Tilting the frame: Considerations on collective action framing from a discursive turn

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Over the past decade many analysts of collective action from the political-process and social-constructionist perspectives have sought to bring ideology back into the analysis of social movements through the analysis of framing. Anchored in Goffman's frame-analytic perspective and strands of collective behavior, frame analysis has provided a window on how collective actors construct an interpretive schema that underlies mobilization and sustains action.

Frame analysis critically highlights processes of signification as a key dynamic for collective action. However, while it usefully focuses on the ideological problems, its proponents have largely failed to problematize the role of discourse in these processes. While the ideological visions structured by frames are exposed as contested and dynamic, the discourse used in framing is taken to be a generally straight-forward bearer of meanings. In this article, I argue that this referential perspective on discourse both poses problems for the analysis of frames and ignores important semiotic dynamics of the framing process. Drawing on the discourse theory of the Bakhtin Circle and recent work in sociocultural psychology, I propose an alternative framework emphasizing the analysis of discursive repertoires.

The perspective on framing

The leading analysts of framing, David Snow and Robert Benford, define a frame as "an interpretive schemata that signifies and condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action in one's present or past environment."¹ They and others focus on framing as the process of deliberate and focused persuasive communication essential for the
mobilization of consensus prior to collective action and as the cognitive process necessary for orienting and sustaining collective action. By constructing a compelling sense of injustice and collective identities for the protagonists and their targets, frames provide a diagnosis and prognosis of a problem and a call to action to resolve it.

Frame construction is often depicted as an emergent and dynamic process, forged in the interaction between challengers and powerholders, and subject to the cycles of protest that bound other social movement processes. Several elaborations on the framing process have argued that it is bounded by the larger political culture or public discourse within which social and political contention develop. The degree to which collective-action frames resonate with potential adherents and sympathizers thus partly depends on their narrative fidelity with prominent ideological visions. Snow and Benford also have suggested that a master frame, a relatively stable configuration of ideational elements and symbols, operates as a kind of grammar for the articulation of more specific collective action framing processes within social movements. However, they and others emphasize that the packaging of frames for specific mobilizations and actions is situationally sensitive, keyed to interactive processes, and occurs in a recursive relationship with the dynamics of collective action.

Frame analysis provides us with considerable insight into the ideological dynamics of structuring opposition, mobilizing actors, and sustaining cohesion necessary for successful collective action. As Mayer Zald has observed much of the recent work on framing has focused on the strategic aspects of framing, on how social movement activists construct messages of injustice and grievances, rather than on underlying concepts of culture and ideology upon which the analysis of framing is predicated. More specifically I argue that despite the fact that framing occurs through language there has been surprisingly little examination of its discursive foundations. Recent writing by Fine and Johnston has brought back attention to a point made long ago by C. Wright Mills and Scott and Lyman, that talk provides the structure by which actors fashion frames into narratives. Other recent work more generally suggests that the storied nature of much political discourse rhetorically bounds ideological accounts of injustice, inequality, and the necessity and promise of responses to them. Yet the relative inattentiveness to discourse as a collective and contested process of meaning production slights key problems both within the internal logic of frame analysis and more generally its capacity to analyze the contentious process of meaning production.
Cracks in the frame

Frame analysis faces unresolved problems and tensions in at least five central areas: the conceptualization of ideology, identifying the manifestation of the frame, the distinctions between discourse and material resources, the micro-macro linkages in the framing process, and the difficulties of maintaining frame fidelity and alignment. Below I explore each of these problems in turn, and then examine how the discourse theory of the Bakhtin Circle and sociocultural psychology provide some useful conceptual resolutions.

Defining ideology and its relationship to framing

There is unanimity among framing theorists that framing is an ideological process, but less clarity as to the differences or relationships between the two. Snow, Benford, and their colleagues tend to discuss this relationship and the definition of ideology itself ambiguously. They refer to "ideological factors - values, beliefs, meanings," to "belief systems" that vary widely in their systematicity, and suggest that "ideology or belief systems are interactional accomplishments that emerge from framing processes."¹² Left ambiguous are (a) whether frames are composed of elements from some larger systematic belief system that is situated outside of social movement processes, as their references to values and beliefs imply, and (b) whether framing therefore is derivative and dependent upon ideological processes that operate outside of the ken of social movements. Alternatively, it is possible that ideology is an emergent and interactional product of framing and is essentially produced in framing. If so, however, Snow and Benford provide no clear way of analyzing such aspects of framing as alignment, centrality, range, and interrelatedness, since their discussions of these processes seem to posit a belief system or ideology outside of the framing process. The ambiguity in their specification leaves their reasoning circular on these questions.

Others such as Klandermans, William Gamson, and Tarrow posit more specific hierarchies of cultural knowledge on the dimensions of their generalizability, pervasiveness, and embeddedness. Various described as political cultures, public discourse, and cultural themes, encompassing and defining structures of popular political ideas are seen as sources of framing elements.¹³ Yet the rhetorical and discursive processes that tie frames to these larger ideological structures remain largely unspecified.
The manifestation of the frame

The relationship between frames and ideology raises related issues of epistemology and representation. Framing theory speaks both of a process of representation and the particular signifiers or manifestations of this process. Goffman himself argued that frames were dynamic, and were capable of dissolving into one another. However, frame analysts tend to depict frames, in practice if less so than in theory, as relatively stable systems of meaning. In this sense, frames are presented as akin to modular texts or maps, with an articulated logic and structure of argumentation. Gerhards and Rucht’s carefully specified graphical structures of argumentation for collective action frames for protests against Ronald Reagan and the IMF are the clearest depictions of such map- and text-like structures.  

Alternatively, frames are read off of and extracted from tactics and strategies, in combination with what are offered as representative statements or claims by the collective actors. The work of Jenness on framing processes in anti-violence activism within the lesbian and gay community, Benford on anti-nuclear activism, and that of Capek on the environmental justice frame exemplify this approach. In either case, as Gerhards and Rucht note, there are surprisingly few empirical examples of frames in the literature.

The representation of a frame as a discrete text, however, is a reification of disparate and discontinuous discourse processes. Often such work depicts a particular configuration of statements, symbols, and meanings as emblematic of underlying and enduring collective understandings produced in protracted ideological struggles. The epistemological assumptions behind such representations are that the coherence of the elements constituting the frame map to some commensurate coherence in a “belief system.” This is seen as particularly important for purposes of frame alignment. However, the presumption (in analytic practice if not in theory) is that this framing discourse is an internally stable enough vehicle for the transmission of meaning so that interpretive strategies for mobilization and action are possible. In many of their analyses frame analysts also assume some isomorphism between their abstractions and the ways in which people actually use framing discourse. Whether we can make these assumptions is not at all clear.
Micro-macro linkages

The role of discourse in both processes of micromobilization and the macro processes of contention in the public sphere suggests that it is a key to the understanding of the micro-macro linkages in mobilization and action processes. As recent work argues, the real link between micro- and macro-movement processes occurs at the meso level, between the individual and the broad macro context. However, the exact ties at this level between the talk of interaction and social construction of issues in the public sphere remain ambiguous in framing theory. 17 William Gamson's path-breaking work on political talk suggests a complex issue-specific process by which people combine media discourses, “popular” discourses, and personal narratives to frame political issues. He argues that people selectively combine these three based on their proximal relations to and uses of each type of discourse for a particular issue. However, Gamson does not provide an elaborated theory as to when people find it most plausible and possible to combine such distinctive discourses into coherent frames. 18

In addition, most accounts of framing assume that discourse is ultimately reducible to monadic cognitive processes. As Johnston asserts, “the ‘true’ location of a frame is in the mind of the social movement participant....” 19 But if framing is an emergent and context-specific social process, it is not entirely clear how individual cognition is disciplined and guided by larger cultural processes; nor is the extent to which individuals possess latitude in determining the content and scope of frames well specified. The analysis of alignment, centrality, credibility, and narrative fidelity suggests these ambiguities. 20 It is not clear whether actors largely are synchronizing frames or ideologies provided to them within a larger political culture, or whether they creatively are reformulating “ideational elements” to make sense of their personal lives. 21 Left ambiguous is whether such processes are ways of meshing a publicly provided “common sense” with more carefully articulated issue packages, whether individuals integrate personal life narratives with frames circulating in the public sphere, or if both processes conjoin in framing. Such distinctions argue for disparate notions of the degree of agency people have in framing. They also raise the question as to whether framing is ultimately a matter of individual cognition.
The staying power of frames

Questions concerning frame alignment and fidelity give rise to related issues concerning the staying power of frames. Frame analysts usefully specify a variety of institutional and conjunctural constraints that determine the effective life of a frame, including media processes, cycles of protest, state intervention, elite hegemonic manipulation, and internal social controls reinforcing cohesion on social movement actors. Given the underlying strategic and pragmatic conception of framing used by frame analysts, problems of stability and duration are largely processes exterior to the production of meaning within framing itself. If activists and social movement organizations effectively do the strategic ideological work of aligning frames to popular conceptions of politics and social issues, then frames will resonate with their target populations. The metaphorical use of analytic terms such as “frame” and “package” often suggests that meanings assume a more or less orderly structure that can endure past their situational use. Language in this sense has an implied, self-evident fixity. This assumption follows from a referential model of language as a neutral bearer of meanings between an addressee and addressee derivative from formal linguistic models such as those of Saussure. In such models, the relationship between the signifier and the signified is taken to be relatively stable and unproblematic in the course of ordinary communication. However, we should question whether the production of meanings itself contains within it the seeds of its own instability. It is possible that the continual reproduction of meaning within the framing process noted by frame analysts contains inherent dilemmas for fidelity, alignment, and potency. Left undiscussed are the dynamic instabilities in the very process of discourse that mitigate against collective action frames’ stability and duration.

The depiction of frames as cultural resources

The development of resource mobilization theory spawned the careful analysis of the nature, accumulation, and deployment of resources necessary for successful collective action. Inclusive definitions of resources proffer the idea of symbolic resources, in which the symbols, discourse, and rituals of collective action are depicted as homologous to material resources. Recent work by Gary Fine and Rhys Williams characterizes non-material components of mobilization and collective action within this rubric. Fine defines talk and behavior as cultural
resources because they are the means by which moral authority is
established. Williams argues that discursive constructions of the public
good are cultural resources since they set the contextual and public
terms for conflict.  

Some time ago William Gamson and his associates carefully differenti-
ated resources from what they termed know-how. Resources, they
maintained, are objects that have clearly specifiable units and are
fungible. Alternatively they defined know-how as the knowledge of
collective repertoires and skills necessary for effective mobilization
and action. Gamson and his colleagues reasoned that for the concept
of resources to have analytic rigor it must be so specified to pinpoint
where, when, and how their deployment is critical for success. They
argued that resources were roughly inversely important to the scope
and size of the specific action in question, least important in other
words in interpersonal interactions (such as in micromobilization).

While the distinction between resources and know-how may not readily
encompass discourse and frames, it points to the complications raised
by depicting discourse as a resource. If the narratives or accounts that
are the material of frames are contextual, public, and emergent in the
processes of mobilization and action, exercising control and distribution
of these resources seems highly problematic. Moreover, if discourse
is deployed rationally, how can we view framing as an exercise in
reality construction without assuming a social control model in which
elite actors manipulate popular consciousness? The constructionist
and rational actor views of discourse offer epistemologies that exist in
tension on these issues.

The discourse theory of the Bakhtin Circle and recent work in socio-
cultural psychology offer some insights to each of these five problems.
As I detail below, in depicting discourse as an ideological process
driven by its own dialectic tensions, these theories call for a reorienta-
tion of our understanding of frames.

The dynamics of discourse

The work of the Bakhtin Circle of literary theorists and sociocultural
psychologists provides an explicit alternative to the referential theory
of language embedded in framing theory. Both schools start with the
foundational proposition that discourse is the social production of
meaning that is essentially dialectic, dynamic, and riven with contradictions. From the Bakhtinian perspective, discourse is dialogic, the interindividual product of streams of speech communication within specific historical situations. Within this interactive process of meaning production, there is a constant struggle between actors to invest discourse with their preferred meanings. As Bakhtin argued

the word is not a material thing but rather the eternally mobile, fickle medium of dialogic interaction. It never gravitates toward a single consciousness or voice. The life of the word is contained in its transfer from one context to another, from one social collective to another, from one generation to another. In this process the word does not forget its own path and cannot completely free itself from the power of these concrete contexts into which it has entered.29

For the Bakhtinians, then, language is composed neither of fixed nor free-floating signifiers. Its meaning is produced through a dynamic social process that always has the potential for shift.30

In a similar fashion sociocultural psychologists characterize the production of meanings in discourse as both intralinguistic and highly dilemmic or contested. Similarly to William Gamson’s notion of themes and counter-themes, they argue more broadly that argumentative discourse in general, as a process of moral inflection, calls forth the fissures and ruptures of its own contradictory implications as it is produced between actors. “Many words,” observe Michael Billig and his associates, “are not mere labels which neutrally package up the world. They also express moral evaluations, and such terms frequently come into antithetical opposites which enable opposing judgments to be made.”31

The double-voiced nature of the word suggests that models of individual cognition misrepresent the locus of meaning and its production. Bakhtinians argued that meaning does not reside within individual cognition; Medvedev and Bakhtin located ideological meaning and consciousness “not within us, but between us.”32 The social practice through which meaning is constructed is the speech utterance. The utterance is a vehicle of contextual meaning between subjects without a fixed structure, content, or length. What determines its scope and length are the semantic exhaustion of its theme, the interactions of the communicants, and the stylized generic forms it takes (I explicate more about speech genres below). All meaning within the utterance is the result of processes of communication and response – what Bakhtin termed “addressivity” –
that are situated both within the "immediate social situation and the broader social milieu." Discourse is thus more properly speaking (pun not intended) interdiscourse, since meaning always lies between and within the confluence of voices that compose communication.33

Sociocultural psychologists similarly reject atomistic models of cognition as psychological reductionism. As Wetherell and Potter maintain, "discourse straddles the boundaries usually erected between objects of internal worlds and objects of external worlds."34 Drawing parallels between discourse theory and Meadian social psychology, they suggest that concepts of self, attribution, memory, and reality — indeed the very domain of consciousness — are interindividual constructions.35 In this sense discourse is a form of mediated action. As a set of cultural tools, discourse provides the conventions and range of reproducible meanings through which actors find possibilities to make sense of social situations. However, discourse also is a social process of enactment and invocation that involves exchange and often discord over how such tools are used and how meaning is created and structured.36

Both schools argue that discourse transpires as an essentially ideological process when it intersects with the operations of power. V. N. Volo-
sinov, a member of the Bakhtin Circle, characterized language as a form of "behavioral ideology" and noted that, "Words are always filled with content and meaning drawn from behavior and ideology.... Language, in the process of its implementation, is inseparable from its ideological or behavioral implementation."37 Based in their dilemma postulate on language, sociocultural psychologists also find both argumentative discourse and the language of common sense as ideological.

Both theoretical groups concur that discourse never neutrally conveys meanings.38 Rather, we should focus on discourse as a process of joint ideological labor, one that is often fraught with underlying ambiguities and contradictions that can become manifest in public contention. As an ideological process, discourse therefore is a terrain of conflict, and not simply the medium or messenger through which it is expressed. As the Bakhtinians emphasized, discourse becomes an explicit battleground for ideological wars of position that are dynamic products of dialogic interactions. "As a living socio-ideological concrete thing," Bakhtin observed,
comes one's own only when the speaker populates it with his own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention. 39

Since ideology is structured through this conflict-riven process of meaning, it is unlikely to be manifest in neatly structured packages or worldviews. In this sense sociocultural psychologists argue that we should analyze ideological practices and effects, with the explicit emphasis on the fragmented and often contradictory nature of ideological production through discourse. In studies of racist and fascist discourses, for example, they demonstrate how people can intertwine constructions of egalitarianism with highly hierarchical representations of self and other given the particular social contexts of their production. 40 As both schools underline, ideology is rarely found in either tidy or sturdy packages.

Despite their emphases on multivocality and ideological contention both Bakhtinians and sociocultural psychologists provide windows on how order, stability, and conventionality are brought to bear in this flow of meanings. According to Bakhtin every epoch, every social trend has a speech genre that privileges some stylizations over others. A genre contains the typical sets of vocabularies, meanings, and rules for using them within dialogue, providing a lens for viewing an aspect of social life. Genres develop because of the need to arrest and stabilize the flow of meanings for speech communication. 41 Generic discourse, however, is also the medium through which powerholders attempt to define the common sense of social life. Within genres, they seek to objectivize and naturalize their power-laden definitions and meanings. Drawing on a parallel line of reasoning, the linguistic anthropologists Charles Briggs and Richard Baumann, observe genre,

ternally crucial to the negotiations of identity and power – by invoking a particular genre, producers of discourse assert (tacitly or explicitly) that they possess the authority needed to decontextualize discourse that bears historical and social connections and recontextualize it in the current setting…. We can say, thus, generic textuality affords great power for naturalizing both texts and the cultural reality that they represent. 42

In a similar vein, sociocultural psychologists analyze interpretive repertoires, a limited range of “recurrently used systems of terms for characterizing and evaluating actions, events and other phenomena … used in particular stylistic and grammatical constructions.” 43 Interpretive repertoires contain the form-giving figures of speech, metaphors,
tropes, and images by which people construct ideological representations. The available repertoires both allow fluidity in the ways in which these representations can be constructed and simultaneously bound the degree of variability within them. Sociocultural psychologists generally suggest that by viewing discourse as a form of mediated action, we can see repertoires as having a dialectical character, both empowering and constraining the production of meaning. The interpretive repertoires that actors draw upon to make ideological sense of social and political controversies and life issues, to represent collective identities, or to justify collective action are subject both to temporal and contextual shifts and to possible dilemmic contradictions raised by their combination in use.

For Bakhtinians ideological contests generally occur within a genre. “The ideological becoming of a human being…,” pronounced Bakhtin, “is the process of selectively assimilating the words of others.” In this sense, the speech genre is the site of hegemony. Actors can realize power within discourse to the extent that they can convert the dialogue to a monologue, that is, dampen or temporarily arrest the multivocality of meaning within discourse. Bakhtinians argued that hegemony can be achieved to the extent monologic discourse becomes authoritative, i.e., to the extent that its meanings become enforced convention while simultaneously suppressing alternatives. Genres in this sense can produce stylizations that lead to the naturalization of meanings, objectivizing the monologic word.

Discourse that has become an object is, as it were, unaware of the fact, like the person who goes about his business, unaware that he is being watched; objectivized discourse sounds as if it were direct single-voiced discourse…. Stylization forces another person’s referential … intention to serve its own purposes, that is its new intentions. The stylizer uses another’s discourse as other, and in so doing casts a slight shadow over it.

In a complementary fashion, sociocultural psychologists maintain that hegemony can be achieved by drawing on interpretive repertoires to bound the dilemmas that can be represented. They usefully remind us that an essential part of the power produced through discourse, and a cornerstone of hegemony, is the capacity to construct silences within common sense. “If people think about one set of issues or dilemmas,” notes Michael Billig,

then their attention is removed from other matters, and the effects of ideology might be gauged by what is not a matter for interesting discussion. In analyz-
ing ideological discourse, therefore, one should be aware of the gaps in discourse, or possible topics which fail to be mentioned.\textsuperscript{49}

Both sociocultural psychologists and Bakhtinians emphasize that the construct of hegemony is necessarily contingent and incomplete. For the former, the possibilities for counterhegemony lie in the fundamentally dilemmic nature of ideological discourse as I have noted. Bakhtin's metaphorical characterizations of ideological domination carefully depicted the inherent instability of authoritative discourse, for people going about their business move and shadows eventually shift with the flux of light. He insisted that genres could never become completely ossified systems; because signification is an essentially contested process among and between actors, meaning within genres eventually falls prey to appropriation and transformation with changing contexts and interlocutors.\textsuperscript{50} By its very nature then, discourse cannot be seen as a simply instrumental process of collective action.

\section*{Tilting the frame}

Bakhtinian discourse theory and sociocultural psychology speak to the problematic issues in framing theory I raised at the start. Both focus on discourse as an inherently dynamic process of meaning construction within social interaction. This discursive turn suggests first a rethinking of framing as a process that has an isomorphic relationship to some broadly specified belief system, political culture, or mentality. Rather, to understand the framing process we should center our investigations on the discursive fields within which the framing process takes place.\textsuperscript{51} Such fields contain the genres that collective actors can draw upon to construct discursively diagnosis, prognosis, and motivation. They are historically and contextually dependent, partially structured through hegemony, and the vocabularies, symbols, and meanings within them are dialogic.

In contrast to the systemic image often connoted by "belief system," fields are inherently partly disorderly or fuzzy, since the actual structuring of meaning is done \textit{in use}. From this discursive perspective, consensus mobilization and collective action processes bring order and structure to the elements in a field by creating action-specific discursive repertoires. Paralleling Tilly's concept of a collective action repertoire, we can conceive of sets of discourses in a field that are related through conflict within a field and drawn upon by activists and
constituents. As Tilly emphasizes in the case of collective action repertoires, discursive repertoires are developed interactionally with opponents and targets.

Consensus mobilization thus becomes not so much a process of frame alignment, but an action-specific process of demonstrating the saliency of a discursive repertoire in defining a problem (or in William Gamson’s terms an injustice), suggesting a critique and proposing a solution. As importantly, such repertoires become salient and compelling to the extent that they can be shown to appropriate, reconfigure, and delegitimize the meanings proffered by opposing repertoires. Actors selectively sort through and use the discourses within a repertoire in dialogic conflict. They are bounded in the selection process not only by the social contexts of contention, but also by the possibilities for combining discourses themselves within a field. The repertoire metaphor makes clearer that not all actors within a mobilization will draw on the repertoire in the same ways, nor will the meanings they create during collective action be entirely commensurate.

As opposed to the often implicit assumption in framing theory that cognitive order and focus are imported externally from a belief system to a collective action frame, a discursive perspective suggests the reverse: the processes of collective action often impress a conscious and explicit order on ideological discourse. The dialogic and often counter-hegemonic process of structuring meaning can be seen as requiring a specificity and clarity beyond the pragmatic and commonsensical use of the everyday generic and often hegemonic discourses within a field.

If the concept of the repertoire more accurately depicts the discourses of conflict, then we need to reconceptualize our abstraction of the frame as an internally coherent cognitive map or ideological text. The concept of the repertoire, which as Tilly argues is based fundamentally in the analysis of interaction, suggests a different model of micro-macro linkages in the ideological processes of collective action and social movements. First and foremost, following the perspectives on discourse detailed above, repertoires are not ideational elements carried about in individuals’ heads, but are fundamentally collective diagnoses of injustice and prognoses for change. They are the products of speech communication between actors (both individual and collective) that are produced, sustained, and transformed in the course of contention. Because framing is dialogic and founded in the social process of mediated action or speech communication, it is the dynamic process
or organizing a confluence of voices. Dialogically key to oppositional discourse and structured in use through utterances, the internal structure of discursive repertoires shifts with use and user. Moreover, the ordering of discourses within a repertoire is also partly a result of their own dialogic interplay as actors produce meaning through them.

Second, the dialogic production of meaning traverses all levels of social movement activity from small-group interactions to mass-media processes. Contrary to Klanderman's value-added model in which the top level of public discourse determines the meanings generated below, a dialogic perspective emphasizes context and recursiveness. A transformative potential within a field always exists both at the level of the small group of movement activists and the macro-level of media processes. Dialogic theory focuses our attention on the pull and tug of hegemony and counter-hegemony between these levels, rather than a more uni-directional analysis of how media processes or organizational communication establish the boundaries of political discourse. The research agenda it suggests has affinities with William Gamson's analysis of political talk among ordinary people.

Researchers need to investigate the ways in which groups select and develop a repertoire from within a field, how the boundaries of the field shape the construction of their repertoire, and alternatively how the development of repertoires redounds upon the ways meanings are then produced within the formation. Media, powerholders, and social movement organizations play an active role in demarcating the discourses within a field, but they cannot solely determine how actors combine discourses nor how they create meanings through them. By characterizing framing as mediated action and joint ideological labor, dialogic analysis focuses attention on the more context-specific processes of meaning production during contention.

In my work on the discursive repertoires of early nineteenth-century English working-class groups involved in labor struggles, I have noted that the content and structuring of their repertoires shifts as a joint function of the targets for their action and the discourses available to them within a discursive field. Over the course of a cycle of protest, workers made claims against employers, the government, and notables within the public sphere. Their discursive field contained discourses of popular and political economy, radical politics, national identity, religious virtue, and family and household life. The discursive structuring of their claims at any point in a cycle of protest was determined
jointly by the targets of their action, and the possibilities and limitations within the field itself for creating coherent claims by combining these discourses. This work provides just one example of how repertoires are produced and transformed over the course of contention. What we need are other detailed empirical analyses of this recursive process so that we can come to more general conclusions on how repertoires are developed, sustained, and transformed over a cycle of protest.

A dialogic model of framing processes thus should reorient our understanding of the staying power and transformations of discursive repertoires. Our examinations of collective action discourse inevitably require some level of abstraction to provide an analytic narrative of their use. However, rather than assuming a particular coherence, as the mappings suggested by Gerhards and Rucht, a better strategy might be to provide exemplary dynamics of the dialogic interaction between collective actors’ competing repertoires. A frame in this sense represents not so much a map or well-modeled text, but the outer boundaries of possible use and combination of the discourses both within a repertoire and as against those of oppositional and hegemonic repertoires. Master frames in particular may represent the edges, the mutable and fuzzy boundaries, within which for a cycle of protest the interplay and interlocking of various repertoires can occur. Frame analysis thus becomes more an investigation of how dialogical patterns are established and their potential for change through continued mobilization and action. In addition, a dialogic analysis, as sociocultural psychologists argue, also focuses on gaps, contradictions, and silences in the production of ideological meaning in action. Dialogic analysis thus holds the potential for investigating how discursive repertoires might denaturalize some aspects of hegemonic discourse while simultaneously reinforcing others.

Snow and Benford have cogently argued that the dynamics of framing between social movement activists and possible constituents are highly dialectical, and have focused on external factors that have an impact on the staying power of frames. Dialogic analysis extends this argument by adding dynamics internal to the discourse process itself. It focuses both on the dynamics of hegemony and counter-hegemony between competing repertoires and the internal tensions and contradictions within the discourses of a repertoire. Recognizing the multi-voiced nature of discourse heightens our attention to the ways in which actors can produce alternative meanings for discourses, key tropes,
and signifiers within a repertoire. It also points our attention to the ways in which the interplay of discourses themselves within a field limits the ways in which meanings can be produced and can raise contradictions that are the impetus for questioning and transformation.

A dialogic model of framing suggests that the stability of a discursive repertoire might ultimately vary with the scope, size, and duration of the social movement and the density of the networks between its multi-organization fields. In the early phases of mobilization and contention, whether local or more regional in scope, the multivocality of discourse could facilitate the mobilization of heterogeneous groups to the extent that it permits multiple and even divergent productions of meaning through a discursive repertoire. The multi-voiced word in this sense can allow for a misrecognition of heterogeneity as unity, as groups with potentially divergent interests and identities articulate through a repertoire what they perceive as shared claims and understandings. In grassroots and local actions, social movement activists and organizations likely are active participants both in the building of a discursive repertoire and in the production of meanings within a repertoire. However, when they seek to mobilize increasingly wider populations (both in terms of sheer numbers and diversity of interests and identities) without commensurate growth in bridging ties and networks, social movement activists and organizations must often rely on mass communication that can attenuate processes of joint ideological labor.

From a dialogic perspective the potential for instability is enhanced when the meanings of discursive repertoires cannot be actively reproduced by social movement activists and organizations through interaction with other participants. As social movement leaders and organizations become increasingly detached from members of local movement networks, the latter groups might refract the meanings produced in a repertoire through the continued joint ideological labor of contention. Their understanding of their participation and the goals of collective action could become increasingly divergent from social movement organization leaders and core cadre. In the terminology of frame analysis, the greater the reliance on mesomobilization for framing alignment the more unstable framing becomes. Moreover, such discourse analysis provides additional explanation for why, as Klandermans and Oegema have observed, social movement organization leaders and core cadre often have difficulty in keeping constituents from being swayed by the counter-arguments of their opponents. The dialogic
and dilemmic nature of discursive repertoires always contains potential for hegemonic incursion.

Perhaps the discourses with the most potential for dialogic transformation are those of identity. Writing both by new social movement theorists generally, and analysts of the feminist and lesbian and gay movements more particularly, has emphasized the centrality of identity issues in both mobilization and action. In a recent article, Joshua Gamson argues that the creation of the secure and stabilized identity boundaries often discussed in the literature in fact is only one part of what we might conceive of as an identity dialectic. Through an analysis of the controversy surrounding the meaning of “queerness” in the lesbian and gay community, Gamson maintains that the destabilization of such identities equally can be a goal among movement activists. In the rise of queer politics, he finds a type of identity construction in the deconstruction and effacement of what are perceived as extant normative boundaries of sexuality. As he observes of the debate generated over the epithet “queer”: “Words, and the ‘us’ they name, seem to be in critical flux.” As gay politics has broadened both nationally and in terms of the diversity of groups included within it the discursive repertoire of gay identity has become destabilized.

Identity politics, whether it concerns sexuality, ethnicity, or nationality, highlights the dialogic process within discursive repertoires. Group designations, the “us” and “them” of social movements, are signifiers prey to ventriloquization of many voices. The very attempt to define and stabilize boundaries through identity discourse is dilemmic, inviting both critique and appropriation. As actors seek to fix the meaning of a collective identity, they simultaneously and inadvertently can raise the dilemmic quality of setting group boundaries. Indeed, the discursive process of creating a sense of group exclusivity can be seen by some actors as an attempt at creating a monologic voice for other group members.

Finally, given the inherent mutability of discursive repertoires we should be wary of classifying them among a list of resources. For unlike the material resources generally discussed by resource mobilization theorists, discourse simply does not share properties of stability, exclusivity, and fungibility that make it reliable, accumulable, and dependably deployable. Indeed, what Bakhtinian theory and sociocultural psychology both call attention to is the potential for persuasive communication to take a wolfish turn on the activists who rely upon it. These perspec-
tives suggest that it might be better to conceptualize discourse as critical mediating action by which activists create legitimacy and collective identitites to garner resources for collective action.

Conclusion

Every social trend in every epoch has its own special sense of discourse and its range of discursive possibilities.

Mikhail Bakhtin

Framing theory renewed the analysis of ideology as a key mediating process in social movement mobilization and collective action. However, in this article I have argued that the framing perspective is deficient because it lacks a critical perspective on the stuff of framing itself — discourse. Drawing from both Bakhtinian literary theory and sociocultural psychology, I have explained how unresolved issues in the conceptualization of frames and their relationship to ideology might be clarified. In the process I have offered a model of discursive repertoires that partially supplants the current theory of framing. Based in dialogism and sociocultural psychology, this model portrays the production of meaning as a dynamic and often conflict-riven process tied to particular socio-historical contexts and patterns of interaction. It depicts the ideological processes of mobilization and action as dynamic discursive processes in which collective actors vie to control the meanings within repertoires of discourse. The instability within discourse itself and the essentially contested character of its meanings both create opportunities for contesting hegemony. However, it also suggests that ideological contention is never wholly driven by the calculated and conscious actions of its participants, as the elusiveness of meaning defies such ironclad control.

Additionally, this discursive approach depicts framing as an inherently collective process, as opposed to the atomistic characterizations of its foundations among some framing theorists. The social character of discourse suggested by this perspective also provides new perspectives on macro-micro linkages in the ideological processes of collective action. Keyed to the collective process of meaning production, it focuses our attention on the complex multi-level processes by which meanings are both circulated and transformed between the level of the small group and the mass media. Tilting the frame with a discursive turn ultimately provides us with the best vantage for seeing the complete
picture of the role of ideology in social movement mobilization and action.

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Notes


5. Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance," 205, 211.


8. "Culture, Ideology and Strategic Framing," Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, editors, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Frames* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 261. This conception is articulated by Doug McAdam who notes that, "By framing, then, Snow and Benford have in mind the conscious, strategic efforts of movement groups to fashion meaningful accounts of themselves and the issues at hand in order to motivate and legitimate their efforts," "The Framing Function of Social Movement Tactics: Strategic Dramaturgy in the American Civil Rights Movement," Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, editors, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Frames* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 339.


11. This inattentiveness is a feature of Goffman's discussion of frame analysis, which is referenced by many of the key contributors to the literature as foundational for work on social movement framing. In *Frame Analysis*, for example, Goffman focuses on the ambiguity of framing largely in terms of the performative aspects of face-to-face communication. Ambiguity can be created by misreadings of the
definition of a situation, conscious actions by an actor such as fabrication, or because of what Goffman describes as the loose connection between talk and the other performative aspects of social interaction, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 502. In terms of political communication in particular the closest Goffman comes to conceptualizing what I term here the "multivocality of discourse" is the "controlled, systematic use of multiple meanings of words and phrases in order to conceal speech behind speech, thereby effecting collusive communication between the very persons who are excluded," Frame Analysis, 515. Goffman provides the example of how political speeches can contain second meanings for a select group not discernible to the wider audience. However, in general he does not recognize the general multivocality of discourse. While William Gamson argues that Goffman's frame theory can be articulated with Gramsci's concept of hegemony, Goffman's referential understanding of language and his embedding of framing in experiential "strips" of focused interaction seem to make this link questionable, "Goffman's Legacy to Political Sociology," Theory and Society 14/5 (1985): 614–615.

12. Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance," 197, 205; Hunt, Benford, and Snow, "Identity Fields," 191. Relatedly, in one of the most well-specified investigations of collective action framing, Gerhards and Rucht define a frame in similarly general terms as "the belief systems of collective actors" as well as seeing the frames they analyze as synonymous with "ideology" ("Mesomobilization," 575).


18. Gamson, Talking Politics.


20. Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes"; Snow and Benford "Ideology, Frame Resonance."

21. Although recently Klandermans has suggested a model whereby individuals sort
through the persuasive discourse of frames and appropriate and use those elements that fit with their existing "cognitive bins" that contain ordered representations of the social world, *The Social Psychology of Protest*, 57–58.


27. Williams, "Constructing the Public Good," 127.


29. Mikhail M. Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, edited and translated by Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 183. See also Mikhail M. Makhitin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, tr. Vern W. McGee, edited by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 87–88, 121; Morson and Emerson, *Mikhail Bakhtin*, 140, 144. To emphasize the double-voiced nature of the word, Bakhtin termed the process by which speakers produce meaning through discourse as "ventriloquization," Wertsch, *Voices of the Mind*, 59. Through this metaphorical characterization he sought to emphasize that when we speak we are always inflecting other people's words with our own meanings, a process initiated as we interpret the words of speakers when they address us.

30. Donati captures some of this essentially contested nature in his discussion of frames, when he notes that their textual basis in discourse which "is made up of the interaction of 'voices'" and that the interpretation of frames depends on acknowledging that "Symbolism depends on the ability of words to say more than they actually denote," "Political Discourse Analysis," 144, 157. However, he does not realize the full dilemmic implications of his description.


38. Michael Billig, Ideology and Opinions: Studies in Rhetorical Psychology (London: Sage, 1991), 17; Billig et al., Ideological Dilemmas, 40. Both perspectives insist that we not reduce discourse to ideology and vice versa. As Ian Parker argues, this
collapsing of categories makes the two redundant and creates an epistemological relativism that either evacuates the politics of meaning or reduces it to individual moral choice, Ian Parker, *Discourse Dynamics: Critical Analysis For Social and Individual Psychology* (London: Routledge, 1992), 19. Similarly, Trevor Purvis and Alan Hunt maintain that we must show “what makes some discourses ideological is their connection with systems of domination. Ideological discourses contain forms of signification that are incorporated into lived experience where the basic mechanism of incorporation is one whereby sectional or specific interests are represented as universal interests,” “Discourse, ideology, discourse, ideology, discourse, ideology...” *British Journal of Sociology* 44 (1993): 497.


53. *Popular Contention*, 30. Tarrow similarly notes in his analysis of collective action frames that new meanings are produced in struggle, “Mentalities, Political Cultures,” 175. Rick Fantasia and Eric Hirsch similarly note that the analysis of social movement cultures involves “the interplay of power relations within the context of that conflict, and with attention to the ways and the settings in which cultural meaning was constructed and transformed by the interaction of contending groups,” “Culture in Rebellion: The Appropriation and Transformation of the Veil in the Algerian Revolution,” in Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans, editors, *Social Movements and Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 156.
55. As William Gamson and David Meyer note, “The degree to which there are unified and consensual frames within a movement is variable and it is comparatively rare that we can speak of the movement framing. It is more useful to think of framing as an internal process of contention within movements with different actors taking


57. Gamson, Talking Politics.


59. Dialogic analysis adds theoretical tools that might explain how these discourses were contextually combined into a repertoire, and with sufficient analysis of a field also allow for the further investigation of other possible combinations. This dynamic has been suggested by Bert Klandermans and Sjoerd Goslinga, “Media Discourse, Movement Publicity, and the Generation of Collective Action Frames: Theoretical and Empirical Exercises in Meaning Construction,” in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, editors, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Frames (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 327.


61. In their discussion of constraints on framing, for example, Snow and Benford discuss empirical credibility, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity, all of which focus on the perceived relationship between collective action discourse and the events that they frame, “Ideology, Frame Resonance,” 204, 208.

62. Dialogic analysis thus elaborates on William Gamson’s suggestion that the credibility of a frame is called into question not by experience per se but the cogency of another frame and Klandermans’s observation that collective beliefs always contain the seeds of their contradiction (Gamson Talking Politics, 70; Klandermans “The Social Construction of Protest,” 84).

63. Following Tarrow’s theory of cycles of protest, Snow and Benford suggest that the potency of master frames follows similar cycles as it ebbs and flows with its
relationship to the large political culture. Dialogic theory provides a similar perspective on discursive repertoires by exploring internal cycles of meaning. Discursive repertoires might indeed have their own cycles of decay and transformation, as their continued use is liable to open more opportunities for the double-voiced word to create contradictions within them, Snow and Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance,” 211–212; “Master Frames,” 149.

64. For analyses that provide some insight into such a process, see the recent work by Gerald Platt and his associates on the construction of the leadership of Martin Luther King Jr. in letters written to him by movement participants. Through content analyses of the letters sent to King by people active in local movements they demonstrate the divergent images that people construct of King through democratic, religious, and Afrocentric/nationalistic discourses. These activists constructed a sense of alliance and commonality in the civil rights movement, though each did so with distinctive discourses that might be seen as part of a larger repertoire. See Stephen Lilley and Gerald M. Platt, “Correspondents’ Images of Martin Luther King, Jr.: An Interpretive Theory of Movement Leadership,” in Theodore R. Sarbin and John I. Kitsuse, editors, Constructing the Social (London: Sage, 1994), 65–83; Gerald M. Platt and Stephen J. Lilley, “Multiple Images of a Charismatic: Constructing Martin Luther King Jr’s Leadership,” in Gerald M. Platt and Chad Gordon, editors, Self, Collective Behavior and Society: Essays in Honor of the Contributions of Ralph H. Turner (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1994), 55–74; “Race and Gender Discourse Strategies: Creating Solidarity and Framing the Civil Rights Movement,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society, Session on “Ideology, Discourse and Social Movements,” Philadelphia, April 2, 1995. For an analysis of black activist identity construction that seeks to modify resource mobilization theory with a social-constructionist perspective, see Francesca Polletta, “Strategy and Identity in 1960s Black Protest,” Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change 17 (1994): 85–114. Polletta explores how the pre-figurative politics of SNCC in the 1962–64 period was partly the projection of a radical Black community identity to challenge black moderate leadership. The rise of such Black power discourse might well provide a suitable case for a dialogic analysis of repertoire change and development.


68. A similar argument is made by Steven Seidman in *Difference Troubles: Queering Social Theory and Sexual Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chs. 6 and 7.

69. Hunt, Benford, and Snow isolate four possible responses to outside critique and appropriation: (a) rejection, (b) the use of appropriations to highlight bias and misunderstanding, (c) see such transformations as flawed understandings based on bad impression management, or (d) acknowledge them as identity flaws (“Identity Fields,” 201–202). The multivocality of identity discourse would seem to create a dynamic for such appropriation and response.