STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE, IDEOLOGY, AND FRAME

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The concept of framing has come to be recognized as one of the few foundational ideas in social movement theory in a relatively short time. However, its core meaning as an interpretive process has never been given adequate theoretical treatment. I propose that the operant meaning of framing is a composite of two grounding ideas: framing is (1) derivative of ideology, and (2) a form of strategic meaning construction, and that these are jointly incorporated in persuasive discourse. I explore the framing literature and show that it contains at least six distinct forms of framing defined by the different ways in which ideology and the strategic imperative are bundled together. Finally, I suggest that these types may have quite different implications for the fate of the movement.

My intent here is to extend our understanding of the ways in which framing processes are implicated in social movements. Framing theory lays claim to theoretical significance by inserting itself into the core problematic of movement analysis, why people participate, and by proposing that rational signifying processes have a central role in this. Especially because movements chronically face major constraining factors over which they may have little control—among them low resource levels and the absence or ambiguous profiles of opportunities—they seek to maximize the power of their symbolic appeals. Framing is represented as an operation that can give a movement a degree of strategic leverage it may otherwise lack. The significance of framing seems amplified with the historical emergence of the heterogeneous and shifting "sentiment pools" characteristic of complex postindustrial or postmaterialist societies. Because of these features, it is also thought of as a way of introducing a concrete workable form of agency into movement theory, thereby situating the study of movements more convincingly in the broader structure/agency paradigm.

Although Ganson, Fireman, and Rytina (1982) had earlier traced the emergence of an injustice frame, the seminal statement of movement framing theory is generally credited to Snow and his collaborators in their formulation of frame alignment. In a series of papers claiming theoretical grounding in Goffman (1974) and more broadly symbolic interactionism, Snow and his colleagues defined collective action frames as symbolic constructions designed "to assign meaning to and interpret relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists" (Snow and Benford 1988). Constituents of this were three aspects: (1) diagnostic, identifying the problem, or grievance; (2) prognostic, proposing a course of action as a solution; and (3) motivational, stimulating active participation.1 To be effective, frames would have to resonate with existing values, seem empirically credible, and make experiential sense

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to potential participants. To this end they could be modified or aligned in various ways so as to better fit the beliefs and sentiments of those to whom they were directed. Four aligning tactics were distinguished: (1) frame bridging, in which ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames were linked; (2) frame amplification, when a frame is subjected to “clarification or invigoration”; (3) frame extension, when a frame is extended to deal with hitherto unmentioned questions; and (4) frame transformation, a more or less totalistic reframing (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986).

This promising beginning resulted in a rush of work on framing in the early 1990s, convincing some that, among a variety of approaches associated with the cultural turn, framing had the greatest theoretical potential. Johnston, for instance, claims that framing had been “at the forefront of the cultural trend in social movement research” (Johnston 1995: 219); similarly, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald maintain that, along with political opportunity and mobilizing structures, framing ought to be considered one of the three conceptual cornerstones of the field (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). By 1995, the conceptual elevation of framing was capped by lengthy textbook recognition: della Porta and Diani give over about two-thirds of their chapter on culture to framing (Della Porta and Diani 1999 chapter 5).

Despite these accolades and a burgeoning literature, some scholars have noted that framing has failed to reach its full potential. To my understanding, there seem to be two reasons for this. First, the concept is undertheorized in the sense that its grounding postulates are mostly unexplored and undeveloped; and second, because of this, empirical research tends not to be guided by theory-building questions and problems. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, having elevated framing to the highest possible theoretical status, echo this double indictment when they remark that theoretically (1) “little systematic work on framing processes ... has yet been produced” (1996: 19); and (2) even though framing research remains less empirically developed than that of mobilizing structures and political opportunity, Snow et al.’s original (but limited) definition has been left behind in a blizzard of research that tends, “to equate the concept with any and all cultural dimensions of social movements ... threaten[ing] to rob ... [a] ... of its coherence ...” (1996: 6). Four years later Zald found the matter of “integration” of framing into movement theory to be still an open question” (Zald 2000: 3). And Benford (1997) has reiterated and expanded McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald’s claim by elucidating a series of deficiencies in the scope of framing: its descriptive and relatively static nature, lack of comparative analysis, and an uncontrolled proliferation of empirically derived concepts.

**FRAMING, THE CULTURAL STOCK, AND THE STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE**

From quite early on, social movement theory has understood framing as a strategic process. Although Gamson’s and Snow’s early conceptions of framing were explicitly set within a broadly interpretive/constructionist tradition, the sea change that broadly applied framing to social movement analysis lifted the strategic subtext, already present in Goffman, to conceptual primacy. I think this is best understood as an elective affinity between the idea and the intellectual climate in movement theory at the moment.

Resource mobilization theory (RM) had emerged—meteoretically—as the dominant theoretical orientation after 1970, but by the 1980s was strongly challenged in two ways. First, a competitor—new social movement theory (NSM)—was riding high in Europe, and making inroads among culturalist researchers in the U.S. Second, RM itself, derived as it was from Olson’s rational actor model, was challenged regarding the utility of the rationality assumption (e.g., see Ferree 1992).

It was here that the idea of frame alignment resonated with RM. RM and political process theorists recast the frame concept from its original interactionist function that vertically connected structure with the social psychological level to one that horizontally connected political opportunity and collective action (e.g., McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996: 2, *et passim*). The comprehensive inventory of frame aligning processes was just what RM needed: a concept that simultaneously met the critiques emanating from the emerging cultural turn but that also fit the rationality axiom of the theory. It was a natural “fit” with McCarthy and Zald’s (1973) “modern trend,” with movement professional entrepreneurs systematically mounting their mobilizations and engineering their campaigns as “frame theoretic,” and even less radically the rationalized order frame (McAdam’s “cognitive liberation” (McAdam 1982). Importantly, Snow and his colleagues were not working in a vacuum. At virtually the same moment, Swidler (1986) suggested that actors used culture as a tool kit in constructing the movement’s persuasive discourse. So strategic framing became established early as a taken-for-granted process (see, for example, Zald’s chapter 11 in McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Gamson 1992). It is perhaps fair to say that framing provided RM with a semiotic resuscitation that other “softer” ways of bringing culture into movement studies lacked, reinforcing the strategic rationality attributed to movements by RM.

So it is hardly surprising that by 1996 the leaders of the RM and political process schools had assigned framing a place at the conceptual pinnacle of movement theory (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996).

Now it is clear enough that strategic framing has its roots in the diverse and changing nature of a society’s cultural stock. As Zald puts it, movements “draw on the cultural stock for images of what is an injustice” (1996: 266), generating frames from “a diverse set of actors in relation to a variety of audiences within and outside of a movement” (261), as well as from what he calls its “broken” and “contradictory” nature (268). So if frames are tools drawn from the diverse and shifting cultural stock, including both (potentially) oppositional and nonoppositional elements (Tarrow 1998: 106-107), it follows that framing also tends to be both shifting, complex, and multiple. Indeed, a cursory review of movement framing studies seems to confirm this. Framing is situated contextually as a process of adjustment that mediates changes in opportunity structure and collective action from one frame to another in and among movement (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996: 2; McAdam 1994). To cite a few more examples: framing shifts are crucial in media framing (Gamson and Modigliani 1989); in a local-to-global orientation in the Brazilian environmental movement (Rothman and Oliver 1999); in globalizing movements (Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1996; Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith 1996), in unifying a master frame from the ideological diversity of Francisco Catalonia (Johnston 1991); in reversing the direction of racial struggle in mid-nineteenth century Cincinnati (Ellingson 1995); in analyzing the appropriation of mainstream ideology by the Chinese women’s movement (Noonan 1997); over the course of the pro-choice movement (Evans 1997); in post-Soviet politics (Zdravomyslova 1996); and similarly in Eastern Europe after communism’s collapse (Oberschall 1996).

Strategic framing, then, often tends to embrace a multiplicity of frames. This occurs in part because of its shifting nature: frame components may just accumulate. Clemens (1996) has shown how the U.S. labor movement grew by a process of “bricolage,” or accretion, as it faced new obstacles and a changing configuration of work. Diverse social bases or sentiment pools can also make multiple framing a more or less permanent feature of a movement, as in the case of the U.S. women’s movement showing very different faces to its middle-class and working-class constituents (Press and Cole 1992), or in the framing battles in MAH, Mothers against Drunk Driving (McCarthy 1994). Framing can also have ideological sources, as in the historic split between pragmatists and pacifists in the peace movement (Wittner 1984; Benford 1993; Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith 1996). Situations in which movements that include diverse social movement organizations face several different political opportunities may be another, as discussed by Diani in his analysis of the North Italian Leagues (1996).
It does indeed appear that framing processes reflect the changing and diverse character of the cultural stock, and that these conditions impose imperatives to which movements respond strategically.

IDEOLOGY AND FRAMING

Now framing may be strategic, but this cannot be the whole of it. More restatement of the cultural stock obviously leaves vacant framing's key function of attracting new adherents. There must be some quality of the movement in terms of which its strategizing makes sense. Although the treatments of this are generally scattered and amorphous, a movement's ideology clearly constrains how strategic framing gets done. Thus, we must first ask: What is meant by "ideology" in the context of framing?

Oliver and Johnston (2000) have provided a helpful discussion explicating the distinct usages of "ideology" and "frame" in movement theory. Ideologies, they maintain, "link theory, norms and values in an interconnected fashion (44) and focus on "the content of whole systems of belief, on thin multiple dimensions, and on how ideas are related to each other" (45). They are historical and relatively stable in nature, and lead us in the direction of other theories of society and social change. They define movement boundaries in terms of their values and connections to movement identities (45-46). Frames, on the other hand, have none of these qualities, but are relatively shallow, situated specifically in arenas of contention, and compared to ideologies, which must be studied and learned, are assimilated relatively easily and quickly (47-48).

But how exactly does ideology shape and constrain framing? Oliver and Johnston focus on explaining the differences and leave it at that. Ideology is indeed different from framing, but this just sets the stage for raising the question of their relationship. The recent literature reveals a broadly consensual understanding of the function of ideology in framing. Zald, for example, defines it as a "set of beliefs that are used to justify or challenge a given sociopolitical order ... and interpret the political world, ... and that tend to be more complex and logical systems of belief than frames, though frames may be embedded in ideologies" (and ideology itself within the global category of culture) (Zald 1996: 262). Tarrow advances a similar scheme: for him the oddly archaic concept of "mentality" along with political culture combine with frame to comprise a hierarchy of progressive inclusiveness or scale (Tarrow 1992). Theoretical formulations such as these have parallels in movement framing research. In his study of the first campaign to abolish the slave trade in late eighteenth century England, d'Anjou argues that the movement leaders' ideologies were the resource for constructing the frames employed in the two central movement functions, "the mobilization of resources and ... challenges of authorities" (d'Anjou, 1994: 41-42). In their study of ideological discourse and segregationist ideology, Platt and Williams claim that "ideology is a cultural resource acting as a structural and structuring feature in organizing social movements" (Platt and Williams 1999: 10). They go on to distinguish "operative ideologies" (clearly described like frames) from a higher-order level of ideology, which they designate as formal and abstract, (itself derivative of broader cultural world-views). Snow and Benford also refer to ideology as a cultural resource in framing (2000: 58-59). It appears that these representations of ideology in framing reflect a common, if loose, understanding: frames are symbolic constructions that in different ways are derivative of ideologies. If this is accepted, it may be asked: What aspects of ideology are particularly important for framing processes? I suggest that two in particular present at least intuitive claims for recognition.

One of these may well be the ideological diversity commonly present in a movement. Although a single movement ideology from which frames are derived sometimes seems implicit in the ideology/framing commentaries, a movement's reflection reveals the limitations of this: (1) movements frequently have internal schismatic struggles over ideology; (2) the various forms of collaboration in movements often engender contentious ideological variants; (3) there may be differences regarding the primacy of particular aspects of the ideology; or (4) the movement may march under an eclectic banner of more than a single distinct ideology. Examples include communism in coming to terms with nationalist sentiments, the varieties of peace ideology often present in peace movements, and the sharp ideological differences in the earlier feminist movement.

Despite an absence of systematic treatment in the literature, there is at least some reason to think that ideological diversity: can be important in framing. Snow suggests a parallel between the master frame/collective action frame distinction and Basil Bernstein's theory of the elaborated and restricted linguistic codes located respectively in the English middle and working classes (Snow 1992). This has never been developed, and may be unworkable; but at least a few others have encountered ideological diversity in their research, and suggested that it has important effects—although just what these might be remains unclear. On the one hand, Johnston maintains that the Marxist, Christian, and conservative Catalan nationalist ideologies present in the Catalan anti-Franco movement results in an "ability to encompass a variety of different interpretations, and to incorporate new and unfamiliar events" (Johnston 1995: 240). Benford, on the other hand, finds that the three divergent ideological strains in the peace movement (as present in Austin, Texas) creates framing difficulties in a situation where unified framing was thought to be a priority (Benford 1993). Findings on both sides of this fence have been reported by others (e.g., Mooney 1995; Noonan 1997). Whatever the particularities of these and other examples, they do seem to support the intuition that ideological diversity is an important condition for movement framing.

The second ideological factor has to do with the strength of movement actors' ideological commitment, something familiar to those in movements everywhere. It makes sense to speak of a movement's ideological salience to capture the varying preeminence of ideology, not only in framing, but movement activities generally. With this term I designate a shared commitment and normative accord that prioritizes movement ideology over competing beliefs, commitments, or demands. One would suppose prima facie that the greater a movement's ideological salience, the more a movement would constrain the range or variability of framing.

I have been discussing ideology from the standpoint of the movement. Indeed, I will employ a relatively restricted sense of ideology as delineated by Oliver and Johnston, understood specifically as the dominant discourse of a movement. It is not to be identified with the cultural stock, which I comprehend as the entirety of the life-world. But neither is it intended as a denial of the presence of ideological aspects of the cultural stock—which would be absurd. I specify movement ideology as a relatively elaborated code or doctrine that is the charter or template defining the movement itself and which exists only in the identities of its adherents. This difference is exemplified in the distinction between the concrete sentiments and beliefs arising out of an exploitative labor system and the doctrinal and theoretical elaborations of Marxist ideology.

FRAME AS JOINT STRATEGIC AND IDEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE

I have described framing as discourse derived from (1) strategic imperatives created in the course of the shifting and complex historical flow of the cultural stock and (2) the domain of movement ideology, manifest in varying degrees of ideological diversity and salience. Framing is thereby formulated as a jointly constituted process, as discourse that conjoins the ideological and the strategic. This way of thinking about framing has not inspired much theoretical attention.

Instead, one finds mostly critiques of instrumental rationality to movements from the standpoint of their cultural reality. Polletta claims that the framing duality of strategic action and cultural / ideological orientations undermines frame analysis by encouraging a reduction of movements' cultural aspects to little more than just another factor to be
strategically manipulated (Polletta 1997). The reality of movements, she argues, is that their cultural richness cannot be reduced to an instrumental rationality, but must be conceptualized, as "a broad semiotic template ..." Similarly, from the standpoint of discourse analysis, Steinberg (1998) maintains that the epistemology of framing cannot reconcile the model of rational action on which strategic frame aligning processes are grounded with the constructionist identity-creating, value-oriented, discourse-centered actor (742). He proposes that this contradiction can be transcended by introducing Bakhtian principles of discourse analysis, and supports this claim through his analysis of early nineteenth century English cotton weavers and spinners (Steinberg, 1995a, 1995b, 1999). Oliver and Johnston, somewhat ambiguously—in the context of their broader endorsement of framing as an important concept—come close to suggesting that strategic framing may be more or less limited to market-dominated times like our own (2000: 47). The work of Kriesi and his colleagues supplements these recommendations with an empirical analysis of framing in the European NSMs of the 1980s under differing national conditions, arguing that it was comprehensible only in terms of its embedding in political power relations, thereby seeming to undermine its status as a type of agency (Kriesi et al. 1995).

Critiques such as these are certainly valuable. In my view, however, they short-circuit a logically prior task, namely, that of this article, clarifying the theoretical status of framing within movement theory. The argument I have made suggests that a potentially more fruitful starting point would be to acknowledge the virtual incorrigibility of the linkage of ideological and strategic discourses in framing. This could be formulated as a recognition that ideologies may limit the range of strategic discourse in framing, but also that strategic discourse in framing may deviate from and even challenge movement ideology. Moreover, if we attribute a good deal of autonomy to both ideology and strategic action it also satisfies a loose criterion of agency. Movements may be thought of as having a structurally grounded interest in ideological maintenance while facing a shifting and complex—yet broadly obdurate—strategic imperative sometimes, even imposed, by the flow of events.

In other words, movements by definition share to at least some degree (1) a common set of meanings and (2) some sense of a problem that it wants to do something about it. The first of these will to some extent include ideological elements. The second constitutes a strategic imperative. Both are interpretations, but also ideologies. Interpretation world the in a relatively unified, complex, and historical mode; a strategic imperative mandates interpretations that are particular and situational. Movement framing designates persuasive discourse that in one way or another incorporates both.

I proceed, then, on the assumption that the ideology-strategic discourse relation is the generic structure of framing. Its empirical manifestations are of course variable, indeed, extraordinarily so, and not become the objects of our interest. Mainly from the movement literature I select movements that vary greatly in their scale, grievances, goals, and social loci, to the end of formulating a provisional inventory of how ideology and strategic discourse work together in framing practices. I present abbreviated descriptive accounts of these, being especially attentive to those aspects of the strategic imperative and movement ideology, I show that at least six distinct variants of this linkage can be identified as follows: (1) simple derivation of strategic discourse from ideology; (2) strategic discourse suppressed by ideology; (3) strategic discourse remote from ideology; (4) the fusion of ideology and strategic discourse in action; (5) strategic framing beyond ideological boundaries; and (6) framing which strategically appropriates hegemonic ideology.

Simple Derivation of Strategic Discourse from Ideology

A good deal of framing manifests itself in a simple derivative fashion. By this I mean that framing processes are both strategic responses to changing circumstances and clearly derived from movement ideology. Evans's study of the pro-choice movement (1997) provides an example. He analyzes framing shifts in the religious pro-choice movement over three periods: (1) 1967-73, when it served as an abortion service, and the framing audience(s) were liberal Jews and Protestants who could provide local references; (2) 1973-80, after the Catholic church and the organizations it created focused on overturning Wade v. Roe; and (3) 1980-92, during which (a) it shifted from the issue of a woman's right to make the decision to conditions bearing on her ability to make them wisely and responsibly; and (b) targeted evangelical groups which had recently entered the multi-organizational field (Evans 1999).

Evans's analysis is mostly about the boundaries among organizations in issue arenas, or multiorganizational fields, and how these influence the successive frames. Activating the already rights-oriented clergy appears to have been a relatively low-cost strategy. Our interest here falls on the fact that the leaders were able to reframe from period to period as the abortion situation shifted strategically, constructing a series of effective frames derivative from the framework of the feminist abstract code, the core ideological tenet of which was a woman's right to choose.

Simple derivative framing also appears in more diverse ideological contexts. D'Anjou's (1996) study of the first campaign against the slave trade in England shows how elite representatives of two distinct ideologies collaborated in the construction of a unified frame demanding the abolition of the slave trade in late eighteenth century England. He argues that several cultural trends, and two in particular, had for some time been creating a more facilitative cultural environment for antislavery sentiments. The first of these included (1) the Quakers turn to a morality-grounded, explicitly antislavery position, followed by (2) a similar shift among dissenting religious groups like the Methodists, and (3) emergence of an anti-slavery voice within the church itself. The second trend was the growing importance of an anti-slavery position in secular thought, from Montesquieu and Locke to contemporary representatives of the Enlightenment (chapter four). A set of facilitating events (the "episodic context" in D'Anjou's lexicon) provoked spontaneous parallel protests but soon a joint mobilization opposing the slave trade. D'Anjou then shows how these events became consolidated as movement ideology, mainly through the efforts of its most important SMO, The Abolition Committee (chapter seven).

Within the elements constitutive of the "interpretive package" (taken fromGamson and Modigliani 1989), d'Anjou presents the frame as a dual one. One line sought to establish slavery as morally and religiously unacceptable, a difficult reversal of Christian doctrine. Slavery was portrayed in a variety of venues, graphically and through texts. In particular, vivid descriptions of the horrors of the slave trade left their mark. The second, on the other, practical grounds, its costs and the increasing burden on the economy. The distinct moral and practical arguments were intended to reach different pools of potential supporters identified with well-known, publicly voiced abolitionist sentiments: on the one hand, church members and the religiously inclined; and on the other, practical politicians who would have to balance abolition of the trade against other matters, especially economic considerations. The strategy of opposing only the slave trade, and not demanding the actual abolition of slavery, narrowed the range of opposed interests (whose counterframing was ineffective) and yet, from a practical political standpoint would eventually result in de facto elimination of slavery.

The anti-slave trade frame was strategically multiple in its appeals to very different sentiment pools, and it was derived from very different ideological sources. Of course in the longer historical sweep, although secular modernizing liberals and the notables who led strongly bonded Protestant religious communities have generally found little affinity with one another, at certain moments they have converged politically, most importantly perhaps in the late eighteenth century in the rise of rational capitalism (Weber 1950, but see also Zaret 1989), and during the political formation of the English working class (Thompson 1966). The slave trade question may have been another. It might be argued that in
each of these instances the particular concatenation of events conspired to facilitate an affinity of ideas centering on the presuppositional theme of the individual, facilitating a bracketing or suspension of other aspects of the ideologies.

**Strategic Discourse Suppressed by Ideology**

Situations of this type exhibit exceptionally high ideological salience, in which movement actors are unconditionally committed to movement ideology, and frame in disregard of strategic considerations. In such situations the possibilities of alternative interpretations are overwhelmed or suppressed. Communism in at least some of its national manifestations, and anarchism generally, seem to be close approximations. The cell structure of the party, devised for especially hostile environments like the U.S., was in these terms an organizational form intended to protect a small and weak movement from the corrupt interpretations that might accompany a strategic approach. As the U.S. labor movement expanded, the party rejected its increasingly adaptive framing, clinging to the doctrine that capitalism was undermining itself dialectically, a process that would inevitably bring into being a revolutionary situation. Whatever the material interests of party leaders may have been—tadying to Moscow and maintaining their organizational positions certainly among them—the consequence at the level of ideas was a rigid adherence to a doctrine that ironically was employed to exclude and even denounce strategic considerations as apophasy.¹

**Strategic Discourse Remote from Ideology**

Another way that the reality of framing departs from the “derivation model” is to be found in situations where ideology is absent or not implicated in framing. The chain of events following the nuclear accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear installation near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in 1979 appears to have been one such instance. The accident quickly generated a series of shifts in the collective action frame that evidently occurred apart from much ideological influence.

Walsh (1988) characterizes the accident, in which radioactive material escaped into the atmosphere, as a “suddenly imposed grievance.” Three Mile Island is a mostly rural area about twelve miles south of Harrisburg on the Susquehanna River where, according to Walsh, antinuclear energy sentiments had scarcely penetrated. A branch of a quite ideological antinuclear energy organization had been active in the Harrisburg area for some time, but the community-based organizations formed in the accident’s wake rejected the organization’s ideological positions, particularly radical environmental critiques linking environmental issues to nuclear weapons. This was so despite the fact that, living as they virtually next door to the plant, they had been the ones most affected, and comprised the bulk of those involved in the massive evacuation.

Walsh describes these entities as representing “two relatively distinct paths to activism, ... localities and cosmopolitans.” Unlike cosmopolitan activists, the localities “were pragmatic, geared almost exclusively to the restart and cleanup issues” (1988: 127). This pragmatism both reflected and responded to the community’s conservatism, meaning the absence of any significant oppositional sentiments or beliefs. Indeed, local nonideological factors centering on threats to the community were important. Over the course of about two years, frame shifts occurred in response to emerging events, particularly “vulnerabilities” generated by legal rulings, positions taken by politicians such as the governor and proposals floated by the targets, and by tactical errors on the part of the movement’s targets—the operating company and the NRC. Frame shifts were, in short, opportunity-driven, reactive rather than proactive, responsive mainly to events initiated by the targets.

Walsh’s account shows that there may be conditions throughout a mobilization that inhibit the emergence of guiding ideologies, and that strategic actions may be mounted not only independently but even in opposition to ideology. Indeed, situations such as this may be more common in the early phases of protest than commonly thought.

**The Fusion of Ideology and Strategic Discourse in Action**

Quite different from the clear derivation of frames from ideologies are movements in which ideology spontaneously transcends its sociocultural constraints—including even the interests of some movement constituents—to become an autonomous force. In such situations, at least for a time, the distinction between ideology and strategic action is erased. On occasion these may be events with world-historical significance. Sewell describes the phase of the French Revolution commencing on August 4, 1789 in these terms: when “ideology broke loose from its social moorings,” creating “a world where mental representations of power governed all actions, and where a network of signs completely dominated political life” (Sewell 1985: 73). Similarly, in the course of his analysis of the anti-Franco movement in Catalonia, Johnston describes one particularly critical event in this scenario, the Capuchin affair. After nearly a decade of mild liberalization during the 1960s, a formal constitution of a new democratic union of university students was introduced through the agency of an illegal assembly at a Capuchin monastery outside Barcelona. This occurred after years of gradually building a unified anti-Franco master frame out of formerly separate and conflicting communist, church, and nationalist sectors in Catalonia. When the police arrived to break up the meeting (in violation of the church’s concordat with the Vatican) a massive reaction broke out involving participants, including some from among the elite, that set in motion extended waves of mobilization. The mobilization transcended all particularism: it was “without labels ... did not have names ... was simply anti-Francoist, a national affirmation, social affirmation, democratic affirmation” (Johnston 1991: 147). The event transformed the consciousness of many, and very quickly became an engine for spreading the movement.

In such events there seems to occur a fusion in action of ideology and strategic discourse. It is close to the image of the irrational mob caricatured by Lebon and other crowd and early collective behavior theorists (and indeed, a model derived from the very events in Sewell’s account). And it calls to mind accounts of comparable actions in China, Russia, and elsewhere. Less cataclysmic versions of such spontaneity are common enough, particularly in the workplace, where a form of what Scott has called “hidden transcripts” may have been festering and spreading.² The accounts of Steinberg (1995a), Fantasia (1988), and Scott (1974) reveal the joint emergent character of oppositional ideologies and frames in such settings.

Although such fusions in action of ideology and strategic discourse are intrinsically short-lived, their consequences—although unpredictable—may be consequential, even fateful. The French Revolution itself devolved for a time into interest-driven warring factions. The public escalation of the anti-Franco movement, on the other hand, evidently solidified a movement already en route to unity and contributed greatly to its growth and power.

**Strategic Framing Beyond Ideological Boundaries**

Another way in which joint ideology/strategic discourse shapes framing occurs when framing goes beyond ideological limits. Intuitively, this might seem more likely in less diverse ideological settings. A case in point is that of European socialism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which Wuthnow describes in terms amenable to my argument.

Wuthnow (1990) analyzes socialism as one of three transformative European social movements (the others being the Reformation and the Enlightenment), demonstrating that they all developed creative levels of discourse in similar political and economic circumstances. Socialism of course considered itself to be a transnational movement, a core
ideological understanding. Wuthnow describes how the various European states presented socialists with more or less intractable conditions forcing each national mobilization to adapt strategically to the particular set of enabling and constraining factors. The national movements ended up creating parties that both acted and theorized those actions along revisionist lines, and departed from orthodoxy in virtually heretical ways. LaSalle's capitulation to nationalism in authoritarian Prussia, Bébel's courting of the petit bourgeoisie and artisans in Saxony, and Jaures's republicanism and moral idealism in France (481 ff.) are cases in point. To these, others could easily be added, for example, the Swedish Social Democrats' early embrace of the Liberals and the politics of suffrage, and later—in power—their coalition with the conservative Farmer's Party.

On what basis can it be claimed that these frames were outside of socialism's ideological boundaries? Was not socialism a relatively ideologically diverse movement? Well, in one sense there was plenty of diversity: socialism was at one level an intellectual battleground, and many of the disputes had to do precisely with the problems associated with different national settings. However, their differences, however, socialists were generally united in their identification of the proletariat as revolutionary agents and of existing states and parliamentary parties as agents of the bourgeoisie. Collaboration with authoritarian regimes and class enemies, and embracing ideologies of national unity, can hardly be reconciled with the idea of history as driven by class struggle and the inevitable demise of capitalism through violent overthrow. I think it is reasonable to say that, at least from the standpoint of the opportunities available in different national settings, socialism was not a particularly diverse or flexible ideology. Perhaps the best evidence of this is the fact that, even as social democratic parties were injecting themselves into the European polities, there remained purist sectors of the movement, which resisted strategic revisionist reframing for decades.

If socialism was not an ideologically diverse movement, why did its bearers frame beyond its core ideology? The most obvious factor was the political intractability of the conditions confronting the national movements, situations that clearly encouraged elevation of the strategic imperative to primary. Wuthnow places considerable emphasis on the extent to which the political goals in the movement, and the politically realistic imperative to which workers confirm the validity of their historic assignment with some concrete political achievements. But it may also have had something to do with the fact that the Internationalals, the only significant supranational socialist organizations (and always arenas of rhetorical struggles), were unfit to exert organizational or financial control over either ideas or practice. Perhaps we could say that because of this situation, European socialist ideology facilitated framing beyond its ideology not because it was a diverse code, but for the structural combination of (1) being faced with a set of opportunity situations, (2) a strong ideological incentive to engage in practical political action, and (3) having an organizationally weak center.

The workings of these factors, to borrow from Althusser, seem to have eventuated in a strategic overdetermination of framing despite highly salient movement ideology. Wuthnow emphasizes that the influence of state actors in strong states like Bismarck's Prussia in effect preempted the movements' very credentializing capacities. The party leaders would of course then claim (i.e., frame) the compromises as important socialist advances (1990: 487 ff.). In our terms this is tantamount to the movement ceding away the power of framing.

One final and important point may be drawn from this. Over the course of these decades and into the twentieth century, socialist ideology certainly became more diverse. An appealing explanation for this may be the recursive play of national framing (and of course practice) on socialist ideology, as the parties began to experience some success. To a considerable degree it seems fair to say that framing processes dominated by strategic considerations lead to ideological adaptation. This is close to a point made by Snow and Benford in their objections to Oliver and Johnston's characterization of ideology and framing, namely, that framing can be a kind of antidote to the reifying tendencies of ideologies (Snow and Benford 2000: 59). In this fashion, the strategic imperative may keep movement theorists and leaders abreast of social change and even ordain significant ideological transformations. Such instances exhibit a partial autonomy of some strategic actions, actions which become change-initiating actions in their own right.

Framing Which Strategically Appropriates Hegemonic Ideology

By hegemonic ideology I mean an ideology promoted by an elite but shared by at least a sector of the non-elite, and also embedded in widespread cultural practices. While this definition does not make hegemonic ideology coterminous with the cultural stock, it does mean that it is to some extent present in the cultural stock. Incorporation of hegemonic ideology in framing appears to be commonplace. Because its manifestations are quite dissimilar I will describe what appear to be three distinct types.

The appropriation by the civil rights movement (and later by other movements) of liberal democratic rhetoric is sometimes cited as that movement's most important frame (McAdam 1988; Morris 1984). While it might be thought that appropriation of the hegemonic ideology in a democratic polity would come naturally for a group seeking access, it should be remembered that the movement was—at least during certain extended periods—accompanied by alternative frames on both its left and right. What is important here is the meaning of democratic-rights ideology to frame specific categories of rights (civil and voting rights) and to justify various forms of civil disobedience as appropriate tactics. Over the course of its many mobilizations, the movement displayed a wide range of collective action frames, from mainly civil and voting rights frames in the South to frames focusing on economic challenges when it attempted to move north. These occurred in conjunction with a rich tactical repertoire of civil disobedience and other actions.

The premise of this framing was that there was a contradiction between the abstract code and the extent of its reach (see McAdam 1994). Frame rhetoric and action lend us of the code and seeks to elevate the sense of contradiction to the status of a causal lever to force change. Politicians, sheriffs, discriminating employers, even "white racists," are not enemies to be overcome, but misguided citizens who need education and persuasion. The frame displays the ideology and its lived contradictions in collective actions that affirm rather than deny the basic legitimacy of the system. This framing tactic might be called the exposure of contradiction.

However, revealing contradiction by no means exhausts the forms of appropriation of hegemonic ideology. A description of two additional types will demonstrate this. I call the first of these inversion of meaning, and discuss how it occurred in the Chilean women's movement as described by Noonan.

Noonan (1998) analyzes women's resistance to the Pinochet regime in Chile between 1973 and 1988. Claiming that both framing theory and political opportunity theory had generally been applied by researchers too narrowly, Noonan asserts that women had been at the forefront of protest in many parts of Hispanic America. She argues that Chilean women played a powerful political role, constructing a feminist and democratic master frame that shook the regime's foundations and was strongly implicated in ultimately bringing about democratic change.

Until about 1953 there had been a strong women's movement in Chile that focused on suffrage and related issues. The rise of Marxist ideology after the war, with its prioritizing of class over other social divisions, set the women's movement on a path of decline. Upon seizing power, the Pinochet regime set out to obliterate every vestige of the Chilean left, not just the code and actors. This opened a modest window of opportunity for the women's movement, which had been in abeyance. Women built what Noonan calls a "maternal frame." This combined both a muted feminist ideology and nonideological aspects of the cultural stock, which strongly reinforced traditional women's roles and was promoted by governments...
of both left and right. But during the Pinochet years there was also a build-up of a network of maternal institutions such as mother’s centers, and these became a significant resource, both materially and ideologically. Noonan writes that, “a body of ideological and material resources that reinforced traditional (i.e., maternal) roles for women were not only available, but promoted by state agencies and political parties” (1998: 257). Coupled with the destruction of the left in the early Pinochet years, this “maternal frame,” Noonan argues, revitalized a feminism that could legitimate itself by keeping one foot in the maternal door. In effect, women appropriated state maternal ideology, and opposed the state by promoting family values while simultaneously building a new democratically oriented feminism.

Beginning in 1978 this mobilization had become widespread enough to support what Noonan calls “an explosion of women’s activism” (1998: 261), and with its spread to other sectors (e.g., the urban poor) escalated into a movement cycle with “a return to democracy” master frame, incorporating demands for an expansion of women’s rights, including political rights, and gender by mass demonstrations in 1985.

Clearly in Chile the emergence of a feminist frame, and ultimately a democracy frame, was no simple derivation. It involved the rise, fall, and interpenetration of different ideologies, along with the interplay of ideology and nonideological aspects of the cultural stock, in frame construction that can be understood only historically. This critically included an incorporation of important aspects of an oppositional ideology. But for this to work it was necessary that it somehow undergo an inversion of meaning. How might this occur?

One possibility is that inversion of meaning in framing is effected through hidden transcripts. As Scott (1990) describes them, hidden transcripts are expressions of grievances that draw upon public transcripts of authoritative discourse, often through accompanying actions, even dramatizations, to scornfully and ironically invert them, and thereby expose them as hollow. He convincingly argues that they are mainly if not entirely generated under authoritarian conditions. Hidden transcripts do seem to have in common with frames the essential property of deploying ideas through actions intended to communicate with particular audiences. Framing that rests on an inverted understanding of hegemonic ideology, then, does not express the grievance in a straightforward unambiguous statement; it remains nested in the hidden transcripts. So while the frame may be an interpretation, in this case its very existence presupposes yet another level of interpretation. It appears akin to the ironic and satiric accounts enacted elsewhere; for example, by dissidents in prerevolutionary underground Eastern Europe.

A third type of appropriation of hegemonic ideology may be seen in the case of the revolt of the Chinese students in their occupation of Tianamen Square in 1989. Students of Chinese unrest began in the late 1980s. Some degree of relaxation of social control, along with an erosion of elite unity, tended to encourage continuing activity, although the fear of a crackdown was ever-present. In early 1989 Gorbachev, at his peak as a reformer, paid a state visit, and about the same time the Asian Development Bank, courted by the Chinese government, held its first meeting there. These events created a large press presence. University students in Beijing, packed by the thousands into overcrowded housing, moved to openly defy the government.

Zuo and Benford (1996) analyzed the events, concentrating on framing. Here was a situation where protesters with little in the way of resources other than their bodies—and networks—faced a powerful state with a history of repression. The only factor over which the students had some control was the way they framed their actions. They recounted the many forms of injustice and corruption that not only they, but also large numbers of ordinary citizens, had encountered for years. They mounted nonviolent actions, such as hunger strikes. They presented these actions in terms of a frame that combined the two dominant Chinese ideologies—Confucianism and nationalism—with Confucianism, a widely embedded set of beliefs and practices in the cultural stock loaded with ethical implications regarding authority and rule. According to Zuo and Benford, this resonated widely among the people. In this
We may now ask: Is it likely that these varying scenarios have different implications for the fate of movements? Although this question takes us beyond the confines of this article, it nevertheless mandates some brief— if speculative— remarks.

It may be that movements in which strategic considerations are suppressed by ideology are limited in their ability to understand and relate to their environment. One might suppose that this reduces a movement’s adaptability and survival capacity. Indeed, observations of this sort are fairly commonplace. The inversion of this, a strategic orientation isolated from any significant ideological presence, and that is self-consciously anti-ideological, would for a different reason also seem unlikely to contribute to sustaining a movement. Consolidation or cooperation with other groups, or even movements, is without question greatly facilitated by sharing a common code. A consciousness linked to little more than a particular grievance and a particular frame would seem to afford relatively slight leverage for such developments. This might apply with special force to periods of abeyance, which appear to be important to movements because of their implications for longer-term survival, and perhaps effectiveness.

These two types of framing have in common an “imbalance” of ideology and strategic orientation, both of which—if the above comments are granted any plausibility— have negative implications for the movement.

The obverse of this may be seen in a similarity shared by the next two types, the fusion of ideology and strategic discourse in action, and framing that overflows ideological boundaries. The former is a kind of short-circuiting of what might otherwise occur as a drawn-out framing battle. In some instances, e.g., the Catalan anti-Francoist movement, events of this type might arise in an instant a higher level of mobilization—and perhaps potential political power—which in turn may recursively prompt shifts in movement goals and tactics, doubtless accompanied by a revamped framing. Framing dominated by strategic discourse beyond ideological boundaries, on the other hand, poses potential challenges to ideological purity, and has important implications for the course and survival of the movement. Although different in other respects, it is in this regard akin to those situations in which ideology and strategic discourse are fused in action.

The observation that framing as the play of agency. Framing may indeed bring agency to life, but from the standpoint of the movement, the form it assumes may well be a difference that makes a difference. When ideology and strategic discourse are fused in action, it is likely to increase mobilization. This is also true when strategic framing extends beyond ideological boundaries. On the other hand, when either ideology or strategic discourse overwhelm framing processes, the opposite effect is more likely.

In this regard, consider the strategic appropriation of hegemonic ideology. Clearly this is a form of framing that may enhance movement’s chances in diverse circumstances. It also hints at relationships between regime types and the different forms of hegemonic appropriation. The regime contexts of the movements discussed here suggest the following: (1) democratic polities might facilitate framing featuring exposure of contradictions, (2) authoritarian regimes may encourage inversion of meaning appropriation, (3) totalitarian regimes may correlate with moral political appropriation, and (4) weak regimes might be more likely to give rise to negative opposition framing.

Very generally, the fact that such an array of framing types can be identified in these terms strongly suggests that taking framing processes for granted as more or less uniformly strategic and generally ideological is not only difficult to support, but even an obstacle to theoretical development, and should be seen as more complex and flexible—as I have suggested here. The fact that the ideology/strategic imperative coupling can be applied across major dimensions of movements—their size, national/transnational character, old versus new, to mention just a few—supports this proposition.

Although this inquiry is intended as exploratory, some mention of its limits is nevertheless warranted. Drawing case material opportunistically from the voluminous movement literature is only the most obvious of these. Beyond this, I have not attempted to discuss the inner technical features of ideology or the strategic imperative, a necessary task to further advance framing theory. Empirically, despite the inherent flux of movements and my own emphasis on the shifting nature of framing, I have—of necessity I think—presented the types in essentially static fashion. Of course, movements in their historical reality need not cling to one or another form of framing, but may, and often do, slide or consciously shift from one to another.

In conclusion, it is worth noting that Zald has recently proposed a major—and contested—shift in the direction of a new agenda in movement studies (Zald 2000a, 2000b; for dissenting views, Diani 2000, Klandermans 2000), from the resource/contentious action model to “ideological structured behavior,” which he defines as behavior “guided and shaped by ideological concerns” (2000a: 3). He maintains that this would better accommodate movement studies to the cultural turn, facilitate needed work on socialization within movements, and expand the range of movement study beyond what he considers to be a relatively narrow political domain. Such an enhancement of the status of ideology would clearly seem to support a continuing theorization of the ideology/strategic discourse framing bundle in movement studies.

ENDNOTES

1 Giver and Johnson (2000) point out that Snow and Benford appropriated these ideas from Wilson (1973), who expressly identified them as constituent of ideology. See also Snow and Benford’s (2000) clarification of this.

2 A systemic treatment or definition of “strategic” in the framing literature is to my knowledge nowhere to be found. My sense is that framing theorists and researchers think of strategic framing as discourse that responds to an action imperative, and is intended to influence beliefs or feelings—and ultimately action—in relatively specific preconceived ways.

3 This is not to naively equate them. Gamson himself charged that the early framing theorists had “their feet planted in... a positivist epistemology” while their heads were “in the clouds of a post-positivist constructionist world” (Gamson 1992: 69).

4 A cautionary note. This will not be an attempt to formulate anything like a comparative analysis of movement framing. This would merely be premature, but only a provisional typology based on a preliminary exploration of the variety of ways in which ideology and strategic discourse are joined in framing.

5 It may be noted in passing that elsewhere the stance of the party at least at certain times seems to have been quite different. In much of Europe, where conditions were different from the start, mobilizing was generally open. In agrarian China, in a climate even more hostile than the U.S., the party, while adhering to the same basic doctrine, framed the political situation in military terms and did not temporize or squeal over the appearance of the revolutionary moment. This was certainly ironic, but from a political standpoint realistic as well, since China hardly qualified as a formal organizing or network progressive-capitalist society.

6 Although prefaced at least as early as the 1960s in E. P. Thompson’s great work on the English working class (Thompson 1966), Scott’s analysis of hidden transcripts (1990), even after more than a decade, has in my opinion unfortunately not been very broadly assimilated into movement studies.

7 Zhao’s recent study (Zhao 2001) is of course more comprehensive than any of the earlier analyses, and may well be the definitive analysis of Tiananmen, but it presents nothing that would necessitate a modification of either Zuo and Benford’s framing account or the argument advanced here.

8 These distinctions imply nothing about the possible mix of types in particular movements, at either a given moment or over the historical stretch. These are important matters that cannot be entered into here.

9 It seems that movements can survive indefinite periods of abeyance if two conditions are met: (1) the maintenance of some form of organization or network, and (2) the persistence of an ideology which supports a continuing identity with the movement and perhaps movement organization(s) and even particular individuals (see Rupp and Taylor 1987, Taylor and Whittier 1993; and Whittier 1995).

REFERENCES


