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MICROMOBILIZATION CONTEXTS AND RECRUITMENT TO ACTIVISM

Doug McAdam

Up until the mid-1970s, the study of social movements was dominated by theory and research focused at the micro-level of analysis. This characteristic focus betrayed the underlying view that social movements were less a variety of rational political action than a form of "collective behavior" that operates primarily at a social psychological level. Thus answers to both the macro question of movement emergence as well as the micro question of individual participation tended to be sought in the characteristic psychological profile—however described—of the activist and the presumed psychological functions attendant to participation. Among the variants of this traditional social psychological approach to the study of social movement are the mass society (Kornhauser 1959; Selznick 1970), collective behavior (Lang and Lang 1961; Smelser 1962; Turner and Killian 1972), and relative deprivation (Crawford and Naditch 1970; Davies 1962, 1969; Feierabend et al. 1969; Geschwender 1964; Gurr 1970; Searles and Williams 1962) models.

In the 1960s and 1970s social movement activity reached levels not seen since the 1930s, not only in the United States but in many European countries as well. The political turbulence of the era caught the sociological community

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off guard and demonstrated some glaring deficiencies in the traditional social psychological conceptions of social movements. These developments sparked something of a renaissance in the sociological study of social movements, triggered initially by a critical rethinking of the dominant theories in the field.

The theories were criticized on both theoretical and empirical grounds by many movement analysts (Aya 1979; Gamson 1975; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Oberschall 1973; Rule and Tilly 1975; Schwartz 1976; Shorter and Tilly 1974; Tarrow 1983; Tilly 1978). The effect of these critiques was to shift the focus of movement analysis from social psychological to more macro political and structural accounts of movement dynamics.

In the United States, the principal new theoretical perspectives to emerge in the field are the resource mobilization and political process models. In Europe, the "new social movements" approach has come to dominate research and writing on social movements. In contrast to earlier classical formulations, all of these perspectives attribute rationality to movement participants and posit a fundamental continuity between institutionalized and movement politics. The differences between the two models, then, are ones of emphasis rather than kind. Resource mobilization theorists tend to emphasize the constancy of discontent and the variability of resources in accounting for the emergence and development of insurgency (cf. McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Oberschall 1973). Accordingly, a principal focus of attention in their work is on how burgeoning movement organizations seek to mobilize and routinize—frequently by tapping lucrative elite sources of support—the flow of resources to ensure movement survival.

Though compatible with the resource mobilization approach, the political process model represents a slightly different perspective on social movements. As formulated by its chief proponents (McAdam 1982; Tilly 1978), the political process model emphasizes two sets of macro structural factors believed to facilitate the generation of social insurgency. The first is the level of organization within the aggrieved population; the second, the political realities confronting members and challengers at any given time. The first can be conceived of as the degree of structural "readiness" within the minority community and the latter, following Eisinger, as the "structure of political opportunities" available to insurgent groups (Eisinger 1973).

Though marked by considerable diversity, the new social movements perspective attributes the rise of social movements in Europe over the past 15 years to new political, economic, and social strains that have accompanied modernization processes in postwar Europe (Brand 1982; Klandermans 1986; Melucci 1980). These processes are variously described as having undermined traditional ways of life, reduced the political and social importance of various social groups, and decreased the ability of society and its political institutions to respond to social problems.

As valuable as the recent theoretical shift toward more macro determinants of movement dynamics has been, we now run the risk of merely substituting one conceptual orthodoxy for another. Just as the earlier social psychological conceptions of social movements oversimplified the complexity of collective action, so too do those models that attribute exclusive importance to macro structural factors. Reflecting a desire to redress the new macro bias in movement theory, several authors (Jenkins 1983, p. 527; Klandermans 1984, pp. 583-84; Snow et al. 1985, pp. 2-3) have recently voiced calls for the development of a new and viable social psychology of collective action. While I agree with their assessment of the current macro bias in the field, I am not persuaded that a reassertion of the social psychological is the best way to redress this imbalance. Such an assertion reifies the micro/macro distinction and reinforces the notion that the two constitute distinct levels of analysis. What is missing is not so much a viable social psychology of collective action—the broad contours of which already exist in the literature—but intermediate theoretical "bridges" that would allow us to join empirical work at both levels of analysis. In the absence of such "bridges" we are doomed to perpetuate two important but ultimately incomplete accounts of collective action. Movements may occur in a broad macro context, but their actual development clearly depends on a series of more specific dynamics operating at the micro level. Just as clearly, these micro dynamics must be seen against the backdrop of the larger political-economic context in which they occur if we are to fully understand the timing and specific form they take. This chapter, then, has two aims. In the first or theoretical section of the chapter, I intend to sketch the relationship between macro political factors and the individual decision to participate as mediated through the crucial conceptual "bridge" of the "micromobilization context." In the second or empirical section of the chapter, I will present data that document the crucial importance of these "micromobilization contexts" in the recruitment of volunteers to a specific campaign in the American Civil Rights Movement. The campaign in question took place in 1964 and was termed the Mississippi Freedom Summer project. As a preface to the empirical section of the chapter, I will provide a fuller account of this project. Before I do so, however, it will be necessary to lay a conceptual foundation for the analysis that will follow later in the chapter.

I. POLITICAL FACTORS IN MOVEMENT EMERGENCE

One of the major contributions of the recent paradigm shift in the field of social movements has been the reassertion of the political. Both the resource mobilization and political process perspectives locate social movements squarely within the realm of rational political action. In contrast to institutionalized politics, social movements are simply "politics by other

means," often the *only* means open to relatively powerless challenging groups. As such, social movements should be as responsive to the broad political trends and characteristics of the regions and countries in which they occur as are institutionalized political processes. Recent research in the field suggests as much. Among the macro political factors that have been linked to the development of collective action are expanding political opportunities, regime crisis and contested political arenas, the absence of political repression and the imposition of "suddenly imposed grievances," and the unchecked expansion of the welfare state. Each of these factors will be discussed in turn.

Structure of Political Opportunities

Considerable evidence now exists suggesting the crucial importance of changes in the "structure of political opportunities" (Eisinger 1973) for the ebb and flow of movement activity. By "structure of political opportunities" we mean the distribution of member support and opposition to the political aims of a given challenging group. Characteristically, challengers are excluded from any real participation in institutionalized politics because of strong opposition on the part of most polity members. This unfavorable structure of political opportunities is hardly immutable, however. In so saying our:

> attention is directed away from systems characterizations presumably true for all times and places, which are basically of little value in understanding the social and political process. We are accustomed to describing communist political systems as "experiencing a thaw" or "going through a process of retrenchment." Should it not at least be an open question as to whether the American political system experiences such stages as fluctuations? Similarly, is it not sensible to assume that the system will be more or less open to specific groups at different times and at different places? (Lipsky 1970, p. 14).

The answer to both of Lipsky's questions is yes. Challenging groups *can* count on facing very different levels of support and opposition over time. It is these variations in support and opposition that constitute the shifting structure of political opportunities confronting challengers and members which have been shown to be related to the ebb and flow of movement activity.

For example, Jenkins and Perrow (1977) attribute the success of the farm workers movement in the 1960s to "the altered political environment within which the challenge operated" (263). The change, they contend, originated "in economic trends and political realignments that took place quite independent of any 'push' from insurgents" (266). In similar fashion, McAdam (1982) has attributed the emergence of widespread black protest activity in the 1950s and 1960s, in part, to several broad political trends—expansion of the black vote, its shift to the Democratic party, postwar competition for influence among emerging Third World nations—that served to enhance the bargaining position of civil rights forces. In his analysis of the emergence of the contemporary

environmental movement, Gale (1982) has also noted the importance of a "political system which included agencies already sympathetic to the movement" (p. 6). Indeed, with increased historical perspective has come the realization that the ascendant liberal-left coalition of the 1960s created a broad political context facilitating the emergence of a wide variety of leftist movements. Similarly, the conservative backlash of the 1970s and the contemporary dominance of the political right has encouraged the mobilization of the Moral Majority and pro-life forces while dimming the prospects for successful leftist movements. More generally, Tarrow (1983) has proposed a similar pattern of thaw and contraction in political opportunities as a standard feature of most liberal democratic regimes.

Regime Crises and Contested Political Arenas

Related to, yet distinct from, the previous category are regime crises and general contests for political dominance within a particular region or country. Both situations translate into a net gain in political opportunity for all organized challengers. In this sense the result is the same as in the cases discussed in the previous section. The difference stems from the conditions that give rise to the improved bargaining situation confronting the challenger. In the previous section we cited instances in which broad macro processes—demographic, political, etc.—had increased the leverage of a *particular* challenger without affecting the system-wide distribution of political power. By contrast, regime crises or periods of generalized political instability improve the relative position of *all* challenges by undermining the hegemonic position of previously dominant groups or coalitions.

Despite this difference, both situations are expected to stimulate a rise in social movement activity. Certainly the literatures on regime crises and major contests for political dominance support this assumption. Shorter and Tilly, for example, marshall data to show that peaks in French strike activity correspond to periods in which organized contention for national political power is unusually intense. They note that "factory and white-collar workers undertook in 1968 the longest, largest general strike in history as student unrest reopened the question of who were to be the constituent political groups of the Fifth Republic" (Shorter and Tilly 1974, p. 344). Similarly, Schwartz (1976) argues that a period of political instability preceded the rise of the Southern Farmers Alliance in the post-Civil War South. With the southern planter aristocracy and emerging industrial interests deadlocked in a struggle for political control of the region, a unique opportunity for political advancement was created for any group able to break the stalemate. In like fashion, Skocpol (1979) has located the source of revolution in major regime crises, typically precipitated by military losses and fiscal overextension. To this list of well-researched examples one might also add the generalized political instability

in Germany following World War I as the facilitative context in which the Nazis came to power.

Absence of Repression

A third macro political factor often associated with the rise of a social movement is the absence or relatively restrained use of repressive social control by movement opponents. Although analytically distinct from the other two conditions, the absence of repression frequently occurs in conjunction with both of these factors. In a situation in which expanding political opportunities have significantly improved the bargaining position of a particular group, movement opponents are likely to exercise more restraint in dealing with the challenger.

Now, the movement's improved position increases the risk of political reprisals against any who would seek to repress it, whereas before, the powerless status of the challenger made it a relatively "safe" target. Thus repression is less likely to be attempted even in the face of an increased threat to the interests of other groups. For, as Gamson notes in summarizing the evidence from his survey of challenging groups, insurgents "are attacked not merely because they are regarded as threatening—all challenging groups are threatening to some vested interest. They are threatening *and* vulnerable" (1975, p. 82). To the extent, then, that shifting political conditions increase the power of a particular challenger, they also render them less vulnerable to attack by raising the cost of repression. This argument figures prominently in McAdam's (1982) account of the rise of widespread black protest activity in the 1950s and 1960s. Using the annual number of lynchings as a crude measure of repression, he has documented a significant decline in lynching during the period when black political fortunes were on the rise nationally (87-90). The implication is that the enhanced political significance of blacks at the national level increased the South's fear of federal intervention and thus restrained the use of extreme control measures. This restraint in turn created a more favorable context in which blacks could mobilize.

Recourse to repressive measures is also likely to decline during regime crises as the coercive capacity of the state deteriorates. Skocpol (1979) places great stress on this dynamic in her analysis of revolution, arguing persuasively that it is the collapse of the state as a repressive agent that sets in motion peasant mobilization. One need look no further than Iran under the Shah for a recent example of the same dynamic. As the crisis in Iran deepened, the Shah's ability to utilize the repressive measures he had once used so successfully declined rapidly. When, at last, large segments of the armed forces abandoned the regime, the last restraints on mobilization were removed, a development that precipitated the Shah's ouster.

One could also argue that the rise of the Solidarity Movement in Poland was aided by the unusual restraint showed by the Soviet leadership in failing to repress the burgeoning movement. This failure in turn can be linked to the unique political opportunity created by the Soviet Union's earlier invasion of Afghanistan. Having mounted the invasion only months before the strikes by Polish workers, the Soviet leadership was already smarting from the criticism the invasion had triggered in international political circles. No doubt their desire to avoid another major foreign policy setback, the likes of which would surely have followed an invasion of Poland, greatly restricted their resources to the type of repressive action that they had earlier used so successfully in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Suddenly Imposed Grievances

One final macro political factor that has been linked to the outbreak of collective action is the imposition of what Walsh (1981) has termed "suddenly imposed grievances" (p. 1). Rejecting the claim of some resource mobilization theorists that grievances are relatively constant, Walsh argues that the sudden imposition—whether through accident or conscious decision—of onerous conditions on a population is likely to stimulate widespread collective action. In support of his claim, Walsh provides convincing evidence of a sharp rise in protest activity in the area around Three Mile Island immediately following the accident there.

Nor is Walsh's the only example of this phenomenon. Useem's (1980) analysis of the antibusing movement in Boston leaves little doubt that the imposition of court-ordered busing precipitated widespread mobilization efforts among the residents of South Boston. Molotch (1970) documents a similar rise in protest activity among residents of Santa Barbara, California, in the wake of a major oil spill there. Even rising national opposition to the Vietnam War in the late 1960s can be interpreted within this framework. The war itself can be seen, as it was at the time, as a series of suddenly imposed grievances—higher draft quotas, the "secret" bombing of Cambodia, the elimination of student deferments—each of which, in turn, fueled growing protest against the war.

Welfare State Expansion and the Politicization of Private Life

One final political factor that has been linked to the generation of social movements is the penetration of the state into previously private areas of life. This factor has been stressed primarily by proponents of the new social movements approach (cf. Hirsch 1980; Klandermans 1986; Melucci 1980, 1981), and often is couched in terms of a broader Marxist view of the state. The argument is straightforward. The contradictions inherent in postindustrial capitalist economies have forced the state to intervene in previously private areas of life. The state is required to do so both to underwrite the process of

capital accumulation (O'Connor 1973) as well as to satisfy needs no longer satisfactorily addressed by an ailing market economy. New social movements have then emerged in response to this unprecedented state penetration into various private spheres of life. In this view, movements as diverse as the women's movement, the environmental movement, and the gay rights campaign can be seen as efforts to regain control over decisions and areas of life increasingly subject to state control.

II. MICRO PROCESSES AND THE INDIVIDUAL DECISION TO PARTICIPATE

Although important, these macro political conditions do not, in any simple sense, produce a social movement. They only offer insurgents a certain objective "structural potential" for collective political action. Mediating between opportunity and action are people and the subjective meanings they attach to their situations. This crucial attribution process has been ignored by proponents of both the collective behavior and resource mobilization processes. As Edelman has pointed out, "our explanations of mass political response have radically undervalued the ability of the human mind . . . to take a complex set of . . . cures into account [and] evolve a mutually acceptable form of response" (1971, p. 133). As one form of response, social protest depends upon two related yet analytically distinct social psychological processes.

Cognitive Liberation

For all the recent emphasis on macro political or other structural "determinants" of social movements, the immediate impetus to collective action remains a cognitive one. As William Gamson's recent book (1982) makes abundantly clear, successful collective action proceeds from a significant transformation in the collective consciousness of the actors involved. This process of "cognitive liberation" depends upon the generation and widespread adoption of the following three cognitions described by Piven and Cloward:

> The emergence of a protest movement entails a transformation both of consciousness and of behavior. The change in consciousness has at least three distinct aspects. First, "the system"—or those aspects of the system that people experience and perceive—loses legitimacy. Large numbers of men and women who ordinarily accept the authority of their rulers and the legitimacy of institutional arrangements come to believe in some measure that these rulers and these arrangements are unjust and wrong. Second, people who are ordinarily fatalistic, who believe that existing arrangements are inevitable, begin to assert "rights" that imply demands for change. Third, there is a new sense of efficacy; people who ordinarily consider themselves helpless come to believe that they have some capacity to alter their lot (Piven and Cloward 1979, pp. 3-4).

The absence of any of these cognitions is likely to deprive insurgents of either the motive or will to engage in collective action.

One of the central problematics of insurgency, then, is whether favorable political conditions will be defined as such by a large enough group of people to facilitate collective protest. This process, however, is not independent of the macro political conditions discussed above. Indeed, one effect of improved political conditions is to render this process of "cognitive liberation" more likely.

As noted earlier, favorable shifts in political opportunities decrease the power disparity between insurgents and their opponents and, in doing so, increase the cost of repressing the movement. These are objective structural changes. Such shifts, however, have a subjective referent as well. That is, challengers experience shifting political conditions on a day-to-day basis as a set of "meaningful" events communicating much about their prospects for successful collective action.

Sometimes the political significance of events is apparent on their face, as when mass migration significantly alters the electoral composition of a region. Thus, as early as the mid-1930s black leaders began to use the fact of rapidly swelling black populations in key northern industrial states as bargaining leverage in their dealings with presidential candidates (Sitkoff 1978, p. 282). Even when evolving political realities are of a less dramatic nature, however, they will invariably be made "available" to insurgents through subtle cues communicated by other groups. The expectation is that, as conditions shift in favor of a particular challenger, members will display a certain increased symbolic responsiveness to insurgents. Thus in a tight labor market we might expect management to be more responsive to workers than they had previously been. Or, as regards the earlier example, should internal migration significantly increase the proportion of a certain population residing in a region, we could expect area politicians to be more symbolically attentive to that group than before.

As subtle and substantively meaningless as these altered responses may be, their significance for the generation of insurgency would be hard to overstate. As Edelman notes, "political actions chiefly arouse or satisfy people not by granting or withholding their stable substantive demands, but rather by changing the demands and the expectations" (1971, p. 7). In effect, the altered responses of members to a particular challenger serve to transform evolving political conditions into a set of "cognitive cues" signifying to insurgents that the political system is becoming increasingly vulnerable to challenge. Thus, by forcing a change in the symbolic content of member/challenger relations, shifting political conditions supply a crucial impetus to the process of cognitive liberation.

Value Expectancy

Should the three cognitions discussed above come to be widely shared within a particular population, the chances that collective action will occur are quite good. This likelihood still tells us nothing about whether a given number of that population will take part in any resulting action. To better understand that process we need a model of individual decision making. Through his application of value expectancy theory to the phenomenon of individual activism, Klandermans (1984) has offered us such a model. At the heart of his model is a view of the individual as a rational, calculating actor weighing the costs and benefits of activism. The key point though is that these anticipated costs and benefits are not independent of the individual's assessment of the likely actions of others. Instead, the perceived efficacy of participation for the individual will depend upon the following three sets of expectations he or she brings to the decision-making process:

a. expectations about the number of participants;
b. expectations about one's own contribution to the probability of success;
c. expectations about the probability of success if many people participate (Klandermans 1984, p. 585).

As regards participation, individual activism is most likely to occur in a situation where the individual has high expectations on all three of these counts.

It should be obvious, however, that the formulation of these expectations does not occur in a social vacuum. Rather, the prevailing assessment of the chances for successful collective action within the individual's immediate social circle is likely to exert a powerful influence on his or her own thinking. In this sense, the process of cognitive liberation is not independent of the individual decision-making process described by Klandermans. Rather it is the context within which these individual choice processes occur. The individual's own expectations regarding the prospect for collective action cannot then be separated from the collective attribution processes discussed earlier. For an individual actor to formulate expectations regarding the behavior of others, he or she must be (a) attuned to, and (b) *in contact with* other prospective activists. This point brings us to the all-important structural bridge mediating the relationship between macro political conditions and the individual decision to act on those conditions.

III. THE MICROMOBILIZATION CONTEXT

The key intermediate concept linking macro and micro processes is that of the micromobilization context. A micromobilization context can be defined as that small group setting in which processes of collective attribution are

combined with rudimentary forms of organization to produce mobilization for collective action. Several examples of such settings will help to clarify the concept. Perhaps the most obvious example is that of the preexistent political group. Unions, for instance, provide a previously organized context in which political attributions are generated and translated into concrete forms of action. But the concept is not synonymous with the union as a formally constituted, bureaucratic entity. Subgroups within the union, organized informally on the basis of seniority or along task, racial, or even friendship lines may provide a basis for mobilization independent of the broader union context. This is precisely the situation in the case of a wildcat strike, or in instances where small, informally organized groups of workers become active in other movements. An example of the latter would be the "hardhat marches" organized in the early 1970s by construction workers supporting the war in Vietnam.

This example of "extracurricular" mobilization can apply to nonpolitical groups as well. That is, groups organized for ostensibly *nonpolitical* purposes can serve as the setting within which attribution and organization come together to produce collective *political* action. Several authors have, for example, noted the importance of black churches as collective settings in which early civil rights organizing took place (cf. McAdam 1982; Morris 1984; Oberschall 1973, pp. 126-27). Curtis and Zurcher (1973) assign similar importance to a variety of "nonpolitical" organizations—but especially "fraternal/service" groups—in their analysis of the emergence of a local anti-pornography movement in Texas (56).

Finally, micromobilization may also take place in smaller, informal groups of people. For instance, friendship networks have been known to furnish the crucial context for micromobilization. Perhaps the best known example is the case of the four Greensboro A & T students who initiated the 1960 sit-in movement with a demonstration that originated in informal "bull sessions" in one anothers' dorm rooms. Similarly, Sarah Evans (1980) locates the roots of the women's liberation movement in informal networks of women who had come to know one another in the context of civil rights and New Left organizing. Finally, Wilson and Orum (1976), see such networks as providing an important collective basis for riot participation. They write: "Many analysts have found themselves baffled by the riots of the 1960s; explanations presumed to work, such as those based on conventional psychological theories, do not. On the basis of our limited experience with and observations of these events, it appears to us that social bonds alike, i.e., friendship networks, drew many people to become active participants" (198).

Despite these differences in the size and degree of formal organization of these various collective settings, all serve to encourage mobilization in at least three ways. First, they provide the context in which the all-important social-psychological processes discussed above can occur. I will discuss this factor in greater detail later in the chapter. For now I will only note its significance in the generation of social insurgency.

Secondly, these settings provide the rudiments of organization—leaders, whether formally designated or not, communication technologies, etc.—needed to translate attributions into concrete action. It is not enough that people define situations in new and potentially revolutionary ways; to create a movement they must also act on these definitions. As preexisting groups, these contexts provide the established roles and lines of interaction necessary for action to unfold.

Finally, these collective settings supply the established structures of solidary incentives on which most social behavior depends. By "structures of solidary incentives" I refer to the myriad interpersonal rewards that attend ongoing participation in any established group or informal association. It is expected that these incentive structures will solve or at least mitigate the effects of the "free rider" program.

First discussed by Mancur Olson (1965), the "free rider problem" refers to the difficulties insurgents encounter in trying to convince participants to pursue goals whose benefits they would reap even if they did not participate in the movement. The fact is, when viewed in the light of a narrow economic calculus, movement participation would indeed seem to be irrational. Even if we correct for Olson's overly rationalistic model of the individual, the "free rider" mentality would still seem to pose a formidable barrier to movement recruitment. The solution to this problem is held to stem from the provision of selective incentives to induce the participation that individual calculation would alone seem to preclude (Gamson 1975, pp. 66-71; Olson 1965).

In the context of these settings, however, the provision of selective incentives would seem unnecessary. These organizations already rest on a solid structure of solidary incentives that insurgents can appropriate by defining movement participation as synonymous with group membership. Accordingly, the myriad of incentives that have heretofore served as the motive force for participation in the group is now simply transferred to the movement. Thus insurgents have been spared the difficult task of inducing participation through the provision of new incentives of either a solidary or material nature.

For all these reasons, then, established groups or associational networks such as those discussed earlier are expected to serve as the basic building blocks of social movements. In effect, they constitute the "cellular structure" of collective action. However, this discussion still leaves the issue of micro-macro bridges unexamined. How *do* these mobilization contexts serve to link the macro conditions and micro dynamics discussed earlier? Quite simply, their significance lies in the important interpersonal context they create within which the two social-psychological processes outlined above can occur.

Cognitive Liberation and the Process of Collective Attribution

As regards the process of cognitive liberation, I earlier emphasized the importance of three cognitions that result from the process. It is important

to realize, however, that these cognitions "are overwhelmingly not based upon observation or empirical evidence available to participants, but rather upon cuings among groups of people who jointly create the meanings they will read into current and anticipated events" (Edelman 1971, p. 32). The key phrase here is "groups of people." That is, the chances that cognitive liberation (McAdam 1982) will occur are assumed to be greatest in precisely the kind of collective settings I have called mobilization contexts.

This assumption would seem to be intuitively reasonable. Even in the unlikely event that a single person were to generate these necessary cognitions, his or her isolation would almost surely prevent their spread to the minimum number of people required to afford a reasonable basis for successful collective action. More to the point, perhaps, is the suspicion that under such conditions these cognitions would never arise in the first place. The consistent finding that links feelings of political efficacy to social integration supports this judgment (Neal and Seeman 1964; Pinard 1971; Sayre 1980). In the absence of strong interpersonal links to others, people are likely to feel powerless to change conditions even if they perceive present conditions as favorable to such efforts.

To this finding one might add the educated supposition that what Ross (1977) calls the "fundamental attribution error"—the tendency of people to explain their situation as a function of individual rather than situational factors—is more likely to occur under conditions of personal isolation than under those of integration. Lacking the information and perspective that others afford, isolated individuals would seem especially prone to explain their troubles on the basis of personal rather than "system attributions" (Ferree and Miller 1977).

The practical significance of this distinction comes from the fact that only system attributions afford the necessary rationale for movement activity. For movement analysts, then, the key question becomes, What social circumstances are productive of "system attributions?" If we follow Ferree and Miller, the likely answer is that the chances "of a system attribution would appear to be greatest among extremely homogeneous people who are in intense regular contact with each other" (1977, p. 34). In our terms, the chances that "cognitive liberation" will occur would seem greatest in the type of mobilization context described earlier. These settings also provide a favorable context for a second important interpersonal process.

Value Expectancy and the Aggregation of Choice

Finally, the generation of favorable expectations regarding the prospects for successful collective action would also seem most likely to occur in the kind of collective settings under discussion here. As useful as Klandermans' application of value expectancy theory is, it nonetheless tends, as most choice theories do, to divorce the individual actor and the subjective utilities that shape his or her choices from the collective settings in which these utilities are derived.

This is not to deny that the individual remains the ultimate focus of choice processes. At the same time the generation of expectancies on which choice depends remains a profoundly social process requiring attention to and information about other relevant actors. The significance of these micromobilization contexts, then, stems, in part, from the ready access to information they afforded members. Imagine two students trying to decide whether to attend an antinuke rally to be held on campus. Imagine further that one of the students lives in a dorm and is a member of several political groups on campus, while the other commutes to school and is not a member of any campus groups. Irrespective of their attitudes concerning nuclear power, which of the two students is more likely to attend the rally? Probably the student who is more integrated into campus life. Why? There are several reasons but among the most significant is the fact that our erstwhile activist is involved in several collective settings—the dorm and political group—that favor the generation of high expectations concerning the prospects for successful group action. To the extent that others in either setting are indicating that they might attend the rally, the likelihood that our potential recruit will go are increased as well.

But it isn't just that these collective settings encourage choices favoring participation. They also serve as contexts within which these individual choices can be aggregated into a collective plan of action. It isn't enough that individual actors choose to participate in activism. Their choices must then be combined with those of others in such a way as to make group action possible. Micromobilization contexts provide the setting within which this aggregation process can occur.

We are now in a position to assess the role of these micromobilization contexts in the recruitment of volunteers to a specific instance of activism: the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer project. That campaign brought nearly one thousand primarily white college students from the northern United States to Mississippi—a state in the American South—for all, or part of, the summer of 1964. While there, the volunteers taught black children, attempted to register black voters, and, by their mere presence, dramatized the continued denial of civil rights throughout the American South. As instances of activism go it would be hard to imagine many more costly or potentially risky than the Freedom Summer campaign. Volunteers were asked to commit an average of two months of their summer to a project that was to prove physically and emotionally harrowing for nearly everyone. Moreover, in this effort they were expected to be financially independent. Thus they were asked not only to give up their chance of summer employment elsewhere but to support themselves as well.

The project itself began in early June with the first contingent of volunteers arriving in Mississippi fresh from a week of training at Oxford, Ohio. Within 10 days 3 project members, Mickey Schwerner, James Chaney, and Andrew Goodman, had been kidnapped and beaten to death by a group of segregationists led by Mississippi law enforcement officers. That event set the tone for the summer as the remaining volunteers endured beatings, bombings, and arrest. Moreover most did so while sharing the grinding poverty and unrelieved fear that was the daily lot of the black families that housed them.

A. The Study

Preliminary to their participation in the campaign all prospective volunteers were required to fill out detailed applications providing information on, among other topics, their organizational affiliations, college activities, reasons for volunteering, and record of previous arrest. On the basis of these applications (and, on occasion, subsequent interviews), the prospective volunteer was either accepted or rejected. Acceptance did not necessarily mean participation in the campaign, however. In advance of the summer many of the accepted applicants informed campaign staffers that they would not be taking part in the summer effort after all. Completed applications for all three groups—rejects, participants, and withdrawals—were copied and coded from the originals, which now repose in the archives of the Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for the Study of Nonviolence in Atlanta, Georgia and the New Mississippi Foundation in Jackson, Mississippi.[1] A total of 1,068 applications were coded in connection with this study. The breakdown of these applications by group is as follows: 720 participants, 239 withdrawals, 55 rejections, 54 whose status regarding the summer project is unclear. Together these applications provide a unique source of archival data for assessing the relative importance of various factors in recruitment to activism.

B. Results

Attitudinal Affinity

Attitudinal accounts of activism are based on the assumption that people participate in social movements because of some underlying ideological affinity with the movement. At one level this claim is unobjectionable. Certainly the Freedom Summer volunteers were supportive of the general goals and ideals of the American civil rights movement. The real question is, were the prior attitudes of the volunteers sufficient in themselves to account for their participation. The answer I would offer here is a qualified no. While there were small, suggestive differences between participants and withdrawals in the ideological motivations they brought to the project, these differences would not appear to be enough to account for their very different courses of action that summer.

Not surprisingly, *all* of the applicants—participants and withdrawals alike—emerge as highly committed, articulate supporters of the goals and values of

Table 1. Percentage of Participants and Withdrawals Reporting Various Motivations for Participation in the Freedom Summer Project

	Participants		*Withdrawals*	
Self-oriented Motives	%	(*N* = 300)	%	(*N* = 300)
As a vehicle for personal witness	39	(116)	32	(44)
As a vehicle for personal education (regarding the "plight of the Negro," regarding the "southern way of life," etc.)	21	(64)	24	(32)
As a vehicle for expiating guilt	3	(8)	6	(8)
As a vehicle for personal growth ("to test myself," etc.)	4	(12)	6	(8)
To formally affiliate with SNCC or the civil rights movement	24	(72)	26	(36)
As a vehicle for formal academic study	1	(4)	3	(4)
To experience the excitement of the project ("to be where the action is," etc.)	4	(12)	6	(8)
To gain teaching or other career related experience	11	(32)	3	(4)
Other self-oriented motives	4	(12)	4	(16)
Total self-oriented motives*	—	(332)	—	(150)
Other-oriented Motives				
To aid in the full realization of democracy in the United States	12	(36)	18	(24)
To help improve the lot of blacks generally	82	(246)	65	(89)
To aid in the equalization of black educational opportunities	15	(44)	21	(28)
To aid in the equalization of black political opportunities	13	(40)	6	(8)
To demonstrate white concern for black civil rights	3	(8)	9	(12)
To dramatize the depths of racism in the United States	3	(8)	6	(8)
To act as an example to others	7	(20)	0	(10)
To demonstrate the power of nonviolence as a vehicle for social change	5	(16)	3	(4)
Total other-related motives +	—	(418)	—	(172)

*Average number of self-oriented motives per: participants = 1.11
withdrawals = 1.10

+Average number of other-oriented motives per: participants = 1.37
withdrawals = 1.21

the summer campaign. The logic of the application process virtually assured this outcome. To apply, interested parties had to seek out and obtain a five page application from a campus representative of the project. The applicant then had to fill out the form and in many cases submit to a formal "screening interview" by the campus coordinator of the summer project. In short, applying to the project required considerable effort on the applicant's part, no doubt ensuring a kind of natural selection in the application process. Presumably, only those with considerable attitudinal affinity for the project would have been willing to expend the time and energy required of an applicant.

One question from the application provides a kind of crude confirmation of this presumption. Applicants were asked simply to explain why they "would like to work in Mississippi."[1] As noted earlier, *all* the answers to this item reflected an overwhelmingly positive stance toward the goals of Freedom Summer as well as the movement in general. More relevant for our purposes, there were only slight differences between participants and withdrawals in the thematic content of their answers.

An open-ended list of 17 motivational "themes" was used to capture the applicant's reason(s) for applying to the project. In addition, a single dichotomous code was used to distinguish between answers that reflected either a "self" or "other" motivation for participating. Statements that stressed the *personal* challenge of the campaign or the *individual* benefits of the experience (e.g., teaching experience), were coded as "self-interested" motives. Those that reflected more general, "selfless" concerns were categorized as "other-oriented" motives. However, neither of the above code dimensions captured any significant distinctions between participants and withdrawals. The average number of motives ascribed to both groups that were categorized as "self" or "other interested" was not statistically different.[2] Nor did the 17 thematic code categories produce a characteristic motivational "profile" for participants distinct from that of the no-shows. Both groups tended to rely on the same mix of themes in explaining their reasons for participating.

Admittedly, the single open-ended question described above hardly tells us all we would want to know about the underlying attitudes and values of the applicants. What is clear is that the participants' ideological identification with the project was not irrelevant to their later participation. Rather the participants' consistently strong attitudinal support for the project would seem to have been a necessary prerequisite for their later involvement. What is equally clear, however, is that it was not sufficient to ensure that involvement. On both attitudinal dimensions participants and withdrawals are virtually indistinguishable.

If the motivations underlying participation do not differ significantly for withdrawals and participants, what does? One possible answer to this question is that participants were integrated into a variety of micromobilization contexts to a greater degree than were withdrawals. By micromobilization contexts I

mean any formal organizations, informal networks, or social relationships that serve to "pull" the potential recruit into activism. At least three different micromobilization contexts have been identified in the literature as midwives to the recruitment process. The first of these agents, formal organizations, can facilitate recruitment in two ways. First, individuals can be drawn into a movement by virtue of their involvement in organizations that serve as the associational network out of which a new movement emerges. This was true, as Melder (1964) notes, in the case of the nineteenth-century women's rights movement in the United States, with a disproportionate number of the movement's recruits coming from existing abolitionist groups. Curtis and Zurcher (1973) have observed a similar pattern in connection with the rise of two antipornography groups. In their study, the authors provide convincing data to support their contention that recruits were overwhelmingly drawn from the broad "multiorganizational fields" in which both groups were embedded.

Second, established organizations can serve as the primary source of movement participants through what Oberschall (1973, p. 125) has termed "bloc recruitment." In this pattern, movements do not so much emerge out of established organizations as they represent a merger of such groups. Hicks, for instance, has described how the Populist party was created through a coalition of established farmers' organizations (1961). The rapid rise of the free-speech movement at Berkeley has been attributed to a similar merger of existing campus organizations (Lipset and Wolin 1965). Both of these patterns, then, highlight the organizational basis of much movement recruitment and support Oberschall's general conclusion: "mobilization does not occur through recruitment of large numbers of isolated and solitary individuals. It occurs as a result of recruiting blocs of people who are already highly organized and participants" (1973, p. 125).

Individual activists have also been identified as an important agent in the recruitment process. Here it matters little whether the potential recruit is involved in formal organizations or not. Instead, the emphasis is on the necessity for prior *personal* contact with a *single* activist who introduces the recruit to the movement. Empirical support for the importance of a prior relationship with a single activist can be found in the work of Gerlach and Hine (1970), and Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson (1980).

With respect to these relationships it is useful to ask two empirical questions. First, are they more important than formal organizations in encouraging activism? Second, what *type* of relationship is more effective in recruiting other activists? Here Granovetter's (1973) distinction between "strong" and "weak" ties is of special interest. Granovetter and others have found that weak ties, more so than strong, are crucial to diffusion processes. We will want to see whether, in fact, this pattern holds true in the case of the Freedom Summer project. Did participants know more volunteers prior to the summer than did withdrawals? And, if so, did these prior contacts represent primarily weak or strong ties?

Finally, to these two agents—organizations and individual activists—we can add a third. I am referring to the movement in which the high risk episode is embedded. Here the micromobilization context is not a specific organization or person but the subcultural "world" of the movement. In such cases, prior involvement in the movement is expected to have embedded the individual in a network of organizational and interpersonal ties that are likely to draw him or her into subsequent actions.

In assessing the importance of these three micromobilization contexts, each will be looked at separately in terms of how well they differentiate Freedom Summer participants from withdrawals. Then the effects of all three will be measured simultaneously by means of a logit regression equation predicting participation in the summer project.

1. *Organizational affiliations.* One of the most significant of these contexts is the total number of organizational affiliations listed by the two groups on their applications. Table 2 clearly shows that participants tend to belong to more organizations than do withdrawals. To highlight this contrast we can compare the percentage within each group that belongs to less than or more than two organizations. Forty-eight percent of the withdrawals fall into the former category, as compared to only 35% of the participants. On the other hand, 66% of the participants, but only 52% of the withdrawals, belong to two or more organizations.

But as Table 3 indicates, it is not simply that participants and withdrawals differ in the number of organizations they belong to; the *type* of organizations

Table 2. Number of Organizational Affiliations by the Summer Status of the Freedom Summer Applicants* (in percentages)

Number of Organizations	*Summer Status*			
	Participants		*Withdrawals*	
	%	*N*	%	*N*
0	14	(99)	18	(43)
1	21	(143)	30	(71)
2	23	(157)	20	(48)
3	19	(131)	15	(36)
4	13	(87)	10	(23)
5 or more	11	(74)	7	(17)
Totals	101	(691)	100	(238)

Note:

* Average number of organizations by project status:
Participants = 2.4
Withdrawals = 1.9
difference significant at the .01 level using a two-tailed t-test.

Table 3. Percentage of Participants and Withdrawals Who Belong to Various Types of Organizations

Type of Organization	Summer Status			
	Participants		Withdrawals	
	%	N	%	N
Civil rights organization	50	(347)	40	(96)
Peace or disarmament group	12	(84)	7	(18)
Socialist organization	3	(23)	2	(6)
Democratic or Republican party organizations	13	(91)	11	(26)
Other political organizations	16	(108)	12	(29)
Church or religious groups	22	(150)	18	(43)
Student club or social organization	20	(140)	24	(56)
Student government	8	(57)	9	(21)
Student newspaper	6	(43)	7	(17)
Academic club or organization	12	(81)	16	(37)

differs as well. Participants tend to be members of more explicitly political organizations than withdrawals. Especially significant, given the focus of the summer project, is the difference in the percentage of each group that included civil rights organizations among their affiliations. Fifty percent of the participants did so against 40% of the withdrawals. Similar percentage differences are evident in regard to all other major categories of political organizations. Conversely, withdrawals came disproportionately from the ranks of social or academic organizations. Thus not only do participants belong to more organizations but the political nature of these organizations means that participants were likely exposed to more pressure or encouragement to honor their applications than were withdrawals.

2. *Prior ties to other applicants.* The data also allow us to measure the strength and the type of interpersonal ties that existed between the applicants prior to the summer project. One question on the application asked the subject to list at least ten persons they wished to be kept informed of their summer activities. Reflecting the public relations goals of the project, these names were gathered in an effort to mobilize a well-heeled northern liberal constituency who might put pressure on the federal government to alter civil rights policy. Judging from the names they listed, most of the applicants seem to have been very aware of this goal. The names most often provided by the applicants were those of parents, parents' friends, professors, ministers, or any other noteworthy or influential *adults* they had contact with. Quite often, however, the applicant would include another applicant or well-known activist in their list of names.

Table 4. Percentage of Participants and Withdrawals Reporting Strong and Weak Ties to Other Participants, Known Activists, and Withdrawals

	Participants				Withdrawals			
	Yes		No		Yes		No	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
Strong tie to participant	25	(177)	75	(540)	12	(28)	88	(213)
Weak tie to participant	21	(150)	79	(567)	14	(33)	86	(208)
Strong tie to known activist	11	(81)	89	(636)	4	(10)	96	(231)
Weak tie to known activist	5	(35)	95	(682)	3	(7)	97	(234)
Strong tie to withdrawal	3	(25)	97	(692)	5	(12)	95	(229)
Weak tie to withdrawal	7	(52)	93	(665)	8	(19)	92	(222)

This enabled me to construct a measure of the interpersonal ties connecting participants and withdrawals to (a) other Freedom Summer volunteers, (b) known activists, and (c) withdrawals from the project. In doing so, I was careful to distinguish between "strong" and "weak ties" (Granovetter 1973). Persons listed directly on the subject's application were designated as strong ties. Weak ties were defined as persons who were listed on the application of one of the subject's strong ties.

The interesting finding for our purposes is that participants supplied many more names of other volunteers and well-known activists than did the withdrawals. The differences were especially pronounced in the case of strong ties, with participants listing better than twice the number of volunteers and nearly three times the number of activists as did those subjects who withdrew from the project. This finding makes a great deal of intuitive sense. While weak ties may be more effective as diffusion channels (Granovetter 1973), strong ties would seem to embody a greater potential for influencing behavior. Having a close friend engage in some behavior is certainly going to have more of an impact on a person than if a friend of a friend does so.

It is also interesting to note that participants listed a smaller percentage of withdrawals in both strong and weak ties categories than did the withdrawals. However, the relevant comparison here is not these percentage differences but the distribution of participants and withdrawals among all ties to other applicants listed by the two subject groups. In this case, the contrast is especially striking. Of the 202 strong ties to other applicants listed by participants, only 25 were to persons who later withdrew from the project. This is a withdrawal

rate of 12%, as compared to the 25% rate for all applicants. By contrast, 30% (12 of 40) of the withdrawals' strong ties to other applicants were to persons who later withdrew from the project. Just as having a close friend participate in the project increased the subject's chances of participation, so too did the withdrawal of a close friend decrease those chances. Withdrawals, then, were not only less likely to list another applicant as a friend, but those they did list were two and one-half times more likely to withdraw from the project than those identified by participants.

Finally, we can assess the combined effect of each applicant's interpersonal ties by assigning a numeric value to each of the six classes of contacts shown in Table 4. Shown below, the value assigned to each category of tie is intended to capture its hypothesized effect on the subject's likelihood of participation:

Category of Tie	*Numeric Value*
strong tie to participant	+3
weak tie to participant	+2
strong tie to activist	+2
weak tie to activist	+1
no tie	0
weak tie to withdrawal	-1
strong tie to withdrawal	-2

Using these point values, an "interpersonal contact score" was computed for each applicant. The distribution of these scores for both groups of applicants is shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Percentage Distribution of Interpersonal Contact Scores by Applicant Status*

Scores	*Participants*		*Withdrawals*	
	%	*N*	%	*N*
-1 to -4	2	(11)	5	(11)
0	64	(459)	76	(184)
1-3	13	(96)	8	(19)
4-6	7	(49)	6	(14)
7-9	7	(47)	3	(7)
10+	8	(55)	2	(6)
	101	(717)	100	(241)

Note:
* Average score by applicant status:
Participant = 2.36
Withdrawal = .97
Difference significant at the .001 level using a two-tailed t-test.

Clearly there is a strong positive relationship between participation and the weighted sum of an applicant's interpersonal ties. The average score for participants was nearly two and one-half times greater than that for withdrawals. Even more dramatic, of those applicants who listed at least one interpersonal tie, 19% of the withdrawals, but only 4% of the participants, had scores below zero. Taken together, these findings suggest a simple conclusion. Both the nature and greater number of interpersonal ties enjoyed by participants would appear to have had a significant effect on their decision to go to Mississippi.

3. *Extent of prior civil rights activism.* The final comparative measure of integration into micromobilization contexts concerns the extent of prior civil rights activism by both participants and withdrawals. Both participants and withdrawals were asked to list on their applications any previous civil rights activities they had been involved in. In coding these activities, a numeric value was assigned to each activity based on its intensity relative to all other forms of civil rights activism. Each subject then received a final activity score computed as the sum of the points total for the activities reported on their applications. Table 6 affords a comparison of the distribution of these scores for both participants and withdrawals.

Table 6. Percentage of Participants and Withdrawals by Level of Prior Civil Rights Activity*

Level of Prior Activity+	*Participants*		*Withdrawals*	
	%	*N*	%	*N*
None	24	(174)	34	(81)
Low	31	(224)	37	(88)
Moderate	25	(177)	19	(46)
High	20	(145)	10	(24)
TOTAL	100	(720)	100	(239)

Note:
* Average score by applicant status:
Participant = 5.4
Withdrawal = 3.9
Difference significant at the .001 level using a two-tailed t-test.

+ For the purpose of this table, the four activity categories correspond to the following range of scores on the activity scale:
none = 0
low = 1-4
moderate = 5-10
high = 11 +

Table 7. Logit Regression on the Effect of Various Independent Variables on Participation in the Freedom Summer Project

Independent Variable	*Dependent Variables* *b*	*Summer Status+* SE(b)
Integration measures		
number of organizational affiliations	.182**	.058
interpersonal contact score	.005**	.002
level of prior activism	.044	.023
Major		
Social Science	-.236	.156
Other Majors	-.123	.156
Home Region		
West North Central	.265	.297
New England	.014	.256
Mid-Atlantic	.096	.216
East North Central	.045	.224
West	.401	.309
South	-.009	.262
College Region		
West North Central	-.348	.276
New England	-.222	.182
Mid-Atlantic	-.304	.173
East North Central	-.378	.265
West	-.440*	.193
South	-.012	.246
Race-White	.070	.107
Gender-Female	-.209*	.088
Age	.277*	.141
Highest Grade Completed	.026	.075
Distance from home to Mississippi	-.00003	.0003
Constant	-.159	1.06

N = 794
** = $p < .01$
* = $p < .05$
+ = summer status: 0 = withdrawals
1 = participants

Goodness of fit chi-square = 860.486 with 771 d.f. (p-value = .013)

As expected, participants had significantly higher levels of prior involvement than did withdrawals. Moreover, a closer look at the data shows that the differences are more pronounced at the upper end of the distribution, so that the proportion of participants ajudged to have "high" activity scores was twice as great as the comparable figure for withdrawals. At the other extreme, better than a third of the withdrawals, but fewer than a quarter of the participants, reported no previous civil rights activity.

Finally, we can assess the combined effect of these and a number of other factors on the applicant's chances of participation. By treating the individual's summer status—either participant or withdrawal—as a dichotomous dependent variable, we can attempt to explain participation by means of a logit regression equation comprising the following independent variables: age, gender, race, highest grade level completed, home region, college region, distance from home to Mississippi, major in school, number of organizational affiliations, interpersonal contact score, and level of prior activism. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 7.

The data presented in Table 7 attest to the importance of integration into micromobilization contexts as a predictor of activism. Of all the independent variables it is the three "integration measures" that bear the strongest relationship to variation in participation. Here several specific findings are worth highlighting. First, it is interesting to note that "level of prior activism" does *not* make a significant contribution to variation in the dependent variable. While participants clearly displayed higher levels of prior civil rights activity—see Table 6—than withdrawals, these involvements did not significantly affect the likelihood that they would participate in the summer project. Apparently, their involvement in Freedom Summer did not, in any amorphous way, grow out of their prior civil rights activities. Rather, even these veteran activists required tangible contact with a recruiting agent—either organizational or interpersonal—to encourage their involvement. Thus researchers who stress the facilitative effects of recruitment through either existing organizations or by means of prior interpersonal ties will find support in these data.

Perhaps the most interesting finding concerns the differential impact of various types of interpersonal contacts on likelihood of participation. Table 7 shows that of all the independent variables it is the sum of a person's ties to other applicants or known activists (interpersonal contact score) that bears the strongest relationship to participation. However, when this variable is broken down into the three dichotomous variables that are its principal components—presence or absence of (a) strong ties to participants or known activists, (b) weak ties to participants or activists, (c) strong ties to withdrawals—the explanatory significance of the measure emerges in Table 8 as exclusively a function of strong rather than weak ties. When the analysis is rerun substituting the three dichotomous contact variables for the single contact score, only the two strong tie variables remain significant. Having a close friend participate or withdraw from the project did, in fact, affect a subject's chances of participation, while the presence or absence of weak ties to other volunteers seems to have had little impact in most cases.

Table 8. Logit Regression on the Effect of Various Independent Variables on Participation in the Freedom Summer Project

Independent Variable	*Dependent Variable* *b*	*Summer Status+* SE(b)
Integration measures		
number of organizational affiliations	.194**	.059
level of prior activism	.032	.018
categories of interpersonal contact		
strong tie to participant or known activist	.604**	.144
weak tie to participant or known activist	.259	.149
strong tie to withdrawal	-.395*	.201
Major		
Social Sciences	-.258	.158
Other Majors	-.140	.158
Home Region		
West North Central	.236	.298
New England	.065	.257
Mid-Atlantic	.063	.218
East North Central	.011	.226
West	.444	.311
South	.008	.263
College Region		
West North Central	-.340	.288
New England	-.245	.203
Mid-Atlantic	-.364	.193
East North Central	-.469*	.200
West	-.395	.216
South	-.029	.257
Race-White	.063	.108
Gender-Female	-.206*	.089
Age	.315*	.142
Highest Grade Completed	.030	.076
Distance from home to Mississippi	-.0001	.0003
Constant	-.348	1.12

N = 794
** = $p < .01$
* = $p < .05$
+ = summer status: 0 = withdrawals
1 =participants

Goodness of fit chi-square = 843.761 with 769 d.f. (p-value = .028)

Summary

The evidence reviewed above clearly suggests the crucial importance of micromobilization contexts in shaping participation in the Freedom Summer campaign. Participants consistently scored higher than withdrawals on both organizational and interpersonal items measuring integration into activist networks. Although the differences between the two groups on these items were not always large, the direction of those differences remained consistent, suggesting but a single conclusion: regardless of their level of ideological commitment to the project, it was the extent and nature of the applicant's structural location vis-à-vis the project that best accounts for his or her participation in the Freedom Summer campaign.

Does this mean that the applicants' attitudes or values had no influence on their chances of participating? Absolutely not. Both their willingness to go through the application process and their answers to the open-ended item attest to the participants' high levels of attitudinal support for the project. It is simply that, according to these measures, participants and withdrawals exhibit similar levels of support. Thus attitudinal affinity must be thought of as a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of participation in activism. The suggestion, then, is that neither a strict structural nor individual motivational model can account for participation in this or any other instance of activism. An intense ideological identification with the values of the campaign acts to "push" the individual in the direction of participation, while a prior history of activism and integration into supportive networks acts as the structural "pull" encouraging the individual to make good on his or her strongly held beliefs.

What do these findings have to say about the broader macro political perspectives—resource mobilization, political process, new social movements—that have recently come to dominate theorizing about social movements? In one sense, not a whole lot. That is, these perspectives are concerned with those broad political factors that give rise to widespread *collective* action, while the findings presented here concern the dynamics of *individual* recruitment to activism. On the other hand, these findings serve to remind us that whatever macro factors underlie collective action, it is the microdynamics of mobilization and recruitment that produce and sustain a movement. In their basic dynamics, then, "new" movements are not likely to differ from "old" movements. The macro political roots of movements may vary, but the micro structural dynamics of collective action are likely to look very similar from movement to movement.

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NOTES

1. In actuality, not all applicants were asked this open-ended question. At least 6 different application forms were used in this project, and only two included this item. In all, 300 of the participants and 136 of the withdrawals answered the question. A comparison of those who answered and those who did not answer this question turned up no significant differences between the two groups.

2. While not statistically significant, the greater number of other-oriented motives invoked by participants in their narratives is certainly suggestive. It is also interesting, in light of the singular importance attributed to selective incentives by many theorists (cf. Olson 1965), to note that participants listed no more self-oriented motives—or selective incentives—than withdrawals. Following Olson and the rational choice theorists (Hechter, Friedman, and Applebaum 1982), we would have expected withdrawals to have listed significantly fewer such motives than participants.

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