sociology, receiving its classical form in Weber’s analysis of the routinization of charismatic authority. The “administrative staff” of a movement or organization have: “an interest in continuing it in such a way that both from an ideal and a material point of view, their own position is put on a stable everyday basis. This means, above all, making it possible to participate in normal family relationships or at least to enjoy a secure social position in place
of the kind of discipleship which is cut off from ordinary worldly connections, notably in the family and in economic relationships” (Weber 1978, p. 246).

This familiar passage identifies two distinct mechanisms by which economic imperatives shape the relation of the administrative staff to the organization: the interest in the continuation of the organization itself and the assurance of their own economic situation “making it possible to participate in normal family relations.” Both of these imperatives play a prominent role in Michels’s account of the iron law of oligarchy. The administrative staff will be unwilling to challenge the leadership from within: “Financial dependence upon the party, that is to say upon the leaders who represent the majority, enshackles the organization as with iron chains” (Michels 1962, pp. 140, 138). The status of party officials as breadwinners for their families also pushes the organization’s goals in a conservative direction. For that fraction of the bourgeoisie who cast their lot with the working class, “no backward path is open. They are enchained by their own past. They have a family, and this family must be fed” (Michels 1962, p. 208). Family responsibilities and social position produce similar effects on leaders recruited from among the workers, who will be reluctant to abandon their improved status as officials of a labor organization (1962, p. 259). This account is generalizable, therefore, only to the extent that alternative forms of organizational support (e.g., personal or institutional patronage, see Jenkins [1977]) are unavailable and that staff or members are responsible for their own economic well-being and that of their dependents.

These dynamics continue to figure prominently in contemporary discussions of social movements, although a conservative outcome is no longer assumed to be inevitable. Analyses of funding stress the dangers of co-optation posed by a reliance on outside funding or patronage, while noting the limitations of resources within various communities marginalized by established political institutions (Jenkins 1977; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988). The constraints of everyday life have also been recognized in less narrowly economic terms as “biographical availability” (McAdam 1986); career and family responsibilities may constrain one’s ability or inclination to participate in politics.

As I will argue below, the impact of these resource constraints is mediated by the form of organization. The more obvious point, however, is that the Michels-Weber account overlooks the gendered division of labor within households. Many of the leading figures in the woman movement were subject to a different set of constraints. At the most general level, changes in the division of labor and the growth of a market for consumer commodities left middle-class and upper-middle-class women of the late 19th century with increasing amounts of time free from household respon-
sibilities (Wood 1912, pp. 24–25). Among those most active in the women’s associations, many were supported financially by their husbands, and others came from families of considerable wealth and education (Blair 1980; Sklar 1985). The imperatives of the breadwinner, so central to both Weber and Michels, were clearly less relevant for these groups. For the less privileged, the women’s groups themselves might provide a community—such as the settlement houses (Deegan 1988, pp. 40–45)—or activist careers might be funded by either broad constituencies or prominent patrons. The fact that many educated women remained single or childless—along with many mothers active in these associations having the help of a household staff—lessened the constraints of biographical availability.

The Logic of Political Incorporation

Just as the logic of economic incorporation is mediated by the forms of social organization and family life, the logic of political incorporation is structured by specific institutions. In Michels’s terms, political participation leads to the conservative transformation of oppositional organizations by way of the system of electoral competition and the identification of movement leaders with the political establishment. Foreshadowing Anthony Downs’s analysis of party systems (1957), Michels argued that by competing in elections, oppositional parties would be drawn toward the political center and, thereby, moderate their radical goals (1962, pp. 334–35). But if electoral competition does not produce favorable outcomes, even formal political parties may adopt alternative organizational models and strategies that emphasize ideological purity or solitary incentives rather than electoral advantage (Kitschelt 1989, p. 41). Furthermore, sheer numbers are less closely linked to victory in other systems of political contestation. For a revolutionary party, the requirements of training cadres may well outweigh the advantages of a large membership. For lobbying groups, as for all those engaged in “symbolic politics,” resources, status, and style may matter more than numbers.

Women’s formal disenfranchisement obviously distanced them from the logic of electoral incorporation. Although their groups frequently sought to persuade male voters to support woman suffrage or temperance or some other cause—and often moderated the radicalism of these claims for strategic ends—these efforts were only loosely coupled to the internal life of most women’s associations. Barred from efforts to mobilize members directly as a voting bloc—with the consequent need to acquire majority, if not unanimous, consent to the organization’s goals—women’s associations typically developed internal “departmental” structures that allowed individual members to focus their efforts on a variety of goals,
from visiting the sick to agitating for social legislation. Combined with a political mission summed up in the WCTU motto “Do Everything!” the departmental structure allowed factions or local organizations to experiment in advance of any consensus by the national membership. The organizational arrangements of the woman movement often freed it from the conservative consequences of consensual decision making (Baker 1991, pp. 20–21); when the Woman’s Joint Congressional Committee was established in 1920, “procedure held that whenever three of the WJCC’s organizations voted to support or oppose a piece of legislation, they formed a subcommittee to do their lobbying” (Muncy 1991, p. 103). Such systems of “loose coupling” (Thompson 1967) provided an additional source of insulation, buffering the internal life of the organization from both environmental constraints that might favor centralized bureaucratic forms directed toward discrete instrumental goals and from the veto of conservative factions within a given group.

The Instrumental Claim for Bureaucratic Organization

The claim for the efficacy of hierarchical bureaucratic organization was the first substantive argument made by Michels (1962) and remains widely accepted, even among his critics:

It is indisputable that the oligarchical and bureaucratic tendency of party organization is a matter of technical and practical necessity. It is the inevitable product of the very principle of organization. Not even the most radical wing of the various socialist parties raises any objection to this retrogressive evolution, the contention being that democracy is only a form of organization and that where it ceases to be possible to harmonize democracy with organization, it is better to abandon the former than the latter. Organization, since it is the only means of attaining the ends of socialism, is considered to comprise within itself the revolutionary content of the party, and this essential content must never be sacrificed for the sake of form. [P. 72]

While it is possible to imagine circumstances in which oppositional groups will be immune from the economic and political logics of conservative incorporation, this claim is the bedrock of Michels’s assertion

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8 The unfamiliarity of women’s groups with “politics as usual” played a role in the split between the National American Woman Suffrage Association and the more radical Congressional Union. During the 1916 election, the Congressional Union rejected traditional strategies of persuading male voters in order to mobilize women in suffrage states to use their votes to “punish the party in power,” a model of organized action developed by British suffragettes in the context of a parliamentary system (Van Voris 1987, pp. 120, 131). While much of the dissension centered on issues of nonpartisan-ship and bipartisanship, it was equally true that strategies of mobilizing their members as voters were unfamiliar to many women’s organizations.
that "who says organization says oligarchy" and, by extension, that organization entails both internal and external conservative transformations. In its most simple form, the argument runs as follows: (1) hierarchical, centralized bureaucracies are the most effective form of organization; (2) consequently, existing political parties and institutions have adopted this form of organization; (3) in the course of pursuing their ends, oppositional parties will adopt the same organizational form for strategic reasons, even at the expense of their ideological commitments; (4) therefore, growing organizational isomorphism will lead oppositional parties to become like established political groups, precluding the possibility of meaningful political change.

This argument may be challenged on at least two points. I will discuss the first, the assumption that there is a single form of bureaucratic hierarchy toward which all organizations evolve in the pursuit of efficacy, in the context of an alternative model to be developed below. The second, however, concerns the assumption that the adoption of existing organizational forms by an oppositional group necessarily has a conservative or moderating influence on its critical stance toward existing political institutions and endangers "internal" democracy. Since politics is structured by intersecting rules—how to organize, who should organize, and for what—it is possible that the adoption of conventional organizational models may be destabilizing as it exposes contradictions within the existing system.

Many early efforts by politically active women accepted both the institutionalized models of American politics and the traditional cultural division of the social world into "separate spheres" for men and women. Yet this borrowing revealed incompatibilities between the organizational systems of politics and gender. Attempts by women to use recognizably political methods eventually necessitated a denial of the dual system of separate spheres. Initially, women's political institutions were largely self-directed. In 1848 the Women's Rights Convention at Seneca Falls issued a formal "Declaration of Principles" and Elizabeth Cady Stanton declared that "woman herself must do this work; for woman alone can understand the height, the depth, the length, the breadth of her degradation" (quoted in Flexner 1970, p. 77). By the second half of the century, women's organizations were promoting "Women's Parliaments" as forums in which women could debate and publicize their views. Through the rest of the 19th century, women drew on this model of separate polities parallel to the separate spheres. In 1892, for example, the Southern California Womans Parliament met for "the full and free discussion of reforms necessary to the progress of women's work in the church, home and society" (1892, p. 1). Women's work was redefined in public terms rather than traditional religious terms, but retained its identity as
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a distinct feminine realm. Yet by the end of the century, the appeal of this form of political organization had been undermined, in part by its own success. By establishing a common ground for public involvement and domestic ideals, the parliaments helped to make the idea of political involvement by women more widely acceptable. But because the parliaments were so easily linked with the highly contentious issue of woman suffrage, women frequently faced less opposition when they pursued their goals through organizational models that were not derived directly from the existing political system.

But what would such organizational models be like? For women's associations, and for the suffrage organizations in particular, the immediate dilemma was that any instrumental advantages of hierarchical, centralized bureaucratic form counted against one of the central goals of these groups: the demonstration that women were capable of being independent citizens rather than subject to undue direction by priests, husbands, or other authorities. Consequently, it was not enough to replace hierarchical organizations headed by men with bureaucratic voluntary associations led by elite women. From the level of local parlor meetings to national conventions, attention was paid to the form—if not always the substance—of participatory organization and proper procedure. In San Francisco, the Richelieu club was "mostly composed of the presidents of other clubs. . . . The club's aim is to carry on the drill of parliamentary usage with a view of having a more accurate knowledge of one's rights upon the floor and one's duty in the chair of an assembly" (Club Life, October 1902, p. 3). Women's papers regularly featured drills on parliamentary procedure. Although some organizations were dominated by a single national figure (such as the WCTU under Frances Willard), the GFWC regularly elected new presidents and, in almost all cases, the federated structure and complex departmental divisions of

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9 This was a particular concern in giving the vote to women in communities of recent immigrants. Suffragists and voters of Anglo-Saxon stock were unsure whether these groups would vote in the "true interests" of women and children or be swayed to oppose temperance and other social reforms: "Is it probable that the wage slaves of our great department stores, our shirt-waist and clothing manufacturing establishments and other industries employing large numbers of women and votable girls at almost starvation wages would risk the loss of their job and the mean pittance it returns to them by voting against the wishes of their employers?" (Wisconsin Equity News vol. 4, no. 18 [January 25, 1912]; emphasis in original).

10 Even the decision to organize or not could carry symbolic weight. The National Woman's Rights Convention of 1852 had defeated a proposal to form a national association, rejecting any type of formal organization in the same language used by radical abolitionists and trance-speaking spiritualists: secular authority was an affront to the self-sovereignty of the individual and his or her commitment to higher authorities (Braude 1989, pp. 162–63; Perry 1973, p. 114).
these associations provided for considerable opportunity and flexible participation within the woman movement. Although an organizational chart of any of the major women’s groups would possess many traits of a classical bureaucracy, individual careers rarely involved a regular progression through a hierarchy of offices, suggesting that these groups accommodated the shifting familial and economic obligations of activists (Clemens and Ledger 1992). While embracing the internal specialization of the modern corporation, women were much more ambivalent about establishing a clear hierarchy of authority. Although studies of interest-group politics and social movements have both viewed organization in terms of its contribution to instrumental goals of policy change and legislation, the advantages of centralization and specialization may be tempered by the meanings attributed to organizational models and the differing ability of organizational forms to sustain involvement.

This brief overview of women’s organizations does, however, establish the premises upon which an alternative account of political organization and institutional change must be fashioned. The first point is that the choice of organizational models is not governed solely by instrumental considerations. Cultures have rules about who should organize in what way and for what purposes; consequently, the choice of a conventional model by an unconventional group may produce neither the efficacy nor the conservative transformations suggested by Michels’s analysis. Second, complex societies present many possible models of organization—multiple combinations of hierarchy, centralization, authority, and exchange—which may be simultaneously “legitimate” and incompatible. Americans of the late 19th century were familiar with both the centralized hierarchical forms of the patronage party and the modern corporation, yet the period’s politics are often portrayed as a conflict between these two models of organizing public life. To the extent that a challenging group is immune to the processes of incorporation discussed above, both its potential to cause institutional change and the character of that change will reflect the range of alternative models available in its members’ repertoires of organization.

REPERTOIRES OF ORGANIZATION: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

For much of political sociology, organizations matter as resources; they make coordinated action possible and success more likely. The role of organizations in blocking action has also been demonstrated; prior commitments and established networks can make new patterns of mobilization difficult (Connell and Voss 1990). But organization has consequences beyond the process of mobilization itself. As a group organizes in a particular way, adopts a specific model of organization, it signals its identity
both to its own members and to others. Models of organization are part of the cultural tool kit of any society and serve expressive or communicative as well as instrumental functions. In addition, the adoption of a particular organizational form influences the ties that an organized group forms with other organizations. The chosen model of collective action shapes alliances with other groups and relations with political institutions. At both cultural and institutional levels, models of organization and collective activity are central mechanisms in the transformation of political systems. Once organizational form is viewed as being simultaneously a statement of identity and constitutive of broader institutional fields, social movements appear as not only vehicles of preexisting interests and causes of specific political outcomes, but as critical sources of institutional change.

In order to make sense of such change, the language of cultural analysis is helpful. If a society’s cultural heritage constitutes a set of “models of” and “models for” action (Geertz 1973), an organizational repertoire, the appropriation of each of these possible models is not equally probable. Instead, certain models are privileged by the existing distributions of power, status, and wealth as well as by established institutional arrangements. At the most basic level, there are certain advantages to familiarity: “Even government officials and industrial managers of our own time generally behave as though they preferred demonstrations and strikes to utterly unconventional forms of collective action” (Tilly 1986, p. 391). Organization theorists have emphasized this process, exploring the ways in which conformity to institutional rules produces increasing homogeneity within organizational fields (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977). But if one recognizes an established repertoire of acceptable forms instead of a single institutional rule, processes of institutional isomorphism can also promote change within a social system.

Consider the following possibilities. A group finds itself in a situation where the established models of organization and paths of action are inadequate. This may occur for many reasons: existing models may be tactically or culturally discredited (as wire-pulling and other “methods of politics” were for Mrs. Croly); existing models may be unavailable or off-limits (as electoral politics were for most American women); or no established models of action may be associated with that situation (e.g., methods of holding legislators accountable for specific votes prior to the development of pre-election pledges and legislative roll-call reporting). Confronted with analogous situations, organization and decision theorists have developed accounts of search procedures. These accounts typically establish some relation—either purposive or stochastic—between an environment that provides multiple potential “solutions” and some selection criteria or procedures (e.g., Heclo 1974; Kingdon 1984; March and
Olsen 1989; Meyer and Rowan 1977). Once selected, the choice of a particular solution or organizational model then has consequences for both the environment and the system of relations among organizations. Certain choices may produce organizations that make sufficient demands on their environment to induce new organizations to form (Westney 1987). At the same time, the choice of a model may draw an organization closer to some groups while weakening other interorganizational ties. For example, teachers may choose to affiliate with an occupational group based on the model of the labor union or one modeled on the professions. This difference, in turn, sets up distinctive alliance patterns with other organizations such as the AFL-CIO or the American Medical Association (Hess 1990).

Applied to the study of political change, this account highlights the significance of the available set of organizational models and the process of selection. The repertoire of organization both reflects and helps to shape patterns of social organization. As it is mastered by any given individual or group, a repertoire is largely constituted through experience or awareness of existing forms of social organization. We know what it is to be part of a committee or a commune or a platoon because we have participated in, observed, or heard of these different forms of organization.11 Similarly, we know what different organizational models signify with respect to the expectations and behaviors of members as well as the collective identity presented to others. Thus, the initial use of familiar forms by unfamiliar groups will have a destabilizing effect on existing conventions of organization. For example, the clubwomen, now quaint and moderate figures, named themselves in violation of established feminine conventions. While the term “club” was rejected by some as a “masculine” label, more daring groups such as the New England Women’s Club “deliberately chose club to indicate a break with tradition; it did not want to be associated with good-works societies” (Martin 1987, p. 63; emphasis in source; see also Ruddy 1906, p. 24). For outsiders, organizational form was a signal of these groups’ novel qualities and aims. “What is the object?” was the first question asked of any

11 In this sense, the concept of a repertoire of organization synthesizes the cognitive or cultural “tool kit” model of recent work in social movement theory (Tilly 1978, 1986) with current institutionalist accounts in organizational theory. As distinct from the new institutionalism of economics and political science, with their concerns for transactions costs and rule-governed decision procedures (Williamson 1985; Shepsle and Weingast 1987), in the context of sociology and organization theory, “institutions” are those conventions that “take on a rule-like status in social thought and action” (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Insofar as the concept of organizational repertoire implies multiple sets of conventions, however, this “rule-like” status is necessarily contextual and subject to change.
organization of women, and if it was not the making of garments, or the collection of funds for a church, or philanthropic purpose, it was considered unworthy of attention, or injurious doubts were thrown upon its motives" (Croly 1898, p. 9).

By distancing themselves from religious associations and charitable societies, women's clubs constituted themselves as "absolutely a new thing under the sun" (Wood 1912, p. 188). And in defining itself through the appropriation of organizational models not traditionally associated with female groups, the women's club movement is a clear example of innovation grounded in the materials at hand. This process of organizational change through the rearrangement of existing repertoires characterized the woman movement as a whole.

Once one group has pioneered the use of an organizational model in a new arena, that model may then be adopted for use by other groups. Although the rationale for adoption may flow from momentary strategic advantages, widespread adoption is a source of fundamental change in the organizing categories of the political system. Returning to the specific case of political change in the United States, I argue that the shift from the electoral regime of highly competitive parties to the legislative and administrative focus of interest-group bargaining can be understood by examining the organizational experiments of groups that were comparatively disadvantaged under the first of these regimes. The subsequent shift in the available repertoire of organization—the recognized set of political options—then gave way to a system in which this form of mobilization became part of the taken-for-granted. Writing in 1907, John R. Commons, a prominent economist and social reformer, observed that "there is no movement of the past twenty years more quiet nor more potent than the organization of private interests. No other country in the world presents so interesting a spectacle" ([1907] 1967, p. 359). With respect to the conventions of political action and organization, this new system entailed a focus on legislative rather than electoral politics and a consequent organization on the basis of stakes in particular issues rather than broad political philosophies. As one commentator complained by the 1920s:

The present unionized era of leagues, societies, alliances, clubs, combines and cliques offers confederation for mutual support of almost any interest conceivable except for the diversified interests of the humble in the application of general law. With united front the bankers, the brokers, the dairymen, the detectives, the sportsmen, the motorists, the innkeepers, the barbers, the mingtrowers, the Swiss bell ringers, et al., may and do present their complaints to the legislature for adjustment. [Wismer 1928, p. 172]

Although manufacturers organized nonpartisan trade associations in both the United States and Europe, only in the United States did "inter-
est"—rather than party, class, language, or religion—become the primary idiom of political life, a legitimate if not necessarily welcome form of political organization (see also Clemens 1990a; Maier 1981; McCormick 1986; Reddy 1987; Rodgers 1987). The making of specific claims on legislatures was not in itself new, but previously took the form of petitions, private bills directed at individuals, or the considerable bribery of the Gilded Age (Thompson 1985). What was new was the exertion of issue-specific pressure through political education, public opinion, expert testimony, and the increasingly sophisticated legislative tactics of issue- or constituency-based organizations.

This new system of political organization grew out of an eclectic process of reorganization. Rather than accepting a single model for political action, groups drew on both traditional models and the most modern good government groups as well as imitating what worked for their frequent opponents, the corporations and political machines. By the 1890s, for example, temperance associations and women’s groups had set up their own precinct organizations and departmental organizations to exert focused pressure on specific government institutions (Bordin 1981; Kerr 1980). In California, the Women’s Christian Temperance Union “exerted an influence out of proportion to its size, because of its strong church support, its unique ability to cooperate easily with all other temperance organizations, and because, unlike the fraternal societies, it devoted its energies almost entirely to agitation and reform work. On the model of the national W.C.T.U. the state organization set up many departments, thirty in all, each concentrating on a separate phase of temperance work” (Ostrander 1957, p. 58).

Recognizing the need to create a political counterweight and a vehicle for shaping public opinion, the liquor industry responded by appropriating an organizational model then unfamiliar in business politics: “The liquor dealers formed an organization which, to outward appearances at least, was based on an idea new to California. They formed what was publicized as a liquor-men’s temperance association. Following the example of many temperance organizations before them, the liquor dealers patterned themselves after Masonic design. The new organization was called the Knights of the Royal Arch, and in April, 1902, the Grand Lodge of the Knights of the Royal Arch was formed in San Francisco” (Ostrander 1957, p. 100).

Complete with exotically titled officials, and, no doubt, secret handshakes, this innovation by the liquor interests appears retrograde, a move away from the modern politics of interest based on public opinion and expertise rather than fraternal solidarity. But to conceive of institutional change as the product of novel applications of existing organizational repertoires is not to claim that all such applications will be effective. If
California's liquor dealers engaged in a retrospective form of organizational borrowing, temperance advocates and especially women's groups helped to transform the meaning of corporate political models such as the lobby. In the process, a model that had been associated with corrupt practices was now transformed and legitimated as a taken-for-granted component of political action.

This account of changes in the forms of political organization generates a series of propositions quite different from those associated with the Michels-Weber model. First, rather than identifying a unilinear trend toward hierarchical, bureaucratic forms, this alternative account suggests that we should expect to find a lot of cultural work around the questions of What kind of group are we? and What do groups like us do? The links between organizational and cultural analysis are clear; models of organization are not only conventions for coordinating action but also statements of what it means for certain people to organize in certain ways for certain purposes (Kanter 1972). Second, we should expect that both the substance of these debates and the subsequent patterns of mobilization should vary by the set of organizational models that are culturally and experientially available to a given group at a particular point in time. Third, patterns of organization in response to novel or ambiguous situations should be shaped by a group's existing or desired ties to other groups committed to a particular model of organization. The selection of a specific organizational form should then strengthen ties between some organizations while weakening others.

In the next section of the article I will explore each of these propositions, using examples from the turn-of-the-century woman movement. I am not claiming that women's groups were unique in adopting new models of organization (indeed my argument suggests that available models of organization are likely to be noticed and used by multiple groups), only that women's groups were particularly well placed—both constrained by a lack of viable alternatives and relatively immune to the logics of incorporation discussed above—to explore the potential of organizational models newly introduced to the political arena.

GENDER AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Over the course of the 19th century, the role of gender in defining political identity intensified. In the French "Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen" of 1791 and in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, voting was defined as the exclusive prerogative of adult men (Catt and Shuler 1926, pp. 32–45; Landes 1988, p. 122). In the United States, these formal exclusions were reinforced by a dense web of political association. To the extent that political associations were
based on workplace identities, the differing patterns of men’s and women’s involvement in the labor market ensured that these associations would be primarily single-sex groups. Similarly, insofar as turn-of-the-century political mobilization built on the fraternal organizations of 19th-century America, it perpetuated that period’s distinctively male and female political cultures (Baker 1984; Clawson 1985). While organizations such as the Good Templars and the Patrons of Husbandry (also known as the Grange) did embrace the moral issues of concern to women and at times allowed women to join, in all cases the political organization of men at the end of the 19th century powerfully influenced the participation of women.

But women’s politics were not entirely derivative. Opening her massive overview of the women’s club movement in the United States, “Jennie June” Croly proclaimed “when the history of the nineteenth century comes to be written, women will appear as organizers, and leaders of great organized movements among their own sex for the first time in the history of the world” (1898, p. 1). In part, women’s models of political action derived from their history of public participation, the revivalism of the Jacksonian era was echoed in the fervent calls for reform made by the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (Epstein 1981; Smith-Rosenberg 1985, pp. 129–64) and social reformers drew on a legacy of friendly visiting and personal service to the poor (McCarthy 1982, pp. 3–24). Middle- and upper-class women, in particular, adopted the models of the parlor meeting and charitable society, gradually adapting them as vehicles for a greater role in public affairs. Without directly challenging the fundamentally fraternal character of political life, women drew on domestic and religious models of action to begin to craft a public role for themselves. But the long-standing political exclusion of women meant that their activism would be particularly disruptive to the political order. The puzzle, then, is to explain how women’s groups were able to transform their public identity in a way that largely sidestepped the culturally embedded equation of the political with masculinity.

In this enterprise, women activists drew on an organizational repertoire familiar to them as members of American society if not necessarily through their direct experience in women’s groups: “The woman’s club was not an echo; it was not the mere banding together for a social and economic purpose, like the clubs of men. It became at once, without deliberate intention or concerted action, a light-giving and seed-sowing center of purely altruistic and democratic activity” (Croly 1898, p. 13). Having appropriated a “male” model of organization, the clubwomen continued to transform their movement through organizational imitation. One of Mrs. Croly’s successors as president of the General Federation of Women’s Clubs explicitly celebrated the innovation of the movement,
while acknowledging its basis in imitation. Her “little book,” *The Business of Being a Clubwoman*, “does not deal with purposes or programs, but with *ways* of running our affairs. We must learn to avoid our old mistakes and gain our ends by more direct paths. We can learn out of our own past. And no one but ourselves can give us much help. Colleges and social scientists and experts of various kinds can help us in the *matters* upon which we are working, but as to the *ways* of working we have to blaze our own trail” (Winter 1925, p. vi; emphases in original).

The need to invent new “*ways of working*” was a product of the organizational repertoire that these economically privileged women inherited from the 19th century combined with their double exclusion from both male organizations and partisan politics. Faced with these constraints, the clubwomen and their social peers were pushed to innovate.

While club life was the form of many women’s initial entry into public affairs, three other models of organization were central to the development of a more explicitly political strategy for women. First, women increasingly drew on corporate forms and cash exchanges to replace personal service as the preferred medium for social action. In addition, women’s groups internalized the bureaucratic forms and methods of the modern state as they turned with greater frequency to state and federal governments, rather than to their own communities, as the appropriate arenas for political action (Baker 1991). The final development involved the positive cultural revaluation of the model of the lobby. If these three organizational shifts are taken to an extreme, one arrives at a picture of the modern-day interest or issue group, with its use of educational literature and expert testimony to secure federal funding for some sort of program. As timeless as this form of political action may now seem, it was an invention of the Progressive Era, and women’s groups played a central part in its elaboration and legitimation.

**Organization as Business**

All of these efforts at organizing women and their political activities took place during a period now widely recognized as an organizational revolution. Consequently, rather than confining the analysis to the relations between women’s groups and politics, we must consider the influence of sweeping changes in the broader repertoire of social organization in 19th-century America. Of particular importance was the expansion of the market and the development of new forms of commercial relations (Chandler 1977). While the hierarchical relations of the corporation had mixed implications for women’s self-presentation as independent citizens, the market appeared as unambiguously modern.

For women’s groups, however, the adoption of “business methods”
had consequences that were not apparent in the activities of men already immersed in a system of market relations. Part of becoming a modern organization involved substituting cash exchanges for personal service. Speaking on “Woman’s Work in the Church” to the 1892 Southern California Womans Parliament, the Rev. Lila F. Sprague declared that “the woman of to-day is inaugurating an epoch of belief; a belief that it is better in every way, for all concerned, to give five dollars in cash to the needs of the church, rather than ten dollars in poor cake, and poorer pie, which may, with a big crowd and plenty of hard work, yield a net return of one or two dollars” (as quoted in Womans Parliament of Southern California 1892, p. 8).

Throughout the Progressive Era, the conflict between traditional and activist women’s groups continued to be expressed in terms of the role of money. The call for cash, however, had to confront the fact that many women had only limited access to funds of their own. Consequently, a reliance on the domestic production of baked goods and bazaar items continued alongside an effort to extract funds on the basis of a more “modern” female identity, that of the consumer. Mainstream suffrage associations sponsored “consumer fasts” in which women promised to forgo cosmetics and other luxuries for a week or so, sending the money saved to fund the fight for the vote. More radical organizations tried to sever the link between fund-raising and women’s traditional roles as either charity workers or consumers. In Wisconsin, the leader of the Political Equality League declared “that she will not conduct sales of cookbooks or postcards to raise a campaign fund and further declares that if it is to be that sort of a campaign she will seek a cool spot near Lake Superior and retire there. Promises, Miss Wagner points out, do not pay the bills and begging for money is humiliating” (Racine News, July 11, 1911, Wisconsin Woman Suffrage Scrapbooks).

The shift to business methods characterized the delivery of services as well as their underwriting. Whereas personal contact between charitable women and their poor clientele had once been viewed as central to the project of moral uplift, this “friendly visiting” was increasingly under attack. From the perspective of scientific charity, this form of aid was inefficient; from the perspective of the disadvantaged and their advocates, it was frequently demeaning. In response to these complaints, volunteers in numerous cities sponsored Women’s Industrial Exchanges where working women could sell homemade items, baked goods, and needlework, while charities joined together as “Charity Organization Societies” seeking to coordinate both fund-raising and the delivery of services. Indeed, part of the mission of the new scientific charities was to move completely beyond a reliance on volunteers.

The convergence of these trends toward cash support and paid sup-
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porters is seen in a novel program established by the Associated Charities of San Francisco, an organization in which women held considerable power. In the wake of the 1906 earthquake, the Associated Charities was the main conduit for both federal aid and private relief funds raised across the country and, consequently, developed the habit of operating on a cash basis. Later, in response to the situation of destitute women and children, these women established what one report described as "the most important sociological innovation ever made in San Francisco."\(^{12}\) Continuing an earlier effort to deinstitutionalize the state's orphans, the Associated Charities simply boarded out babies for $12.50 a month. Like the later mothers' pensions, this program provided women with the money to support their own children. Unlike the mothers' pensions, however, this was money that the women earned by entering into an explicit employment relationship with a public agency. For the charity volunteers of San Francisco, the potential of moral suasion or social control rapidly paled next to the demonstrated power of spending.\(^{13}\)

Spending was also a sign of full political citizenship. Recounting their contributions to the San Francisco Panama-Pacific Exposition of 1915, the Woman's Board explained that:

Woman's co-operation in other world expositions has necessarily included an accounting of funds drawn from official sources. That is not the case with the Woman's Board which helped in the creation of San Francisco's Dream City of 1915 and in bringing it to a picturesque and notable obligation of stewardship; it financed all its own undertakings as well as those undertakings which it cheerfully assumed at the request of the Exposition directorate. [Simpson 1915, p. ix]

The importance of this claim is underlined by its presence in the second paragraph of the preface, the first substantive claim in a book-length account. The political significance of financial autonomy is explained in the paragraph that follows:

There are in mind the men and women everywhere who may be interested in these achievements not merely for their intrinsic worth, but also for the

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12 Anna Pratt Simpson, "The Story of Associated Charities since the Fire of 1906." These articles originally appeared in the San Francisco Call in 1909 (Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley).

13 The influence of this model of employment is highlighted by a comparison with the organizational consequences of relief efforts after the Chicago Fire of 1871. Whereas the San Francisco Associated Charities established contractual relations with its clients who were thereby empowered as self-supporting workers, the industrialist-dominated Chicago Relief Association used its authority over the disbursement of relief funds to control the charity organizations of the city through a philanthropic version of the trust, demanding representation on boards in return for a share of the donations (McCarthy 1982).
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reason that they bear eloquent witness to the success of a great human cause, for the reason that they are, in some sort, the first fruits of woman's emancipation in a state newly made politically free, a practical thank-offering of woman's pride and woman's patriotism. [Simpson 1915, pp. ix–x]

By adopting "business practices," these activists diminished the role of distinctively gendered organizational forms in constituting their public identity. This adoption of business practices and cash exchanges simultaneously undermined the forms of intimacy, solidarity, and community traditionally associated with women's groups of the 19th century. In promoting the organization of working women, for example, elite clubs no longer sought to maintain the personal, albeit supervisory, ties of friendly visiting. In San Francisco, the prestigious California Club first sponsored the working-class Porteous Club and then left it to support itself. Once again, business practices signaled civic maturity:

That the little club is capable of managing its own affairs in a small way is sufficiently evidenced by the concert it gave in the early part of the year, when it was practically, though not yet nominally, on its own resources. . . . None the less was the affair organized and carried through in all business details by the Porteous members themselves, and so well did they manage that they netted $108.04 as their profit from the entertainment. After such a result none can doubt the business capacity of the baby Porteous. [Club Life, May 1902, p. 4]

Such shifts toward business practices were in tension with the familial models of sisterhood and mother-daughter relations that had shaped both the organization and self-image of women's organizations of the 19th century (DuBois 1991). But if these changes made it possible for women's organizations to take public actions not directly linked to the domestic, the questions of how such actions could be made politically effective remained.

From Community to Bureaucracy

While the organization of activity around cash exchanges signaled personal dignity and political maturity, this move away from personal service as a primary public activity also had consequences for the ability of women to enter into politics as usual and to stimulate the expansion of state agencies. To the extent that their activities were constructed around a cash nexus rather than around personal service, experimental private programs could be adopted more easily by state agencies, once sufficient public support had been generated. Without directly confronting the gendered opposition of home and electoral politics, the oblique embrace of
business forms of organization resulted in an increasing isomorphism between women’s associations and state agencies.

Yet if the reliance on cash facilitated such transfers, it was not their sole cause. Charitable programs for men had experienced much the same development; indeed, the reliance on work-based systems centered on employment exchanges or coalyards was much more usual for impoverished men. But there was a danger in distributing public moneys to poor men, a danger beyond the threat that dependency posed to their moral character. Any such distribution might be easily turned to political purposes, to partisan advantage. Yet the same was not true for impoverished women. Unable to vote themselves, and with their lack of attachment to adult men as the very condition of their eligibility for aid, widows and unmarried women could be the targets of public aid without the funding of those programs being attacked as politically corrupt. Given their relative immunity from the logic of political incorporation, the disenfranchised were culturally privileged as recipients of public largesse.

The distinctive position of women with respect to the state reflected the dynamics of organizational isomorphism along two dimensions. With respect to the organizational field of electoral politics, women’s formal disenfranchisement insulated their associations from electoral incorporation, the onslaught of “predatory politics” that had undermined both agrarian and labor movements. But by adopting business practices as models of organization, women’s groups could then accommodate themselves to the generic bureaucratic procedures common to both corporations and state agencies.

These agencies were central to the new politics of interest groups and social programs. In many cases, women’s groups played an important role in the establishment of these institutions. In the United States, many women demanded the vote not as a natural right but in order to secure specific reforms—child-labor laws, temperance, and protective legislation for working women. Frequently, women’s groups not only demanded state intervention, but initiated it by providing funds for kindergartens, probation officers, and health inspectors and other services later provided by public agencies (Gibson 1927, pp. 214, 216; Williamson 1925, p. 40). Arguing that working women were without the protection of union contracts—due to their incapacity for forming contracts, the nature of the labor market, or the neglect of union organizers—women’s labor reform groups called for state intervention to control both hours

14 This characterization of aid recipients was, however, often merely a convenient construction since aid to indigent women could be used as a way of securing the electoral support of male relatives who might otherwise be called upon for financial aid.
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and wages for women, actions that often drew criticism from organized labor. These demands for economic regulation and social services mean that women's politics are of particular importance for understanding both the beginnings of the American welfare state and the entrenchment of interest-group politics.

The creation of state agencies also had important implications for the future of women's politics in the United States. For just as the business transformations of women's organizations allowed for a measure of political success in the decades surrounding the turn of the century, these changes also undermined the strength of these organizations. By shifting to cash transactions, away from personal service and the creation of community, these organizational innovations eroded the personal networks and commitments that so often account for the success of a social movement. The political effects of adopting business practices worked in opposite directions. The implementation of this model first served as a path by which women could sidestep the clearly gendered forms of the 19th-century polity. But once established in the polity, women's groups adopted increasingly hierarchical models of professionalism and expertise that ultimately made the widespread political mobilization of women less relevant for the determination of policy outcomes (Muncy 1991). Although elite women reformers were much more likely to attend to and rely on their constituencies than were male bureaucrats, more and more often a few well-placed experts and political insiders could accomplish as much as mass rallies and petition drives.

In this respect, Michels's prediction of the emerging gap between leaders and members was fulfilled. Insofar as women's groups had both created and captured state agencies, a smaller set of reformers and activists could successfully promote a political agenda that had once required a mass movement. For example, in carrying out its infant health and birth-registration campaigns, the newly established Children's Bureau

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15 Prior to the recruitment of a cadre of wealthy supporters, for example, "the suffragette style drew on the militant traditions of the labor movement, and its protest tactics, such as outdoor rallies, were suitable to a constituency with little money." As money replaced effort as the medium of mobilization, suffragists were increasingly divided by class and pushed toward passive roles as donors and audiences: "Meetings went inside once there was money to hire halls" (DuBois 1991, pp. 169, 173).

16 This distance did not necessarily translate into a conservative goal transformation because of the distinctive organizational context in which the leaders found themselves. During the 1920s, the leadership of the woman movement—particularly that of the suffragists—embraced the international peace movement and, consequently, endured attacks and red-baiting from conservative women's groups and politicians (Van Voris 1987, pp. 189–97).
relied on the cooperation of 1,500 clubwomen by 1914 and on 11 million by the national Children’s Year of 1918 (Ladd-Taylor 1991, p. 117; Muncy 1991). But the leaders of agencies were no longer leaders of movements and, as the woman movement was absorbed by parties and new voluntary associations during the 1920s, the new women bureaucrats were left vulnerable to conservative attacks and the dismantling of programs and agencies. But, in the meantime, women’s groups had helped to legitimate models of extraparty politics.

Politics without Parties: The Art of Lobbying

Because American women initially pursued their political goals without the benefit of the vote, they developed methods of influence distinct from the electoral context of partisan politics. One opening was found in lobbying, the unsavory practice of the Gilded Age, that Thompson (1985) described as “a constitutionally guaranteed right of all citizens . . . that nonetheless has no respectability unless it masquerades under euphemistic aliases.” Unlike the vote, the right of petition was available to all—“minors, minorities, aliens, women, even idiots have always been able to employ it” (Thompson 1985, p. 27; see also Herring [1929] 1967, p. 36).

In constructing their own “euphemistic alias,” one which would distinguish them from aliens, idiots, and others with no claim on citizenship, women combined the tainted model of the lobby with educational strategies more conventionally associated with 19th-century women’s organizations. As one clubwoman (Wood 1912, p. 26) observed, “the earliest form of the woman’s club was the study club, the ‘Middle-aged Woman’s University.’” But women did not immediately recognize education as a strategy of political influence. As of the First Biennial of the General Federation of Women’s Clubs in 1892: “The educating of public opinion as the only permanent basis for welfare work seems not at the time to have become a part of the inner consciousness of the average General Federation worker” (Wood 1912, p. 50). Over the next decade, the links between women’s politics and “educational strategies” were firmly secured. The woman suffrage movement embraced the model of education as a form for both internal mobilization, through a “Course of Study” on political science, and for external cultivation of sympathizers among the male electorate (Van Voris 1987, pp. 43–44). Other women’s groups linked education to social policy demands: “The method employed by the Consumers’ League to better conditions invariably followed this rule: obtain facts through investigation, acquaint the public with the facts, and after educating public opinion, secure legislation” (Nathan 1926, p.
This last step, the merging of educational and legislative strategies in a new model of political organization, proved most difficult.

The politics of education and public opinion ran into difficulty when women attempted to translate research and expertise into political influence. Having crafted a political role from a strategy associated with corporate bribes and illicit interests, women were vulnerable since this political role could be easily attacked. During the debate over the woman’s eight-hour bill in California, Maud Younger, a San Francisco union organizer, encountered this dilemma:

The rule against lobbying while the houses were in session was strictly enforced. Miss Younger’s efforts in behalf of the Eight-Hour Bill had earned her the name of lobbyist. Having business with Senator Caminetti one forenoon, she ventured on the floor of the Senate while that body was in session. Her presence was observed and objection made to lobbyists being permitted on the floor.

When Caminetti understood that Miss Younger was the “lobbyist” referred to, he became furious even for him. . . .

“This young woman is assisting me in my work. She is not a lobbyist, she is acting as my clerk. She will not leave my desk.”

Still the objection was made. [Hichborn 1911, pp. 246–47]

The rule against lobbyists on the floor had been passed only two years earlier by antimachine progressives, yet was frequently used by machine politicians against reformers (Hichborn 1909, pp. 219–25). Then, as now, the line between legitimate and illegitimate representation of interests was unclear.¹⁸

Despite these dangers, lobbying was one of the few models of political influence available to women, and they worked to legitimate this model of activity by linking it to the conventions of professionalism and expertise. Prior to securing the right to vote, for example, members of the California State Federation of Women’s Clubs replaced a loose Legislative Committee composed of six district representatives with one headed by a more powerful Legislative Chairman. While the initial results were

¹⁷ The political appropriation of education had been pioneered by the major parties themselves in an effort to cultivate the small but decisive group of independent voters that developed in the late 19th century (McGerr 1986). Within the woman suffrage movement, the political appropriation of education also resulted in demands for an educational requirement for the vote.

¹⁸ Franklin Hichborn, a journalist closely allied with the progressive forces in the state, noted this difficulty in his account of the last machine-dominated California legislature: “The problem of drawing the line between legitimate and reprehensible lobbying has perplexed wiser men than sat in the California Legislature of 1909.” Hichborn himself accepted the propriety of lobbying when one had a “legitimate interest” in a bill, but the criteria for legitimacy remain unclear (Hichborn 1909, pp. 226, 228).
somewhat disappointing, within two years the clubwomen claimed some credit for the passage of the eight-hour law for women, the employers’ liability law, and bills pertaining to child labor. By 1912, following the suffrage victory:

The California Federation of Women’s Clubs, through its Chairman of Legislation, invites all State organizations of women to cooperate with it in forming a central committee, a State Legislative Council of Women. . . . The purpose of this body will be to prevent duplication of this work and expense; to bring together experts from each society who can plan mutually for better work than would be possible alone; to decide how much legislation and what is wise to ask for, and to see that this is being prepared by responsible organizations; also to select a small committee to be in Sacramento during the session of the Legislature to look after all interests involved in such legislation.

One reform-minded journalist proclaimed that the California women had invented “the Scientific Management of Club Influence” (Gibson 1927, pp. 181, 185, 188).

The women’s associations of California may have been somewhat precocious in establishing a formal lobby, but they were not alone. In Washington State, women’s groups affiliated with the nonpartisan Joint Legislative Committee and eagerly joined in campaigns for labor legislation as well as women’s issues more narrowly defined, forging important political alliances and developing considerable political skills (Tripp 1973, pp. 85–86). Even the women’s groups of Wisconsin, constrained as they were by nativism, dry sentiments, and a general cultural conservatism, were willing to venture into this new field of endeavor. The Milwaukee Consumer’s League gave its support to women’s hours legislation, although the primary advocates of these bills were the city’s Social Democratic legislators (Schmidt 1933, pp. 187–88). The State Federation of Women’s Clubs passed resolutions favoring mothers’ pensions and child-labor laws, sent officers to testify on bills, and created a Legislative Committee whose members “are finding the work decidedly educational, and are acquiring a knowledge of the methods used to pass or defeat bills never dreamed of in the philosophy of women’s clubs” (Wisconsin Federation of Women’s Clubs 1909, p. 83).

Having mastered these methods, women lobbyists effectively supported a wide range of legislation that has secured the United States a reputation as a “maternalist” welfare state (Skocpol and Ritter 1991; Skocpol 1992). Tensions between the models for feminine and political identity lingered; women found that their choice of political techniques continued to draw comment. As Maud Wood Park of the National American Woman Suffrage Association wrote: “The Front Door Lobby was the half-humorous, half-kindly name given to our Congressional Com-
mittee in Washington by one of the press-gallery men there, because, as he explained, we never used backstairs methods" (Park 1960, p. 1). Once women had secured bases of power within government, they sought to implement programs that would serve their constituencies but were increasingly constrained by their obligations to carry out programs promoted by other political coalitions. The women who led the Children's Bureau, for example, were torn between an infant health program favored by working women and the enforcement of child-labor laws that threatened the tenuous family economies of these same women: "Female reformers in government functioned both as advocates for poor mothers and as administrators of the (sometimes injurious) policies that affected them, and their contradictory role made conflict with grass-roots mothers inevitable" (Ladd-Taylor 1991, p. 123). These organizational accomplishments won a begrudging acceptance for politically active women, but they also transformed the relation between activists and the members of their self-adopted constituency.

Organizational Repertoires and Cross-Class Alliances

While these changes may have helped to undermine the solidarity of the woman movement—once rooted in the relatively intimate networks of clubs and parlors—they also made it possible to negotiate other class-based divisions among women. So long as privileged women drew on those models of organization closest to their own experience, their differences with working-class women and men were emphasized. But as their repertoire of organization expanded, so did the possibilities of cross-class alliances among women. The significance of changing organizational models is suggested by a comparison of the political development of privileged women with the experience of working-class women. Similarly excluded from formal political participation, working-class women confronted this situation with a different repertoire of organization. Although women rarely had equal standing within the labor movement, within two years of dropping its commitment to secrecy in 1878, the Knights of Labor did authorize the initiation of women (Delzell 1919, p. 10; Foner 1979, pp. 186–87; Levine 1983, pp. 324–25).¹⁹ In 1882, at the second convention of the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions (the

¹⁹ The reasons that women could not join the Knights earlier were rooted in cultural beliefs about the feminine character. The founder of the Knights, "though far in advance of many members of the early Knights, was so obsessed with the value of secrecy and with the sexist view that women could not keep secrets that, while he favored the inclusion of all male workers and mentioned women, he did not advocate opening membership to women" (Foner 1979, p. 185). The model of organization thus identified those who could and should be organized.
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forerunner of the AFL), women were invited to participate. Thus, like the Patrons of Husbandry, these male-dominated organizations did not formally exclude women in the manner of the multiplying fraternal societies of the time (Clawson 1989, pp. 180–87). But unlike the Patrons of Husbandry, who often found themselves claiming “some earnest Grangers and good workers, especially the sisters, who seem to take more interest in the grange than the brothers” (California State Grange 1887, p. 110), the large 19th-century labor unions remained clearly the province of men. Women rarely accounted for more than 10% of the membership in the Knights of Labor and a smaller proportion yet in the AFL (Foner 1979, p. 188; Levine 1983, p. 325).

While this degree of openness compares favorably with that encountered by middle- and upper-middle-class women who sought to work alongside their “fathers, husbands and brothers,” labor organizations were not free from more general cultural beliefs that women were not as amenable to organization as men. Reflecting on recent state-level suffrage victories, one Socialist organizer asserted: “Many have contended that the work of propaganda among women requires essentially different methods than those used among workingmen. So it was said shortly ago that the work among agrarian populations must be carried on differently than for the town proletariat. This has been proven erroneous, and the same principles have been found to apply in both cases” (Simons 1912?, p. 6).

Insofar as the labor movement was concerned, however, the conditions of employment of most working women made it difficult for them to organize effectively within the framework provided by the AFL. Although skilled women had joined craft unions in the late 19th century (Eaves 1910, pp. 314–15; Matthews 1913, pp. 40–50), by the turn of the century, the fastest growing group of women workers were unskilled operatives working in industries such as textiles, garment manufacturing, and electrical goods. In these occupations, men and women alike proved difficult to organize; for women, this situation was aggravated by the AFL’s repeated failure to hire women organizers (Dye 1980, pp. 13, 80). But even these failures helped to reinforce the primacy of class rather than gender as the organizational basis of public identity for working women.

The tensions between models of political organization based on class solidarity and gender became evident in the policies of the Women’s Trade Union League (WTUL), a cross-class alliance of wealthy, educated reformers and women activists who had made their way up through union movements and strike organizing. For the first decade of its existence, the WTUL adhered to the definition of working women as workers, overriding the organizational experience that its elite sponsors
brought from years of participation in the woman movement. Since the labor movement was technically open to women, an approach that emphasized craft-based organizing protected the sponsors from class-based attacks on their motives and the working women from charges of dual unionism. Dependent on the AFL for both financial support and legitimation as a labor organization, the WTUL was constrained from pursuing industrial models of labor organization or taking a more explicitly political approach that might aggravate the tensions between the AFL’s official bipartisan stance and the independent electoral efforts of the socialist wing of the labor movement. Given these struggles over organizational models and strategies within the dominant labor federation, a craft union strategy seemed preferable to more “feminine” organizational forms that often resembled the political strategies of the Socialists. “In its first years . . . the league did not explore alternatives for women’s unions. In the early twentieth century, the AFL represented the only model for successful unionism, despite its severe limitations for female industrial workers. For the league, it was the labor movement, and the WTUL saw no alternative but to carry on its organizing campaigns within the AFL’s framework” (Dye 1980, p. 87).

With the victory of craft unionism and the hegemony of the AFL only recently secured, any women’s experiments in union form would inevitably challenge their most powerful allies. Only after years of disappointments and declining financial support from the AFL did the WTUL begin to draw on the models of political action developed within the middle-class bastions of the woman movement. Legislative campaigns began to replace union organizing and industrial strikes.

This shift in strategy depended upon the ongoing evolution of organization and strategy among middle- and upper-middle-class women. During the same years that the women’s club movement began to grow rapidly among the middle class, women philanthropists had sponsored “Working Girls Clubs” offering classes and lectures (Montgomery 1987, p. 146). Although the clubs enjoyed considerable popularity in the Northeast, these attempts at cross-class alliances relied on the public but prepolitical models of the women’s club and were often a source of tension with working-class women hostile to any patronizing, however well-intended. This hostility was echoed by the men of the labor movement. After certain “ladies of a philanthropic and religious turn of mind” established a

20 A decade or more later, the WTUL appealed to immigrant women by setting up clubs parallel to the men’s fraternal benefit clubs, arguing that unionization could grow out of social solidarity. But, reflecting the ambiguous role of women in the work force, these clubs were caught in a controversy over whether to distribute marriage benefits or strike benefits (Dye 1980, pp. 112–13).
“Girls’ Union” in San Francisco in the late 1880s, the *Coast Seamen’s Journal* complained that “while we believe they mean well, their mode of procedure is not such as will emancipate our sisters from the slavery and socially degrading position which they at present are placed in” (quoted in Matthews 1913, p. 5). Club life did not appear to offer a path to significant economic improvement.

With the increasing turn of the women’s club movement toward legislative activity, however, new parallels emerged between working-class and middle-class women’s movements. Like their middle-class counterparts, working women risked censure when they ventured into the male world of politics. Surveying women’s union activities in San Francisco, Lillian Matthews (1913) noted that:

> The waitresses as a body and individually exhibit considerable more interest in municipal politics than do the women of other trade unions. This gives rise to many rumors that the waitresses include within their membership women who serve, from time to time, at least, in the type of cafe and resort which is always a factor in the darker side of municipal corruption. It is reported from numerous sources also that politicians of a certain class make use of the favor of waitresses because the publicity of their work throws them in contact with people whom they wish to influence. All this is mere rumor, however. But, whatever the reasons and whatever conclusions it may suggest, it is undoubtedly true that the waitresses mix into municipal politics, and that during some administrations they have received marked favors in the way of municipal positions. [P. 81]

In a city governed by the allegedly corrupt Union Labor party, participation in politics tarnished the reputation of the unionized waitresses at the same time that their activities suggested a further corruption of politics, a proletarian version of the “cunning spider-lobbyist” of the Gilded Age and her illicit mixing of the domestic and the political (Herring 1967, p. 36). But if the waitresses were censured for their alleged appropriation of the clearly masculine model of patronage politics, other models of political action were culturally available. Faced with defeat in organizing

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21 The reputation of the waitresses’ union was also attacked because the organization flaunted standards of feminine propriety in order to secure the financial basis of a solid union: “The waitresses raise most of their funds for relief and sick benefits from their large annual ball. This ball provokes considerable disapproval. One of the main features is a bar, and from the sale of drinks the receipts are $600 to $800. The sum thus derived goes into the benevolent fund.” With these ill-gotten gains, the waitresses provided death benefits, supported a paid staff which was “not customary in other unions,” established a minimum wage scale, and “molded together a class of workers who are notably hard to weld.” Despite all these accomplishments, the culturally questionable methods of the waitresses caused “the personnel of the Waitresses’ union [to receive] more criticism than is accorded to the women in the other unions” (Matthews 1913, pp. 78–81).
workers, both the Knights of Labor and the AFL had sometimes turned to lobbying or legislative strategies (Montgomery 1987, pp. 164–69) and, at least potentially, this path was also open to working women and their more privileged allies.

This shift in strategy is evident in the organizational development of the Women's Trade Union League. Between 1913 and 1915, the New York League switched its resources from supporting strikes to working for the passage of legislation and, above all, a woman suffrage bill: "The league's commitments to suffrage and protective legislation suggest that members had begun to cast their lot with women's organizations and feminist issues rather than with the male-dominated labor movement. . . . WTUL women also increasingly viewed their difficulties with organized labor as a fundamental conflict between men and women rather than as a conflict between workers and a predominantly upper-class organization" (Dye 1980, p. 123).

This shift required the organizational experiences and expertise that middle-class women had acquired over two decades of involvement, first in the club movement and charitable associations, then in the politics of suffrage and social reform. As the contrasting fates of middle-class and working-class women's organizations demonstrate, the relationship between gender and politics is mediated by organizational form and capacity. For working-class women, the comparative openness of male unions to their participation lessened the incentive for organizational innovation at the same time that the hardships of their lives limited the time and resources available for independent organizing. For middle-class women, by comparison, the sharp ideological delineation between the separate spheres pushed them to invent new organizations.

The organizational developments within the far-flung woman movement support each of the three propositions set out above. Rather than displaying a regular evolution toward more bureaucratic forms of organization in order to promote efficacy, women's groups were constantly engaged in debates over the meaning of different organizational forms. Even when business models were adopted, this was often not out of instrumental concerns but as an effort to demonstrate the status of the membership as autonomous, rational citizens eligible for an equal place in the American polity. Second, the organizational repertoires at stake varied across both time and social position. While an early generation of middle- and upper-middle-class women used the club to distance themselves from traditional female models of association, later generations contrasted the solidary and still distinctively gendered woman's study club with organizational models and practices (departments, cash exchanges, professionalism, and expertise) appropriated from business and bureaucracy. Over the same period, working-class women were fre-
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quently represented in—or at least by—work-based organizations promoting identities based on employment or economic sector (e.g., the Knights of Labor and the Patrons of Husbandry).

This class-related divergence of organizational repertoires created conditions in which the third proposition may be demonstrated: patterns of organization in response to novel or ambiguous situations should be shaped by a group's existing or desired ties to other groups committed to a particular model of organization. Faced with the task of creating organizations that would include working women, elite female reformers had to choose between work-based and gender-based models of organization. For so long as they were allied with and financially dependent on the AFL, the WTUL pursued organizationally conservative forms of workplace organizing. As this relationship became strained, the WTUL reconstituted itself around a more explicitly political model, strengthening its ties to other major women’s associations. Through these efforts, the distinctively gendered models of organization dominant in the 19th century disappeared, only to give way to a political system in which the bureaucratically organized representation of women by women (experts and activists, usually privileged) emerged as the leading edge of social policy expansion in the United States. But even though the reorganization of gender and political identity was incomplete, these changes had far-reaching effects on the institutions of American politics.

ORGANIZATIONAL REPERTOIRES AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

Through ongoing processes of organizational innovation—the constant search for political advantage or shared identity by trying something new, adopting some alternative model of organization—women's groups helped to create a new system of political institutions. In the place of a political system in which voting had been the central act and identity was grounded in the solidary networks of community and workplace, the beginning of the 20th century saw the rise of a political regime in which groups claiming to represent categories of persons presented specific demands to legislatures, using the leverage of public opinion, lobbyists, and expertise rather than sheer numbers of votes. Although scholars may well differ over the conservative nature of these developments and their normative status, these changes stand as an important example of profound institutional transformations stemming from regular—not revolutionary—political processes.

To understand how such change occurs, it is necessary to abandon the assumptions of unilinear development and institutional homogeneity that have dominated theorizing about the relation of social movements to political institutions. Instead, recent developments in organization theory
and social movement studies point to the importance of a multiplicity of organizational models, a repertoire of organization. This variety forces qualification of the classic models of the relation between movements and political institutions. First, different models of movement organization (and differences in the identities of those organized) mean that some movements may be more susceptible to the logics of incorporation that characterize a specific political regime. Second, in order to circumvent the disadvantages imposed by a specific regime, movement groups may import models of organization that are already culturally legitimate although not previously recognized as political. By using models of organization that are simultaneously familiar and novel, social movement groups may bring about changes in the taken-for-granted rules about what political organization is and what it is for.

In the United States, the loosely knit “woman movement” of the turn of the century provides an important example of this type of institutional change. Although the women’s parliaments and parties did demonstrate the isomorphism with existing political institutions predicted by the classic model of Michels, the majority of organizational activity by women’s groups involved a much more eclectic process of copying and transforming multiple models of organization: “Colleges and social scientists and experts of various kinds can help us in the matters upon which we are working, but as to the ways of working we have to blaze our own trail” (Winter 1925, p. vi; emphases in original). Limited by their exclusion from the organization and practices of electoral politics, women’s groups were particularly motivated to discover or invent new channels for their political activities. By drawing upon available alternative models of organization—business methods, state bureaucracy, and lobbies, along with models drawn from education and the professions—women’s groups helped to pioneer a distinctively nonelectoral style of social politics. The success of their experiments was such that this new style was quickly appropriated by other political actors and the historical origins of this model of political organization have been forgotten as the system of interest-group bargaining is taken as natural, indeed as constitutive of American politics (Moe 1980, p. 2).

Women’s groups were a source of political change because they were marginal to the existing electoral system, but not so marginal that they were ignored by other political actors. Together with the assumption of organizational heterogeneity—the assumption that a repertoire of organi-

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22 A similar assumption is found in much neo-Marxist work on modern society that focuses on the contradictions between institutions held to have different “logics” (e.g., Alford and Friedland 1985; Block 1977; O’Connor 1973).
zation exists—the presence of differences in political power is fundamental to this account of institutional change. The potential of a challenging group to produce changes in existing institutions is a joint product of the incentives to innovate produced by relative marginality and its visibility within the political arena, as well as the acceptability of those innovations to other political actors. Framed in these terms, this process of institutional change is a recurring element in the political history of this country. The civil rights movement, for example, was grounded in both the decreasing political marginality and increasing organizational innovation of blacks in the United States. The Great Migration out of the South increased black voting strength just as the shift of blacks to the Democratic party contributed to their leverage over the administration. Profiting from this growing visibility, activists synthesized models of organization grounded in religion with the strategies of nonviolent resistance and court-centered contestation to create a style of oppositional politics now shared by both the Left and the New Right (McAdam 1982). Similarly, the antiwar movement of the 1960s sought to exploit new relations with the mass media and, thereby, helped to usher in a political system in which a central role is played by the access of challenging groups to television coverage and the ability of established elites to control the terms of that coverage (Gitlin 1980). Nor is this dynamic limited to the United States. Describing the rise of ecology parties in Western Europe, Herbert Kitschelt (1989, p. 3) argues that “Left-libertarians have engaged in protest movements with loose alliances of federated, egalitarian organizations with little hierarchy or formalization of decision-making procedures. They have attempted to build their parties in the same mode” in the hope of ultimately “creating a more decentralized, libertarian and participatory society with less emphasis on economic competition and growth.” In those nations where it is marginalized by the political entrenchment of social democratic parties, the libertarian left has used the relatively high economic and educational capital of its membership to make visible a logic of politics defined by the representation of alternative life-styles or values rather than by electoral competition and compromise.

This account of institutional change does not imply that challenging groups achieved all that they desired, that oppositional intentions were not co-opted. Indeed, the enduring power of Michels’s analysis stems from the broad scope of the logics of incorporation in modern societies. But not all social groups and organizational forms are equally susceptible. Given the organizational heterogeneity of modern society and its consequences for the repertoires of organization that inform political life, the very process of challenging political institutions can change the rules of political action, if not necessarily the substance of political outcomes.
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